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GANGANATHA JHA KENDRIYA SANSKRIT VIDYAPEETHA

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KSHETRESA CHANDRA CHATTOPADHYAYA
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PANDIT KSHETRESA CHANDRA CHATTOPADHYAYA

Among the many distinguished scholars of Sanskrit whom Uttar Pradesh has produced, Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya deserves to be in the front rank. From time immemorial, Uttar Pradesh has been the home of Sanskrit Learning, and the Pandits of Kashi have kept on the tradition of Sanskrit Scholarship from generation to generation. Their work has inspired many of their dsiciples, and Pt. Chattopadhyaya is one of them. He had the singular good fortune of reading with the giants of old like Dr. Mm. Ganganatha Jha, Dr. Venis and Mm. Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj. By his indefatigable industry and devotion to learning he has maintained their traditions to this day and there are many younger men who have kindled their modest rush-lights at his benignant lamp. He has been a source of inspiration to many of them and every Sanskritist in the country knows what Pt. Chattopadhyaya has contributed to the cause of Sanskrit learning. Beginning his carrer as a humble lecturer in a college, he rose to the position of Professor and Head of the Sanskrit Department in the Allahabad University and was invited to attend learned conferences in foreign countries where his scholarship was much appreciated.

A man of plain living and high thinking, Pt. Chattopadhyaya has lived a pure and spotless life and stands as a beacon light to many a humble worker in the path of scholarship. Besides being a distinguished Sanskrit Scholar and teacher, Pt. Chattopadhyaya was greatly interested in upholding the constitutional laws of the University. In our councils and committees he was seen at his best. He was thoroughly conversant with the laws of the University and could press home his points with great effectiveness. His uncompromising attitude in upholding the high standards of the University, his desire to see justice done to all, without distinction, his insistence on the quality of research, made an impression on all those who shared the honour of membership of Academic Councils and Committees with him. He was indeed a Constitutional Pandit and more than once he had to go to the High Court to enforce a statute. Even the Chancellor's decisions he called into question and it has been found that in a number of cases he was right. Like his great teacher Mm. Pandit Ganganatha Jha, he stood for the purity of our

examinations and nothing could make him swerve from the high standard which he had set before himself. So great was his love for academic excellence that he was sometimes called too rigid and blamed for it. But he never chose to sacrifice a principle for the sake of popularity.

He was a genuine scholar and was always eager to promote the cause of learning. His habits were those of a devoted savant. His intellectual keenness, his penetrating insight into letters, his analytical powers, are of a high order and entitle him to a place in the forefront of our eminent scholars of Sanskrit.

A malignant fate has confined him to bed for more than three years and his intellectual activities have been brought to a stand still. He is not in a position to take up active work in the present state of his health but the fire is not wholly extinguished in him. He can still guide and inspire those who seek his advice on learned topics. Verily Pt. Chattopadhyaya is a scholar and a gentleman who is thoroughly devoted to learning and is still capable of giving effective guidance and inspiration to those who work with him. In paying him this tribute I am fully conscious of the debt I owe him. Words are a poor vehicle to express my gratitude to him. I am proud of the affection he always felt for me and the confidence he reposed in me.

This volume is primarily the creation of the members of Pt. K. C. Chattopadhyaya Felicitation Volume Committee. Subsequently, an Editorial Board was formed with the approval of the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi, which helped in a great many ways at all stages. They were, unfortunately, compelled to exclude a number of articles for want of space. Yet Drs. Aryendra Sharma and M. D. Balasubrahmanyam deserve our thanks for the careful management of the articles, correspondence and proof correction which have been helpful in the production of this volume. Although some slips and misprints have become inevitable due to the shortage of time and other difficulties, the credit of printing the two parts of this volume goes to the Allahabad Block Works Private Ltd., Allahabad, who have done a fine job within the space of five months.

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Allahabad.

ISHWARI PRASAD

CONTENTS

LIMITATION ON KING'S LEGISLATIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE KAUṬILĪYA ARTHAŚĀSTRA

SURENDRA NATH MITAL,
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While stating the general provisions for the settlement of disputes, kauṭlya speaks of four kinds of *vivāda pādas*, *-dharma*, *vyavarhāra*, *caritra* and *rājaśāsana*, and says that each latter one supersedes the former (III. 1.39-40). The conclusion that is often drawn from this passage is that, according to kauṭilya the King is authorised to make laws superseding ever *dharma*, *uyavahāra* and *caritra*. But it does not seem to be a correct interpretation of what kauṭilya says. It would be better to consider here exactly what is the actual meaning of Kauṭilya.

In the passage referred to above the meaning of the latter two kinds of *vivādapādas* (which may be translated as types of rules for the settlement of disputes), i.e. *caritra* and *rājaśāsana*, is quite clear, and, there seems to be no difference of opinion about their meaning. There seems no such general agreement about what the first two kinds of rules signify. However, on a proper consideration, the meaning of these two kinds of laws also becomes clear. *Vyavahāra* seems to mean the *vyavahāra* rules viz., rules connected with the eighteen kinds of *vyavahārapādas* (matters of dispute) and dealt with by Kauṭilya in this *adhikaraṇa*. (III) or by the Manusmṛti in the eighth and the major part of the

ninth chapter, or by yājñavalkya in the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa* of his *smṛti* or in the Nāradasmṛti. The rest of the subject-matter of the Dharmaśāstras, which is termed as '*ācāra*' (and *prāyaścitta* may also be included within it) can be understood as rules of '*dharma*'. Kauṭilya has, of course, used the word '*dharmastha*' for the judges who apply the law described in the third *adhikaraṇa*, the *adhikaraṇa* itself having been entitled as the '*dharmasthīya*' The above-mentioned verses occur in the first chapter of this *adhikaraṇa*. Therefore, it is natural to think that the word '*dharma*' probably refers to the laws described in this *adhikarṇa*. 'Dharma', however, in this passage cannot be connected to the law applied by the *Dharmasthas*. It is used in the sense in which it also occurs in the subsequent ślokas, which have been discussed below (III. 1.43-45) i.e. in the sense of *ācāra* rules laid down by the Dharmaśāstras as contrasted with the rules of the *vyāvahārika śāstra*. The next *śloka* (verse) seems to confirm this interpretation. It says "of them *dharma* is based on *satya* (truth), *vyavahāra* on witnesses, *caritra* on the conglomeration of men and *śasana* (*rājaśāsana*) is order of the king." This seems to mean that rules of *dharma* can be enforced only on the basis of the acceptance by the individuals as to whether they have truly behaved according to them or not, as much of the *dharma* law is self-enforceable; the enforcement of the *vyavahāra* laws is to be done mostly on the evidence of the witnesses (though, of course, there are other means of proof also), and *caritra* can be enforced on the basis of the collective idea and information that a particular group of people, who accept that custom have obout that particular matter; whereas śāsana is the order of the king, and it depends on him, whether in the then prevailing circumstance it is to

be enforeed or not, or, if it is to be enforced, how far that is to be done. The śloka may be interpreted in another way also" of them *dharma* is rooted in truth (eternal principles), *vyavahāra* in witnesses (i.e. vyavahāra rules can be applied according to the evidence of the witnesses), *caritra* in the coming together of men (i.e. the living of persons together as a group results in the emergence of customs among them) and the king's order is *śāsana* (i.e. *śāsana* is rooted in the command of the king)." Now *dharma* laws are considerably more difficult to follow as they demand a greater discipline in the individual than the other types of laws. There are lesser restraints in the *vyavahāra* laws as compared to *dharma* laws, because they are mainly related to the disputes arising between individuals and groups. Some regions, castes, families etc. have their own customs, which are different from the *vyavahāra* rules. It is easier for these groups to follow these customs rather than the *vyavahāra* laws, for these groups are accustomed to such customs, which are also suited to their way of life. The disputes among the people belonging to those region, castes etc. are to be decided in accordance with these customs and not according to *vyavahāra* rules. The directives and orders of the king are to be either of a temporary nature or relating to certain peculiar circumtances or in furtherance of his own duties as laid down in the *śāstras*. This becomes clear on a perusal of the eight types of *śāsanas* about which Kauṭilya has spoken at another place (II.10.38.46). As the *śāsanas* deal with particular sitiations the enforement of those directives is essential in these situations, even if, in exceptional cases they are contrary to *dharma, vyavahāra* and *caritra*. Thus, though the *dharma* rules are superior in content to the

other three kinds of rules, and, it would be better if one were able to follow them, while, on the other hand the śāsanas of the king may be of comparatively far less importance than the other there kinds of laws, still, in matters of their application because of the above-mentioned reasons, the *rājaśāsanas* are to be applied first and, then *caritra, vyavahāra* and *dharma* respectively. In short, the reason for this is that in particular situations or for particular groups or individuals it will not be proper to apply a higher type of rule, which may be difficult for them to follow or more difficult to be put into practice in these circumstances. This is what is meant by saying that each latter one supersedes the former.

Not only this, Kauṭilya, on the other hand, seems to be of the opinion that the king's orders mud enforce *dharma, vyavahāra* and *caritra*, because he repeatedly insists that the king should promulgate rules of (the *varaṇāśramadharma*) I. 3. 17 ; I. 4.16 ; III. 1.18 ; III. 7. 38; III. 16.42; V. 6.35; XIII. 4.62 ; XIV. 1.1), that justice ought to be meted out by the courts of the *dharmasthīyas* (judge) according to the *vyavahāra* rules described in details by him, and that the customs of regions, villages, castes, families and associations etc. must be enforced by the king (III. 7.40 ; III.10.45). It can never be presumed to be the intention of Kauṭilya, that the king can, as and when he wishes issue laws over-riding *caritra, vyavahāra* and *dharma.*

In the *vyavahāra* portions of various digests (Kṛtyakalpataru, Vīramitrodaya, Dharmatattvakalānidhi, Vyavahārakalpataru, Smṛticandrikā, Parāśaramādhavīya, Madanaratnapradīpa, Nṛsiṁhaprasāda, Vyavahārārthasamuccaya, Vyavahāracintāmaṇi and Vivādatāṇḍava)

some verses, said to be from the smṛtis of Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana, have been quoted. In these verses the terms *dharma*, *vyavahāra*, *caritra* and *rājaśāsana* have been explained, and it has also been described how each one of the latter supersedes the former. The four are said to be the means of deciding disputes (*catuṣprakāro' bhihitaḥ sandigdhe'rthe vinirṇayaḥ*). Now, this can mean one of the two things. Either it may mean that these *vyavahāra-pādās* are methods through which a decision can be arrived at, such as ordeals (*dharma*), various means of proof e. g. witnesses (vyavahāra), inference (*anumānena nirṇītam caritramiti kathyate*, -Bṛhaspati) and the order of the king probably issued not on the above grounds, but on the basis of the personal knowledge of the case through spies etc.). The verses quoted as Bṛhaspati's and one verse as that of kātyāyana give the above meanings as the alternative meanings of these words. The *vyavahārapādās* may also mean different kinds of rules, as has been stated above. However, where the verses quoted as Bṛhaspati's and Kātyāyana's describe how each one of the latter supersedes the former it becomes clear that by *vyavahārapādās* they, at this place, mean the different kinds of rules and not the different methods of arriving at a decision. Here they say that *vyavahāra* i. e. decisions arrived at after a careful or logical consideration of the rules laid down in the śāstras for resolving disputes should override *dharma* (i. e. rules wherein acceptance of the guilt by the person concerned is a means of giving a decision which may mean the rules known as the *ācāra* rules). Again, the practices prevalent in a region or amongst a group of people should form the basis of decisions regarding disputes among them and that *vyavahāra* rules should not be applied there. Lastly, if

the king makes an order which is not in consonance with *caritra* (or with the above three) the king's order should be applied in preference to *caritra* (or the above three). The examples of the last two given in some digests are very clear on this issue. If a person commits adultery, and this is proved on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses, he ought to be punished according to *vyavahāra*. But if this adultery was committed with an ābhīra woman amongst whom adultery is prevalent, then the person who is accused of committing adultery ought not to be punished because of this custom. Here *caritra* has overridden *vyavahāra*. Again, though the practice prevalent amongst the people may be that the king's servants are not to enter family residences, but if the king comes to know that a culprit is hiding in such a house, he may issue an order to his men to enter the house and arrest the culprit. Here *rājaśāsan* overrides *caritra*. No example of *vyavahāra* overriding *dharma* is clear. But it can be taken to be something like this. If a person has committed guilt involving capital punishment and does not admit it, while the witnesses, relying on yājñavalkya's words, "if a person belonging to any of the four varṇas is likely to receive capital punishment, the witnesses may speak a lie" (II.83), do not speak the truth and the person is acquitted *vyavahāra* may be said to have superseded *dharma*. From the above two things are clear. Firstly, *paścimo pūrvabādhakaḥ*, according to these verses does not simply mean that *rājaśāsana* supersedes the other three. It means that each latter one supersedes the former one or ones. Secondly, that orders of the king, which go against *dharma*, *vyavahāra* or *caritra*, are either of a temporary nature or deal with particular matters.

After the two verses quoted above Kauṭilya speaks again of "governing or (controlling) (the people) by *dharma, vyavahāra, saṁsthā,* (custom), and fourthly by *nyāya* (equity), and adds, that by acting thus the king "conquers the earth bounded by the four quarters." He says further, "If there is a difference of meaning (interpretation i.e. arthe between *dharmaśāstra*(on the one hand), and *saṁsthā* or *vyvahāra* (on the other hand), the interpretation is to be made according to *dharma.* If on a point of *dharma sāśtra* comes in conflict with equity, equity is to be considered authoritative there, and there the written text loses its validity." (III. 1.43-45). The second *śloka* can also be translated in the following manner, "If there is a conflict between *samsthā* or *vyāvahārika śāstra,* (on the one hand) *dharmaśāstra* (on the other hand) in a matter in dispute (*arthe*), the dispute is to be decided according to *dharma.*" This translation cannot, however be accepted for two reasons, Firstly, it will mean that kauṭilya is thereby contradicting his own opinion expressed earlier. Secondly, these verses as has been discussed below, deal with the interpretation of the different kinds of laws, rather than with the method of resolving conflict between them.

In these verses, *saṁthā* can, of course, be considered synonyonous to '*caritra*', but it would be wrong to equate the word '*nyāya*' with '*rājaśāsana*'. It is true that the first of the three ślokas, where *dharma, vyavahāra, saṁsthā* and *nyāya* have been placed together, can create the impression that the word '*nyāya*, has been used in place of '*rājaśāsana*'. It is also true that the *śāsanas* (king's orders) must be based on *nyāya* (equity), and, therefore anyone can think that '*nyāya*, is synonymous to *rājaśāsana* (though even this would be a far-

fetched equation), yet, when Kauṭilya says "*nyāyastatra pramāṇaṃ syāt tatra pāṭho hi naśyati*", the words here used in opposition to each other are not *dharmaśāstra*' and '*nyāya*' but '*pāṭha*, and '*nyāya*', and therefore, '*nyāya*' can here mean equity only, and cannot be said to be used in placed of '*rājaśāsana*'. Again, these three verses, as is clear particularly after going through third verse (as explained above) refer to the interpretation of laws, and, therefore, though it was considered essential that *dharmaśāstra*, *vyavahāra* and *saṁsthā* (or custom) must be referred to at this place, there was felt no such necessity to refer to *rājaśāsana* as they were not meant to be permanent laws for the governance of the place. Therefore, what these verses mean is that if there is difference in the interpretation of similar rules found both in the *dharmaśāstra* and in *vyavahāra śāstra* or *saṁsthā*, interpretation to the *dharmaśāstra* rule should be considered more authoritative, while the *dharmaśāstra* rules should themselves be interpreted on the basis of equity. Thus here also the conclusion cannot be drawn that kauṭilya considers the king's laws to be more authoritative than the *dharmaśāstras*.

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PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PLACE IN HUMAN LIFE

SATKARI MUKERJEE

Varanasi

I am choosing a subject for discussion in this paper which is by its very nature bound to be beset with formidable difficulties. Philosophy is "something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology it consists of speculation on matters as to which definite knowledge lies, so far been unascertainable ; but like science it appears to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science ; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land exposed to attack from both sides ; this No Man's Land is philosophy." (See Introduction to the *History of Western Philosophy* by Bertrand Russel).

Philosophy deals with questions which cannot be proved with mathematical certainty. The problem of after life, immortality, the nature of the soul whether it is personal or impersonal, man's relation to his fellow beings and to society and state and above all to his ultimate destiny, and the assumption of God as the author and controller of the Universe ; these are questions which have exercised speculative minds from the very beginning of civilization. Though no definite answers have been found and the differences of philoso-

phers have aggravated the uncertainty, a thinking man who refuses to be satisfied with creature comforts cannot shelve or dismiss them. These questions have been answered by theology, that is so by a religion. But these answers are too definite and their definiteness causes suspicions. A thinking mind cannot accept any religious dogma without reasoned examination. Here he is condemned by the custodian of religion. Further more, he is attacked by the scientists. Science carries on its enquiry into the nature of the facts with the help of observation and experiment. Science has made wonderful discoveries and changed the face of the world. The findings of science are definite and unambigous. Philosophy on the other hand finds itself at a disadvantage because the problems which it seeks to solve are not amenable to experiments in the laboratory. Of course, the interpretation of subtle super-sensible facts of scientists and laws are not always unanimous, but science carries on experiment further and further and the doubts of yesterday are cleared by the finding of the next day. This is the advantage of science over philosophy.

One may ask why then should the philosopher waste the time on such insoluble problems. The Logical Positivists have voiced powerful objections against philosophical speculation which they think as futile as the chase of the Will-O-the-Wisp. To this indictment Bertrand Russel has given an interesting answer: "Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of very great importance". It is not good either to forget the

questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them."

Russell's attitude is pragmatic but one cannot flippantly dismiss it as worthless. But I think there are other weighty considerations. One must have certain conceptions regarding the world. These conceptions constitute his philosophy unless a man elects to guillotine his logical conscience, he cannot avoid being perplexed by the vexed questions. A man has hopes and aspirations and beliefs that there is truth in the world and this truth can be discovered. Besides, a man is painfully conscious of his limitations and infirmities which do not allow him to rest in thoughtless slumber. A thinking man is not satisfied with the dogmatic solutions offered by theology. These dogmas of religion my lull an unthinking person into a sense of security and self complacency. But there are thinking minds who though form a minority are the salt of earth. They are not fond of scepticism for its own sake, nor are they inclined to take refuge on blind faith. Scepticism and credulity are the two extreme attitudes of an unhealthy mind. To take anything and everything on trust as sacrosant truth is a symptom of intellectual lethargy which brings down a human being to the level of unthinking brutes. And to indulge in doubt of every proposition and parade one's intellectual supcriority is also a pit-fall. Philosophy teaches us to avoid these two extremes—the Scylla of Wanton Scepticism and the Charybdis of unashamed credulity.

The sceptics have tried to make enormous capital out of error and doubt. In out ordinary experience we make mistakes and till the correction of error we are

apt to misjudge things as what they are not. The stock examples of perceptual error such as the misperception of rope as snake or nacre as silver given in Indian Philosophy show that all our cognitions are not reliable. The example of dream has false experience from end to end and has been made the yard-stick for assessment of human experience. The subjective idealists e. g. the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and the Buddhist śūnyavādins maintain that what passes for normal experience is nothing better than dream experience in respect of their truth-claim. There can be no truth in our experience ; in other words, all our cognations give appearance and no truth. Truth is only a hope and a dream. But this is scepticism in excelsis. These sceptics do not accept logic as an instrument of discovery of truth or its attestation. They do not believe in the necessary relatian of any two facts which are styled in Aristolean logic as the middle term and major term, or *hetu* (probans) and *sādhya* (probandum) in Indian Nyāya. All the arguments depend for their validity on the major premises—the universal proposition which shows the necessary and universal relation between the middle term and major term (*vyāptivākya*). Nor are they inclined to endorse the truth of the minor premises (*pakṣadharmatā*) without these two premises no conclusion can be established. These sceptics may concede their pragmatic and provisional utility in our theoretical and practical transactions. The *śūnyavādin* has erected a respectable philosophy which delights in exposing the inconsistencies and self-contradictions in all statements and philosophial assertions.

These sceptics are not open to refutation, in as much as they will dismiss all counter-arguments as false

assumptions. The sceptic will plead that he does not maintain an independent position of his own, and so whatever inconsistency or contradiction the orthodox philosopher may expose as vitiating any proposition, he will simply ward it off by saying : "That is not what I believe to be my position. So your accusation is futile."

But this unqualified scepticism may strike a seeker of truth as a vain glorious pose. It is extremely doubtful whether a man can be satisfied with a negative position namely, there is no truth and everything encountered in experience or conceived in the mind is a false appearance, a pretence and a fraudulent show. To be consistent the sceptic must doubt his own existence, and so cannot pretend to take part in a philosophical debate. Furthermore, how can he denounce anything as error unless he is conscious of what is truth. Error is rather a relative term and is intelligible only in contradistinction to truth which stands unassailed and can be conceived as a self independent and self-contained principle, though one may honestly doubt whether such Absolute Truth is knowable as a fact. Whatever may be the reason for doubting absolute truth one cannot deny relative truth. Without a conception of such truth one cannot draw a line of demarcation between error and truth. The *Śūnyavādin* finds self-contradiction in the arguments of professional philosophers and self contradiction, unless it stems from objective truth, will only be a case of *argumentum ad hominem*. The negativist has no logic of his own and so his conception of falsity and invalidity can be borrowed from academic logic. If this logic is false and all its concepts are subjective, how can they be employed as

the yardstick of measuring truth or otherwise. So his confutation of professional philosophy, based on logical organs forget in the arsenal of the traditional logic, looses all value. The sceptic is debarred from pronouncing judgment on the truth or error when he has no original instrument for making such measurements. Either he must accept the logical tradition as true in conformity with the academic custom or he must desist from participation in philosophical disputes as he has no logical instrument of his own. It will not be far from intellectual honesty to observe that such scepticism is not immune from the change of deliberate pretence or employing a device of escapism. It is true that the assertion implicit of the śūnyauādin that nothing exists is not a case of self-contradiction like the assertion of a barren mother or a mare's nest or a square circle. But it is a contradiction of fact and factual contradiction ultimately amounts to self contradiction. As soon as the proposition nothing exists is contemplated, its falsity becomes obvious. The thought of it is a fact which cannot be denied. So such universal assertion is not capable of being accepted as a serious philosophical proposition.

Such is also the case with the subjectivist, who revels in the denial of external reality. The subjectivist does not believe in material facts, but believes in the existence of other knowing subjects, though equally external. This denial of the reality of anything other than one's own cognition is bound to extend to other minds. And this will entail solipsism, which makes nonsense of all our thought and activity.

The transition from subjectivism to individualism is a natural process. The subjectivist only thinks of

himself and does not care a brass farthing for other souls, which he repudiates as false appearance. This subjective attitude has its repurcussion on ethical conduct and religion.

Unfortunately, all the protestant religions in India namely Buddhism, Jainism and other smaller cults laid exclusive emphasis upon the interest of the individual after death and professed unreserved contempt for the values of the world. Family-life, which hinges upon marriage, was regarded as an aberration from spiritual life. Marriage was looked upon rather a sin, since it involves loss of celibacy. The birth of a son was considered to be a powerful rivet to the binding chain of worldly existence. Had these extremists had a free sway and all men and women followed their advice the human race would have come to total extinction. The world would have been left over to insect and birds and brutes. These philosophers, who practiced their tenets, set awesome example to the spiritually ambitious souls, who would sacrifice everything for achieving a quick salvation. The result was the ever expanding unwieldy monasteries teeming with shaven heads or naked ascetics. Even during the life-time of the Buddha the monastic institutions were bursting at their seams. Multiplication of converts only added to the number of idle hands and mouths and the society and the state, which were traduced as so many pitfalls and snares, had to feed them free of cost. The only return, which the pious donors received from them, was the counsell to practice asceticism in minor and truncated form. The votive-offerings were announced to be sure passports to heaven and progressive march to salvation. Buddhism in its latest developments

seceded farther and farther from the original tenets of the Buddha, the promulgater of the new faith. Though Buddhism differs from Jainism in vital matters and both of them denounced each other as false ways of life, they agreed on one point namely, the condemnation of Vedic religion, which sought to achieve prosperity, power, wealth and worldly happiness as the stepping stone to ultimate emancipation. Vedic religion held family-life in high esteem and the perservation of the race as a sacrosanct duty. Marriage was regulated by strict laws of eugenics and the procreation of excellent daughters and healthy, powerful intellectually superior, valiant sons of heroic mould, capable of protecting the nation from the ravages of anti-social elements within the community and inroads of foreign barbarians was held out before the nation as the noble ideal. Society was divided into four classes of men, 1. the intellectual, pious and morally superior individuals called Brāhmaṇa, 2. the class of valliant warriors, who were trained to protect the country and the nation, called Kṣatriya ; 3. the Vaiśyas, who followed the profession of merchants and agriculturists with the sole aim of augmenting the wealth of the country and thus securing the economic foundations of the nation ; 4. the class of labourers, skilled artisans, who facilitated the pursuit of the respective avocations of the three castes. Whether this had a spiritual foundation or not, the social organisation was maintained on a firm and stable basis. Each of them had to perform religious rites and ceremonies. This was called Varṇāśrama system. In course of time, snags and surges manifested themselves and the custodians of the state had to make necessary adjustments.

The protestant-creeds reviled the social organi-

sation by holding forth specious arguments preaching equality of all men, regardless of their intellectual, moral and physical differences. They strove for social revolution. The result was inordinate other-worldliness and the contempt for worldly prosperity and power. Though these protestant-creeds did not wage a war against the ruling caste, it was implicit in their philosophy and religion. It is a significant fact that when Sind was invaded by others in the beginning of 8th century, the Buddhists nobility refused to co-operate with king Dahir and rather welcomed the Arab invaders. They believed that change of kingship would not affect their economic, political and social interests.

Subjectivism in religion and philosophy tends to corrode social cohesion and political stability tending to produce anarchy. Social cohesion and individual liberty are apt to come into conflict, and it has been essayed to keep these two interests in compromise. The Brahmanical thinkers in India were always on the alert to curb irrational, selfish tendencies to break loose from society. But in India there was never a totally totelitarian regime and the State did not intefere with the legitimate exercises of individual liberty. It is rather curious that in philosophy there was censorship and all sects and communities could pursue their religions rites with impurity, provided their freedom was not abused to subvert the moral laws and the laws of the state. What however brought about the downfall of Hindu polity was the fissiparous tendencies of petty states and their rulers who asserted their individual supremacy after the break up of an empire. This individualism on the States was the remote consequence of subjectivism preached by the protestant creeds. The fundamental

principles of political science which was composed by Brahmins in the main were pooh-poohed as the fabrications of fraud, with the loss of national freedom by the foreign conquest, the whole country was in a state of hibernation, punctuated with sporadic religious movements preaching reward in the other world for their humility and weakness. The expression 'the mild Hindu' had become proverbial in the British period. The emancipation of the nation from this spiritual weakness can be secured only by the restoration of faith in personal and national enterprise for the economic and political amelioration of the people. The people must be taught to gain self confidence and belief that the major portion of our sufferings can be redressed by industry and preseverance. The creeds which foster individualism as opposed to pursuit of welfare of the whole state has to be rectified and put on the sound keel.

Individualism in philosophy has a tendency to create intolerance of other opinions. Its baneful effects are seen in religious intolerance. Fortunately, the philosophy of *Vedānta* which is inclulcated in the *Bhagavadgītā* has taught every Hindu that there is only one God and in whatever form and however varying liturgy the worship may be offered, it will reach the altar of God. When the Muslims perform their liturgical worship in the mosque and the Christian sings the glory of God in the Church, the Hindu does not feel disturbed. He is persuaded by his philosophy that they are engaged in pious duties. Unfortunately, the semitic creeds are pronounced in their vilification of the Hindus' religious observances and they regard the Hindus as worshipers of idols. But *Vedānta* philosophy tells us that God is infinite and all religious prayers and hymns necessarily

delineate His infinitude and Omnipresence. All external forms of worship including pilgrimages to holy places to Mecca, Jerusalem and Vārāṇasi are imperfect ways of approach. In this context I quote the utterance of Vyāsa in which he implores the forgiveness of God for triple offence : "O Master of the universe, may thou please condone the three offenses I have committed. I have meditated on thee with forms, though Thou art formless. I have uttered hymns of praise describing Thy Majesty though it eludes all speech : I have repudiated Thy Omnipresence by my visitation of holy places on account of my weakness."

One should ponder on the deep significance of this assertion. All worship, physical, verbal or mental necessarily delimits the limitless and thus makes an idol of God. There is an element of fetishism in all religions as shown by Max Mueller in his *Hibbert Lectures*.

I abjure all pretention to convert the sceptics and atheists and dogmatists and fanatics. Philosophy with all its logic has failed to bring about unanimity among men. Perhaps to enforce unanimity by regimentation of thoughts is bound to lead to ossification. The philosophy of *Vedānta* helps us to steer clear of extreme dogmatism and the extravagant liberty. To achieve progress, particularly intellectual and spiritual, one must subject himself to the drill and discipline of moral laws. Freedom is our goal. But this cannot be achieved without paying the price for it. *Vedānta* of all systems of thought has the courage of focussing our attention on the unity and universality of reality. Whereas plualistic philosophy magnifies the differences and thus paves the way for quarrel, fued, jealously and intolerance, *Vedānta*

gives us the opposite picture. One may complain that philosophy has may defects but this only proves that we have not yet found the last word in philosophy and religion and also in science. If we do not put too much emphasis upon the differences of philosophies and seek to catch hold of this sphere of agreement and harmony, we shall find that three is no reason to hold up philosophy to ridicule. A thinking person cannot get rid of philosophy which is expressed in his outlook on life. The angularities of philosophy have to be smoothened. And all rational men should be on the watch that neither philosophy nor religion gives a wrong twist to the tenor of thought and life. Our attitude should not be influenced by dogmatism or religions fanaticism. It is a wonder of wonders that India even in her hey-day of power did not ban atheistic movements. The thinkers and philosophers of India thought that arguments of atheists could be challenged by logical methods and there is no need to resort to violence. This is the philosophy of India which has saved the country from bloodshed on account of philosophical and religious differences.

BHARTṚHARĪ AND BUDDHISM

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Bhartṛhari's Criticism of the Buddhist Theory.

Our investigations in the *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* clearly indicate that the Buddhist philosophers attacked the thought of Bhartṛhari as being heretical in nature and now it would be appropriate to look at the other side of the coin and see how Bhartṛhari regarded Buddhist doctrine. There is a great deal of controversy in academic circles about whither or not Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is Buddhistic in content[1] and I made my investigation of the text with this in mind. The general conclusion was that, althought Bhartṛhari did not make a sweeping denunciation of Buddhist doctrine, he did attack it as being heretical. Let us now examine some of the passages of the *Vākyapadīya* which pertain to this problem, making use of the various commentaries.

In the *Vākyapadīya* there are passages which deals with the problem as to whether or not there is a fundamental distinction between the original meaning of a

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1. Radhakrishnan, (*Indian Philosophy*,, vol. II, p. 465) maintains that the *Vākyapadīya* is Buddhistic in content, but W. Ruben (*Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, VIII, 1931, S. 53, Anm. 2) claims that there is no evidence to show that Bhartṛhari was a Buddhist.

word (mukhya—artha) and the secondary meaning of a word (the metaphorical meaning—gauṇa-artha). For example, if one sees a lion and says, "That is a lion," the word 'lion' is used in its original sense; whereas, when one says, "That man is a lion," the word 'lion' means something like 'a man who is fierce like a lion' and is thus used in its secondary or metaphorical sense.

However, someone who holds a philosophical position different from that of Bhartṛhari might say something like the following with regard to this point:

"When a (secondary) meaning (of a word) is alertained even though diametrically opposed (to the original meaning of the word) then the word following the conception (of the secondary meaning) functions as its original meaning.")

(atyantaviparīto 'pi yadā yo 'rtho' vadhāryate)
yathāsaṃpratyayaṃ śabdas tatra mukhyaḥ pravartate
(*Vākyapadīya* II. 287).

In other words, it is impossible to draw a hard and fast distinction between the primary and secondary (metaphorical) meanings of words. The meaning of words is established by us completely subjectively and there is no 'original meaning' which has an independent existence transcending our subjectivity. This is the claim that a word which is used in one sentence must be understood as expressing its original meaning within those limits.[2]

Bhartṛhari would, however, counter this claim, saying "Although the meaning of a word belongs to

2. bauddha eva śabdārtho nāsti kaścic chabdeṣu gauṇamukhyavibhāga iti . . . . vākye na śabdeṣu gauṇamukhyavibhāgaḥ kaścit. (Punyarāja ad *Vākyap*. II, 287)

subjectivity, the distinction of original and secondary meaning is fixed (from the very first".)[3] Further he is emphatic that the secondary meaning is based on the original meaning; it is established through postulating the original meaning.

"Truly metaphorical expression is established because of the existence of the original meaning."

Upacāro hi mukhyasya saṃbhavād avatiṣṭhate
(*Vākyap*. III, 8, 13. p. 313)

While attempting to prove that the distinction of these two meanings can be established, he first asserts the existence of a distinction of *satya* (truth) and *asatya* (untruth).[4]

"Although the ascertainment of the Truth of the real meaning (of a word) depends on (our subjective) notions, none of the notions arises (unrestrictedly) with this (word) as something arbitrary."

Yady api pratyayādhīnam arthatattvāvadhāraṇam

Na sarvaḥ pratyayas tasminn asiddha iva jāyate
(*Vākyap*. II, 288)

There is no explanation of this passage in the commentaries but I think the following would be an adequate interpretation. Given the word 'lion', for example, aside from the original meaning (something like-'carnivorous, ferocious feline with a main') we can distinguish various metaphorical meanings such as ferocious person' or 'kingly individual'. These are all formed in our subjectivity but there is clearly a distinction between

3. bauddhe 'pi śabdārthe vyavasthita eva gauṇamukhyavibhāgam iti. (Puṇyaraja ad *Vākyap*. II, 299)

4. idanīm atrāpi gauṇamukhyavibhāgaṃ samarthayituṃ satyāsatyavibhāgam tāvad upakramitum āha.———(Puṇyarāja)

the original meaning and the metaphorical meaning. Moreover, since there is a fixed relation between the two, the metaphorical meaning could not possibly be something which is established in a purely arbitrary manner. Pursuing this point in more detail, Bhartṛhari continues.

"The act of seeing with respect to water is identical with the seeing of a mirage (in both cases). Although the act of seeing is and the like are the same in both cases, water is not a mirage."

Darśanaṃ salile tulyaṃ mṛgatṛṣṇādidarśanaiḥ
Tulyatve darśanādīnāṃ na jalaṃ mṛgatṛṣṇikā
(*Vākyap*. II, 289)

It sometimes happens that a mirage, reflecting the water of an oasis, suddenly appears in the desert. The claim being made is that when one compares the seeing of the water of a mirage and the seeing of actual water one finds that the act of seeing is in both cases the same but the objects of our seeing are different i. e., actual water and the water of a mirage are not the same. This is clearly in opposition to Budhist doctrine, for the metaphor which compares all worldly phenomena to mirages is used quite extensively in Buddhist literature and in works influenced by this literature such as the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (2.31). With respect to attacking the explanation based on this metaphor at least, Bhartṛhari is in agreement with Bhartṛpranpañca and Śaṅkara.[5]

5. cf. Śaṅkara ad *Bṛhad. Up.* p. 731, 1. 17 (See *The Development of Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 166 ff.). According to Śaṅkara's *Commentary on the Brahma Sūtra* (2.2.28) Śaṅkara rejected the Buddhists comparing even the experience of their waking hours to things like *gandharvanagara*. Moreover the metaphor of *mṛgatṛṣṇā* is referred to at *Vākyapadīya* III, 13, 8 (p. 434)

"Since it is universally well-known that there exists a function which is not common to both a rope and a snake, even though the seeing of both is the same, a distinction of the two must be clearly made."

Yad asādhāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ prasiddhaṃ rajjusarpayoḥ

Tena bhedaḥ paricchedyas tayos tulye 'pi darśane

(*Vākyap.* II, 290)

Just as a person may see a rope lying in the road at dusk, mistake it for a snake and become frightened, so too people become perplexed and troubled by mistaking the various aspects of the phenomenal world for reality. In Vijñaptimātratā philosophy the snake is explained as corresponding to Imagination and the rope as corresponding to Interdependence. Futher, this metaphor is found in the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (2.17;2. 18) and is often used by Śaṅkara.[6] Bhartṛhari, however, rejects this interpretation and claims that, both in the case of seeing and actual snake and also in the case of seeing what one mistakes for a snake, the act of seeing is identical but the rope and the snake are two completely different objects and the two must be clearly distinguished. On this point then, Bhatṛhari is at odds with the Vijñāṇavāda school.

"And when a cause (is a defect in the object or the sense organ) of the perverted view (error) concerning things well-known (the true thing)[7] is seen if the difference (e. g., two moons) from the true thing which is due to this cause and is recognized, then people call this (difference) 'untrue' (*asatya*)."

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6. P. Deussen, *System des Vedānta*, S. 290

7. prasiddhaḥ satyarūpo 'rthaḥ——Puṇyarāja

Prasiddhārthaviparyāsanimittaṃ yac ca dṛśyate
Yas tasmāl lakṣyate bhedas tam asatyaṃ pracakṣate
(*Vākyap*. II, 291)

Since errors in knowledge are due to defects in the objects or sense organs, for example, our mistake of a rope for a snake which is due to insufficient light and the existence of the two moon which is due to the eye-sickness, it is not right to regard everything as false by identifying it with its mistaken forms. This argument of Bhartrhari is also given in the beginning of the *Vimśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* where people of other schools criticize the Vijñānavādins.

It reads, "Just as, though those who suffer *timira*-eye sickness see hairs, rope and the like, such cognition does not occur to those who are free from timira-eye-sickness."[8] Therefore, Bhartṛhari's argument comes from the views of opponents of the *Vijñānavādins*.

"Although a wall painting[9] with an uneven surface may resemble mountains and the like, these do not function as obstacles in the way that mountains do."

Yac ca nimnonnate citre sarūpaṃ parvatādibhiḥ
Na tatra pratighātādi kāryaṃ tadvat pravartate
(*Vākyap*. II, 292)

This means that actual mountains have the function of impeding our progress but painted mountains do not.

"If one touches a (real) wheel by hand the uninterruptedness of the tactile sensations continue to be but this is not the case with a wheel of fire-brand since if one touches if it is interrupted."

8. yathā taimirikānāṃ samtāne deśādyābhāso nānyeṣām. (*Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3, line (12)

9. citrabhitti—Puṇyarāja

sparśarabandho hastena yathā cakrasya saṃtatah
na tathā, alātacakrasya vicchinnaṃ spṛśyate hi tat
(*Vākyap* II,293)

This comparing the phenomenal world to a wheel of fire brand is found quite often in Buddhist texts. It is the central thought of the fourth chapter of the *Māṇḍūkhya-Kārikā*, but it is precisely this view which Bhartṛhari is attacking.[10]

"And in the cities the earthen embankment, the rampart, and the upper stories give rise to tactile sensations and covering, but in the case of 'Gandharva city, (=a mirage) there is nothing of the sort."

vapra-prākāra-talpaiś ca sparśanāvaraṇe yathā
nagareṣu tu te tadvad gandharvanagareṣv api
(*Vākyap*. II, 294)

The likening of the phenomenal world to Gandharva city i.e., to a mirage is quite common in Buddhist works and is also found in the second chapter of the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (2.31). Bhartṛhari, however, staunchly opposes such a view, and it is of particular interest that an argument quite similar to Bhartṛhari's is given in the beginning of the *Vimśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* as an example of the criticisms of the Vijñaptimātratā doctrine put forth by other schools. "Gandharva castle cannot be used as a castle."[11]

There do not exist in a thing made from clay so much efficiency as accomplished by true (*real*, *mukhya*) wild beasts, domestic animals, etc. Therefore these

10. The metaphor of the wheel of fire is referred to in other places as well.

11. gandharvanagareṇāsattvān nagarakriyā na kriyate. (*Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3, line 15.)

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beasts, domestic animals and the like are objects designated by the suffix-*ka*."

mṛgapaśvādibhir yāvān mukhyair arthaḥ prasādhhyate
tāvān na mṛnmaye 'py asti tasmāt te viṣayaḥ kanaḥ
(*Vākyap*. II, 295)

"A vast area is covered by well-known mountains but it is seen that their reflection (*pratibimba*) is located within a small area.

mahān āvriyate deśaḥ prasiddhaiḥ parvatādibhiḥ
alpadeśāntarāvastham pratibimbaṃ tu dṛśyate
(*Vākyap*. II, 296)

This also can be taken as a criticism of the comparison which is found in various Mahāyāna Sūfras[12] and the adoption of such doctrine by one of the Vedānta schools.[13] of everything to its reflection on the surface of a mirror or water.[14]

· "Moreover, true (real *mukhya*) poison and the like are the cause of death but the poison and the like in a dream do not accomplish their own end."

maraṇādinimittaṃ ca yathā mukhyā visādayaḥ
na te svapnādiṣu svasya tadvad arthasya *sādhakāḥ*
(*Vākyap*. II, 297)

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12. For example : *Laṅkāvatāra*, pp. 20, ln. 15; 42, ln.9; 72, line 16; 94, ln.4; 106, ln. 6; 375, ln. 4.

13. cf. Śaṅkara ad BS. vol. II, pp. 85, ln. 3 ff.; 90, ln. 10. cf. BS. III, 2, 18.

14. The *pratibimbaka* metaphor is also used at *Vākyapadīya* I, 100, but since there an active manifestation (i.e.. nāda) opposed to a passive manifestation (i.e, sphoṭa) is compared to the water surface it must be considered separately from the present use. At *Vākyapadīya* I, 20 the fact that grammar manifests the nature of various words is compared to *pratibimba* but in this case the problem is completely different.

This metaphor which likens the phenomenal world to a dream is also one which appears quite frequently in Buddhist works and in the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* after chapter 2.

As has been discussed before, this view is in sharp contrast to that of Bhartṛhari and is rather in agreement with the criticisms offered by other schools in the *Viṃśatikā-Vijñaptimātratā siddhi* ("i.e., The food, drink, swords, staffs, poisons, medicines, garments, etc. to be found in dreams cannot be used to assuage thirst and so forth.")[15]. Moreover, it is known that within the *Vedānta* school itself his position is quite similar to that of the *Brahma Sūtra* (2.2.29) and Bodhāyana.[16]

Bhartṛhari summarized the above argument in the following fashion. Anything which seen is untruly due to differences of place, time, and the sense organs are determined in the way that it is generally acknowledged by ordinary people." (*Vākyvp.* II, 298)

According to puṇyarāja's commentary, mistakes in cognition occur in the following instances : (1) Differences of place. That is to say that mistakes sometimes occur because of a difference of distance. (For example, mistakes which arise because the object seen is a great distance away). (2) Differences of time. For example, in summer one sees from a distance the haze caused by subterranean heat and mistakes it for water. (3) Differences relating to the sense organs. For example, one who has

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15. *Taisho Tripiṭaka,* Vol 31, section 74 : yad annapānavastraviṣāyudhādi svapne dṛśyate tenānnādikriyā na kriyate (*Viṃśatikā-Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3, ln.14)

16. See *The Development of Vedanta philosophy* in Japanese, p. 91

a certain affliction of the eyes may see two moons in the sky. Since one must decide about such matters in the way that people acknowledge as being generally correct the distinction of truth and falsity with regard to cognition is clear cut. Thus, according to Punyarāja, it is a mistake to regard even true cognition as being false or illusory.

In addition there are arguments,[17] which we will investigate later, which can be interpreted as defending the Mādhyamika thesis that all is void, although it is not clear whether in these instances he had in the doctrine which interprets *śunyatā* purely negatively. At any rate, it is obvious that Bhartṛhari's assertions are diametrically opposed to the assertions of at least the *Vijñaptimātratā*, i.e. it is indisputable that he is in agreement with the claims of opposing schools. Moreover, when one turns to his relation to the other schools of Vedānta while keeping the above points in mind one finds that he attacked the doctrine expressed in the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (chapter 2 ff.) and, in part at least, the thought of Śaṅkara. On the other hand, with regard to this particular point at least, he is in agreement with Bodhāyana, Bhaṛtprapanca, and chapter 1 of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*.

According to Helārāja's commentry there are still more references to the *Vijñaptimātratā* in the *Vākyapadīya*. In the passages which discuss the 'meaning of words' (*padārtha*) the following statement succeeds the presentation of the argument of the *Vaiśeṣikas* :

"Certain people know that what is called form has pervasion as its nature and explain as a thing (*dravya*) (the form) which has separation (from others) as its

17. This will be discussed on another occasion.

nature.[18]

anupravṛttiūpāṃ yāṃ prakhyatām ākṛtim viduḥ
kecid vyāvṛttirūpāṃ tu dravyatvena pracakṣate
(*Vākyap.* III, 1, 19, p. 22)

Helārāja takes this passage to be an expression of the doctorine of the *Vijñānavāda*. After presenting this heresy Bhartṛhari proceeds to develop his own theory.

"It is different" is limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of the highest Being. The same is true of 'It is not different.' Such expression (*prapañca*)[19] arises with reference to the various *ātman* of things which are connected (with the limiting adjunct)".

bhinnā iti paropādhir abhinnā iti vā punaḥ
bhāvātmasu prapañco 'yaṃ saṃsṛṣṭeṣveva jāyate
(*Vākyap.* III, 1, 20)

Thus, if one follows Helārāja's interpretation, one must understand Bhartṛhari as viewing Vijñānavāda philosophy as the heresy of 'certain people' not of his school on a par with Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which is to say that it occupies a position inferior to the Vedānta thought to which he subscribed. However, the Vijñaptimātratā thesis given here is not to be taken as the traditional thesis asserted by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is rather the thesis asserted by the later scholars of the Vijñanavāda who were primarily interested in logical investigations.

It is evident that he was not a Buddhist for he paid great reverence to the Vedas and followed the principles of Vedānta philosophy, but it is worth noting that he expounded a thesis which is in direct opposition to the statements and intentions of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

18. For an interpretation of this passage, consult *Vākyapadīya* III, 1, 14

19. In the annotation the word *vyavahāra* occurs.

PRĀKṚTS AND ASSAMESE

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To explain the Indo-Aryan linguistic phenomena in Assam we have, to begin with, two well-known theories.

In the first place we have the theory of Inner and Outer Indo-Aryan, initiated by A. F. R. Hoernle, much stressed on linguistic basis by Sir George Abraham Grierson. They hold that the present-day Indo- Aryan languages fall into two groups : the Inner Group including the Western Hindī dialects, surrounded by an Outer Group ring of languages and dialects like Panjābī and Lahndī, Marāṭhī, Oriyā, Bengali and Assamese, the Bihārī dialects and sub-Himalayan Pahāṛī languages. Ramāprasād Chanda gave partial anthropological support to this theory by postulating the difference between dolicocephals, represented by the Inner Aryans, and the mesocephals, represented by the people of Gujarat, Orissa, Bengal, etc.


Secondly, we have Grierson's view that the modern Indo-Aryan languages on north-eastern India are all derived from Magadhi Prakṛt through Magadhi Apabhraṁśa. He says : "Māgadhī was the principal dialect which corresponded to the Old Eastern Prākṛt. Māgadhī Apabhraṁśa, in fact, may be considered as spreading out eastwards and southwards in three directions. In the north-east it developed into Northern

Bengali and Assamese, to the south into Oriya, and between the two into Bengali. Each of these three descendants is equally and directly connected with the common immediate parent, and hence we find North-Bengali agreeing in some respects rather with Oriya spoken far away to the south than with Bengali of Bengal proper of which it is usually classed as a sub-dialect" (*Linguistic Survey of India*, I, i, pp. 125-26). He observes : "North Bengal and Assam did not get their language from Bengal proper but directly from the West" (*loc. cit.*). It is no wonder that north Bengal and Assam are thus grouped together, for they were one and the same kingdom till at least the 16th century and Koc Behār (Cooch Behar) was *a*, if not *the*, centre of Assamese culture under the hegemony of the Koces in the age of Śaṅkaradeva (1449-1569) who enjoyed the Koc king's munificence. It is from the 17th century that the language of Cooch Behar and other areas of North Bengal accepted the vassalage of Bengali, and has been considered to be its dialect. Otherwise, "The whole of North Bengal including Koch-Behār, Rangpur, Jalpāiguri and also perhaps Dinājpur, should have been included with Assam, if the territorial readjustments were to be made on the basis of linguistic homogeneity" (Banikanta Kakati, *Assam-Its Formation and Development*, 1940, p. 4)

Professor Suniti Kumar Chatterji groups the different modern Indo-Aryan dialects of Assam, Bengal and Orissa into four divisions, Rāḍha, Varendra, Kāmarūpa and Vaṅga, and puts them in a tabular form (*The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language*, Calcutta, 1926, p. 140), which is concisely reproduced

below.

Forms of Māgadhī Prākṛit and Apabhraṁśa as brought to Bengal, Assam and Orissa



Thus we consider Assamese conventionally as a Magadhan language to have emerged out of the Māgadhī Prākṛt. The Magadhan languages are said to have descended ultimately from the language of the outer Aryans. This ethnic classification of the Indo-Aryan immigrants into two broad groups does not establish the existence of two major OIA dialects ; nor can it be linguistically proved. The Magadhan NIA dialects had to pass through the successive stages of the linguistic history of the Indo-Aryan ; therefore, the grammatical features of the Magadhan NIA which are claimed by Grierson to be the linguistic peculiarities of the NIA languages descending down from the language of the Outer Aryans, are statistically unsound and historically inconclusive. The Hoernle-Grierson theory is not accepted by linguists, and Chanda's anthropological interpretation also runs

counter to it in some important respects.

The history of the Indo-Aryan is the history of changing morphemic features. The characteristics of the proto-Prākṛt dialects are not clearly known to us. In such a vast country as India the regional variations in the spoken dialects of the ancient Indo-Aryan people are very likely; but the phonological and morphological variants of the proto-Prākṛt dialects have not been exhaustively worked out. *i* which is a rare phoneme in the Indo-Iranian, has been noted by Pāṇini as a phonemic alternant of *r*. This Prakritism in Sanskrit is a proto-Prākṛt regional development as testified by the Aśokan language, where it occurs only in the East and East Central inscriptions. We do not exactly know whether the suffixes for the gerund *-tvāna* (found in Pali very frequently; *chettvana marassa papphukani*),*-tuna* (attested from Aśokan, where we have *abhivādetūnam*, and Prākṛt *ghettuna*, *gantuna*, etc.) and *-una* in Mahārāṣṭrī are merely phonologically varying morphemes or are morphologically distinct. The passive past participle from √*dā* in MIA is in most cases *diṇṇa*, but *dita*| *ditae* (*dita ke*) is also noticed. *diṇṇa* takes the suffix *-na*, not the usual past participle suffix *-ta* of OIA- Secondly, the appearance of the reduplicating syllable with *i* is an unusual feature, the parallel development having been in Greek presents, i. e., *didōmi*. Similarly, √*dā*+ past participle>MIA *didā*+*na* (a weak grade form of the root in the past participle, giving *did-na*>*diṇṇa*.

Some other examples may also be assorted (e. g., the MIA development of *jh* from OIA *kṣ*, as in *jhīna* <*kṣīṇa*, besides *kkh, cch* and *śk*) to come to a probable suggestion of the proto-Prākṛt dialect divergence at a

very early stage. The MIA dialects were grammatically nearer to one another in the earlier stage, and the frequency and flexibility in sounds and forms are noticed in the Aśokan Inscriptional MIA. But the dialects were living languages of the people and were, therefore, subject to continual changes. The changes were however, activated by linguistic and non-linguistic factors. As the flux of the language begins from a common source which had a complex pattern and synthetic texture, the tendency was always at work to shelve out complexities. The various phonetic combinations and morphemic variants of OIA were gradually dying away, and in the very early stage one dialect had preference for one form while the other retained or developed another. The influence of the non-Aryans of India and, still earlier, the dissolution of the Indo-Iranian people into groups had probably contributed to the linguistic changes and dialectal divergences.

We do not have in our possession any MIA work which would refer itself specifically to modern Assam or ancient Kāmarūpa. No literary Prākṛt could, therefore, be said to have application to Assam. The earliest reference to the language of the people of Kāmarūpa is furnished by Yuan-Tsāng, the Chinese pilgrim who visited the kingdom of Bhāskara-varman (early 7th century) and was the king's guest for about a month. He records : "The language of Kāmarūpa differs a little from that of mid-India." But we do not have any recorded evidence worth the name to prove this statement. Professor Suniti Kumar Chatterji now (1954) takes this "differing a little" to mean "differing altogether", as he considers this to be

a reference to non-Sanskrit tongue, because Kāmarūpa then, much more than modern Assam, was inhabited by Mongoloid people of the Tibeto-Burman group. But if the pilgrim meant what the records have, we cannot altogether rule out the probability of the culture of Aryan languages in the land. We have the definite evidence of the different copperplate inscriptions of the Hindu kings, belonging to the Puṣyavarman, Sālastambha and Brahmapāla dynasties and ruling Kāmarūpa from the 4th to the 12th century. These inscriptions are all written in a high style of Sanskrit. They are the proof that a high Hindu culture and civilisation held the land. Yuan-Tsāng himself refers to the fine education and hundreds of deva temples that he saw. It is more probable that Kāmarūpa's 'differing a little' from the language of Magadha "refers to those modifications of Aryan sounds, which now characterise Assamese as well as North and East Bengali dialects" as Dr. Chatterji originally held (*ODBL*, p. 79).

What is of greater importance about these royal inscriptions than their professed Sanskrit is their departures from that language. When Mahāmahopādhyāya Padmanath Bhattacharya Vidyāvinod brought out the first collection of ten grants in his *Kāmarūpa-śāsanāvalī* (Rungpore, 1853 Śaka), he marked these departures, ascribed them to scribal ignorance and was at pains to "correct" them according to his scholarly idea of Sanskrit. Scholars, however, are now agreed that these forms not conforming to Sanskrit, instead of being taken as slips or lapses are to be considered as indications of local speech habits or "Prakritisms".

Professor Chatterji (*ODBL*, app. C, pp. 181-ff) studied some of the place-names occurring in the Nidhanpur inscription of Bhāskaravarman (7th cent.), the Tezpur rock-inscription of Harjaravarman (early 9th cent.), the Nowgong inscription of Balavarman (c. 975), the Gauhati inscription of Indrapāla (c. 1050), etc., with a view to finding modern forms. Kaliram Medhi (*Assamese Grammar and Origin of the Assamese Language*, Gauhati, 1936, pp. lxxiii-lxxx) finds "Assamese words" appearing in the copperplate inscriptions of Kāmarūpa. In a paper, 'Place and personal names in the early land grants of Assam,' Dr Banikanta Kakati connects some of these names with modern Assamese forms and Boḍo, Khasi, Mundaṁ Santoli words. Professor Dr. Beni Madhab Barua in a valuable note ('The scribe-engravers of Indrapāla's second copper-plate and Prākṛt of pre-Āhom times', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, no. 3, September 1947, pp. 242-247) examined some of the non-Sanskrit forms in the inscriptions and regretted that Padmanath Bhattacharya "has done some amount of disservice by going to offer us a vulgate edition of the texts in Sanskrit". Barua sought to conclude : "The pre-Āhom inscriptions of Kāmarūpa contain a few other instances of Prakritism that may be taken to indicate the nature and form of the dialect as current in those times, say from the 6th to the 12th century A. D., I mean the Prākṛt language in the historical background of Assamese. The archaic forms crept in these records and held their rightful place through the inadvertence on the part of the local composers, or that of the local scribe-engraver, or that of both, in spite of the conscious attempt made for producing the legal

documents, the land-grants in authentic Sanskrit". Dimbeswar Neog (*The Origin and Growth of the Asamīyā Language*, Gauhati, 1964, pp. 43-56) makes exhaustive lists of instances of Prakritism available in the inscriptions and calls them "trails of Kāmarūpa Prākṛt since about the sixth century" as against "the illusion of Māgadhī Prākṛt as the parent of modern Asamīyā, so also of Bengali and Oriyā probably, for that matter." There is thus at least a case for attempting to reconstruct a picture of the Prākṛt as prevalent in Kāmarūpa in the second half of the first millenium in the historical background of Assamese which evolve about the close of the period.

The literary Prākṛts do not record the actual spoken dialects of the various dialect areas ; but the literary specimens at least help us to characterise the process of change and simplification which were going on through the centuries. The comparative survey of all the MIA records beginning from the Proto-Prākṛt stage down to the emergence of the NIA is sure to give a vivid and descriptive account of the historical course of the Indo-Aryan. A student working on the growth and development of a modern Aryan language cannot overlook the history of the development of the MIA dialects. This does not mean, however, that each and every form and feature of our vernacular are traceable to the earlier period ; there are innovations, and in the event of falling into disuse and subsequent loss of a syntactic morpheme, a new one may be reconstructed, or a native form might have gained predominance. The future tense sign, *-b*, for example, did not come to the NIA from its OIA counterpart through MIA. The Magadhan future

sign, *-b*, is, however, based on an OIA gerundive (*-tavya*), which was not inherited directly, but through the process of change that had been operating in MIA; but this Magadhan tense sign is distinct from its Hindī counterpart. Assamese pluralising suffix *-hā̃t* might, as B. M. Barua suggests, be connected with *henta* as found in the Guwākuchi inscription of Indrapāla and this is probably derived from the present participle plural of √*as*. *si*=he, *si-hā̃t*=they. But the Ass. pluralising suffix *-bor* might not have come from *bahala* or *bhuri* as some authors would like to suggest. *-bor* might be same word as Khasi-*bhor*, as Dimbeswar Neog suggested. A comparable form of the other suffix *-bilāk* is found in Gāro (*polāk, bolāk*) (S. Biswas 'The number and function words, *Journal of the University of Gauhati*).

B. M. Barua classifies the instances of Prakritism to find out rules to generalise different formations. The phenomena he notes are[1] :

1 The abbreviations used indicate the following copperplate inscriptions reproduced in *Kāmarūpa-śasanāvalī* except the Khanāmukh grant of Dharmapāla, which was edited by P. D. Chaudhury in the *Journal of the Assam Research Society* VIII. 4, pp. 117ff.

B ... the Nowgong charter of Balavarman, 8th cent.

BhN ... the Nidhanpur charter of Bhāskaravarman, early 6th cent.

Dh_1 ... the Śubhaṅkarapāṭaka charter of Dharmapāla, 12th cent.

Dh_2 ... the Puṣpabhadrā charter of Dharmapāla, 12th cent.

DhKh ... the Khanāmukh charter of Dharmapala, 12th cent.

1. The shortening of long vowels :

a < ā	Vājasaneyi		Vājasaneyī	(BhN[106])
	Savitra	<	Sāvitra	(BhN[104])
	caturbhaga	<	caturbhāgaḥ	(BhN[108])
i < ī	Taittiriya	<	Taittirīya	(BhN[13])
	Gāyatripāla	<	Gāyatrīpāla	(BhN[119])
	Dhṛtīsvāmi	<	Dhṛtisvāmī	(BhN[82])
u < ū	mayura	<	mayūra	(BhN[50])
	sunu	<	sūnu	(BhN)
o < au	Kośiko	<	Kauśiko	(BhN[126])

2. The shortening of long vowels before conjoint consonants and anusvāra :

a < ā	Chandogya	<	Chāndogya	(BhN)
	Bhaggavo	<	Bhārgavo	(BhN[83])
i < ī	īśvara	<	īśvara	(BhN[67])
i < ai	Śaniścara	<	Śanaiścara	(BhN[129])
u < ū	bhutvā	<	bhūtvā	(BhN)
	murtte	<	mūrtte	(BhN[39])

3. The substitution of one vowel for another :

i < a	puṣkiriṇī	<	puṣkariṇī	(BhN[132] B[49], I, Dh_2)
a < i	upakalpatā	<	upakalpitā	(Bh N[39])
	racatā	<	racitā	(BhN[40])
	Taittarīya	<	Taittirīya	(BhN[113])
u < a	Vājasunayi	<	Vājasaneyī	(BhN[83])
	jagaduduya	<	jagadudaya	(BhN[26])

H ... the Hāyuṅgthul charter of Harjaravarman, 9th cent.

I_1 ... the Gauhati charter of Indrapala, 11th cent.

I_2 ... the Guwākuchi charter of Indrapāla, 11th cent.

Barua cites udupāna (Aśoka's R. E. I. for udapāna.

ai < e	daive	<	deve (BhN), Contrary to MIA ; of śela (śaila) in *Vajjālagga*
a < ṛ	vaha	<	vṛha (BhN) ; cf. MIA, at least Aśokan magh (mṛga) as in the Girnār inscription
a < e	cehada	<	chedaḥ (BhN[129])
a < u	Sanayana	<	Sunayana (BhN[115])
a < o	Yaśabhuti	<	Yasobhuti (BhN[14]) (This last means dropping of the visarga in the sandhi,)

4. The dropping of *y* before *i* :

śāsaitā	<	śasayitā (BhN), although we have lekhayitā and Prāpayitā in the same grant.
dolāitam	<	dolāyitam (B)

There do not seem to be any sort of phonetic abbreviations.

R ... the Bargāon charter of Ratnapāla, 11th cent.

V ... the Tezpur charter of Vanamāla (Śālastambha dynasty), 9th cent,

5. The dropping of *y* in consonantal combinations :

matsanyāya	<	matsyanyāya	(BhN)
Lakṣmā	<	Lakṣmyā	(I_2)
Kāśapa	<	Kaśyapa	(BhN)

cf. Kalāṇa (kalyāṇa) as in the Girnar inscription.

6. The absence of sandhi :

-i+a = ia	Hariadbhuta	(BhN[81])
-o+a = oa	tebhyo aksarāṇi	(BhN[139])
-n+e = ne	asmineva	(I_1)

7. The dropping of the initial vowel of the second word in a sandhi :

i+e = i-	payanti va	(H)

8. The dropping of visarga in a sandhi :

Yaśabhūti

9. Samprasarana : siri < śrī (I_2)

Bāhavṛca < Bāhvṛcya (BhN[13])

10. Padmanath Bhattacharya observes that generally anusvāra and visarga had worn out in the inscriptions. Barua makes note of the following changes of anusvāra :

ṁ (followed by s, ś and h) > ṅ :

puṅsam	<	puṁsām	(BhN) ; Balavarman's Nowgong plates, 22)
yaśāṅsi	<	yaśāṁśi	(BhN)
mīmāṅsā	<	mīmāṁsā	(Dh_2)
aṅsa	<	aṁśa	(BhN)

ṁ (final) > n : amalaṁ > amalan

yauvanaṁ > yauvanan

ṁ (feminine genitive) dropped :

Dattadevyāṁ > Dattadevyā (BhN)

ṛatnavatyāṁ > ratnavatyā (BhN)

11. There is a tendency, Barua points out, to change *as* into an *o* as in Pāli :

nāgebhyo	<	nāgebhyaḥ
Chāndogo	<	Chāndogaḥ

This is a non-Magadhan trait.

12. Barua cites an instance of assimilation, which is the same as in Pāli : *Pradyunna* < *Pradyumna* (BhN), the Pāli being *Pajjunna*, and observes the tendency to do away with (*reph*) (r) in all cases of assimilation as in Pāli :

suvaṇṇa	<	suvarṇa	(BhN)
puṇṇa	<	pūrṇa	(BhN)

There are other assimilations :

rya > jja	vījja	<	vīrya (I_1)
tsa > ccha	vacchare	<	vatsare (Dhkh)

13. There are many instances of the substitution of one consonant for another :

g > k	abhikāmika	<	abhigāmika	(BhN)
d > t	Bhaṭṭinanta	<	Bhaṭṭinanda	(BhN)
t > d	Ananda	<	Ananta	(BhN)
j > y	yāyeta	<	jayeta	(R)

14. There is dropping of *t* or *ṭ* in a consonantal sandhi, in which it is followed by another consonant :

ujvalam	<	ujjvalam	(BhN)
sampatyu-pāta	<	sampat-tyupāta	(BhN)
satva	<	sattva	(BhN)
bhavatasya	<	bhavattasya	(BhN)
kuṭimam	<	kuṭṭimam	

15. There is doubling of *t*, as in *stilti* < *sthiti* (BhN)

16. There is the euphonic advent of consonants in the middle of words :

āmra > āmvra		(B)
Lakṣmī-sama	Lakṣmī-s-sama	(BhN)
Kamalavāsinī-ni iva,	divākara-m-iva	(H)

17. One sibilant is at random subsituted for another as in Aśokan dialect of Kalsi, Mansehra and Shahbazgarhi" :

darṣita	<	darśita	(BhN)
śakala	<	sakala	(I_1)
jyotisā	<	jyotiṣā	(I_2)
duskara	<	duṣkara	(I_2)
vaṅsa	<	vaṁśa	(I_2)
Satakratu	<	Śatakratu	(Dh_1)
sasāsa	<	śaśāsa	(Dh_1)
saśvat	<	śaśvat	(Dh_1)
addhaśotaḥ	<	arddhasrotaḥ	(Dh_2)
Aslāyana	<	Āslāyana	

These instances go counter to the rule in Māgadhī of all sibilants converging on palatal *ś*. In Assamese the sibilants are distinguished as an unvoiced guttural spirant (X) except in combination. Dr. Chatterji takes *pravista* for *praviṣṭa* in the Tezpur rock inscription of Harjara-varman as "showing Assamese confusion of the cerebrals and dentals as early as the 9th century" (*ODBL*, p. 182).

B. M. Barua points out certain other peculiarities of the language of the Kāmarūpa inscriptions :

"*balavanto* in H for *balavān*, Pāli *valavā*, is a form which is very common in Assamese, cf. Pāli *mahanto*, Bengali *śrīmanta*, Assamese and Chittagong dialect

śirmanta, guṇavanta, buddhimanta, Lakkhimanta". Cf. Pāli *Theragāthā*, verse 1050 : gatimanto satimanto dhitimanto. ca yo isi."

dummarī (as in the original) or "*dumbarī*, for Sk. *udumbara*, Bengali *ḍumur* (a fig tree), too, is a local word." It is *ḍumaru*, *ḍimaru* in modern Assamese. Other non-Sanskrit names of trees pointed out by Barua are :

parali, parul Sanskrit patali ; cf. jatali (BhN) mod. Bg. jarul ākhoṭa (Dh_1)

odi-amma (Dh_1), which, Barua thinks, is a kind of margo, but is probably to be equated to mod. uriām, uḍiām, a kind of tree, kṇṭāvakkada.

D. Neog adds to the list of trees the following :

āmba < Sanskrit āmra (B, I_1)

suvarṇadāru (B, Dh) possibly a Sanskritisation of sonaru (B)

jati, (B), jhari pākaṭī (Dh_1), mod. As. jaḍī jarī and pākari.

hijjala, mod. As. hijal, hidal ($R_{1,2}$)

Bhallābhiṭhi (Dh^1) as the name of a plot of land is interesting, as in the Kamrup district *bhiṭhā, bhiṭhi* is still used to mean basti land (Sanskrit *bhitta, bhitti*) ; cf Porābhiṭhi (old name of Barpeṭā) *Pitṛbhiṭhā* (ancestral plot of land, the name of a novel),

jola (Dh2, I2, etc), joli (Dh2, etc.), 'a stream' are frequently seen in several inscriptions, and is the same as mod. Assamese *juli* (Dhekiyājuli) and *juri*. It is found in a later inscription (M. Neog, 'The Nīlacala inscription of a unknown kāmarūpa king, *J. U. G.*, vol. XXVII). Kakati cites *Santali jola*, 'a shallow or marsh.'

The scribe-engravers are called *sekyakāra* (BhN), which Barua considers to have been just a sanskritized form of a local word, and *taṭṭhakāra* (Dh2). "According to Prof. S. K. Chatterji *sekya-kāra* for **sekka-kāra-*, whence Bengali *sekrā* (through a spoken Prākṛt *sekka-ara,*)=goldsmith *sekka* is a borrowed word from Iran, meaning 'die', 'stamp for coining,' and then 'engraving,' on metal' : it is the same word as Arabic *sekkah* (*sikkathun,* to give the full form in Classical Arabic). Arabic *sikkah* (*sikkathun*) and Middle Persian * *sikka, sikka,* which we find borrowed in India by 630 A. D.. are both derived from the Aramaic, *sykt*= 'die'." ":Prof. S. K. Chattterji suggests that here *taṭṭhakāra,* 'maker of tatthas' : *taṭṭha,* or *tattha,* is a Persian borrowing from Middle Persian (and Modern Persian) *tashṭ* = 'plate'. 'metal salve', This became Indianized as *taṭṭha, tattha,* whence modern Bengali *ṭāṭ*= 'copper-plate'. *taṭṭhakāra* gives Modern Indo-Aryan thathera, *ṭhāṭari* of *thāṭari-bāzār* in Dacca town and, *ṭhaṭherī-bāzār* in Benares town, where the metal workers congregate."

Barua asserts that the expression, samprāpte Bhagadatte Śrīmat-Prāgjyotiṣādhināthatvam (V), corrected by the Vidyavinod to samprāpto Bhagadatto......, had behind it such an oft-recurring Pali Jātaka idiom as *Brahmadatte rajjam karante,* which is a locative absolute.

The features as enumerated above must have been a reflection of the Aryan tongue prevalent in Kāmarūpa, which "differed a little" from the language of Magadha, as noted by Yuan-Tsang. It will have been seen that these features do not conform absolutely to Magadhi or any other formalised Prākṛt. Overlapping the period of the inscriptions we have the Buddist *Caryā,*

songs, written between the ninth and the twelfth century in Kāmarūpa or, at least in the eastern region. The language has been claimed by Bengal, Assam, Mithila, Orissa, etc. as their own. Dr Chatterji calls the langnage Old Bengali." "The language of the Caryās seems to be based on a West Bengal dialect" rather than on a East Bengal one (*ODBL*, p. 117). "The language is not 'Prākṛt' or 'Apabhramśa' as it has been urged by some, since it shows simplification of the MIA double consonants (dhama < dhamma < dharma, jāma < jamma < Janma, tāntī < tantī < tantri, bāṭa < * vaṭṭa vartma, ...) and has developed some genuine Bengali morphological forms. It is not 'Magadhi' i. e., Magahi, because no specifically Magahi characteristic is traceable, and the verb system is as yet primitive" (p. 118). "But the influence of the śaurasenī Apabhaṁsa was very great on it : and occasionally of Sanskrit and the literary Prākṛts of the second MIA period" (p. 115). The past in *-ia* (more probably *-ila* in these places) and sharingly in *-iu* and *-u*, pronominal forms like *jo*, *so*, *ko*, *jasu*, *tasu*, pronominal adverbs *jima*, *tima* and pronominal adjectives *jaisana, taisana. jaiso* are from Śaurasenī Apabhraṁśa. Echoes of the old literary Prākṛts of the West are also seen ; e. g. the *-o* affix ; stray instrumental feminine in *-ia* (*samahia* < *samādhya*); retention of double consonants in a few cases, and occasional form like *kim pi* < *kim api* (pp. 115-16).

On the other hand, as Dr. Banikanta Kakati observers, certain phonological and morphological peculiarities here have come down in an unbroken continuity to modern Assamese. The peculiar shortening of an anterior *-a-* before a following *-a-* in the next or a succeeding syllable appears in the *Caryās* for the first

time; e. g., *pakhā* (pakṣa), *cakā* (*cakra*), *bhaṇḍāra* = mod. *bhārāl* (*bhāṇḍāgāra*), in all these cases Bengali withstanding the shortening. Certain morphological characteristics are the same here as in modern Assamese; viz., dative case-ending in *lai* (kula-lai, meru-śikharalai); locative ending in *-ta* (saṅkamata, bāṭata hāḍita); genitive ending in *-ra* (sasara, abidara). The present participle in *-ant-* (Early As. -ant-, mod. -ōt-; e. g. paḍante, jāante, burante), conjunctions in *-i*, *ile* (suni, dekhi, carile) are also genuinely Assamese (*Assamese— Its Formation and Development*, § 15).

Morphemic variants, however, seem to compete with each other in the language of the *Caryās* and tend to indicate the dialect features of the later Magadhan dialects. The pronominal *mai*, 'I', as found in Assamese and East Bengal dialects, find a variant, *āmi* <*amhe*, 'I', as in Bengali. There are other competing forms as well.

The simplification of the MIA assimilated conjuncts is a common feature in NIA. The change followed by compensatory lengthening was not complete in the language of the *Caryās*; e. g.... *dhāma* (22, 44, 5) < *dharma*, *kāpura* (10, 28) < *karpūra*; but *andhāra* (21, 50), which is *āndhār* in Assamese and *ādhār* in Bengali. This may have been a case of phonetic interruption by vowel dissimilation, which has continued in Assamese *cāk* < MIA *cakka* < *cakra* (mod. As., *mau-cāk*, bee-hive), although we have *cakā* (carya 14).

yā > *ia* forms in absolutives became more prominent in MIA in place of Skt. *-tvā*, so that kṛ-*tvā* became *kṛ-ya > *karia* (*Caryā*). The dropping of the final *a* in Assamese and the addition of a definitive *ā*

in Bengali to give *kari* and *kariyā* respectively are dialect features.

In MIA the various declensions of OIA were gradually converging to one type, and this tendency was evident in Aṣokan inscriptions. In Assamese as in other NIA languages the declension types were levelled. The paradigmatic signs for nominal inflexion are more or less morphologically similar in the Magadhan languages. The dative in *-lai* has already been noticed. The Early Assamese post-position *hante*, = *sante*, standing for the ablative, seems to have been a present participle form of √*ās* used in absolute construction ; see Mādhava Kandali, bhaya sante nṛpatira śihari'a gāwa' 'Fear being, the king's body shivered.' The modern post-position for the ablative, *parā*, may be the same as Skt.-Old Presian *parā* (away, forth). Dr. Kakati takes it as the strengthened form of *par* (OIA pare > *pari, par).

It is interesting to note that the indirect object with *-k* of Assamese is fully established in the *Caryās* ; but it is used with nouns only, whereas the pronouns have the *-re* ending (thākurak, kāhere), which is now used in Bengali. *ka*-genitives, on the other hand, are found in the *Caryās* as well as in Early Assamese and Bengali, although it was not much favoured. The suffix has been variously explained. It may have derived from a post-positional *kṛta* ; hasta-kṛta pustaka > hāthaka pustaka ; hāthaka darpaṇa (Vidyāpati) ; chāndaka bandha (Caryā). It is probably non-Magadhan in origin ; it is the standard genitive suffix in Hindī (kā, kī, ke). The usual *ra*-genitive might go back to *kerakam* : kerakam > keraam > kera (Early Assamese : jākera e guṇa-nāma).

The *ta*-locative of the *Caryās* persists in modern Assamese, while *hi* and *hi̐* in them disappear except in the artificial Assamese Brajabuli (caraṇahi̐).

In MIA the passive past participle assumed the function of the finite past and lost the passive sense in the late MIA. But in the *Caryās*, the *ta*|*ita*-past retains the passive sense (amhe jhāne diṭhā, Carya 1, i. e., asmābhiḥ dhyānena dṛṣṭaḥ). The Magadhan languages did not retain this past tense ; the *I*-past of Assamese-Bengali-Oriya is fully established in the *Caryās* ; it is probably a phonemic variant of the same suffix ; *ta* > *ḍa* > *la*. See *deta* (caryā 8), 'gave' ; *gāiḍa*, 'sang' ;*samāiḍa* (caryā 2). Where, however, Dr. Sen would seek to read *gāin*, *samāin*, against the manuscript reading.

Assamese, Bengali and Oriya have almost the same types of verbal conjugation ; the difference lies only in the use of personal terminations. In the conditional past, however, Assamese has retained the Apabhraṁśa principle *traikālye śatṛ*. In the *Caryās* the present participle of the verb is used : *keli karanta*, *beni bāṭa bahanta ;* but in the Assamese the present participle of √*as*, *santa*=*henta*=*hēt*, is added to the different tense forms of the principal verb : *karīlo-hēten*, *karile-hēten*.

In this paper, brief as it is, attention has been drawn to indicate the relationship between MIA and Assamese through stages relevant to the geographical position of the latter, so that the native and non-Aryan elements in Assamese remain outside the scope of thestudy.

We have cited above a number of instances of Prakṛitism, woven conçiously or unconsciously into

the Sanskrit text of the inscriptions of Bhāskaravarman and other Kāmarūpa kings, whose reign ranged from the 6th to the 12th century A. D. We may be liking to call them a 'madness'; but we must also say that there is much 'method in that madness'. These departures from the Sanskrit norm betray quite striking non-Magadhan traits, of which ones particularly to be noted are: (i) In the instances cited we have all the three sibilants with the dental tending to dominate a little; and this would run counter to the rule *ṣaso śah* (Hc. xi. 3) in Magadhi, while we have only an unvoiced guttural spirant, *x*, in modern Assamese in place of all the three sibilants. (ii) *r* never turns into *l*. (iii) The substitution of *k* for *g* and *t* for *d* (abhikāmika, bhaṭṭinanta) is rather on line with Paiśāchī (bhakavatī, matano, tāmodaro). To have *d* for *t* in the one rare case (*ananda* for *ananta*, which might very well be *ānanda*) is a Śaurasenī feature, whereas in Magadhi *t* is not changed to *d* as in that dialect; nor is it dropped as in Mahārāṣṭrī. Prākṛt. (iv) In Magadhi nominative singular of masculine of words ending in *-a* is obtained by substituting *-e* for *-a* (Hc. iv 287—*eṣaḥ* > *eśe*, *meṣaḥ* > *meśe*, *puruṣaḥ* > *puliśe*); but in the instances before us we have the singular nominative in *-o* as in Prākṛts in general. I would just like to place before the eminent Prākṛt scholars and linguists present in this Seminar the question whether the postulation of the author of *The Origin and Growth of the Asamiya Language* of an early Kāmarūpa Prākṛt whence the NIA Assamese emerged may be accepted with confidence.

So far as the Caryā songs, which I have also noticed are concerned, as Dr. Jules Bloch has said,

it is eastern only because it is found in eastern texts, but is not eastern if it is linguistically considered. Dr. Chatterji has noted that it is not Māgadhī, but it bears influences of Śaurasenī Apabhraṁśa and "occasionally of Sanskrit and the literary Prākṛts of the second MIA period." Dr. Sukumar Sen would consider these Śaurasenī Apabhraṁśa traits rather as Avahaṭṭha, which succeeded Sanskrit as the language par excellence of the whole of India at a time (intro. to his edition of *Caryāgītipadāvalī*, Burdwan, 1956). Dr. Banikanta Kakati in his *Assamese—Its Formation and Development* occasionally points out morphological and phonological peculiarities of modern Assamese which would not lend themselves to an explanation by Māgadhī standards. It, therefore, remains to be considered if we can imagine the existence of proto-Assamese stage which would not be Magadhan in all aspects.

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BUDDHISM AND ITS RELATION TO CHINESE RELIGIONS

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I. The religious trends in early China

Buddhism was the earliest foreign religion which was introduced to China in the first century C. E. Being a pioneer, its philosophical tenets, religious organization and practice were not known to the Chinese before. In the initial stage, it attracted the attention of men of high position like Prince Ying[1] of Ch'u and Moutzu, althoguh both of them did not understand the Buddhist doctrine very correctly. This was due to the fact that the Prince was deeply interested in magical arts and the worship of spirits. He believed that Buddhism was a branch of the Taoist cult. Possibly he was influenced by the popular story that the Buddha appeared in a dream[2] to Emperor Ming-ti of the Han dynasty in the form of a golden man. From this one may gauge his knowledge concerning Buddhism. In the case of Moutzǔ, he regarded the doctrine of Karma or cause and effect to be the same as the continuity of the soul.[3] It was a misinterpretation of the doctrine of Anatta or non-

1. T'ang Yung-tung, Han-wei-liang-tsin-nan-pei-ch'ao-fu-chiao-shih or History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Western Tsin, Eastern Tsin, Southern and Northern dynasties, p. 153.

2. T'ang, op. cit. p. 17.

3. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 73-79 and 88.

soul. If the understanding of the well-known supporters of Buddhism like these two, could be superficial to such an extent, naturally, one cannot expect anything better from the masses at that time. On account of this, when great Buddhist missionaries like An Shih-kao,[4] Fu Tu-teng, Kumārajīva, Buddhabhadra and others reached China at different intervals, they were regarded as magicians for their unusual skill to interpret the language of the birds, to cause the growth of a blue lotus from a begging bowl, to predict the arrival of foreign boats from India, to make damp ashes float on the surface of water and many other surprising magical feats. There were only a few learned scholars who showed great respect to their learning and pure conduct in the observance of the Vinaya or discipline. Besides, their secular knowledge of astronomy, geography, the cosmic principles of Yin and Yang and the five elements, the preparing of the calendar, the interpreting of prophecies and the art of healing was considered to be their normal training and qualifications, althogh secular[5] learning was not encouraged by the Buddha. The fact that Kao-seng-chuan or the Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Teachers repeatedly publicised the unique achievement of performing magical feats leads us to suspect that there must be a certain motive behind it. Looking deeper into the matter, we notice that supernatural powers ascribed to these teachers coincided with the traditional Chinese belief of immortality. This is illustrated in the

4. Kao-seng-chuan or Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Monks, *Taisho*, Vol. 50, pp. 322 ff.

5. The Brahmajala-Sutra, *The Sacred Books of the Bddhists*, Vol. II pp. 16-26.

cases of the Han magicians[6] such as Li Shao-chün, Shao-ong, Luan-ta and Hsu Fu who were supposed to be able to command the spirits and ghosts, to reach the Fairy Islands and gather the life-giving herbs for preparing a concoction so that one may become an immortal.[7] On the basis of this observation and since Buddhism was regarded as a branch of Taoism, it was able to gain a footing on Chinese soil. Hence, it received friendly treatment from the Chinese public in its initial stage.

Doctrinally, there is a great similarity between the two religions. The Buddhist concept of leading a life of purity, having no desires for worldly pleasure and being freed from moral blemish is not much different from that of Leotzu's taking no notice of a sage[8] and his wisdom, and remaining in inactivity and self-contentment. We are also aware of the fact that the story of Laotzu's mission to India[9] to convert the Buddha had a profound influence on the Chinese masses who believed that Gautama Buddha was the disciple of Laotzǔ. That being so, Buddhism was identified with Taoism. But on the other hand, it was due to the

6. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 51-53.

Wang Chih-hsin, Chung-kuo-tsung--chiao-ssu-hsiang- shih-ta-kang or A Brief History of Chinese Religious Thought, pp. 68-69 and 74-5 ; Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Buddhism in China, pp. 25-27.

7. D. Howard Smith, *Chinese Religions*, p. 99.

8. W. T. Chan (tr.), The way of Lao Tzu, ch. 19 and ch. 75.

9. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 59-60.

W. Pachow, "Laotzu and Gautama Buddha, an enquiry into the authenticity of Laotzu's mission to India", *S. Paranavitan's Commemoration Volume*, Peradeniya, Ceylon, 1965.

striking similarity between Taoism and Buddhism that the latter was enabled to spread far and wide in China in its early years. This is the other side of the coin, we need not feel shy or uneasy about it.

II. Its relation to the state

During its existence in China for a period of nearly two thousand years, occasionally Buddhism received harsh treatment and persecution[10] from several emporors bearing the title of 'Wu'. It began with Emperor T'ai Wu-ti (424-450) of the Northern Wei dynasty, then he was followed by Emperor Wu-ti (561-578) of the Northern Chou dynasty, Emperor Wu-tsung (840-846) of the T'ang dynasty and Emperor Shih-tsung (954-959) of the Later Chou dynasty. During the periods of persecution Buddhism suffered immense damage and great humiliation. However, this does not mean that the Buddhist kept quiet without showing any sign of protest. Actually many of them did register their protest, even at the risk of their lives. Take for instance, Hui-yüan, an eminent Buddhist teacher who wrote a learned treatise pleading in favour of not paying homage to the king when Huan Hsuan, prime minister of the Eastern Tsin dynasty (317-420) was carrying out a purge of the Buddhist Sangha. This is a complicated topic involving many causes and factors which may be summed up as follows :

(1) The Chinese think that they are the descendants of the Yellow Emperor ; that they have a glorious civilization for thousands of years and that they have also long ago left the primitive ways of the cave man

10. Chiang Wei-ch'iao, Chung-kuo-fu-chiao-shih or History of Buddhism in China, ch. 5, pp. 36-39.
T'ang op. cit. pp. 493 and 538.

and entered into a civilized world, where man wears silk dresses, eats tasty meat dishes and stays in palatial buildings. Further, holding the view that China was situated in the center of the Earth, they regard its neighbours as barbarous, uncivilized and unable to contribute anything worthwhile to Chinese learning. As Buddhism came from India which was a country of the barbarians, and as Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism was an Indian, he was of course a deity of the barbarians. How could it be possible for the civilized to adopt a religion of the uncivilized ? Under these circumstances, if China is to be restored to its pristine purity of the virtues of ancient sages and sage-kings such as Yao, Shun, Y'd and T'ang (ca. 2536-1766 B. C.), the first step in this direction is to reject any institution of a foreign origin. When this was put into effect, Buddhism was the first victim. This trend of national superiority is clearly seen in the official statement made by K'ou Ch'ien-chih[12] who was a Taoist teacher of Emperor T'ai Wu-ti (424-470) of the Northern Wei dynasty. Unfortunately this sparked off the first persecution of Buddhism in China. On account of their national pride, the Chinese were unable to tolerate the culture of a foreign nation, therefore, all foreign elements were subjected to unkind treatment and rejection. Consequently Buddhism was the chief target of attack.

(2) Considering the sayings of Laotzǔ such as "The Tao constantly does nothing, but everything is done"[13],

11. See Life of Hui-yuan, Kao-seng-chuan, ch. 6 *Taisho*, Vol. 50, p. 322f.

12. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 493-494.

13. Tao-te-ching, ch. 37 : Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo-che-hsuch-shih or History of Chinese philosphy, Vol. I p. 224.

and "Man models himself after Earth, Earth models itself after Heaven, Heaven models itself after Tao and Tao models itself after Nature,"[14] as found in the Tao-te-ching, there is a certain amount of philosophical and metaphysical elements. They deserve our deep respect and admiration. But Taoists of the Han, Wei, and Tsin dynasties (from the second century B. C. to the fifth century) like Chang Tao-lin,[15] Wei Po-yang, Kao Hung and Tao Hung-ching were of a different type. The first person mentioned in the list claimed that Laotzu was the founder of Taoism and hence he established the Taoist cult of Five-Bushels-of-Rice;[16] the rest contributed generously to the final formation of the Taoist sects of Alchemy and Amulets. The theory and practice of these sects are very superficial and not of much value to society. At the most one may say that their function is similar to that of a shaman or an old-fashioned physician. Consequently the ancient emperors and kings who either attended a religious ceremony for the purpose of receiving a sacred text on magic, and then called himself the True-King-of-the-Peace,[17] or held to the belief that Loatzu was their ancestor and, therefore, a posthumous title called "The Mysterious Primordial Emperor"[18] was conferred on that great philosopher. It seems this was not enough. In order to demonstrate their filial piety for the great ancestor young princesses of the royal house of the T'ang dynasty (7th-9th century) were

14. Chan (tr.), op. cit. ch. 25.

15. Wang, op. cit. pp. 75-77.

16. Chiang, op. cit. pp. 33 ; Tung-han-tsung-chiao-shih or Religious history of the Eastern Han dynasty, pp. 66-77.

17. T'ang, op. cit. p. 494.

18. Chiang, op. cit. ch. 15, p. 9.

ordered to join the Taoist Church and became female Taoists. By this means they blissfully believed that they could attain immortality. We are not sure as to the final attainment of their goal. But one thing is clear, that is to say, Taoism gained the status of a national religion of China in the Northern Wei and T'ang dynasties, whereas Buddhism and Confucianism were in a subordinate position.

On other occasions emperors of warious dynasties used to convene conferences in order to discuss the superiority[19] of the three existing religions in China, viz., Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, and accordingly seates of precedenee would be allocated to them on official functions. This measure was apparently a white-wash, because they regarded Buddism as a foreign religion which meant that it could not possibly amount to anything worthwhile. To them it was obvious that Taoism or Confucianism should occupy the first position. In other words, from the standpoint of national pride and the preservation of national culture Budhism should be looked down upon and it deserved the third and the last position, because it was a foreign religion.

(3) Contrasting most sharply with the traditional Chinese culture is the relationship between Budhism and conservative Confucianism. They look like ice and burning coal, and therefore, there is hardly any possibility of a compromise. These Confucianists talk about the observance of social relations,[20] that there

19. T'ang, op. cit. p. 541.

20. James Legg (tr.), *Confncian Analects*, Book 12, ch. 12; *The Work of Mencius*, Book IV, part I, ch. 30.; *The Works af Mencius*, Book III, part I, ch. 4.

should be love between the parents and children, justice between the sovereign and subjects......and distinctive duties between the husband and wife. They also lay great emphasis on the teaching of "Of the three infilial sins, the one being without a son is the worst." and 'Everyone within the empire, including those who live in the remotest corner, is a subordinate to the king.'[21] and many other Confucian ethics. They regard the family to be the basic unit of society. It is the duty of every man to observe the filial piety[22] while at home and fulfil one's obligations in respect of his country. If a person renounces the world and becomes a Buddhist mendicant, it means that he is infilial and disloyal to his parents and the state by neglecting his obligations and duties. Further, according to the Confucian definition of the word 'subject,'[23] it appears that anybody who lives within the boundary of a country is a subject, and he is obliged to pay allegiance to the king. Accordingly a mendicant is also a subject, and therefore he should pay homage to him, too. Owing to this interpretation there arose the question of whether or not a Buddhist monk should salute the emperor. Had it been in India, the question would be whether the parents should or should not worship there children who had entered the Buddhist monastic Order. As customs differ from country to country,

21. The Work of Mencius, Book IV, part I, ch. 4. In quoting the Book of Poetry, it says ;

"Under the whole heaven,
To the boarders of the land,
Every spot is the sovereign's ground ;
Every individual is the sovereign's minister (subject)."

22. *Confucian Analects*, Book 12. ch. 11.

23. See note 21 above.

there exists an entanglement and confusion of misunderstanding which is beyond the comprehension of ordinary man. It may be imagined that when Buddhism was first introduced to China, it had experienced great difficulty and hindrance on account of the differences of national traditions and customs.

However, after a length of time, Buddhism was able to overcome these tremendous obstacles. It was not only highly honoured by the kings, ministers, the intelligentsia and the masses, but throughout the ages eminent and outstanding Buddhist teachers were produced by the Sangha, and the teaching of the Buddha was able to spread extensively in all directions. The various series of Kao-seng-chuan[24] or the Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Monks can be cited as evidence in this respect. The popularity of Buddhism may be due to its profound philosphy, boundless compassion or universal love, religious ceremonies including Buddhist art and sculpture and the organization of the Sangha. It was also due to the translation of two popular Buddhist texts, viz., "The Sūtra on the Original Vows of Kṣitigarbha Bodhisattva"[25] and "The Ullampana Sūtra." The former describes the Bodhisattva's visit to the land of Darkness to rescue his mother who was undergoing painful sufferings and the latter concerned itself over the salvation of the departed and helpless souls. When these Buddhist stories became popular they made a deep impression on the people so much so, that they were inclined to think that Buddhism also showed interest in filial piety. Thus it was in no way

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24. *Taisho* Nos. 2059, 2060, 2061 and 206 2.

25. *Taisho* No. 412.

against the Confucian ethics, but it would, on the other hand, help improve the morality of the people.

(4) Tracing the main cause which led to the enforcement of control over the Sangha by the state, one was the controversy about paying allegiance to the king and the other being the economic drain on society. Han Yu, a Confucian scholar of the T'ang dynasty was a formidable opponent of Buddhism under the second classification. Besides, the Sangha was partially to be blamed for the decadent trends as shown by some of its members. In the fifth century there was a Bhikkhuni by the name of Miao-yin.[26] At that time the members of the royal houshold including some of the kings of the Tsin dynasty (317-420) showered on her honors and respect. Taking advantage of this, she frequented the palace and made alliance with the influential nobles. People who desired favours from these high officials often approached her and made her their intermediary. She, too, was deeply involved in the game for earthly considerations. It is said that the number of people who went to pay her visits amounted to many hundreds per day. Their horse-drawn vehicles, were parked just outside her monastery, and this made the place look like a market square. Should this be correct, then where was the Buddhist principle of observing a life of purity, non-activity, non-attachment and the freedom from worldly possessions ? The unbecoming behaviour of this Bhikkhuni and her associates should be held responsible for bringing disgrace on the Buddhist Sangha. As a sequel there was an official purge for eliminating the undesira-

26. T'ang, op. cit· p. 348.

ble elements. Perhaps the Buddhists have learnt a lesson.

III The contribution of Buddhism to Chinese culture

Buddhism's unique contribution to Chinese culture is, perhaps, in the form of an organized religion and the doctrine of Karma which means good or evil action. Through action one my either be rewarded with a happy birth in heaven or degraded to undergo sufferings in hell. Further by the practice of reciting the names of Amitabha Buddha, the devotees will be born in his Paradise of Bliss called "Sukhavati." This is very easy and simple to practise, therefore, the heavenly paradise is within the the reach of every body. In addition to this, by constructing stupas and monasteries, by making statues and translating Buddhist sacred taxts, it helped introduce to China Indian literature, philosophy, fine arts and architecture on the one hand, and sometimes these objects served as a memorial dedicated to one's departed ancestors or men of distinguished service to the nation on the other. In any case, the awe-inspiring monuments enhance the scenic beauty of a particular locality, it was stated by one of the emperors of the Ch'ing dynasty (1616-1911) that most of the famous mountains in China were occupied by the Buddhist Sangha. It means that wherever there is a beautiful spot, one is sure to find an ancient Buddhist monastery in excellent traditional artchitecture. It is obvious that the daily life of the Chinese people has been directly or indirectly influenced by an atmosphere which is thoroughly saturated with Buddhist culture. According to Poet Po Chu-i

of the T'ang dynasty that even a three-year-old child knows of the Buddhist saying from the *Dharmapada*, "To perform all the good deeds and avoid doing the evil ones." This is definitely an indication of the profound penetration of Buddhism into the Chinese masses. This Buddhist atmosphere has become a part and parcel of Chinese culture so much so, that one could hardly make out any difference in respect of its Indian origin.

Among the Buddhist Schools which were developed in China, the Pure Land, T'ien-t'ai and Ch'an or Zen are essentially Chinese products, although some of their tenets could be traced to the Indian origin. As these schools suit the Chinese temperament and climate so well, they are identified with Chinese orientation. Take the case of Ch'an (Zen), it has done away with the bookish learning, it points to the mind of man in order to see his inner nature and thereby to achieve sudden enlightenment.[27] How simple, bold and straightforward ! This Zen of the Chinese patriarchs which allows one's mind ample freedom, is definitely superior to the Indian traditional Dhyāna or meditation. People call this School the "Chinese Ch'an." As it is tinged with strong Chinese characteristics, it adds splendid glory to Chinese culture.

Among the other contributions made by Buddhism to Chinese culture[28] which may be mentioned here are : the translation of Sanskrit texts, phonology, linguistics, imaginative literature, architecture, sculp-

27. W. Pachow, "Zen Buddhism and Bodhidharma", *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Calcutta, India, 1956.

28. Ch'en, op. cit. p. 471,

ture, painting, astrology, calendar-computing, mathematics and medicine. Morever, in terms of its itfluence on religions of Chinese origin, it caused Taoism and Confucianism to formulate their new concepts and philosphy and bring about a religious systematization. Owing to the limited space one is not permitted to go into details.

Thus we see that Chinese Buddhism, in its initial stage, was a lonely and helpless visitor to the Land of Confucius and Laotzu. For quite a long while it attached itself onto the wagon of Taoism, perhaps with a purpose. But finally it firmly established itself in China and made outstanding contributions to Chinese culture.

PĀṆINI 3. 4. 87-88 *Vis-à-vis* VEDIC IMPERATIVES IN -SI

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1. There are, mostly in the Ṛgveda, about two dozen verbal forms formed from the bare rootstem in the strong form with a suffix *-si* like *kṣéṣi, néṣi párṣi, yákṣi, vákṣi, śroṣi* etc[1]. They vary in the frequency of their occurrence, ranging from a single occurrence in some cases (*nakṣi* 5. 24. 1, *bhakṣi* 7. 41.2, *yótsi* 1. 132.4, *rátsi* 5. 10. 1, *śróṣi* 6. 4. 7, *sakṣi* 5. 33. 2, *hoṣi* 6. 44. 14) to no less than thirty seven in the case of *yákṣi*.[2] Leaving aside differences of opinion about the interpretation of individual cases, there is a general agreement, among both ancient commentators and modern scholars, that these forms, as a class, have an imperative value[3].

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1. The full list given by Whitney and Macdonell is: *kṣéṣi, jéṣi joṣi (= joṣ-si) darṣi, dhakṣi, nakṣi, neṣi, parṣi, prāsi, bhakṣi, matsi, māsi, yakṣi, yamsī yāsi, yótsi, rátsi, rāsi, vákṣi, véṣi, sróṣi, sakṣi, sátsi* and *hoṣi*. Others add a couple of forms more which are of a doubtful nature : *gāsi, cakṣi, staṣi*.

2. Sometimes we get two such froms in one and the same *ṛc*. Thus the oft-repeated line: *ā devān vakṣi yakṣi ca* (RV. 5.26.1, 6.16.2 8.102.16; *vakṣi* and *yákṣi* occur in 2.36.4 and 3.4.1 (*yakṣi* unaccented also). *Jeṣi* and *yotsi* occur in 1.132·4; *yamsi* and *prāsi* in 1.42.9; *yakṣi* and *satsi* in 2.6.8; *vakṣi* and *satsi* in 10.3.7; *neṣi* and *párṣi* in 3.15.3. Rarely we get even three forms in a ṛc. Thus *rāsi, yakṣi* and *vakṣi* occur in 3.4.1; and *parṣi, rāsi* and *véṣi* in 6.4.8.

3. The regular indicative forms of the 2 sing. active of these roots, excepting those of the *ad*-class, follow their own types; *nayasi piparṣi, yājasi, vahasi, sṛṇoṣi* etc. In the roots of the *ad*-class both kinds of forms are naturally identical: *kseṣi, prāsi, yāsi veṣi*. But these latter form only a minority.

Opinion differs among modern scholars as to the historical origin[4] of these Vedic forms and their position in the Indo-European family of languages. I am not going to enter into that question for the present. The present paper has a limited object : to investigate whether the forms in question have been noticed and accounted for by Pāṇini. In this connection P. 3. 4. 87—88 are to be examined. The traditional interpretation of these sūtras, which is uniformly the same from the *Kāśikā* downwards[5] is such as, if accepted, would leave the present category of forms unaccounted for in the Pāṇinian system. I propose to give here a new and straight-forward interpretation of these two sūtras which would show that Pāṇini had taken care of the forms in question.[6]

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4. They are generally described in grammars as indicative persons of the root-class, used imperatively, (Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar,* § 624; Macdonell, *Vedic Grammar,* § 451; and so even by the ancient Sanskrit grammarians who describe the formation as *loḍar the lat).* It has also been suggested that these forms were made by adding-*i* to the injunctive forms of the root-aorist (*Thurneyen, Kuhns Zeitschrift* 27,176). Renou (*Grammaire la langue vedique,* § 316) similarly looks upon them as an autonomous formation, where an ancient suffix *-s* may have been extended by a deictic *-i*. For recent investigation on this subject see Johanna Narten, *Die sigmatischen Aoriste im Veda* (Wiesbaden, 1964), and George Cardona, 'The Vedic imperatives in *-si*', *Language* Vol. 41, No. 1 (1965) where both the writers have come to the conclusion that the forms in question function as part of the sigmate aorist system, correlated with 3. sg. subjunctives in *-sat-* connection between forms like *neṣi* and *neṣat* was noticed by Bhawe also, *Soma-Hymns* III. 148.

5. Patañjali does not comment on these two sūtras.

6. The late Dr. S. S. Bhawe has recently emphasized the necessity of utilising Pāṇini for Vedic interpretation. In his *The Soma-hymns of the Ṛgveda* (Vols. I-III), however, where some of our forms are explained, he does not state the Pāṇinian position *vis-a-vis* these forms. Moreover, he is not consistent in his identification of the forms. Once he describes the forms as 'pres. sing, formations having an imperative sense' (I-7) or simply typically Ṛgvedic non-thematic (imperative) (III.148). Elsewhere he calls them 'sigmatic forms——to be taken in a subjunctive sense' (II.92). Still elsewhere he speaks of 'aor. subj. forms like *neṣi*' (III. 148).

2. The imperative meaning of these forms is an accepted fact. Often the context demands it : the passages concerned contain prayers to gods to conquer enemies, to bring wealth, to carry the singer across difficulties, the request to Agni to bring the gods and to offer sacrifice to them etc. Sometimes the forms in question occur in co-ordination with regular imperatives or similar forms like injunctives.[7] This imperative sense of these forms was already noticed by Yāska who twice (*Nir*. 6. 13 ; 8. 14) paraphrases *yakṣi* (RV. 7. 39. 4 ; 10. 110. 9) by *yaja* and once (*Nir*. 8. 19) *vakṣi* MS 4. 13. 7. etc. by *vaha*. Sāyaṇa[8] also, allowing for difference of opinion in some individual cases, almost always paraphrases these forms by those in the imperative. Modern authorities on Vedic grammar have taken note of the peculiar use of these forms. Modern translators and annotators also like Renou, Geldner

7. Thus RV 1.42.9: *śagdhi pūrdhi pra yaṁsi ca śiśihi prāsy udaram/pīhṣann iha kratum vidaḥ* contains three regular imperatives and two injuctives. RV 2, 36.4; *ā vakṣi devā iha vipra yakṣi coṣan hotar ni ṣadā yoniṣu triṣu/prati vīhi prasthitam somyaṁ madhu pibā āgnīdhrāt tava bhāgasya tṛpṇuhi* has four imperatives. In RV. 1.75.5 *yakṣi* occurs with *yāja* (twice), the regular imperative from the same root.—— RV 10.3.7: *sa ā vakṣi mahi na ā ca satsi* compared with 10.70.3: *ā devān vakṣi ni sadeha hotā* gives the equation *satsi-sada;* similarly the comparison of RV 1.13.1 *susamiddho na ā vaha devā Agne haviṣmate/ hotaḥ pāvaka yákṣi ca* with *ā devān vakṣi yakṣi ca* gives the equation *vakṣi =vaha.-yakṣi* is once contrasted with the indicative *yájasi* (6.48.4) and (unaccented) with the subjunctive *yajāsi* (6.4.1). *pársi and pāráya* occur together in 1.174.9=6.20.12, where *parṣi* occurring in a subordinate clause does not have imperative meaning.

8. Thus: *jeṣi (1.132.4)=jaya: nakṣi (5.24.1)=vyāpnuhi; bhakṣi* (7.41.2)=*dehi;ratsi (5.10.1) - vilikha, kuru; sroṣi (6.4.7)=śṛṇu; pra sakṣi (5.33.2)=parābhava; pra hoṣi (6.44.14)=prajuhudhi.* It is needless to multiply instances.

etc. have accepted their imparative value on the whole.[9] The imperative use of the forms in *-si* then, can be accepted as not requiring any further proof.

3. -S*i* (P) is Pāṇini's basic suffix for 2. sing. *parasmai* (3. 4. 77-78 ; 1. 4. 99-102, 105) which, like other basic suffixes mentioned in this rule, undergoes various modifications and substitutions in different tenses and moods. About its form in the imperative P. 3. 4. 87 : *ser hy apic ca* says (1) that this *-si*, when it represents *loṭ* is replaced by *-hi* and (2) that this *-hi* is *apit* (not *pit*). This latter statement was necessary as otherwise the substitute *-hi*, which replaces *-si* (P), would have become *pit* by *sthānivadbhāva* (P. 1. 1.56) i. e. treatment of the substitue in the same way as the original.

Investing this suffix *-hi* with an *apit* character serves many purposes : firstly, the suffix, since it is not *-pit* can be accented (since P. 3. 1. 4 does not now operate); secondly, this suffix which is *sārvadhātuka* (3.4.113; 1. 1. 56) now becomes *ṅit* on account of *apittva* (1. 2. 4) and thus prevents guṇa for the stem-vowel (1. 1. 5 ; *ihi*, *stuhi*, *āpnuhi*); and, thirdly, this same *ṅittva* is also responsible for changing the final *ā* of the stem into *-ī* (6. 4. 113 ; *jānīhi*, *mimīhi*).

This *-hi*, further is replaced by *-dhi* or is dropped in circumstances mentioned in P. 6. 4. 101-103 and 6. 4. 105-6 respectively.

Then follows the next rule (3. 4. 88) : *vā chandasi* 'optionally in the *Chandas*'. Here the question is : What does this option exactly refer to? The whole

9. And also other commentators like Skandasvāmin, Veṅkaṭamādhava, etc.

Indian grammatical tradition is quite firm on this point. It maintains that out of the two statements made in the previous rule, only the second one is rendered optional here ; the option does not extend to the substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si* . The *Kāśikā* is quite explicit on this point. It says : *Apittvaṁ vikalpyate, nādeśaḥ.*[10] *Chandasi viṣaye hiśabdo vā apid bhavati* 'The *apit*-ness is being made optional, not the substitute. In the matter of the *chandas* the word *-hi* becomes *apit* optionally'. Its illustrations are *yuyodhi, prīṇāhi*, and *prīṇīhi*. In *yuyodhi* (with Vedic *ślu* ; 2. 4. 76) the *-dhi* replaces *-hi* by 6. 4. 103, because *-hi*, which is only optionally *apit* in the Veda, can now be *pit*, i. e. *aṅit*. This explains the guṇa in *yuyo-*. Similarly, along with forms like *prīṇīhi* (wīth a *ṅit -hi*), there can also be forms like *prīṇāhi* (with an *aṅit -hi* and consequently absence of *ā* > *ī*).

Bhaṭṭoji's comment on this rule in the *Siddhānta-kāumudī* is terse to the maximum but no less explicit. He simply says : *Hir apid vā* '*-hi* (which replaces *-si*) is optionally *apit* (in the *chandas*)'. There is no doubt that he too does not extend the Vedic option to the substitution of *-hi* in place of *-si*.

3. 1 The commentators give their reason also why they apply the option only the *apittva* of *-hi*, and

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10. Pandit Bāla Shastri's ed. (1898) reads *ādeśaś*. The other editions, including the recent one by Svami Dvarikadas Shastri and Pt. Srikālikāprasada Shukla (Varanasi, 1965-67) giving the commentaries *Padamañjarī* and *Nyāsa*, reads *lādeśaś*. The correct reading should be *nādesaḥ* (i. e. the word should begin with *n-;* also the sentence should end after this word and not before it as we find in the editions. The correct reading (*nādeśa-)* is given by the *Padamañjarī*. For the corruption in the *Nyāsa*, see the next note.

not to its very substitution in the place of *-si*. Thus the *Padamañjarī* accounts for the *Kāśikā's* statement *apittvaṁ vikalpyate* on the ground *anantaratvāt*' 'because of immediacy'. Similarly it explains *Kāśikā*'s *nādeśaḥ* 'the substitute is not (being made optional)' on the ground *vyavahitatvāt* 'because something intervenes'. The same explanation is also given by the *Nyāsa*, although the text here is corrupt[11]. It will thus be seen that the commentators take their stand on the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya Vidhir vā pratiṣedho vā* 'A rule, may it enjoin or forbid anything) either enjoins or forbids (only) that which is nearest (to it in some other rule)'.[12] In fact Nageśa introduces this Paribhāṣā by citing the very case of the present rules *ser hy apic ca* and *vā chandasi,* remarking that the option would have extended to the substitution of *-hi* (in the place of *-si*) and suggesting that it would have resulted in undesirable forms if the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya* etc. were not there : *Nanu 'vā chandasi' ity anena 'ser hy apic ca' ity*

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11. Both the editions of the *Nyāsa* (that by Srish Chandra Chakravarti, Rajshahi, 1924 and the recent Varanasi ed.) are corrupt here in three places. Firstly, the Pratīka *lādeśa* (which is chosen by the editors of the *Kāśikā* as their *Kāsikā* text) has to be correted into *nādesaḥ* since the *Nyāsa* as well as the *Padamañjarī* explain why the substitute is not rendered optional (*na ādeśaḥ vikalpyate.*) Secondly in the sentence: *ādeśas tu tena vyavahitatvād anantaro na bhavatīti vikalpyate* a word *na* is evidently to be inserted before *vikalpyate*. Lastly, in the sentence: *atrāpi pittvena nittvaṁ nasti tena guṇo na bhavati* (which is a commentary on *yuyodhi*) the words *na bhavati* have to be equally obviously corrected into *bhavati*. (In the second place a *na* is wanted while in the third place there is a *na* which is not wanted. Is it possible that by some curious misprint the *na* is misplaced?

12. Translation by Kielhorn.

anantarasyāpittvasyeva her api vikalpaḥ syāt ... *ata āha 'anantarasya vidhir'*...[13]

3. 2 The position of the ancient grammarians on this point, then, is quite clear. None of them thinks that P. 3. 4. 88 can make the substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si* optional. It is therefore no wonder that none of them cites our forms like *néṣi yáksi. váksi, śróṣi* in this connection. Nor is there seen any attempt to account for such forms by invoking any other rule of Pāṇini.

3.3 Sāyaṇa, who was not only a Vedic interpreter but also a grammarian, was hard put to it to account for such forms in the Pāṇinian system. On such occasions he generally follows one of the two following courses. Sometimes he regards these forms as formally present indicative but having an imperative value: *loḍarthe laṭ* as he says while commenting on *yaṁsi* (RV 1. 42. 9) and *néṣi*[14] (RV 3. 15. 3). But he does not cite any rule of Pāṇini to support *loḍarthe laṭ*. In 3. 4. 6 Pāṇini allows the use of *luṅ* (aorist), *laṅ* (imperfect)

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13. Similarly Sīradeva in his *Bṛhatparibhāṣāvṛtti* and Haribhāskara Agnihotri in his *Paribhāṣābhāskara (Paribhāṣāsamgraha* p. 215 and 344 respectively). Further, both of them illustrate the alleged obligatory nature of *-hi* and at the same time the optionality of its *pittva* by the forms *yuyuhi yuyohi*. These forms, which are purported to be Vedic, are just figments of the imagination. They are not met anywhere in the Vedic literature and incidentally show how the later grammarians were removed from the spirit of the Vedic language. The imaginary forms become all the more glaring if we read the concluding sentence of Haribhāskara's work: *na paribhāṣāvaśād aniṣṭāpādanaṁ sāṁpratam*' 'It is not proper to coin undesirable forms on the strength of the Paribhāṣās'.

14. Similarly other commentators. cf. Skandasvāmin's remark : *loḍarthe cātra laṭ* on *māsi* (1.92.7) and *yaṁsi* (1.42.9) etc.

and *liṭ* (perfect) with the value of any other *lakāra*. Here he does not mention *laṭ* as having such a capacity. The other course sometimes followed by Sāyaṇa is to regard such forms as formally imperatives. The absence of the substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si* is accounted for by him merely invoking their *chāndasatva*. Cf. his remarks : *loṭi ... sipo hyādeśābhāvaś chāndasaḥ* (on *yakṣi* in RV 3. 14.5) and *loṭaḥ sipi .... hirādeśaś chāndasatvān na bhavati* (on *vakṣi* in RV 3. 15. 5). Here too he does not cite any rule of Pāṇini which would account for the absence of substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si*. He too had not taken into his head to investigate minutely the real significance of P. 3. 4. 88.[15]

2.3 The modern annotators and translators

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15. Though these are the two ways in which Sāyaṇa generally understands these forms (and, of course in the presnt indicative sense in some cases,) sometimes he assigns a past indicative (simple or perfect) meaning also to some of these forms. This is so, for instance, when he paraphrases *véṣi* (5.30.4) by *aveḥ, agamaḥ; darṣi* (6.26.5) by *vidāritavān asi;* and *parṣi* (6.20.12) by *pratīrṇo bhavasi*. (All the three are understood by Sāyaṇa elesewhere in an imperative sense, vide his explanations of *veṣi* in 1.76.4, *darṣi* in 8.6.23 and *parṣi* in 6.4.8). Here the loss of the *aḍāgama* may be accounted for by P. 6. 4. 75 but the retention of *-i* of *-si* (against P. 3.4.100) cannot be accounted for. Further, Sāyaṇa sometimes takes the form *yakṣi* as some sort of 1 sing. pres ind. (middle?) when he paraphrases it by *prayaje, prakarṣena pūjayāmi* under 6.16.8, by *prayacchāmi* under 10.4.1 and by *āyāce* under 10.52.5. Similarly Venkaṭa Mādhava and Mudgala: *pra yaṁsi* (1.61.2)=*prayacchāmi*. I do not know how they could be thus taken in the Pāṇinian system.-On *jeṣi* (2.30.8) he remarks: *chāndasaḥ śapaḥ sluḥ*. Here *śapaḥ śluḥ* is evidently a mistake for *śapo luk*. On *yakṣi* (3.17.2) he says: *yajer leṭi rūpam*. But in the absence of *aṭ* or *āṭ* (P.3.4.94), *leṭ* 'subjunctive' is unthinkable. Lastly he once (1.141.8) takes *dakṣi* Pp. *dhakṣi*)=*dahati* with the remark : *puruṣavyatyayaḥ*.

follow the traditional interpretation faithfully. Thus, S. C. Vasu, *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini* Vol. I p. 593 translates P. 3. 4. 88 thus : "In the Vedas, the substitute *hi*" is optionally treated as not having an indicatory 'p'." Besides the illustrations of the *Kāśikā* he gives one more, an hypothetical instance, viz. *yuyudhi*. Böhtlingk translates : 'Im Veda ist dieses हि auch unbetont.' He wisely refrains from giving any hypothetical from.

4. Here, then, is a problem. Here on the one hand is a category of forms, by no means rare, with a pronounced meaning—a meaning which is accepted as belonging to these forms by both ancient and modern authorities ; on the other, if one accepts the traditional interpretation of P. 3. 4. 88, such forms remain unaccounted for in the Pāṇinian system. The acceptance of traditional interpretation would mean that Pāṇini had missed the significance of these forms. That would hardly do credit to his otherwise well-established minute observation of the language. Should we not rather re-examine our own interpretation of his rule?

4. 1 I for one would propose that the option stated in P. 3. 4, 88 refers to the previous rule (3. 4. 87) as a whole i. e. it makes both the statements of that rule optional : the substitution of *-hi* in place of *-si* as well as its *apittva*. In interpreting the option-giving rule in this way we have nothing to lose and everything to gain. For here we not only account for the forms like *yuyódhi, prīṇāhi, prīṇīhi,* but also for the forms like *kṣéṣi, néṣi, yákṣi, yákṣi* etc. (with the dropping of *śap* by P. 2.4. 73). Thus we fill in a gap in the Pāṇinian system, a gap which owes not to any mistake

of omission on Pāṇini's side, but to our own faulty interpretation of his rule.

4.2 But the question may be asked : what about the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya vidhir* etc. ? The difficulty can be tided over by refusing to regard the Paribhāṣā as something very sacrosanct. The Paribhāṣā may be looked upon as *anitya* 'non-obligatory', as indeed, many others are, and then the option can extend to the substitution of *-hi* also though it is not contiguous. After all, the facts of the language are more important than the conventions of the grammarians. And even though Nāgeśa does not seem to regard the Paribhāṣā as *anitya,* there is at least one work, the commentary on *Paribhāṣāsūcana* of Vyāḍi, which regards this Paribhāṣā as *anitya* : *Evaṁ tarhi siddhe yat sāgrahaṇaṁ karoti, taj jñāpayati, anityaiṣā paribhāṣeti'* (*Paribhāṣāsaṁgraha,* ed. Mm. K. V. Abhyankar, p. 10).

Or, if one does not want to be so irreverent, one can choose to look upon the whole preceding sūtra (3. 4. 87) as *anantara.* There is a unity of the subject matter : both the statements refer to the substitute *-hi.* After all, even Pāṇini has made the two statements in a single sūtra. If we look at it in this way even the *anantara* Paribhāṣā can have no objection.

4.3 It is needless to add that Pāṇini is merely *describing* a particular fact of the Vedic Sanskrit, viz. that the suffix *-si* there has sometimes the value of the imperative. It was not within the scope of his system to give an explanation of this phenomenon. What, however, must be added is this : *-si,* like any other suffix mentioned in P. 3. 4. 87 is primarily only a basic

suffix, unconnceted with any tense-mood. It becomes a representative of *laṭ* only when it actually replaces it (and in which formation, incidentally, it remains unaltered by modifications and substitutions). *-Si*, which is optionally retained in Vedic *loṭ*- formations is the basic *-si* which now becomes a representative of *loṭ*. Consequently it is wrong to say, in the Pāṇinian system, that forms like *kṣéṣi*, *neṣi* etc. are a case of '*loḍarthe laṭ*' 'present indicative having a value of the imperative'. It is *loṭ* itself. *

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IMMORTALITY IN ŚAIVISM

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Religion is an autonomous discipline. Its only justification is direct experience. The tenets of faith are not to be subordinated to material disciplines, whose techniques and aims are limited to their own inherently narrow spheres. They are not subject to physical laws. Even psychology and logic do not enter their precincts ; they only point towards them. One has, therefore, to ascend into the supersensuous origin of existence to grasp their meaning and significance. Immortality is such an experience.

The concept of the immortality of the soul is a common property of all the religious cults of India except those of the *Chārvākas* (materialists) and the Buddhists (the rationalists or agnostics). Even the Chārvākas in the last analysis, concede the continuity of *Prakṛti* (matter) and intelligence (*chaitanya*) and the Buddhists accept the continuity of consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and *śūnyatā*, which is a peculiar concept meaning neither existing (*sat*) nor nonexisting (*asat*). Śaivism is avowedly a theistic cult believing in the eternal and ultimate principle *Śiva* (the Blissful and the immortality of the soul, which is essentially of the same nature.

The sources of the Śaiva concept of immortality and, as a matter of fact of other main religio-philosophical cults of India, are to be traced in the *Upaniṣads*. Ever since man began to observe and reflect on the nature

of the universe, he found that in the midst of the fleeting and transitory phenomena of the world there is an abiding and immortal principle, which sustains it and gives it a spiritual substance and an ethical content. The *Īśopaniṣad* declares :

> All this—whatsoever moves on this transitory earth—is permeated by the Lord. Enjoy (the temporary objects of the world) through detachment. Do not covet any body else's wealth (or whose is wealth ?).[1]

The Lord is the Supreme Eternal Being, who reveals the above-quoted truth to the individual soul, the enjoyer of the worldly objects. It is a dialogue between the universal soul and the individual soul. Though the objects of the world are transitory, the soul is eternal, who enjoys, suffers, gets into bondage and, through proper knowledge, attains liberation. The proper knowledge consists in the unity of the soul and the universe in the Supreme Self :

> When to the man of realization all beings become the very Self, then what delusion and what sorrow can there be for that seer of oneness ?[2]

The quest of immortality in the world of the mortals is voiced in the *Kenopaniṣad* as follows :—

> Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards its objects ? Being directed by whom does the vital force, that precedes all proceed (towards its duty) ? By whom is this speech

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1. ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वं यत्किञ्चित् जगत्यां जगत् ।
तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः मा गृधः कस्यस्विद् धनम् ॥ 1
2. तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥ *Īśopaniṣad* 7.

willed that people utter ? Who is the being who directs the eyes and the ears ?[3]

The gist of the question is :

> Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is apparent ; or does the directorship through mere will over the mind *etc.* belong to some independent entity which is different from the aggregate ?

The answer to the question is :

> 'Since He is the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, the life of the life, the eye of the eye, therefore the intelligent man, after giving up (self-identification with the senses) and renouncing the world, becomes immortal.'[4]

In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* a bold question regarding the immortality of the soul is put by Nachiketā to Yama (Death) :

> "This doubt that arises, consequent on the death of man—some say, 'It exists,' while other say 'It does not exist'—I would know this, being instructed by you......"[5].

After evading the question and tempting *Nachiketā* with attractive boons, Yama (Death), ultimately, gave the following answer :

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3. केनेषितं पतितं प्रेषितं मनः केन प्राणः प्रथमः प्रैति युक्तः ।
केनेषितां वाचमिमां वदन्ति चक्षुः श्रोत्रं क उ देवो युनक्ति॥ *Kena.*, 1.

4. श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो मनो यद् वाचो ह वाचं स उ प्राणस्य प्राणः ।
चक्षुषश्चक्षुरतिमुच्य धीराः प्रेत्याऽस्माल्लोकादमृता भवन्ति ॥ *Kena.*, 2.

5. येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्ये अस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके ।
एतद् विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः॥ *Kaṭha* I.1.20.

The intelligent self is neither born nor does it die. It did not originate from anything, nor did any thing originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, undecaying and ancient yet new. It is not injured even when the body is killed.[6]

The self that is subtler than the subtle and greater than the great is lodged in the heart of every creature. A desireless man sees that glory of the self through the serenity of the organs, and (thereby he becomes) free from sorrow.[7]

In the *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* the immorality of the soul is stated in the following stanzas :

The soul (*Haṁsa*) travels in the Cycle of Brahma (*Brahma-Chakra*), which is the substenance of all that exists, the abode of all and all embracing. (Through ignorance) he regards himself and God (*preritāram*) as separate. But when he unites (through proper knowledge) himself with God, he realises his immortality.[8]

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The material objects are perishable (*kṣara*) the soul is eternal (*akṣara*). Both are under the control of God. When the soul fixes itself

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6. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन् नायं कुतश्चिन् न बभूव कश्चित् ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥ *Kaṭha*. I. 2. 18.

7. अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् आत्मा अस्य जन्तोर्निहितो गुहायाम् ।
तमक्रतुः पश्यति वीतशोको धातु प्रसादान्महिमानमात्मनः ॥ *Kaṭha*. I.2. 20.

8. सर्वाजीवे सर्वसंस्थे बृहन्ते अस्मिन् हंसो भ्राम्यते ब्रह्म-चक्रे।
पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततः तेनामृतत्वमेति॥ *Sveta*. 6.

on God, he becomes one with Him and is freed from cosmic illusion (*Māyā*).[9]

Śvet. Up 6.10.

In the same Upaniṣad there is an allegorical description of the immortality of the soul :

> There are two birds, friends and eternal companions, perching on the same tree. One of them tastes the fruits (and therefore is involved and suffers.) The other remains unattached (and free from wordly suffering).[10]

In the above-quoted texts reference is to the spiritual immortality of the soul. There is no hint at bodily permanence of the individual. On the other hand, it is accepted that the body is perishable. It is the soul that survives the death of the body. The soul, at its option, through proper knowledge or the grace of the Lord may unite with the cosmic soul, the supreme source of all universe or, through ignorance, may wander in the cycle of births and re-births. It may be in bondage or liberation, but it does not lose its essential character of immortality. The doctrine of re-incarnation as developed in the Upaniṣads implies the continuous existence of the soul independent of the forms it assumes.

Out of the Upaniṣadic moorings, subsequently, the following main schools of Śaivism flourished in course of time (1)—the Mahāpāśupata, (2) the Śaiva-Siddhānta, (3) the Vira-Śaivism and (4) the Kashmir Śaivism. Besides, there arose a number of heterodox of anti-Vedic

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9. क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।
तस्याभिध्यानाद् योजनात्तत्वभावाद् भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥
Śveta. 10.

10. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्य नश्नन्नन्योऽ भिचाकशीति॥—*Śveta.*4.6.

sects, like the Kapalika and the Kalamukha. They have their peculiar concepts of the soul and its immortality.

1. *The Mahāpāśupata*—

Mādhavāchārya in his *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* (14th century A. D.) deals with this school, which shows that it had been in existence long before him. According to it there are five *padarthas* (objects to be known).

(1) *Kāraṇa* (the cause—Īśvara or God).
(2) *Kārya* (the effect, the entire universe).
(3) *Yoga* (union with God through concentration).
(4) *Vidhi* (method or technique).
(5) *Dukkhānta* (cessation of miseries).[11]

Under the second category, *Kārya*, the concept of the soul is explained. The entire universe including animate and inanimate objects is the effect of God (*Pati*). It is dependent on God. It is of three types—*vidyā* (consciousness of animality), *Kāla* (the emergence of elements and organic consciousness and *paśu* (deluded, embodied and endowed with the qualities of births and re-births). In the eyes of the Lord (*Pati*=Parameśvara) everything in the universe is *paśu* (animal).[12]

The ultimate goal of *paśu* (the soul) is to regain its purity and union with its source, God, through *Yoga* and *Vidhi*. This is the state of *dukkhānta* (complete cessation of miseries). It is of two types : (1) *anātmaka* (impersonal) and (2) *sātmka* (personal). In the first

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11. *The Pāśupata-sūtras* with the commentary of Kauṇdinya, Oriental Manuscripts Library, University of Travancore, Trivandrum,

12. Ibid.

case there is the absolute extirpation of miseries. But, at the best, it is a negative condition of existence and therefore, not adequately significant. In the second case the soul becomes not only free from all limitations but it regains its full power of supremacy (*aiśvarya*), consisting of vision (*dṛk*) and action (*kriyā*). Though the soul has to perform a long and arduous journey before it reaches its goal, its existence is not ephemeral. It is an eternal and immortal entity, even though covered with impurity.[13]

2. *Śaiva Siddhānta.*

This cult is mostly prevalent in South India, particularly in Tamilnadu. Twenty-eight Āgamas are the chief authority on the sect. There are various schools of theological doctrines regarding the nature of the soul from monistic to pluralistic. The most current doctrine holds that God, souls and matter are from eternity distinct entities. The object of religious discipline is to disengage the soul from the matter and graudally to unite it with God. The relationship between these three entities is expressed by the allegory of a *paśu* (animal), *pāśa* (the fetters) any *pati* (the master or Lord). Every individual soul, deluded and embodied is a *paśu* (animal) in *pāśa* (fetters) and, therefore, suffers, from sorrow. All sorrows proceed from ignorance and *malas* and they are removed through clear knowledge of these three entities. This knowledge is gained through the grace (*anugraha*) or *arul* or *prasāda*) of *pati* (master) who is Lord Śiva. After becoming free from the *pāśa* (fetters=bondage) the soul regains its pure nature and rejoices in eternity.[14]

13. Ibid.

14. cf. *Śiva-jñana-bodha* by Meykaṇḍadeva; *Pauṣkarāgama*; *Mātaṅga-Parameśvara-tantra.*

In the *Vāyavīya-Saṁhitā* of the *Śivamahāpurāṇa* monistic touch is given to the concept of *paśu* (the soul). It says that though it is difficult to find out any rational plea for admitting a universal soul but experience forces to accept a universal entity which enjoys and suffers and which is different from body, senses and intellect. This entity survives even when the physical body perishes. It is to this universal entity that all objects of experience appeal. It is the inner controller. It is unchangeable through all changes. It is the perceiver of all things, though itself cannot be seen. When it is associated with the body it under-goes all impurities and sufferings and is drawn into the cycle of births and rebirths. This universal entity appears as many and manifests different intellectual shades in different organisms. Therefore, all souls, in the last analysis, are identical with the universal soul and consequently eternal and immortal.[15]

3. *Vīra-Śaiva School.*

According to the *Siddhānta-Śikṣāmaṇi* an authentic work of this sect, *Brahman* is an identity of being (*sat*), consciousness (*chit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). It is devoid of of any form or differentiation. It is infinite and beyond comprehension. In this all pervading existence the entire world of the conscious and the unconscious is included in its potential form and it is from this that the whole universe becomes manifested without any external aid or instrument. The aforesaid qualities of *Śiva* are of transcendental nature (*aprākṛta*). They are manifested through his inherent power (*Śakti*). Under

15. *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, II. 1.611 d-12,

the doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala*, the centre of Vīra-Śaiva philosophy is to emphasize the fact that the individual and the world as sustained in God and are indentical with Him. The cult preaches difference-in-unity. It is just like the philosophical doctrine of *Bhedābheda* taught by many Vedāntic schools. In religion this notion means that God, who is transcedent and beyond comprehension out of his free will manifests Himself also in the form of the objects that we perceive in the world and also in the nature of the individual selves. Thus the individual souls share the eternity of God and essentially are immortal.[16]

4. *Kashmir Śaivism.*

Kashmir Śaivism, on the basis of its literature is divided into three sections called *Trik* (Threefold Science) consisting of (1) *Āgamas*, (2) *Spanda* and (3) *Pratyabhijñā*. The other reason why it is called *Trik* is that it deals with three entities—Īśvara, Ātmā and Prakṛti. The *Āgama-śāstra* is regarded as revealed by *Śiva* Himself. The *Śiva-sūtras* were composed by Vasugupta in the ninth century A.D. They form the bedrock of the super structure of Kāshmir Śaivism. The *spanda-śāstra* was developed by Kallaṭa, a disciple of Vasugupta. The *Pratyabhijñā* school was started by Somānanda, the author of the *Śiva-dṛṣṭi* and was further developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.[17]

Kashmir Śaivism is monistic. According to it the only and the ultimate reality is *Śiva* and the entire universe is His reflection (*ābhāsa* or *Prakāśa*). It postu-

16. *The Anubhava-sūtra* of Mayideva.

17. The *Śiva-sūtras* discovered by Vasugupta ; *Spanda-Kārikā* of Vasugupta or Kallaṭa : The *Śiva-dṛṣṭi* of Somananda ; The *Pratyabhijña sūtra* of Utpala.

lates a conception of positivism in a theistic framework. *Śiva* is the cause (*Kāraṇa*) and even the identity (self-*ātman*) of everything in the universe, including the so-called individual selves. He manifests Himself as *Pati* (Master, Lord). *Paśu* (The creatures) and *Pāśa* (fetters =*Śakti*- power). The procees of manifestation involves five-fold successive steps—creation (*sṛṣṭi*), maintenance (*sthiti*), withdrawal (*samhṛti*), merger (*vilaya*) and grace (*anugraha*). Śiva, out of His own free will (*svātantrya*), and without any external instrument projects and with-draws the universe. The innate energy of power through which he performs these functions is called *Śakti* or *Para-śakti* (Primal Energy). Even the soul or *Jivātman* is a reflection of *Śiva* and being of the same nature is eternal and immortal. When, in the process of projection or manifestation, the soul is embodied, it enjoys and suffers ultimately, through the grace of Śiva, he *recognizes* his true self (attains *pratyabhijñā*) and he is freed into its purity and eternity. The question of mortality does not arise, because the soul is a continuously conscious personality and inheres in the cosmic cousciousness, *Śiva*.[18]

In Śaivism as in other religious sects of India, the concept of immortality is based upon direct observation and immediate experience. It is a tenet of faith, rather than a hypothesis or a chain of argumentation. It is the ultimate hope which sustains the man in his all troubles and tribulations. To regard it as a primitve superstition, delusion or illusion will be simply a counter-round of nescience.

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18. The *Iśvara-pratyablijñāsūtrā Paramārthasāra* of Abhinava-gupta.

THE PERSONALITY OF GAUDAPĀDA

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A book named *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā* or *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* or *Āgamaśāstra* is, by and large, attributed to Gauḍapāda. But recently the personality or historicity of Gauḍpāda has been proved to be fictitious. So we shall enquire whether Gauḍapāda was a historical person.

Max Walleser has shown that the name, Gauḍapāda, is a figment, made up from the title of the book *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā*, "Summary verses consisting in pādas of the Gauḍa School"[1]. His starting premiss is a quotation from the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* wherein its author, Sureśvara, after citing two verses from the *Gauḍapadīyakārikā* and two from the *Upadeśasāhasrī* states: "In this way this meaning has been spoken by our revered Gauḍas and Dravidas"[2].

From this Max Walleser argues that there were two schools of Advaita, the one represented by Gauḍas, the people of North India and the other by Drāviḍas viz. Śaṁkara who is called so because he was a resident of South India.[3] He accepts that by the word Dravidas is here meant Śaṁkara, an individual author of a book, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, but denies a similar meaning to the word 'Gauḍas' and infers that by Gauḍas should mean the anonymous summary verses, consisting in pādas

1. *Der altere Vedanta*, pp. 1, 6, 11.
Review of the book by Dr. L. D. Barnett J. R. A. S. 1910 p. 1362.

2. Evaṁ Gauḍaiḥ Drāvidaiḥ naḥ pūjyairayam arthaḥ prabhāsitaḥ/*Naiṣkarmya siddhi* IV/44. Also *Der altere Vedānta*, p. 2.

3. Op. Cit. p. 3.

of the Gauḍa School. It is difficult to account for the double standard of fixing the meaning of two similar words both of which refer to one and the same type of meaning. As Dr. Belvalkar has said in a similar context we normally expect that the words will possess a similar connotation.[4] It is further impossible to assign the meaning of quarters (pādas) to the word *pāda* in the compound word "*Gauḍapāda*", for the word *pāda* like *caraṇa* and *ācārya* is simply honorific. In Indian literature the pādas are used only to denote the four sections of a chapter and not the verses consisting of four lines. So there is nothing in the text of Sureśvara which can lend support to the conjectures of Dr. Walleser. If the ingenious Doctor would have cared to consult the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika* of Sureśvara, an author upon whom he relies for his views, he certainly must have given up his baseless conjectures, for the same author shows beyond an iota of doubt that Gauḍapāda was an individual author of the *Gauḍapādīyākārikā*. The following citations may be given here to this effect :—

(a) "This, as narrated by us, has also been said by ācārya Gauḍa, the knower of the doctrines of the Veda"[5].

(b) The verses of Gauḍapāda and others are witness to the above-mentioned truth. They should be strenuously studied as they emanate from the knowers of the Tradition"[6]

4. The *Vedanta Philosophy*, Part 1 pp. 182-183.

5. Niḥśeṣa-veda-siddhānta vidbhirapi bhāṣitam. Gauḍācāryairidaṁ vastu yathāsmābhiḥ prapañcitam. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika* II. 1. 386.

6. Ślokāśca Gauḍapādāder yathoktārthasya sākṣiṇaḥ / Adhīyate'tra yatnena sampradāyavidaḥ svayam // Ibid IV 4.886.

Moreover, Śaṁkara himself refers to Gauḍapāda at several places in his works. The following sources can be produced to eliminate the propaganda against the fact that Gauḍapāda was the preceptor of Śaṁkara's preceptor :—

I. In the *Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya* Śaṁkara salutes Gauḍapāda as his revered *paramaguru.*[7]

II. In the *Upadeśasāhasrī* he, again, salutes Gauḍapāda as the teacher of his teacher[8] (*Guror garīyase*).

III. In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* Śaṁkara quotes twice from the *Āgamaśāstra* and calls its author by such respectful expressions as the knower of the Vedānta tradition.[9]

IV. In the *Chāndagyabhāṣya* Śaṁkara refers to the author of the *Āgama-śāstra*, a treatise consisting of four prakaraṇas in this way:

"The reality of self which can be known only from such past masters of the philosophy of Vedānta as have given up all desires for external things, have sought shelter into the identity of Ātmā and have adopted the highest stage of a mendicant's life, as has been described by the most revered follower of the school of Prajāpati in the four Prakaraṇas. He alone is teaching it these days and nobody else is doing so[10]".

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7. Yastaṁ pūjya-abhipūjyaṁ paramaguruṁ pādapātair natosmi. *Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya* IV/100.

8. *Upadeśasāhasrī* XVIII 2.

9. Atroktaṁ vedāntārtha Sampradāyavidbhir ācāryaiḥ, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* II. 1.9 and Tathā ca sampradāyavido vadanti, Ibid 1.4.14.

10. Idaṁ tyaktasarvabāhyaiṣaṇair ananyaśaraṇaiḥ paramahaṁsa-parivrājakair atyāśramibhir Vedāntavijñānaparair eva vedanīyaṁ pūjyatamaiḥ prājāpatyaṁ cemaṁ Sampradāyamanusaradbhir upanibaddhaṁ prakaraṇacatuṣṭayena. Tathānuśāsatyadyāpi ta eva nānya iti *Chāndogya-upaniṣadbhāṣya* VIII. 12.1.

The last citation of Śaṁkara's is very important in several respects. In the present context it proves that the four *Prakaraṇas* viz. the Āgamaśāstra which is termed as four *Prakaraṇas* (by Śaṁkara in the introductory sentence of his commentary thereon) were written by one and the same person who alone was teaching the traditional philosophy of Vedānta during the life-time of Śaṁkara.

Thus the very starting premisses of Dr. Walleser are figments of his own mind. The whole edifice that he has built upon this fictitious foundation is simply a *fata morgana* and perhaps shows at best his craze for novelty. It is very significant that his conjecture has universally been disapproved. Dr. Barnett says in the review of his book that "the evidence adduced is very inconclusive". *Prima facie* the name Gauḍapāda is exactly parallel to Dramiḍācārya and the word *Pāda*, properly an honorific ending, is often applied to form titles of individual, e. g. *Pūjyapāda* This seems to us to be the natural explanation of the name and the quotations adduced by Dr. Walleser do not prove his case.[11] Dr. Winternitz writes that the order of succession,[12] Gauḍapāda, Govinda, Śaṁkara, is above suspicion. Professor Vidhushekher Bhattacarya pertinently observes: "There is a text before us known as the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā*, or passing under any other similar names, and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production

11. J. R. A. S. 1910 p. 1362.
12. *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. III p. 430 note 3.

of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself and not his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet it presents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one Gauḍa. When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition as far as possible? Thus as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is Gauḍa, or with the honorific word, *pāda* or *ācārya* added to it Gauḍapāda or Gauḍācarya".[13]

The historicity and personality of Gauḍapāda having been established, we shall now proceed to the examination of his actual authorship. What did he write? In the *Āgamaśāstra* there are 215 Kārikās divided into four Prakaraṇas or Chapters and twelve prose-sentences which occur in the first Chapter. So is he the author of all the 215 Kārikās and 12 sentences? This question has been one of the burning issues in the contemporary journals of Indology and has been replied in different ways. All the views on the subject can be classified into the following divisions:

(a) There is the traditional view in the Advaita order that Gauḍapāda wrote only 216 Kārikās. He did not write the 12 sentences which constitute *Māṇḍūkya*

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13. By V. Bhattacharya, *Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, University of Calcutta, 1943, Introduction pp. LXX-LXXI.

Śruti. Gauḍapāda wrote a sort of free commentary upon these passages.[14]

(b) Doctors Deussen and Vekatsubbaih hold that Gauḍapāda wrote the 215 Kārikās as well as the twelve sentences. Dr. Venkatasubbaih further maintains that as Ānandagiri indicates,[15] the first verse of the *Āgama Śāstra-bhāṣya* of Śaṁkara was also composed by Gauḍapāda.

(c) Professor B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma holds the traditional view of Dvaita Vedānta in saying that Gauḍapāda wrote the last three Prakaraṇas only. The Kārikās of the first Prakaraṇa together with the twelve prose-sentences constitute, according to this view, the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* Gauḍapāda simply incorporated

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14. This view is held by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan in his book *Gauḍapāda* pp. 81-52, by Dr. Belvalkar in the *Vendānta philosophy*, part 1 pp. 195 ff. and by Amar Nath Ray in his article, "The Māṇḍūkya-upniṣad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapād", IHQ. 1934 pp. 566-567.

15. Dr. Paul Duessen writes in the *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads* p. 30 "The commentary on Māṇḍūukya which is extant under the name of Śaṁkara treats this and Gauḍapāda's Kārikās as one and seems to regard the whole as in one sense an Upaniṣad. Dr. Venkatsubbaih writes in his article, "The Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad and Gauḍapāda" in I. A. Oct. 1933 : "It is clear that the twelve sentences comprising the Māṇḍūkya are in the opinion of Śaṁkara of the same nature as the verses which with these sentences, form the Āgama Prakaraṇa, and that they have been written by the same person as wrote the 215 verses" (p. 182). He further says on p. 183 that the other commentators also "referred to by Ānandagiri must have held the opinion that the work before them beginning with "prajñānāṁśupratānaiḥ" continuing the sentence "Om ity etad akṣaram idam" and ending with "Namaskurmo yathābalam" was wholly written by Gauḍapāda. The same view is held by him in P. O. Vol. I Nos. 1-2 ,1936.

them in his work.[16] Prof. Sarma's main thesis, however, seems to be this that "Madhva was propounding no new or startling theory when he identified these twenty nine Kārikās (of the first chapter) as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*[17] In this way he simply exonerates Madhva from a mistake, if it were so, which on his showing may be laid at the door of many predecessors of Madhva.

(d) There is a view held by Puruṣottama, the grandson of Śuddhādvaitin Vallabha, that all the Kārikās and the 12 sentences constitute the *Māṇḍūkya Śruti.* Mr. Sarma has shown that many latter advaitins also subscribe to this view.

(e) Some hold that these four chapters were written by four different persons. This view is inevitably concluded by those who maintain that there is no unity of composition or thought among the four Prakaraṇas. Max Walleser seems to attribute these Kārikās to four or even more than four authors when he says that they were anonymously current during the time of Bhāvaviveka and other Buddhists.

(f) Finally, there is a view that Gauḍapāda wrote only Kārikās of the first three prakaraṇas and the fourth prakaraṇa was written by a different hand. This view is inferred not only from the fact the fourth Prakaraṇa is independent of the preceding three Prakaraṇas as it

16. Mr. Sarma has defended this view in several articles (1) New Light on the Gauḍapādakārikā R. P. R. II 1931 : (2) Further Light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās R. P. R. III 1932 : (3) Still further Light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās R. P. R. Vol. IV 1933 : (4) The Upaniṣadic theory of the Gauḍapāda Kārikās P. O. Vols I and II.

17. R. P. R. Vol. III, P. 45 (the bracketed mine).

has salutatory verses in the beginning and the end whereas the other Prakaraṇas have no such verses, but also from the fact that it is a Buddhist work written by a Buddhist whereas the preceding Prakaraṇas are Advaitic works.

Now it will be shown that none of these views except the first can have even a probability value. The passage which we adduced from Śaṁkara's *Chāndogya* commentary is a *locuss classicus* in this respect. It proves that all the four Prakaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara, were written by one and the same person whom we have identified with Gauḍapāda.

As regards the authorship of the twelve sentences of the first prakaraṇa, there is no doubt that they constitute *Māṇḍūkya Śruti* and are older than the Kārikās. The following pieces of evidence are sufficient for holding this view :—

(a) Maṇḍana Miśra[18] in his *Brahmasiddhi* quotes a word from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and calls it *Śruti*.

(b) Sureśvara[19] in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika* quotes a full line from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and explicitly says that it is the statement of the *Māṇḍūkya Śruti*.

(c) The colophon at the end of the first prakaraṇa found in some printed copies and manuscripts of the

18. Tatra 'Sarvajñaḥ,' Sarveśvaraḥ' ityapi Śrutī samādhye eva. *Brahmasiddhi* p. 127 Cf. *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* 6.

19. Eṣo' antaryāmyeṣa sarvasya prabhavatyasau, Māṇḍūkeya śrutivacanam iti spaṣṭamadhīyate. op. cit. III 8-26.

Cf. *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* 6. This has been also pointed out by Y. Subrahmanya Sarma in the upaniṣadic theory of Gauḍapāda Kārikā, R. P. R. Vol. I, No. IV, 1933 and by Amar Nath Ray in the "Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad and the Kārikāṣ of Gauḍapāda," I. H. Q. 1934. Both these scholars rightly criticize the view of Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma.

Āgamaśāstra reads like this : "Here ends the first Book called *Āgama Prakaraṇa* in the *Gauḍapādakārikā* which is meant to discover the meaning of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.[20] This proves that the distinction between the Śruti portion and the Karika portion had been maintained by scholars of yore also.

(d) The *Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya* of Śaṁkara also maintains the above distinction. The very colophon at the end of the first Book states that "here ends the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad-cum-Gauḍapādīya Kārikā-Bhāṣya*".[21] The colophon at the end of the other Books do not contain the word *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*

So it is clear that Gauḍapada was the author of only the 215 Kārikas of the *Āgamaśāstra* and not of the twelve sentences. The twelve sentences were before him. The view of Prof. Bhattacharya that they are later than the Karikas is a false inference from the premiss that the latter are not a commentary upon the former. The premiss is true ; in reality the Karikas are not a commentary, for they are simply developing the fundamental idea of the Upaniṣad without commenting on the words that occur in the Upaniṣad. But from this the chronological priority of the Kārikās cannot be established.[22] The twelve sentences were systematically arranged by Gauḍapada in his *Āgamaśāstra*.

20. Iti Māṇḍukya upaniṣadadarthāviṣkaraṇa parāyāṁ Gauḍapādakārikāyāṁ Prathamāgamaprakaraṇam.

21. Iti Gauḍapādiya kārikā sahitamāṇḍūkopaniṣadbhāṣye Prathamāgamaprakaraṇam.

22. See V. Bhattacharya op. cit. pp. XXXVIII-XLVII for the view that the Upaniṣad is later than the Kārikās. For the criticism of the view see *Gauḍapāda* by T. M. P. Mahadevan pp. 45-50.

Has Gauḍapāda written any other works ? Four commentaries each on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the *Uttara gītā*, the *Nṛsiṁhottaratāpanīya Upaniṣad* and the *Durgā Saptaśati* and two Tāntrika treatises, the *Subhagodaya* and the *Śrīvidyāratha Sūtra* are passing under the name of Gauḍapāda. But there is no *prima facie* evidence to show that they were written by the author of the *Āgamaśāstra*. Apart from the phliosophical differences between the *Āgamaśāstra* and these works there is also the lack of originality of approach that is a hall-mark of the author of the former. So they may be regarded as spurious. Professor Bhattacharya suggests that they are the works of a different Gauḍapāda.[23] This view may be regarded as highly probable.

23. op. cit. pp. LXXXIX-LXXX.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. R. P. R. = Review of Philosophy and Religion.
2. I. H. Q. = Indian Historical Quarterly.
3. P. O. = Poona Orientalist.
4. I. A. = Indian Antiquary.
5. J. R. A. S. = Journal of Royal Asiatic Society.

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE THEORY OF KARMA

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Whatever the business of Comparative Philosophy may consist of, a necessary prerequisite to it is to understand the 'things' seemingly to be compared. One cannot really understand a thing if the elements which make that thing understandable are not experienced as true elements.

We would not like now to elaborate a theory on Comparative Philosophy and much less on Comparative Religion. Our aim is to offer a single instance of a fundamental notion at home in Eastern spiritualities, all too often misrepresented in Western interpretations and mutual dialogues and try to make it understandable in a modern language intelligible to more than one cultural tradition.

Few doctrines so pervade the religions of Asia as does that which laymen call the transmigration of souls. Few ideas have been so much misunderstood, few deemed more of a stumbling-block in the way of any rapprochement between Christianity and Asian religions.

With the following considerations I do not set up to make a scholarly investigation into the nature of that belief. Rather I should like to rough out my own view by way of a colophon to a monograph on the subject[1]

1. Cf. R. Panikkar, "La loi du karma et la dimension historique de l' homme" in *Hermeneutique et Eschatologie* ed. by E. Castelli, Paris, Aubier, 1971, pp. 205-230.

and to earlier theological reflection on the necessity of trying to understand a doctrine from within it, not from outside it and in terms of alien categories[2].

Let us begin by observing that misunderstandings are not confined to the West, that the belief as commonly held among the Asian peoples does not answer to the underlying insight in the law of *karma*. Now of course a popular belief, whatever deference it may merit, cannot be accounted the last word on the matter. If we assume that a Hindu or Buddhist scholar wished to investigate the christian idea of heaven on the basis of the popular belief he had been able to elicit by questioning factory hands, shoppers, and people coming out of cinemas and churches, it would hardly be difficult to persuade him that the genuine christian idea of heaven is something different altogether, 'toto caelo'. I shall not take the trouble to refute misunderstandings, pointing out, say, that the notion *karma* has little to do with any wandering of individual substantial souls from body to body, being born and reborn down the ages, as though what is "handed on" over and over were an essential selfhood, a personified individuality.

To my mind what the law of *karma* or rather the idea of *karman* seeks to convey is the following: Not primarily a moral law, a psychological trait, or even an anthropological pattern. *Karma* is a thing religious through and through and therefore a universal, cosmic thing. It does not have to do with men alone or their behaviour ; it operates everywhere, because it forms a

2. I refer to my publications on Comparative Philosophy and Comparative Religion.

constituent element in every being. *Karma* is the hallmark of all being's and therefore of every being's contingency and creatureliness ; it expresses the cosmic solidarity and the very time-bound nature of all existence—in other words, the historicity of the whole universe. Let me enlarge.

The word *karman*, of course, means action, but not any action at all, considered on its own, in isolation from its source and its consequences, rather the action whole and entire, single when all is said and done (of which God alone can be the agent in a theistic context), the action whereby the world comes into being and perdures, the action whose echoes ring in every nook and cranny of being, the action which every deed and activity merely mirrors, gives back, individualizes, channels, expresses, lays bare. The underlying idea in *karma* is a single vision of the entire universe. *Karma* is sacrifice—in others words, the strength, the energy if you like, that sustains the universe and keeps it one. It is not an underlying common substance or a sort of shared being that embodies itself variously in particular beings, but rather a dynamism pervading every thing which exists and by that very fact making every thing whatever it is. It is a cosmic dynamism, a universal law—medieval Europeans might say, a 'pondus', an 'impetus', a 'nexus' which does not simply impel or attract beings but atcually constitutes them.

The vision one meets with alive and operative in most of the Asian world's millions, both in times gone by and at present ; what forcibly impresses itself upon one as the archetypes of the Eastern soul, even in those who make up the modern 'educated' 'caste' of intellectuals and far more so in those (still a majority) upon

whom the winds from other climes have not blown ; the implicit infrastructure of Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas, Sikhs, Asian 'animists', and so forth could be epitomized in the word *karma*, which one Upaniṣad says was the esoteric theme the sage Yājñavalkya discoursed on outside the assembly with his friend in an attempt to read the riddle of death. At the end of the day the notion of *karma* springs from an awareness of life as one and undying.

What exists, what is of value, what really matters, is not 'me' my mental 'ego', which born, undergoes change, and dies, but Life itself. Life never dies. I am nothing but the bearer for a while of a torch alight with the flame of life. What matters is the flame. The 'realized' person is the one who acknowledges himself to be a flame, a fire, who communicates in perfect fellowship with all the flames in this world that make up a sole and single fire. *Karma's* insight is the firm persuasion that I bear a thing far more precious than my mental self can lead me to suppose—in short, that I bear and hand on the godhead. Hence the way Eastern men rise above all self-centeredness and treat all pain as comparatively unimportant. Hence too the sense of responsibility on a cosmic scale. I bear a thing that outsoars me. My particular fate is not at stake : rather I hold in my hands the fate of the universe itself. It has been handed on to me and I in turn must hand it on ; it has been entrusted to me and I must treat it in such a way that the flame shall not go out—which means that I must burn away my own life. As Tagore poetically puts the matter : "Life is a gift to us that we can prove worthy of only by giving it up ourselves".

Experience of *karma*, or belief in it, solves most of the problems which otherwise would distress me to the point of neurosis or despair. Even positing a personal God seems less needful. Belief in *karma* fits in both with belief in God and with disbelief in him. *Karma* makes me feel a sense of solidarity with the whole universe, not excluding its gods and perhaps even its divine Creator, who in that case would be the Creator of *karma* itself. I am bound up with everything, everything affects me and my deeds too affect all the universe. *Karma* makes my relations with other people something deeper than a relationship between individuals, which always carries with it the 'individual burden of incommunicability. Divine Providence would be a more or less personalized way of living that universal fellowship which *karma* conveys. What happens to me is neither fated to happen nor purely accidental ; it is caused ; and it is the tremendous cause contrived by the working together of the universe in order that I shall act in a way enabling the universe to continue its upward course and its own pace. What 'happens' to me, therefore, is not something pointless ; and I have no further grounds for tormenting myself by wondering why it has happened to me instead of to somebody else, since I cannot be differentiated from that very occurrence which is my *karma*.

Karma, then, means justice, right order, that framework of things which ensures the cohesion of the universe and its continuance in being. When I die, my ego is not reborn embodied in another ego. Rather if my ego has not died with me that means that I have not yet lived real life, I have not yet discovered that this ego is the primary, nay the only thing shutting me out from

real life— which of course amounts to saying that the torch I bore still has to go on burning and that what I mistakenly looked on as my self, all that weight of ungenuineness, I have not done away with, so that it must go on its way down the history of the universe. My ego does not change owners, passing on again to a new one ; my ego is only the bearer, the embodiment at a given point in time and space, of that part of the cosmos which is my own self operating in the karmatic chain of existence. Hence the more 'realized' a man is, the holier he is, the mightier will be the influence he wields in the total *karma* of the universe.

By the same token, to put the idea of *karma* in a christian context, what happened in Adam or happened in Christ is not something that happend to two individual members of a collective whole, in which case it would demand the utmost subtlety of theologians to account for the transmission of original sin and the efficacy of Christ's redemptive work, but something that happened throughout the karmatic chain, precisely because the one who embodied it at that particular point in time and space was not a mere mental 'self'. (Adam and Christ in this case). Souls do not travel on again : all that is un-soul, all un-life, goes on being a burden until it becomes wholly subject to the *Pantocrator*, the Lord of *karma*, submits to the Source whence it sprang, and God is all in all once more....

It is no easy task trying to make others understand an experience of one's own. It will not do to be wordy, especially when the words all have meanings that are ambivalent to say the least. Awareness of *karma* gives one a peace of mind in life such as few other deep persuasions can do. It does not remove one's

freedom or responsibility but teaches one resignation (not fatalism) and a cosmic sense of proportion which is difficult to achieve when one makes the individual the centerpiece of things. I make no comparisons. I merely try to sketch the underlying insight of *karma* in its sound and positive features; because just as belief in God may degenerate into an unwholesome reliance on him that destroys men's initiative, so belief in *karma* may degenerate into fatalism—unconcern with personal values, neglect of personal relationships, and the like.

In order to understand the countless texts on the subject we must bear in mind the two points of view from which it is traditionally approached. A schoolman would say of *karma* what he says of creation, that it can be understood actively or passively: either as a metamorphic power, a force which sets the wheel of existence turning, or as the passive material to be metamorphosed—that is, burnt, annihilated. *Karma* is what enables us to live in this life: the karmatic residue is what must be disposed of. These two senses figure over and over again, under one guise or another, in the spiritual writing of the East. *Karma* may be taken as the creatureliness that I must defeat and rise above, as the unburnt material I have been entrusted with, so that my business on earth is to burn *my karma*, turning it into sheer fire, which itself will go out when it finds no more fuel to burn; or again as the actual burning, the very power that enables me to burn, metamorphosize, cleanse all I have been entrusted with.

I do not wish to enlarge here upon this twofold sense of *karma* regarded as an active force, as the act of creating and metamorphosizing a situation, which

bursts the bounds of all possible imagining, thinking, even being—that is, as the deed whereby the creature ceases to be a creature and reaches the other shore—, or as an act which destroys and also metamorphosizes, but by destroying creatureliness only destroys *karma* itself (in the passive sense) and burns away existence. The first sense would make possible a fruitful dialogue with the religions of semitic origin, particularly with a certain type of christianity ; but at present I do not care to enter upon those rocky paths.

Perhaps the basic theme which a philosophic investigation would bring out is the contrasting experience of individualization as between East and West. Whereas in the modern West men unconsciously, as a rule work from the individual with his duties, his rights, his self-awareness, his intellect, and so forth, making the individual the foundation and the goal of everything, in the East even these days men work from the whole, the collectivity, undifferentiated reality, the bare crude datum. At most Eastern spirituality will tend to individuate and isolate but even then only by way of a theoretical finale, and that very finale will be regarded as a cosmic fulfillment rather than an individual one.

While the personal God is a God who deals with individuals, private or collective (e. g. the people of Israel), and judges them according to their personal conduct and talents, the experience of *karma* rests upon the playing of an actual part in a cosmic order which God may perhaps govern, which he may perhaps even create, but where in fact he too obeys the same law of *karma*, because what he creates outside himself is *karma*. This view scarcely leaves room for interpersonal relations, which it will always look on as useful

but not at all definitive personalizations of cosmic relations. Whereas Western civilization rests on the primacy of the person and defies understanding execpt in terms of the person, Eastern culture rests on a universal fellowship or common destiny in which each partaker plays only his own appointed role. Whereas 'differentiation', 'perfection', and fulness represent positive values in the culture of the West, indifferencc, simplification, and nothingness take first rank in the Eastern world.

Here we are dealing with primal human experiences and choices, so that there is no use trying to disregard them, or to imitate them when they do not spring of themselves from our own depths. It is idle to say that one world-view outdoes another, that the Eastern soul has not yet learnt to individualize but lies sunk in mass indifferentiation (not the true state of affairs, let it be noted) ; it is idle to find fault with the West, calling it schizophrenic (just as unfair a charge). A man labors in vain to achieve an awareness of universal solidarity and attune himself to the rhythms of the cosmos when his own deliberate will forms the chief stumbling-block athwart that way. My only purpose here is to sketch what strikes me as a basic human experience, without drawing rash conclusions as to the road men should take towards a better civilization than the present one. Possibly even the attempt at anthropological manipulation on this level is absurd, not to say something worse. And yet facing our situation may warrantably help to start the process of growth or even catalize it. One thing does seem certain, at least with regard to the few years of man which we are permitted to gaze back on and peer

forward at : that history is tending to individualize men on one hand and to collectivize them on the other in groupings different from the traditional ones. Everything suggests that a transition is going on from the superindividual stage to the superpersonal stage via individualization and personalization.

Be that as it may, two ideas appear to follow from all that we have said. The first is that no human system can be properly evaluated unless one has gained experience of it from within it. Hence the necessity for experiencing other religions from within, because their deep vision of things flows from a religious experience, not from the mere rational speculation of philosophy. The second idea is that only a profound and connatural understanding of them will place men in a position to arrange that encounter between nations, cultures, and religions so that the symbiosis will be benficial, not ruinous.

In saying all this I have not meant to affirm that the theory of *karma* is true, or false. I have merely tried to show : first, that the theory is far from nonsensical, that it represents a deep insight into the nature of things ; and second, that there is no reason at all for condemning it in the light of christian principles. Indeed, I am convinced that its adoption would enrich Western culture and fructify christian theology, resting as that does exclusively on a judaeo-graeco-western worldview, just as it would enrich and deepen the karmatic experience of reality. The first step might quite possibly bring us to theological pluralism rather than to a theological synthesis, for which unquestionably the time is not ripe. I seem to see a whole spectacular program

stretch out before our eyes. And obviously, until these and analogous attempts bear their fruit it is laughable, not to say insulting, to talk of incarnating the christian faith in Asia or adapting the Gospel message to any culture and mental outlook. The day is done when the 'natives' could be fobbed off with a few concessions to their customs. The difficulties loom large, but the might of the Spirit is not given stingily. There stands the challenge for anyone who cares to take it up.

I have tried to say, quite simply, that experience of faith must not be confused with attachment to a belief.

ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM 'UBHAYA VEDANTA'

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The term *'Ubhaya Vedānta'*, 'twofold Vedānta' is current in *Śrīvaiṣṇavism* and is used as an epithet of writers and teachers. It has been understood as referring to the twofold basis of *Śrīvaiṣṇava* thought, the one in the *Tamil hymns* of the *Ālvārs* and the other in the *Upaniṣads* in Sanskrit.

Recently I came across this epithet being used for a Śaivite teacher. The explanation for this that occurs immediately is that as there is the *Tamil hymns* of the *Nāyanārs* the *Śaiva* counter-part of those of the *Vaiṣṇava Ālvārs*, the expression as applied to *Śaivism* could have the same reference to the *Tamil Śaiva* psalms and the *Upaniṣads* as constituting the twofold Vedāntic basis of *Śaivism* too.

But a different and more a likely explanation seems possible. In the above explanation we have to resort to two languages, *Tamil* and *Sanskrit*, which will necessitate also the relevance of this term within the provenance of the *Tamil* area. If the epithet is used for authors and scholars in other areas and centres like Banaras, we should naturally seek something else in addition to the *Upaniṣads* as forming the basis of *Vedānta*, something which too is in *Sanskrit*.

There is a work entitled *Siddhāntaśekhara*, a digest (*nibandha*) of *Śaiva Āgamas* by Viśvanātha of Banaras who came of a family of scholars patronised by the Western

Calukyas of Kalyān. Viśvanātha who wrote this work in the first quarter of the 13th cent.[1] A. D. describes himself as the pupil of one Kṛṣṇa of Banaras, son of Janārdana Cūḍāmaṇi and proficient in different Śāstras including *Śaivism*. In the colophon to the chapters of this *Siddhāntaśekhara*, Viśvanātha describes his *Guru* in Saivism as an *Ubhaya Vedāntin*:

इति श्रीशुद्धशैवागमाचार्य-श्रीकृष्णयोगीन्द्रशिष्येण उभयवेदान्ति-भास्करसूनुना कृताग्निष्टोमेन विश्वनाथेन विरचिते सिद्धान्त-शेखरे ।……प्रथमः परिच्छेदः।

From the nature of the work *Siddhāntaśekhara*[2] and the background of the author, his family and *guru*, it is clear that the term *Ubhaya Vedānta* means, by the two sources of Vedānta, the *Upaniṣads* and in addition to the *Upaniṣads*, the *Āgamas*. It is well known that in the *Vedānta Sūtras* II. 2. 35-42 the *Āgamas* and their authority are examined and Śaṅkara rejects the views of *Āgamas*, *Śaivite* and Vaiṣṇavite, on the nature of God and creation. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha's *Bhāṣya*, there is no contradiction between the *Āgamas* and the *Upaniṣads* both of them having had their source in the Almighty and being equally authoritative.

वयं तु वेदशिवागमयोर्भेदं न पश्यामः । I.2.35.

Thus according to *Śaivite* Śrīkaṇṭha's interpretation of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, there is a *Samanvaya* between the *Āgamas* on the one hand and of the *Upaniṣads* on the other as basis of *Vedānta*.

This is a significant phase in the history of *Vedānta* showing the integration of the Āgamic and Vedic

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1. See R. 5268, Madras Govt. Ori. Mss. Library.

2. An edition of this work with my foreword is being brought out by Sri Sitarama Somayajin, Professor of Saivism, Maharaja's College of Sanskrit, Mysore.

traditions and its theistic interpretation, whether Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite. If *Ubhaya* in *Ubhaya Vedānta* is taken as referring to the *Pāñcarātra* Āgama texts as a compliment to the *Upaniṣads*, it is quite appropriate to Viśiṣṭādvaita also. Rāmānuja shows this *Samanvaya* between *Upaniṣads* and *Pāñcarātra Āgama*, some texts of which he quotes, in his *Śrībhāṣya* II 2. 39-42.

It therefore appears more appropriate to take the term *Ubhaya Vedānta* as referring to the integrated *Upaniṣad-cum-Āgama* approach and as equally valid for *Śaivite* and *Vaiṣṇavite* traditions, both of which have such a dual basis in *Upaniṣad* and *Āgama*.

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DADHYAÑ ĀTHARVAṆA IN THE VEDIC LITERATURE

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Dadhyañ is mentioned as the son of Atharvan[1] in ṚV. 6.16.14; 1.116.12; 117.22.[2] He is mentioned nine times in the ṚV. He is a seer who kindled Agni (6.16.14) and is mentioned with Atharvan, Aṅgiras, Manu and other ancient sacrificers (I.80.16; 139.9).

The Aśvins gave a horse's head to Dadhyañ who then proclaimed to them the place of mead (*Madhu*) of Tvaṣṭṛ (1.11,7.22). With the head of a horse Dadhyañ proclaimed to the Aśvins the place of mead (1.116.12). The Aśvins won the heart of Dadhyañ; then the horse's head spoke to them (I.119.9).

Sayaṇa, while commenting on I.116.12 gives the following legend: अत्रेयमाख्यायिका। इन्द्रो दधींचे प्रवर्ग्यविद्यां मधुविद्यां चोपदिश्य यदि इमाम् अन्यस्मै वक्ष्यसि शिरस्ते छेत्स्यामि इति उवाच। ततोऽश्विनौ अश्वस्य शिरश्छित्वा दधीचः शिरः प्रच्छिद्य अन्यत्र निधाय तत्र आश्व्यं शिरः प्रत्यधत्ताम्।

1. cf. (a) तमु त्वा दध्यङ्ङृषिः पुत्र ईधे अथर्वणः ṚV 6.16.14.
   (b) दध्यङ् ह यन्मध्वाथर्वणो वामश्वस्य शीर्ष्णा प्र यदीमुवाच ṚV 1.116.12.
   (c) दध्यङ् ह मे जनुषं पूर्वो अङ्गिराः प्रियमेधः कण्वो अत्रिर्मनुर्विदुस्ते। ṚV 1.139.9.
   (d) येना नवग्वो दध्यङ्ङपोर्णुते। ṚV 9.108.4.
2. cf. Sāyaṇa (a-b) अथर्वणः पुत्रः दध्यङ् एतत्संज्ञ ऋषिः Ṛv 6.16.14, and 1.116.12.
   (c) दध्यङ् अथर्वगोत्रोत्पन्न एतन्नामको महर्षिः Ṛv 1.139.9.
   (d) दध्यङ् एतन्नामकोऽङ्गिराः Ṛv 9.108.4.

तेन च दध्यङ् ऋचः सामानि यजूंपि च प्रवर्ग्यविषयाणि मधुविद्याप्रतिपादकं ब्राह्मणं चाश्विनावध्यापयामास । तदिन्द्रो ज्ञात्वा वज्रेण तच्छिरोऽच्छिनत् । अथाश्विनौ तस्य स्वकीयं मानुषं शिरः प्रत्यधत्तामिति शाट्यायन वाजसनेययोः प्रपञ्चेनोक्तम् ।

"A legend is told in this connection. Indra taught the *Madhuvidyā* and *Pravargyavidyā* to Dadhyañ and warned him that he would cut off his head if he taught it to some one else. Then the Aśvinas cut off Dadhyañ's head and replaced a horse's head by means of which Dadhyañ taught Aśvinau the *ṚKs*, *Yajus* and the *Sāmans* dealing with *Pravargya-vidyā* and the *Brāhmaṇa* dealing with the *Madhu-vidyā*. Indra knew this and cut off the horse's head with his thunderbolt. Thereupon Aśvinau replaced the original human head. The story has been narrated in details in *śāṭyāyana* and *Vājasaneya*."

In 1.84.13-14 it is said that Indra killed the 99 Vṛtras with the bones of Dadhyañ—

इन्द्रो दधीचो अस्थभिर्वृत्राण्यप्रतिष्कुतः । जघान नवतीर्नव ॥

While commenting on the *Ṛk* Sāyaṇa gives a historical legend of the Śātyāyanins : अत्र शाट्यायनिन इतिहासमाचक्षते । 'आथर्वणस्य दधीचो जीवतो दर्शनेनासुराः पराबभूवुः । अथ तस्मिन् स्वर्गतेऽसुरैः पूर्णा पृथिव्यभूत् । अथेन्द्रः तैरसुरैः सह योद्धुमशक्नुवंस्तमृषिमन्विच्छन् स्वर्गं गत इति शुश्राव । अथ पप्रच्छ तत्रत्यान् नेह किमस्य किञ्चित् परिशिष्टमङ्गमस्तीति । तस्मा अवोचन् अस्त्येतदाश्व्यं शीर्षं येन शिरसा अश्विभ्यां मधुविद्यां प्राब्रवीत् । तत्तु न विद्म यत्राभवदिति । पुनरिन्द्रो अब्रवीत् । तदन्विच्छतेति । तद्धान्वैषिषुः । तच्छर्यणावत्यनुविद्याजह्रुः । शर्यणावद्ध वै नाम कुरुक्षेत्रस्य जघनार्धे सरः स्यन्दते । तस्य शिरसो अस्थिभिरिन्द्रोऽसुराञ्जघान' इति ।

"Here the Śāṭyāyanins tell a legend. As long as Dadhyañ was living on the earth the demons were defeated. But no sooner did he go to heaven than the whole earth was pervaded by them. Thereupon when Indra being unable to face the demons inquired after the *Ṛṣi*, he came to know that he had gone to heaven. He, however, asked the people, "Is there no remnant

of the sage left?" The people said, "Here is the horse's head by which he taught the *Madhuvidyā* to the Aśvins. But we do not know where it is now". Indra then said again, "Go, search for it." They searched and getting it in Śaryaṇāvat brought it to him. (Śaryaṇāvat is indeed a lake in the lower part of Kurukṣetra).[3] With the bones of that head Indra killed the demons."

Indra, besides producing cows from the dragon for Trita gave cowstalls to Dadhyañ and Mātariśvan (10.48.2). These are probably the cow-stalls which Dadhyañ opens by the power of *Soma* (9.108.4). It is noteworthy that in the only older passage (6.16.14) in which the name of Dadhyañ occurs, he is the son of the ancient fire-priest Atharvan and is himself a kindler of fire. Otherwise he is chiefly connected with *Soma* and with Indra in the release of cows.

Owing to his horse's head and his name he can hardly be disassociated from Dadhikrā. Let us, therefore, examine the etymology of the word.

The Etymological meaning of Dadhyañ

Keith says that the word etymologically means "Curdward (*Dadhi-añc*)". It thus may mean either 'possessing' or 'fond of' curdled milk. Monir Williams interprets it as 'sprinkling *Dadhi*' on the analogy of the word *Ghṛtācī* i.e. 'a ladle which sprinkles ghee'. Bergaigne however, is of opinion that Dadhyañ does not differ essentially from *Soma*. Keith further conjectures that Dadhyañ originally represented the lightning form of fire and that the horse's head would indicate its speed; the voice with which it speaks, the thunder; its bones the

3. cf. इच्छन्नश्वस्य यच्छिरः पर्वतेष्वपश्रितम् । तद्विदच्छर्यणावति ॥ Ṛv 1.84.14.

thunderbolt.[4] Yāska and Durgācārya try to derive the word as follows—

दध्यङ् प्रत्यक्तो ध्यानमिति वा। प्रत्यक्तमस्मिन् ध्यानमिति वा—Yāska. दध्यङ् मनुः अथर्वा इति त्रित्वपक्षे आदित्या एवैते तगुदगायोगाद् भवन्ति, द्युः स्थाने समाम्नानात्, पृथक्त्वे पुनर्द्युस्थानाः तत्सहचारिणः एते ऋषयः। प्रत्यक्तो ध्यानम् प्रतिगतो ध्यानमिति; ध्यानारम्भणे ह्येष उक्तः स्वमधिकारमनुतिष्ठति। तस्मिन् ध्यानकार्यं सफलं लक्ष्यते इति वा। —Durgācarya.

The telling of the mead (मधुविद्या) is interpreted more prosaically by Hillebrandt as referring to the use of honey in the ritual by the Atharvans.

Shri. S.P. Pandit's view

Shri S. P. Pandit, the author of *Vedārthayatna* avers : The ṚV. does not refer to the manner in which Indra killed the enemies with the bones of Dadhyañ. The story given by Sāyaṇa in his commentary does not appear to be a genuine one. This feat of Indra seems to have been completely forgotten in the post-Vedic period. In the *Brāhmaṇas* which are composed many years after the *Saṁhitās* the story seems to have been hopelessly misrepresented.

The statements that (a) the Asuras were frightened at the mere sight of Dadhyañ and were defeated, (b) that Indra was unable to kill the demons, (c) that the demons pervaded the whole earth and (d) that the horse-head of Dadhyañ was found in the lake Śaryaṇāvat in Kurukṣetra do not seem to have originated in the Vedic period. They definitely seem to have a stamp of much later period. As a matter of fact Śaryaṇāvat was

4. Keith further adds that his connection with the secret abode of Soma, would resemble that of the eagle with celestial Soma. The name, too, suggests the curdling effect of the thunderstorm.

a lake in which the *Soma* plant grew in abundance.[5]

Mr. S. P. Pandit conjectures that this may lead us to the rational explanation of the myth that the sage Dadhyañ must have been a symbolism for the *Soma* plant. The lines of arguments are as follows :

(A) The word Dadhyañ means 'a substance mixed with curds' दधि अञ्चति इति and hence it represents Soma mixed with curds (दध्याशिर).

(B) Indra killed the enemies with the bones of Dadhyañ. This only means that the billets of the *Soma* plant resembled bones. Indra drank the *Soma* squeezed from these billets and having secured power thereby, killed the enemies like Vṛtra etc.

(C) Dadhyañ put on horse's head and taught *Madhuvidyā* to Aśvins. This means that the top of the *Soma* plant resembled a horse's head. The Vedas say that the Aśvins endowed various substances with sweetness. They also got the honey prepared by the bees. In the same way the Aśvinau must have come to know that the *Soma* plant also contains sweet elixir. This must have given birth to the myth that Dadhyañ taught *Madhu-vidyā* (i.e. preparation of *Soma*) with a horse's head to the Aśvins.

(D) That Indra at last found the horse's head in a lake called Śaryaṇāvat, thus, supports the interpretation.

(E) That Dadhyañ introduced fire-worship with the offerings of *Soma*, means that in all ages fire was to be

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5. cf. (a) सिन्धून् पर्वताञ्छर्यणावतः Ṛv 10.35.2. (b) अश्वस्य शिरो···विदत् शर्यणावति । Ṛv 1.84.14. (c) मन्दस्वा सु स्वर्णर उतेन्द्र शर्यणावति । Ṛv 8.6.39 (d) ये वादः शर्यणावति Ṛv 9.65.22. (e) शर्यणावति सोममिन्द्रः पिबतु । Ṛv 9.11.3.1.

worshipped first. *Soma* was considered to be an essential requisite in the cult of fire.

The above line of arguments by Shri Pandit apparently seems to be quite logical. It must, however, be remembered that the Western Scholars were the founders of interpreting every Vedic reference, which was ordinarily inexplicable, symbolically. The Indian Scholars were naturally influenced by them. Of course, it must be admitted that symbology is one of the peculiarities of the Vedic language. But that does not mean that even in an apparently historical context symbolism should be sought. But thanks to the critical acumen of some scholars whose researches are proving that the Ṛgveda is a history, a significant social record and not a mere bundle of mystic symbols.

If Dadhyañ is to be identified with the *Soma* plant, how are the *Ṛks* (6.16.14; I.116.12, I.117.22, I.80.16) where he is said to be the son of Atharvā or 'Ātharvaṇa' to be explained? Sāyaṇa definitely asserts that he is the son of Atharvā or at least a sage born in the family of Atharvan or of an Aṅgiras. His commentary on ṚV. 9.100.4 definitely suggests that Dadhyañ and *Soma* are not identical.

Bhāgavata Purāṇa (6.11.20, 8.20.7),[6] Śatapatha Br.(4.1.5.18 etc.),[7] Jaiminīya Br., Pañcaviṁśa Br.(12.8.6),[8] Br. Up. (2.5.22; 4.5.28) refer to him in clear terms as a sage. Dadhyañ, thus seems to be one of the most ancient

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6. नन्वेष वज्रस्तव शक्र तेजसा हरेर्दधीचस्तपसा च तेजितः। and श्रेयः कुर्वन्ति भूतानां साधवो दुस्त्यजासुभिः । दध्यङ् शिबिप्रभृतयः ……………॥

7. दध्यङ् ह वा आभ्यामाथर्वणो मधु नाम ब्राह्मणम् उवाच ।

8. दध्यङ् ह वा आङ्गिरसो देवानां पुरोधानीय आसीत् ।

seers. It was due to him that people took to fire-worship. The custom of extracting *Soma*-juice and of offering it to the gods is said to have been started by Dadhyañ with some other seers.

To resume, Dadhyañ Ātharvaṇa seems to be a special figure among the Atharvans. He is mentioned once in *Maṇḍala* VI which is specially fond of Atharvans, and elsewhere only in *Maṇḍalas* I, IX, X. The essential legend about him is that with the head of the horse hidden in the mountains he declared the *Madhu-vidyā* to the Aśvins. Further, Indra is said to have found the horse hidden in the mountains and to have slain ninety-nine Vṛtras with the bones of Dadhyañ. He is the son of Atharvan and the kindler of fire, and he obtains cows from Indra and opens cowstalls by Soma's power. The legned suggests that he is the founder of the *Soma*-cult.*

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PROBLEMS OF YAKṢAS

RAI GOVIND CHANDRA

The various problems of yakṣas have been attracting the attention of scholars both European and Indian for a long time now but like so many unsolved questions of Indian History and Culture these have also remained riddles staring us in our faces. These problems can be divided under three main headings, namely, etymological, theological and ethnological.

Under the etymological problems of the word *yakṣa,* come the questions of determining the exact meaning of this word in the context it appears in ancient Indian literature, its derivation as propounded in the lexicons and from aboriginal languages, its connection with similar words of other ancient languages of the world like Sumerian, Hittite, Babylonian, Pahalavi, Egyptian, Greek and Chinese, the changes in the meaning of this word by efflux of time etc.

From theological angle the problems which crop up are whether the yakṣas belonged to the Āryan pantheon or have got their place in it due to later contacts with the aboriginal inhabitants of India, in case they are of aboriginal origin, the probable time they penetrated the Āryan religion, the forces of nature they represented in the aboriginal religion, the benefit they bestowed, the place they occupied after entering the Āryan religion, the changes in their status and

beliefs about them, the mode of their worship in aboriginal societies and later in Āryan and Hindu religions, the place of their worship, the people who worshipped them, the present mode and places of worship.

Similarly under the ethnological issues come the ethnographical and ethnometric problems of yakṣas, such as questions of identifications of the yakṣas with a particular tribe of ancient India, the regions occupied by the yakṣas, the appearance of the members of the yakṣas tribe, their dress, their mode of life, their food, their occupation, their traits of character etc. Likewise the questions of connecting the yakṣa tribe with a tribe of same name surviving today, the regions occupied by this tribe, the effect of terrain and climate on the physical features and appearance of the members of the tribe, reasons for their migration to their present habitat, the mingling of races and consequent changes in their physical appearances, their houses, their present day dress, their food, their religious beliefs, their customs, their character, the ethnometric date about them, their literature, their number also come within the limits of ethnological problems. The basis of literary evidences will have to be considered within the framework of ethnological issues.

The etymological and theological problems concerning yakṣas have been dealt with by the scholars but the ethnological problem, the foremost one remains still unexplored. The purpose of this paper is to probe it from this angle and to establish that yakṣas are not simply mythological concepts but they represent an Indian tribe which exists even to-day.

The word *yakṣa* according to Coomaraswami is

is not of Sanskrit origin[1]. Hillebrandt finds the earliest meaning of this word : magician uncouth being, unseen spiritual enemy etc., then simply a supernatural being of exalted character.[2] In the *Dhātupāṭha* of Pāṇini *yakṣa dhātu* comes under *curādigaṇa, ātmanepada seṭ* : *Yakṣa pūjāyām* (Dhātu no. 1693).[3] In the *Dhātumālā* of *Saddanīti* it is explained as '*Yakṣa*' *pūjāyām. Yakkheti, yakkhayatiti yakkho. Yakkho ti mahānubhāvo satto* etc.[4] Later lexicons interpret the word as soul, as one who worships, as one who is worshipped. A number of derivations have been suggested of this word e.g. from *yaśa.*[5] ; from Persian *yaśa*[6] ; from the Greek god *Kabeiros* etc.[7] ; It, however, appears to be the name of tribe as the word "*itarejanaḥ*" of *Atharvaveda* (8, 10, 28) clearly suggests. The origin and meaning, if any, will have to be searched in Sumerian as the people with whom they can be identified, if at all, seem to have passed to India from Southern Arabia.

The word *yakṣa*, however, occurs in several hymns of the *Ṛgveda* and here a feeling of antagonism

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1. J. N. Banerjee, *Development of Hindu Iconography* p. 337, fn. 1.

2. Hillebrandt, *Vedisch yakṣa un Festigahe Richard gathe*, Erlangen, 1927.

3. *Word Index to Pāṇini—Sūtrapāṭha and Prīśiṣṭas*—compiled by Shridhara Shastri Pathak, B. O. R. I., Poona, 1935.

4. *Dhātumālā of Saddanīti*, Ch. XVIII, p. 523, ed. by Helmer Smith, 1929.

5. Renou—*Etūde vediques et Pāṇincennes*, III, 38.

6. Mayrhofer, III, (but here Iranian hypothetical word yahś is given).

7. E. W. Hopkins, "*Sanskrit Kabairas and Greek Kabeiros*", J. A. O. S., Vol. II, Sept. 1913, p. 55.

against yakṣas appears, though they are described as beautiful to look at(7, 56, 16) and whose weapons fly as those of Bṛhaspati (1, 190, 4). In the *Yajurveda Saṁhitā* it appears that this antagonism becomes a little subdued as is evident from the verb *yakṣat* formed the noun and used in the sense of worshipping (*SYV*. 20, 24-34 etc.). In the *Atharvaveda itarcjanaḥ* denotes yakṣas (AV. 8, 1078) and signifies that this was a tribe. In the *Śatapatha* Kubera is described as Rājā probably of the yakṣas.

The Āṭānāṭiya Sutta of *Dīghanikāya* describes yakṣas as residents of Uttarakuru and Sudarśana mountain in the northern region. The people born here have no attachments, do not accept things from others, neither they sow seeds, nor plough the fields. They eat wild paddy (*akṛṣṭa-pacya*), scented rice cooked in milk; they go to all directions on bullocks, animals, women and men etc.[8] From this description it is evident that yakṣas were members of a tribe.

Yakṣas, according to Ceylonese chronicles, were ruling at one time the island of Ceylon where they had come from the main land ; but when they began to give trouble to the merchants passing via Ceylon, Buddha by his miracles frightened them and made them leave Ceylon and go to Giri Dvīpa[9]. This description also suggests that there was a tribe called yakṣa.

In the *Mūla Sarvāstivāda Vinaya* the story of the

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8. *Dīghanikāya*, ed. by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana & Jagadīśa Kāśyap, Mahabodhi Society, Sarnath (Varanasi), 1936, p. 277-280.

9. V. Rangacharya, *Pre-Musalman India*, p. 596 : also A. A. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian & Indonesian Art*, Ceylon, p. 158.

initiation of all the four Mahārājas by Buddha is recorded.[10] The story in short runs as follows : Once when Buddha was in Puṣkariṇī kṣetra on the banks of river Mandākinī he resolved to initiate four Mahārajas of all the four quarters. They all came with their followers ....Mahāraja Vaiśravaṇa came along with several hundred thousands of yakṣa followers from the North. They had all brought with them gold and offered that to the Lord, after doing salutation to the Lord by bowing their heads at his feet they sat down before him. Among these four Mahārājas, two belonged to Aryan tribe, i. e, Dhṛtaraṣṭra and Virūḍhaka and other two Virūpakṣa and Vaiśravaṇa were of Dasyu tribe. Buddha thought that if he delivered his sermon in Aryan speech (aryā vāc) two belonging to Aryan tribe would understand, while the rest two who were of Dasyu tribe would not. Similar would be the case if he spoke in Dasyu language. He, therefore, decided to preach the first two in Aryan speech and the rest two in Dasyu speech. He delivered his first sermon in Aryan speech to Dhṛtarāṣṭra Mahārāja in the following words : "*Iti hi Mahārāja- jīrṇaḥ kāyaḥ vedanā śītībhūtā saṁjñā niruddhā saṁskārā vyupaśāntā vijñānamastaṁgatam. Eṣa evānto duḥkhasyeti*"................."Now he turned towards the rest two and preached Virūpakṣa : " *Iti hi Mahārāja ene mene daṣphe ḍaṇḍaṣphe eṣa evānto duḥkhasyeti*"; and to Vaiśravaṇa he said : "*Atra te Mahārāja māṣā tuṣā saṁśāmā sarvatra vivāṭhi eṣa evānto duḥkhasyeti*".

Here we find that two groups of languages or speeches have been used for these two groups and there

10. *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, 1,255-260; also Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, Vol. II, p. 425 ff.

is distinction between the speeches used in preaching the two Dasyu Mahārājas namely, Virūpākṣa and Vaiśravaṇa too. Thus from the above citation of the text it is evident that the tribe to which Viśravaṇa, the Lord of the yakṣas belonged had its own particular language which was classified under the Dasyu group of languages and it had certain peculiarities and variations from other Dasyu speeches of the period.

It is significant to note that in the Dulva the whole of the above cited Aryan speech has been translated into Tibetan language but the portions of the sermons delivered to Virūpākṣa and Vaiśravaṇa, said to be in Dasyu language were not translated but were simply transliterated in the original form. Let us consider the possibilities which prompted the ancient scholars to do so. Two reasons for the same that come to mind are : (a) the translation of the text into Tibetan was done at a later stage when these tribal languages had become obscure, (b) the translators kept purposely the original speech to give specimens of the tribal languages of the yakṣas and Kumbhāṅdas to which Vaiśravaṇa and Virūpākṣa belonged.

This also confirms that there was a tribe of yakṣas in ancient India and it had its own speech.

The Dasyu vāca in *Ṛgveda* is called *mṛdhra vāca* which has been described as lisping tongue by Muir.[11] Prof. Macdonell records this to be the language of enemies.[12] The names of the Dasyus which occur in *Ṛgveda* are Cumuri, Śambara and Śuṣṇa etc. The adjec-

11. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, II, 392.

12. *Vedic Index*, Vol. I, p. 347, fn. 4 & 5 ;

tive '*anās*' used for the Dasyus brings forth the hyp
sis that they were members of a tribe. If we take
to mean flat nosed then also it depicts certain non-A
tribe which comes nearer to aborigins.

The Dasyus have been described in *Ṛgve*
akarman, non-believers in rites, *adevayu*-indiffere
gods, *abrahman*- without devotion, *ayajvan*- non-perfo
of yajñas, *ayajyu*- non-worshipper, *avrata*- non-believ
laws, *anyavrata*- followers of strange ordinances or pa
(perhaps other than those of the Aryans) : an
Atharvaveda as *devapīyu*- reviling gods. They are
described as *anās* and *kṛṣṇa tvac* etc.[13]

Robert Sheafer writes that there is a differ
between the Dāsas and Dasyus. Dāsas were ene
who claimed equality with Aryans, to defeat them
to conquer them was laudable. And Dasyus
considered to be of low class who could be beaten
punished etc. He has tried to connect the Dasyus
Bhils.[14] Now the problem arises, can we take
the Bhils and yakṣas belonged to the same an
common tribe.

In the Census Report it is stated that the B
were spread all over India before the adven
Aryans.[15] Perhaps originally they migrated f
Sahara region when it turned into a desert and thro
Arabia reached India. Here, however, when t
came in contact with other aboriginal tribes, t
were termed as Bhils as in Tamil there is a w

13. Ibid. *Kṛṣṇa tvaca* and *Anās*, RV. 1,130,8.

14. Robert Sheafer, *Ethnography of Ancient India*, Otto Ha
sowitz, Wiesbaden, 1959, pp. 32. 33.

15. *Census Report*, 1931, Vol. I, Pt. III–Ethnographic acc
of Bhils of Central India, 1935, pp. 40-42.

Bhileśvara meaning a person using bow and arrows. The Bhils are not Austroloids, as on the basis of blood grouping the Austroloids have 'A' group of blood while Bhils and Mundas have 'B' group.[16] It appears that before the Tamilians used common nomenclature Bhil, a number of tribes existed which were known by their individual tribal names remnants of which still exist, e. g. there is a tribe living in Gujarat and Western Rajputana, of Bhils known as *Vāsavo* and another tribe known as *Nahalā*. Compbell has described the Nahalas as mostly savages,[17] a prominent characterstic of the yakṣas too. Can there be any connection between this *Vāsavo* and the Pali word *Vessavaṇa* (Vaiśravaṇa - Kubera), the Lord of *yakṣa*. Likewise *yakkha* the Pali word for *yakṣa*, was probably the name of another Bhil tribe which migrated to northern region under certain circumstances and this important factor will be discussed in the succeeding pages.

Bhils have been described in Rajputana Gazetteer as of small stature, dark in complexion, flat-nosed and ugly.[18] Dasyus too were *kṛṣṇa tvac* and *anās* in *Ṛgveda* as referred before. Thus they could have been the modern Bhils. D. N. Majumdar describes Bhils as having both flat and erect noses with alive complexion not unlike their Gujarati neighbours and their women folk is more intelligent than their men[19]—a characterstic

16. D. N. Majumdar, *Races & Cultures of India*, Asia Publishing House, 1951, p. 40.

17. Compbell, *The Wild Tribes of India*, London, 1882, p. 31.

18. *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Calcutta, 1908, p. 87.

19. D. N. Majumdar, *Races and Cultures of India*, p. 40.

ascribed to *yakṣiṇis* in the Buddhist texts. It is possible that he has based his conclusions on those Bhils who inhabit the jungles bordering towns of Gujarat. These physical changes in them appear to have cropped up firstly through their impregnation by Śakas and later on by the Gujaratis.

The migration of Bhils from plains to remote places like hills and jungles must have definite basis. As stated before they were known as Dasyus in *Ṛgvedic* period and after the Aryan advent they must have considered the remote places more congenial for their residence than to live near the Aryan settlements due to constant fear of persecution and forced employment to menial works. In this connection we have the textual testimony to our support. If we consider the problem where did the yakṣas live, the *Ṛgveda* testifies their presence near the Aryan settlements[20] and if we take them as dasyus then at least two battles were fought by Aryans with them, one near Puṣkariṇī or modern Rāvī and another on the banks of river Yamunā.[21] As stated before the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* too records that Lord Buddha preached Vaiśravaṇa, the king of yakṣas, at Puṣkariṇī region which corroborates the fact that the region of yakṣas was in the same area where Aryan settlements took place and they had to migrate.

The regions occupied by the yakṣas.

As per description in the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* yakṣas were residents of Uttarakuru in the vicinity of Sudarśana mountain. Their cities were *Āṭānaṭā*,

20. RV. 4, 3, 13.
21. *Vedic Index*, Vol. I, p. 347, fn. 2.

Kusināṭā, Para Kusinaṭā, Nāṭasuriyā, Kapīvanta, Janogha and 99 other cities.[22]

In the *Brahmapurāṇa* yakṣas are said to be the inhabitants of lower Himalayan hills.[23] According to *Śrīmadbhāgavata* they were the residents of Droṇagiri of Himālaya mountains.[24] In the *Kūrmapurāṇa* [25] it is stated that yakṣas lived at a place where the Kailāsa peak separates itself from the main Kailāsa mountain which means that they were living at a place in the lower hilly tract of Kailāsa. *Matsya*[26] and *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇas*[27] record the place round Kailāsa peak situated on the back of the Himālayas as their abode. The *Vāyu Purāṇa* describes Jyotiṣa Śṛṅga (peak) of Meru mountain as the place of Kubera and around it the abode of his generals.[28].

In the *Mahābhārata* Kubera with eight lacs of yakṣas has been described as living on *śveta* peak of Mandāra mountains.[29] Kālidāsa in his *Meghadūta* has described them to be the inhabitants of Alakāpurī situated in the hills where Gaṅgā falls from mountains.[30] The place should not be very far from modern Uttara Kāśī. Buddhist *Jātakas* describe their abode in deserts, forests, mountains and water.[31]

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22. *Dīghanikāya*, pp. 270-280.
23. *Brahma Purāṇa*, 108, 1-60.
24. *Srīmadbhāgavata*, 4, 10, 5.
25. *Kūrma Purāṇa* , Pūrva Bhāga, 48, 4.
26. *Matsya Purāṇa*, 120, 3, 18.
27. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, Pūrva Bhāga, 2, 18, 5-17.
28. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 30, 81-86 ; 40, 8.
29. *Mahābhārata*, Vana Parva, 139, 5, 12.
30. Kālidāsa–*Meghadūta*–Pūrva Megha, 63.
31. Ratilal Mehta, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 324 ; *Jātaka* I, p. 99, 349.

Sufficient textual evidence is available which throws abundant light on the origin, physical characteristics, dress and food and special traits of character of yakṣas and thus its discussion is of considerable importance in propounding our thesis.

Their origin

In the Purāṇas yakṣas are said to have been born out of the union of a *brahmarākṣasa* and an *apsarā* (a divine damsel) named Kṛtusthalā.[32] In *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, however, they are said to have been born to Kāśyapa and Khasā.[33] In the *Rāmāyaṇa* it is stated that when Brahmā created water those who accepted to protect it were given the name of Rākṣasa and those who said that they would worship it were called yakṣa.[34] In all probability it appears from the above mythological statements that the yakṣas were a tribe of the aboriginal races inhabiting India before the advent of Aryans and since their origin was not known, they were described as offsprings of *brahmarākṣasa* and an *apsarā*—a divine damsel. Their being comparatively handsome than other aborigines might have been the reason for the above description. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the attempt is to establish the meanings of the words Rākṣasa and yakṣa.

Physical characteristics of yakṣas.

According to *Ṛgveda* yakṣas have been described as beautiful. It is stated : 'Marutas are as beautiful as yakṣas[35] ....' In the *Gṛhya sūtras* the Ācarya sitting in his *pariṣad* is described as pleasant to look at like a

32. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, upodgāta Pāda III ; 7, 101-132.

33. *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, I, 197, 2-7 ; *Vāyu Parāṇa*, 79, 134-135.

34. *Rāmāyaṇa*, uttara kāṇḍa, 4, 9-13.

35. R.V. 7, 56, 16.

yakṣa.[36] In the *Mahābhārata* they are said to have red eyes, golden hue, tall and strong body.[37] *Jātakas* also describe them having red eyes which do not wink and their bodies do not produce shadows. They are tall like Tanḍa tree, have big heads of the size of a group of trees (*kuñja*), have big eyes almost as big as bowls, two of their teeth come out their mouth and their nose is like that of a hawk.[38] In the *Purāṇas* they have been described as ugly. *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* describes their physical features almost like Rākṣasas. They are thus dreadful to look at with big teeth, yellow eyes, mouth spread over upto the ears, flat nosed, ears like thorns, thin haired, unusually big bodies.[39] In the *Skanda Purāṇa* they are portrayed as hefty, heavy bodied, dark skinned and having strong voice.[40] The *Vāyu Purāṇa* describes them almost like Rākṣasas with round eyes, yellow colour, fat with protruding bellies, having eight teeth, mouth spread upto the ears, very tall heads like smoke, their body hairs standing on ends ; they have small hand and have lips and tongue of copper colour, long eyebrows, thick noses, red throat and blue skin and of dreadful appearance.[41] The *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* portrays them as pleasant to look,[42] while in *Brahmavaivarta*

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36. *Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra*, 3, 4, 28 : *Drāhyāyaṇa Gṛhya Sūtra*, 3, 1, 25.

37. *Mahābhārata*—Vana Parva, 161, 28 161, 55 etc.

38. Ratilal Mehta, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 324 ; *Jātaka* ; Vol. VI, p. 307 ; I, p. 273 etc.

39. *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, Vol. I, 197, 5-14.

40. *Skānda Purāṇa*, Kāsī Khaṇḍa, 8, 13-14.

41. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 70, 56-63.

42. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, Upodghāta Pāda, III, 7, 125.

Purāṇa they are described as ugly.[43]

On the basis of ancient Indian Mauryan Sculptural evidence it can be said that they were supposed to be taller (one and half to double the size) than ordinary men. Their body was proportionate and stout, with protruding bellies, face generally round and nose flat at the bottom. Later sculptures depict them as dwarfs with small legs and protruding bellies having ugly faces with flat noses.[44]

Their dress.

As per description in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*, yakṣas used coloured garments. Turban appears to be a popular headgear. It is also stated there that they used to tie the lower parts of their legs. Use of ornaments like earrings, armlets and crown was also in vogue.[45] As recorded in *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* yakṣas come with presents of gold and gems to offer to the Buddha which confirms that the ornaments used by them were of gold studded with gems.[46]

Ancient sculptures show them wearing *mauli* on their heads, *uttarīya* on their shoulders, and *dhotis* on the lower part of their bodies ; the *yakṣaṇīs* are seen wearing dhotis only. Yakṣas are shown wearing jewelled turbans, torques on their necks, several necklaces over the chest, heavy earings, armlets, bangles and jewelled band on the wrists as well as above their bellies and on their loins. In the later sculptures they are often shown

43. *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*, Śrīkṛṣṇa Janma Khaṇḍa, 10 ; *Śbdakalpadruma*, Vol. 4, p. 2, col. 1, 2, 3.

44. A. Coomaraswami, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*. p. III, 9 ; Zimmer, *Indian & Indonesian Art*, Fig. 19 : Sāncī West gate ; Amarāvati, Fig. 90, lower left hand pannel.

45. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 70, 57-63.

46. *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, 1, p. 257-258.

carrying a fly whisk in their right arm or holding something with their arms upraisad. In most cases they are depicted as laughing.[47]

Their food.

Regarding their food habits there is a mention in the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* that they took wiled paddy rice cooked in milk.[48] In the *Mahābhārata* at one place it is stated that Yudhiṣthira offered rice and lintels mixed (*khicarī*), meat and water mixed with *tila* to yakṣas.[49] *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* indicates their meal time to be at sunset.[50]

The special traits of their character.

So far as their special traits of character are concerned, one of the hymns of *Ṛgveda* describes them as *adbhutakṛta* (capable of performing miracles) like Mitrāvaruṇa.[51] The *Atharvaveda* records them as *mahat* (great)[52] and Pippalāda Śākhā as *puṇya janāḥ* (virtuous); the *Mahābhārata* accredits them with the quality of swift movement, capable of using various types of weapons and transformation to different bodies.[53] In the *Meghadūta* they have been shown to be the lovers of music, flowers and trees and have also been described as proficient in the art of painting.[54] Their special habitat were the caves as

47. *Infra*, p. 22, fn. 1.
48. *Infra*, p. 5, fn. 1.
49. *Mahābhārara*–Aśvamedha Parva, 65, 6-7.
50. *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*, Pūrvārdha, ch. 83, p. 317.
51. *Ṛgveda*, 5, 70, 4.
52. *Atharvaveda*, 18, 7, 38 ; 11, 8, 15.
53. *Mahābkārata*–Vana Parva–161, 28-29 ; 161, 55-56 ; 313, 29 ; 314, 2.
54. Kālidāsa–*Meghadūta*–Uttaramegha, 1-11.

suggested in the *Brahma Purāṇa*[55], the same is also corroborated by the *Paumacariu*, a Jain work,[56] and by the *Pavananjaya Nāṭaka* (of later date) as well.[57] Their love for trees is evident from a description in the *Mahābhārata—vṛkṣamāśritya.*[58] According to *Āṭiānāṭiya Sutta* they rode on animals, women and men for their movement from one place to another.[59]

Yākhā tribe.

In the preceding paras we have discussed the ethnological problems of yakṣas based on literary and other sources. On the synthesis of the same we can say that yakṣas were a tribe,[60] of old Dasyus—modern Bhils, which is still found in Nepal and known as *yākhā*, Pali *yakha*—perhaps of non-Aryan origin which was later on Sanskritized as *yakṣa*—a point which needs detailed discussion.

Yākhā, a small tribe of Kiratas.

Yākhā now being a small tribe form part of Kirātas. The term Kirāta includes tribes like Khambus, Limbus, Yakha etc.[61]

The Kirātas.

The Kirātas or Kirantis inhabit the southern slopes of Himalayas—Kiranta Deśa—the mountainous region

55. *Brahma Purāṇa*, 36, 15.16.

56. Kavirāja Svayambhū Deva–*Paumacariu*–Bhāratīya Jnānapītha, 1957, Vol. I. 8. 1-9.

57. Hastimala–*Pavananjava Nāṭakam*–Acts 6 & 7. p. 116.

58. *Mahābhārata*–Vana Parva 313, 39.

59. *Dīghanikāya*, p. 279.

60. Salatore, *The Wild Tribes of India*, p. 126 ; D. C. Sircar, *Geography of Ancient and Mediaeval India*, p. 62.

61. Salatore–Ibid, p. 127 ; Risley, *Castres and Tribes of Bengal*, Vol. I, p. 480.

between Dudkosi and Karvi rivers in Nepal.[62] Sylvain Levi says that the territory between Dud-kosi and Amu is inhabited by Kirātas.[63] Hodgson is of the view that Kirātas have lived in the region for the last 2000-2500 years. They were powerful enough and had extensive territory under their control at one time extending upto the Gangetic Delta. His conclusions are based on *vaṁśāvalis* (ancient chronicles) of Nepal proper, which show a long line of Kirānti sovereigns ruling there from the mythic age of the Shepherd Kings (Gopāla) down to the 14th century.[64] Although the terms Kirāta, Kirānti or Kirānti are of high antiquity and are applied in the sense of the country and the people even today, it is remarkable to note "that the Kirantis themselves do not readily admit the genuineness or propriety of those terms, but prefer the names of Khwombovel Khambo and Kirawa as their general personal designations and seem to have none at all for their country.[65] They are divided into numerous tribes speaking dialects so diverse as to be not mutually intelligible. Division of Kirāntas into Wallo (hither), Manjh (middle) and Pallo (further) is on territorial basis. Yākhā Linbu, Lohorong and Chhingtāng are classified under Wallo Kirāntas though the yākhās and Limbus do not accept that they are Kirāntas yet they are closely related races having essential comity of customs and manners with the Kirāntis. They intermarry and their dialects also do not differ much from the Khwombu tongue.[66]

62. Salatore, *Ibid.*, p. 22.
63. Sylvain Levi, *Le Nepal*, Vol. II, p. 77-78.
64. B. H. Hodgson, J. A. S. B., No. 5, 1858, p. 447.
65. Ibid, p. 448.
66. Ibid, p. 448-449.

Their number.

The number of Kirātas or Kirāntis including yākhās and Linbus and others in the past did not exceed quarter of a million, though in the remote past they were said to be 'No lakha Kirānta'. The village headman known as Pasung enjoyed a good deal of authority—he collected taxes and decided the disputes.[67]

Unlike other citizens of Nepal Kirāntis including yākhās retained the freehold of their ancestors which they called *walikha*. The boundaries of an estate were defined by the run of the water. The tax paid by each landholder or *thungpung hungpa* (lord of the soil) was rupees 5 per annum.

Their profession.

The Kirāntis are generally agriculturists growing maize, buckwheat, millets, peas, dry rice and cotton. The use of plough was not common which is proved by the fact that there is no word in their dialect for plough. They bought their iron implements, copper utensils and ornaments from other tribes.

Their houses.

They lived in small villages, their huts were small, obliquely raised on the outer side to get a level on the slope of the hill. The walls of the huts were of thick reed, neatly plastered and the roofs were thatched with grass. They built their houses themselves.

Their dress.

Till lately members of the tribe used to wear cotton cloth made out of the native cotton grown. The cloth

67. Ibid, pp. 449-450.

was hand spun and hand woven by the women folk of the tribe. Cloth used was generally dyed with madder and with other wild plants—whereof one, a climber, yields a fine black colour. Use of ornaments brought from other tribes was also common.

Their food.

For food they used cereals grown by them and meat. They formented and distilled liquor for themselves and used the former in great quantity.[68]

Their religion.

Their religious notions were vague. They had no term to denote God or any special deity, though the word *mang* may be construed to mean some deity and Khyimmo or Khyimmang for household deity. There was no priesthood and thus there was no class in the society to which the work of worship was assigned. Any one inspired by *mang* could become a priest and his duty was to propitiate the household god of each family by annual worship celebrated after the harvest and to perform trivial ceremonies at marriages and death. He also made offerings to the *manes* (*sankha*) of the ancestors of each house-holder. The priest was called *Nakchhong.*

Kirāntis also believed in black magic and called its priest Krakra or Kunyamayawo. The professional antagonist of the black magic priest was variously named in different dialects, as Janicha, Mangha, etc. He was an exorcist and physician.[69]

They observed only two religious festivals every year, one for the Khyimmo (the household god) and the

68. Ibid, pp. 450-451.
69. Ibid, p. 451.

other for the Samkha (souls of the deceased). The later suggests their belief in Caitya worship which is one of the oldest forms of worship. It contained the relics of the ancestors incarnated as yakṣa, called Khā to-day, who could bestow all wealth. His picture with two jugs holding money appears along with Lakṣmī to whom sacrifice is offered.

Their customs.

The Kirāntis used to buy their wives paying usually in the shape of copper household utensils. If one had no means he would go and earn his wife by working at the would be father-in-law's house. Usually they married at maturity. Divorce could be had at the pleasure of either party but in case it was sought by the wife her family had to pay the price to the husband and the children remained with the husband. Their marriage ceremony was brief—the priest takes a cock in his left hand and strikes it on the back with the blunt side of a sickle till the blood comes out of its mouth, on the basis of the blood mark on the ground prophecy about the offspring whether males or females is made. In case the blood does not flow, marriage was considered to be childless.

Kirātas burried their dead on the day of death on hill tops and made tomb of stones loosely constructed. The funeral had to be attended by the priest who moved with the corpse with a copper vessel in his hand which was struck by him with a stick thus invoking the soul of the deceased desiring it to go in peace and join the souls that went before.[70]

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70. Ibid, p. 451-452.

The law of inheritence gave equal shares to sons and nothing to daughters. They usually wore the hair long and hid the top knot which they carried like Hindus.[71]

Character.

The general character of the Kirāntis has been described as fierce. They used to come to blows especially in their cups.

Physical features.

Kirāntis are of short stature—their height ranging from 5' to 5'-4''. The length of the head ranging between $8\frac{1}{4}$' to $9\frac{1}{8}$' and the width from 6' to $6\frac{1}{4}$', shows that they were long headed people—a charactertic of the aborigins of India.[72]

Their literature.

According to Hodgson Kirāntis never had any literature[73] while Sylvain Levi on the basis of *Lalitavistara*, is of the opinion that they introduced a Lipi.[74]

We get references of Kirātas in *Vājasneyi Saṃhitā.*[75] The *Atharvaveda* contains description of Kirāta girls digging with thin edged spades (kudālī) made of gold.[76] They lived in caves and mountains were their homes. When Bhīma went out for *digvijaya* he came across Kirātas after crssoing Videha.[77] Nakula had con-

71. Ibid, p. 452-456 (for details) ; D. R. Regmi, *Ancient Nepal*, p. 23.
72. Ibid, p. 452-456 (for details) ; D. R. Regmi, loc. cit.
73. Hodgson, JASB, No. 5, 1858, p. 451.
74. Sylvain Levi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 451.
75. *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, 30, 16 ; 5. A. V., 10, 4, 14.
76. AV 10, 4, 14.
77. Sylvain Levi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 75-76.

frontations with the Kirātas in the West. In the great battle of *Mahābhārata* Kirātas came under the banner of the king of Prāgjyotiṣa. It is mentioned that they were of golden complexion, ate fruits and dressed themselves in skins. According to Periples they lived on the mouth of the Ganges and had flat nose.[78]

The Yākhā tribes.

As discussed yākhā tribe forms a part of Kirātas. We get only a few details about them. Besides Hodgson we have the evidence of Grierson about yākhās—described as a small tribe found between the Arun river and Singibela range—most of them recorded in Chainpur. Small settlements of the tribe were also recorded in Darjeeling and Sikkim. In the Census of 1904 they were also found in Assam.[79] The peculiarities of their language have also been recorded by Grierson.[80]

On the authority of Sir Herbert Risby, Grierson has described that the members of this tribe called themselves *yak-thomba* or yakherds, with reference to the tradition that this was their characteristic occupation before they crossed the Himalaya into Eastern Nepal; he has further stated that Hodgson was of the view that yākhās were the yākkhas mentioned in the *Mahāvansa* as living in the Himalayas. The yākhās like the Jimidars, use the honorific title Rai to denote themselves.[81] If like Licchavis they were all Rais then their king and leaders would be Mahārājā.

78. Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 75-76.

79. A. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India,* Vol. III, part I, 1909, reprint in 1967, p. 305.

80. Ibid, p. 305-310.

81. Ibid, p. 305.

Conclusion

From the above testimonies it is practically certain that yakṣas were a tribe of Bhils. Their description as being beautiful in the *Ṛgveda*[82] might be a comparative connotation. We also know that Mongoloids had come in contact with the aborigines of India in the proto-historic period[83] and their blood mixture through the process of impregnation with some of the Bhil tribes like yākhā might have resulted in making them comparatively beautiful than rest of the population. When they were pushed away by the Aryans they took refuge in the mountains and forests where their further contact with the Mongolians accounted for further change in their physical features. As mentioned above the burial customs of the yākhā tribe[84] correspond with that of the aborigines inhabiting the Indus Valley.

We can thus conclude that the yakṣas were a tribe, remnants of whom are still present in Nepal and known as yākhā. They had their Caityas which were the abodes of their ancestors and which they worshipped. These are known as Khā in their dialect as short form of yākhā. These ancestors were supposed to give all the wealth one desired and had unrestricted

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82. *Infra*, p. 19, fn. 1.

83. Mongolian skull at Mohenjodaro–Col. Sewell & Dr. Guha in Marshall's 'Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization'–II, 643, pl. CLX–5, 7 ; Mackay–Further Excavation at Mohenjodaro–p. 281, fn. 1 , p. 269, pl. LXXV–8–Mongolian slant of eyes, No. 9; D. K. 6197.

84. *Infra*, p. 32.

and swift movement because of being spirits. It appears that later on these beliefs found acceptance among other people of India who started treating them as supermen and thus they became mythological figures. Thus the yakṣas who were worshipped were the ancestors of this tribe. Later on the tribe itself became popularly known by the name of *yakṣa* or *yakkha* ; therefore, the word *yakṣa* denotes a tribe.

position with the genitive form of *Sū́rya* or *Svár*, e. g. *Sū́ryasya Duhitā́* or *Sū́ro Duhitā́* (once *Sū́re Duhitā́*, to denote figuratively a natural phenomenon connected with the *Aśvins* and the sun.[3] The literal translation of such phrases will obviously be "the daughter of the sun", but the metaphor underlying the Vedic phrases, *Sū́ryasya Duhitā́* or *Sū́ro Duhitā́*, is a subject of diverse interpretations. Sāyaṇa offers no cogent and consistent explanation of these phrases and attempts varying explanations according to his convenience. In his commentary on three passages of the Ṛgveda,[4] Sāyaṇa explains the figurative expression "*Duhitā́ Sū́ryasya*" simply as "*Sū́ryā*" and refers in this connection to a passage of the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* which narrates a legend relating to the marriage of *Sū́ryā* with the *Aśvins*.[5] In his commentary on most of such parsages Sāyaṇa does not attempt any explanation of the figurative sense underlying this phrase. In his commentary on RV. VII. 69, 4 Sāyaṇa explains the phrase "*Sū́ro Duhitā́*" as "the daughter of the sun." But the phrase "*Sū́ryasya Duhitā́*" occurring in RV. IV, 43, 2 is explained by him as "the wife of the sun", and the same phrase occurring in RV. IX, 1, 6 and 113, 3 is interpreted by Sāyaṇa as *Śraddhā* "faith" in accordance with a view put forward by the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (XII, 7, 3, 11) that *Śraddhā* is the

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3. RV. I, 34, 5 ; 116, 17 ; 117, 13 ; 118, 5 ; III, 53, 15; IV, 43, 2 ; VI, 63, 5 ; VII, 69, 4 ; IX, 1, 6 ; 72, 3 ; 113, 3.

4. Cf. Sāyaṇa-Bhāṣya on RV. I, 116, 17 ;117, 13 ; VI, 63, 5.

5. Ait. Br. IV, 7 ; cf. K. Br. XVIII, 1 ; RV. X, 85, 8-9 ; AV. VI, 82, 2 ; TS. IV, 7, 15, 4.

daughter of the sun.[6] The same phrase occurring in RV. III, 53, 15 is, however, explained by the scholiast as *Vāg-devatā*, "the goddess of speech", in consonance with the *Nighaṇṭu* (I, 11) which lists *Sūryā́* as one of the synonyms of *Vāk*, "speech". In his commentary on RV. IX, 72, 3, Sāyaṇa takes an entirely different view and explains the phrase "*Sūryasya Duhitúḥ*" as "of Dawn." This is a significant departure from his usual interpretations. It is obvious from the foregoing that the explanations offered by Sāyaṇa and other ancient Indian commentators do not help us substantially in arriving at the correct meaning of the figurative phrase, "the daughter of the sun."

Modern scholarship also has not as yet fully succeeded in unravelling the mystery of this cryptic phrase. According to Grassmann and Macdonell[7], "the sun conceived as a female called either *Sūryā́* or more commonly the 'daughter of Sūrya' "is meant by the phrase " *Duhitā́ Sū́ryasya*". I am unable to subscribe to the assumption that the Vedic phrase, "the daughter of the sun", denotes "the sun conceived as a female". It is abundantly clear from the context as well as from the wording of this phrase that the sun and his daughter are two separate entities. Geldner in his German translation of the Ṛgveda is mostly content with giving a a literal rendering of this phrase. However, in the translation of three passages, Geldner appends footnotes explaining the figurative meaning of this phrase as

6. In their commentary on the Vāj. S. XIX, 4, Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara also take the same view and explain the phrase "*Sū́ryasya Duhitā*" as "Śraddhā".

7. *Vedic Mythology*, p. 51; *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda*, under *Sūryā́*.

"poetry or song"[8], in contradistinction to *Śraddhā* as explained by Sāyaṇa. In the footnote to his German translation of RV. III, 53, 15, Geldner refers with approval to an ancient Indian tradition which, as already accepted by Sāyaṇa, explains the phrase "Duhitā́ Sū́ryasya" as *Vāk*, "speech.[9]" Thus the modern scholars leave the position of these passages as doubtful as before.

Any attempt to determine the precise meaning of this phrase "*Duhitā́ Sū́ryasya*" must be preceded by a close scrutiny of the Ṛgvedic Hymns addressed to the *Aśvins*, for "the daughter of the sun" is very closely associated with these twin gods in most of the Vedic occurrences. We find that "the daughter of the sun" is replaced by *Sūryā́* in about a dozen Ṛgvedic passages concerning the *Aśvins*,[10] and in RV. VIII, 8, 10, the word *Yóṣaṇā* "maiden" replaces "the daughter of the sun". The ancient Indian legend referred to above, which narrates the marriage of *Sūryā́* with the *Aśvins* only confirms the view that *Sūryā́* or the daughter of the sun" represents a natural phenomenon connected with the *Aśvins*, but it does not help us in identifying that phenomenon. The *Nighaṇṭu's* enumeration of *Sūryā́* among fifty-

8. Cf. footnotes to his German translation of the Ṛgveda (*Der Rig-veda*, Harvard Oriental Series, volumes 33-35), IX, 1, 6; 72, 3; 113, 3.

9. Cf. *Bṛhad-devatā*, IV, 112-116; *Nighaṇṭu*, I, 11. Cf. Geldner's footnote to his German translation of RV. IX, 113, 3.

10. RV. I, 184, 3; IV, 43, 6; 44, 1; V, 73, 5; VIII, 22, 1; X,85,8.9.14 ff.

seven synonyms of speech does not solve the riddle[11], although it lends some support to Sāyaṇa's explanation of this enigmatic phrase occuring in RV. III, 53, 15. It has to be admitted that the precise identification of *Sūryā́* must remain a conjecture until and unless the identity of the *Aśvins* is established with absolute certainty. It is, therefore: better to leave this question open. However, a passage of the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* (I, 213), which mentions the *Uṣas* "Dawn" instead of *Sūryā* in a legened parallel to the one connected with the marriage of *Sūryā* with the *Aśvins* referred to above, seems to suggest that *Sūryā* or "the daughter of the sun" may stand for the Dawn (*Uṣás*) which is so frequently described in the RV. as "the daughter of Heaven". This view gets some support from the fact the epithet *Yoṣaṇā* "maiden" applied to *Sūryā* or "the daughter of the sun" as stated above is found applied to the Dawn in two Ṛgvedic passages wherein the Dawn together with the Night is called "divine maiden."[12] Another important fact which corroborates this view is that the *Aśvins* are very closely connected with the Dawn (Uṣas) in a large number of Vedic passages.[13] Moreover, it is also a significant fact that the Vedic passages in which Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" is spoken of in connection with the *Aśvins*, do not mention *Uṣas* separately along with Sūryā. In other words, the

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11. In *Nighaṇṭu* V, 6 *Sūryā́* is metiōned after *Uṣā́h* among the deites. Commenting on this part of *Nighaṇṭu*, Devarāja Yajvan remarks : सूर्याव्याख्याता वाङ्नामसु । एषैवोषाः सूर्या सम्पद्यते ।

12. RV. VII, 2, 6 ; X, 110, 6. (दिव्ये योषणे)

13. Cf. *Vedic Mythology*, pp. 48 ff. RV. I, 44, 2 ; 183, 2 ; IV, 52, 2-3 ; VIII, 5, 2 ; X, 39, 12 ; etc.

passages mentioning Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" do not contain any mention of *Uṣas*. This circumstance seems to suggest that in some passages the word *Uṣas* is used in association with the *Aśvins*, whereas the same natural phenomenon is poetically described as *Sūryā* or "the daughter of the sun" in the other Vedic passages concerning the *Aśvins*. In most of the Vedic passages relating to the *Aśvins* the *Uṣas* is described as following the twin gods. This description also accords with the figurative statement of the RV. that Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" ascends the chariot of the *Aśvins*. The ancient Indian view explaining *Sūryā* as *Vāk* "speech" or *Śraddhā* "faith" may owe its *rationale* to the Indian religious practice of uttering hymns of praise and offering sacrificial oblations to the deities at the break of dawn (*Uṣas*). The time of the *Aśvins* is, according to Yāska, up to the rising of the sun[14]. Accepting this view, Macdonell observes: "Thus their relative time seems to have been between dawn and sunrise."[15] The relative time of the *Aśvins* between dawn and sunrise supports our identification of Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" with the Dawn and militates against the above-cited view of Grassmann and Macdonell, who identify *Sūryā́* with "the sun conceived as a female."

The circumstance that the *Uṣas* is spoken of as "the Yóṣā of *Sū́rya* in RV.VII, 75, 5, or in a similar strain elsewhere, does not vitiate our identification of "the daughter of Sū́rya" with the *Uṣás*, for different kinds of relationships are conceived by the Ṛṣis between

14. *Nirukta*, XII, 4 :—तयोः कालः सूर्योदयपर्यन्तः ।
15. Op. cit., p. 50.

the gods, as pointed out by Yāska.[16] For instance, the Uṣas is also described as the mother of the sun in some Ṛgvedic passages, as is pointed out by Macdonell in the following words : "Thus as followed in space by the sun, she is conceived as his wife or mistress. But as preceding the sun in time she is occasionally thought of as his mother."[17] Thus there is some basis for identifying "the daughter of the sun" with the Dawn. However, a final word on the subject must wait till the natural phenomenon underlying the *Aśvins* has been identified with absolute certainty.

Now we take up the third category of Ṛgvedic passages in which the word *Duhitṛ́* is used in conjunction with the nominative form of *Pitṛ́* or a similar word.[18] It is perfectly clear from a cursory perusal of all these passages that a literal translation of the word *Duhitṛ́* occurring in them is incapable of conveying the intrinsic meaning of such phrases. It naturally leads us to the conclusion that the word *Duhitṛ́* has been used in these passages in a figurative sense which needs to be investigated. That the word *Duhitṛ́* along with *Pitṛ* is employed in a figurative sense in these obscure passages is confirmed by the later *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* which explain as an allegory the legend of Prajāpati's passion for his daughter. The legend in question seems to owe its origin to a misunderstanding of some of these obscure Ṛgvedic

16. *Nirukta* VII, 4 : —इतरेतरजन्मानो भवन्ति । इतरेतरप्रकृतयः ।

17. Op. cit., p. 48.

18. RV. I, 71, 5 ; 164, 33 ; III, 31, 1 ; V, 47, 1, VIII, 101, 15 ; IX, 97, 47 ; X 17, 1; 27, 11; 40, 5 ; 61, 5.7 ; 72,4-5 ; 159, 3.

passages[19]. Explaining the allegory underlying this legend, the *MS*. and the *P. Br*. opine that the word *Duhitṛ́* in the legend stands for the Dawn.[20] But the *Ait. Br*. and the S. Br. which seem to be confused about the real basis of this allegory, explain that *Duhitṛ́* in this legend stands for Heaven or Dawn.[21] The tenor of relevant Vedic passages points to the conclusion that *Pitṛ́* or *Prajā́pati* of the legend stands for Heaven, who is spoken of as *Dyaús Pitā́*, "Father Heaven", in many Ṛgvedic passages.[22]

Thus we see that the word *Pitṛ* seems to have been employed figuratively in the Vedic passages under reference to denote "Father Heaven" and this cryptic employment of the word *Pitṛ́* along with *Duhitṛ́* appears

19. RV. I, 71, 5:—स्वायां देवो दुहितरि त्विषिं धात् ।
RV. I, 71, 8:—शुचि रेतो निषिक्तं द्यौरभीके ।
RV. X, 61, 5-7;—प्रथिष्ट यस्य वीरकर्मंमिष्णादनुष्ठितं नु नर्यो अपोहत्।
पुनस्तदावृहति यत्कनाया दुहितुरा अनुभृतमनर्वा ।।५।।
मध्या यत्कर्त्वमभवदभीके कामं कृण्वाने पितरि युवत्याम् । मनानग्रेतो जहतुर्वियन्ता सानौ निषिक्तं पिता यत्स्वां दुहितरमधिष्कन् क्ष्मया रेतः संजग्मानो निषिञ्चत् । स्वाध्योऽजनयन्ब्रह्मदेवा वास्तोष्पतिं व्रतपां निरुतक्षन् ।।

20. MS. III, 6,5:—प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यध्यैदुषसं, तस्य रेतः परापतत्, ते देवा अभिसमगच्छन्त ।
MS. IV, 2, 12:—प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यकामयतोषसं, सा रोहिद्भवत्, तामृश्यो भूत्वाध्यैत् ।
P. Br. VIII, 2, 10 ;—प्रजापतिरुषसमध्यैत्स्वां दुहितरं तस्य रेतः परापतत्तदस्यांन्यषिच्यत ।

21. Ait. Br. III,33, 1;—प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यध्यायद्दिवमित्यन्य आहुरुषसमित्यन्ये ।
S. Br. I, 7,41:—प्रजापति हं वै स्वां दुहितरमभिदध्यौ। दिवं वोषसं वा।

22. RV. I, 90, 7; 164, 33; IV, 1, 10; I, 89, 4,160, 2; 185, 10; 191, 6; VII, 70, 6.

to have led to the creation of this baffling legend in the later times. The process of transforming the figurative statements into legends led to some changes in the original terms employed in such statements. Consequently, the term *Dyaús Pitá́*, "Father Heaven" or simply *Pitṛ́*, Father", used in relation to the *Duhitṛ́* of the above statements, changed into *Prajāpati* in the corresponding legends of the later *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*. This is why similar legends found in the later works mention the daughter or daughters of Prajāpati. Besides the above-mentioned legend relating to Prajāpati's passion for his daughter, another legend which describes the *Nakṣatras*, "lunar mansions" "as daughters of Prajāpati[23], clearly shows that *Prajāpati* in this legend stands for *Dyaús Pitā*, "Father Heaven", from whom the *Nakṣastras* derive their sustenance. The allegorical statement that Prajāpati's daughter became red when he made amorous overtures towards her refers to the red colour of the *Uṣas* who is called as *Aruṣī́* "red" in the RV.[24] Thus the entire evidence available on the subject strongly favours the view that word *Duhitṛ* along with *Pitṛ* or a similar word is used in a figurative sense in the Ṛgvedic passages under discussion.

As regards the main idea underlying such allegorical expressions, it may be stated that the Creator or the source of the thing conceived is poetically conceived as *Pitṛ* "Father", whereas the creation emanating from

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23. MS. II, 2, 7 ; KS. XI, 3 ; XVIII, 14 ; TS. II, 3, 5, 1-3; III, 4, 7, 1 ; Vaj. S. XVIII, 40 ; S. Br. IX, 4, 1, 9 ; Saḍviṃśa Br. III, 12.

24. MS. IV, 2,12—सा रोहिदभवत्, तामृश्यो भूत्वाध्यैत् ।
Ait. Br. III,33—तामृश्यो भूत्वा रोहितं भूतामभ्यैत् ।

that source is figuratively spoken of as his *Duhitṛ*, "daughter", who draws (*duh*) her sustenance from him. The S. Br., which allegorically describes *Iḍā* as Manu's daughter, also avers that the Creator is figuratively spoken of as Father in relation to his creation which is allegorically described as his daughter.[25] The Ṛgvedic passages referred to above need to be interpreted in the light of this discussion, and the figurative meaning of *Duhitṛ* should be given due importance.

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25. S. Br. I, 8, 1, 8-9 ;—तां होचतुः "कासी"ति । "मनोर्दुहितेत्यावयोर्ब्रूष्वेति "नेति होवाच । "य एव मामजीजनत तस्यै वाहमस्मीति" ।।८।। तां ह मनुरुवाच कासीति । तव दुहितेति । कथं भगवति मम दुहितेति । या अमूरप्स्वाहुतीरहौषधी घृतं दधि मस्त्वामिक्षां ततो मामजीजनथाः । साशीरस्मि । तां मा यज्ञेऽवकल्पय ।" ।।९।।

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. Br.	=	Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa.
A. V.	=	Atharva Veda-Saṃhitā (Saunakīya).
K. Br.	=	Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa.
M. S.	=	Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā.
P. Br.	=	Pañca-Viṃśa-Brāhmaṇa.
R. V.	=	Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā.
S. Br.	=	Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.
T. S.	=	Taittirīya-Saṃhitā.
Vaj. S.	=	Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā (Mādhaṃdinī).

मीमांसान्यायानां शास्त्रान्तरोपयोगिता

वि० श्री० रङ्गनाथाचार्यः, प्रयाग विश्वविद्यालयः

विदितमेवेदं विदुषां यत् शास्त्रान्तरेषु ये न्यायाः सञ्चार्यन्ते ते सर्वे पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्र व्युत्पादिताः इति । न केवलं शास्त्रेषु अपि तु लोकव्यवहारेऽपि प्रयुज्यमाना न्यायाः एतच्छास्त्रव्युत्पादिता एव । यद्यपि सूत्रकारेण जैमिनिना वैदिकवाक्यान्यादायैव विचारः कृतः तथाऽपि स विचारः वैदिकलौकिकवाक्यसाधारणः । जैमिनिः स्वयमेव लोकवेदाधिकरणे लौकिकानां वैदिकानां च शब्दानां एकार्थत्वं प्रतिपादयति । अयं न्यायः तद्व्युत्पादितन्यायविषयेऽपि अतिदेशमर्हत्येव । अस्मिन्निबन्धे कांश्चन न्यायानादाय ते कथं उत्तरमीमांसाशास्त्रे, व्याकरणशास्त्रे च उपयुक्ता इति विचार्यंते ।

उत्तरमीमांसा

ब्रह्मसूत्राणां विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तानुसारेण भाष्यमारचितवन्तः श्री रामानुजाचार्याः पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोः ऐकशास्त्र्यं मन्यन्ते । ते लिखन्ति 'मीमांसाशास्त्रं 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यारम्य 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्' इत्येवमन्तं सङ्गतिविशेषेण विशिष्टक्रमम्' इति । अत्र पूर्वाचार्यसम्मतिमप्युदाहरन्ति, 'तदाह वृत्तिकारः संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेन शास्त्रेकत्वसिद्धि' रिति । तस्मादाचार्यपादैः बहुष्वधिकरणेषु पूर्वमीमांसासिद्धन्यायसञ्चारपूर्वकं अर्थाः निर्धारिताः । तत्र कानिचन स्थलान्यत्र निर्दिश्यन्ते ।

अपच्छेदन्यायः

जैमिनिना षष्ठाध्यायपञ्चमपादैकोनविंशत्यधिकरणे 'पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्' इति सूत्रेण अपच्छेदन्यायः व्युत्पादितः । स च एवंरूपः—ज्योतिष्टोमे दक्षिणादानात् प्राक् बहिष्पवमानार्थं तद्देशं ऋत्विजः गच्छन्ति । तदानीं एकस्य पृष्ठतः अन्यः इति पिपीलिकावत् प्रसर्पन्ति । तत्र पुरतः गन्तुः कच्छं गृहीत्वा पृष्ठतः अन्यो गच्छेत् । एवं सति प्रमादात् ऋत्विजां मध्ये यदि उद्गाता गृहीतं कच्छं मुञ्चेत् तदा दक्षिणामदत्वा यज्ञः समापनीयः । तं समाप्य पुनरपि यज्ञः

अनुष्ठेयः। यदा च प्रतिहर्ता कच्छं मुञ्चेत् तदा तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे सर्वस्वं दद्यात्। यदि तु प्रथमं उद्गाता मुञ्चेत्, अनन्तरं च प्रतिहर्ता, तदा उत्तरकालीनप्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तं सर्वस्वदानरूपप्रायश्चित्तं तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे कर्तव्यम्। उत्तरज्ञानं पूर्वज्ञानं बाधित्वैव आत्मानं लभते। एवंच उत्तरकाले स्वयं बाधितं सत् पूर्वज्ञानं न उत्तरस्य बाधकं भवितुमर्हति। तस्मादुत्तरकालीनमबाधितमेव वर्तते। तथाचोत्तरकालीनापच्छेदनिमित्तकमेव प्रायश्चित्तमनुष्ठेयम्।

अयं न्यायः श्रीभाष्यकारैः जिज्ञासाधिकरणभाष्ये महापूर्वपक्षोपस्थापनावसरे सञ्चारितः। 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादि विधयः पूर्वकाण्डे सन्ति। अत्र स्वर्गकामाद्यधिकारी, यागरूपसाधनं, स्वर्गादिफलं इति कर्ता, साधनं, साध्यं च भिन्न-भिन्नं प्रतीयते। तस्मादेतादृशं शास्त्रं भेदावलंबिशास्त्रम्। 'तत् त्वमसि' 'नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन' इत्यादिशास्त्राणि अभेदावलंबीनि। पूर्वापरापच्छेदे पूर्वशास्त्रवत्, अभेदप्रतिपादकशास्त्राणां निरवकाशत्वात् तैः अभेदप्रतिपादकैः भेदावलम्बीनि ज्योतिष्टोमादिशास्त्राणि बाध्यन्ते। अनेनैव न्यायेन वेदान्तवाक्येष्वपि सगुणब्रह्मोपासनपराणि वाक्यानि निर्गुणप्रतिपादकवाक्यैः बाध्यन्ते। निर्गुणवाक्यानां गुणापेक्षत्वेन परत्वात् बलीयस्त्वम्।

रात्रिसत्रन्यायः

अयं न्यायः पूर्वमीमांसायां चतुर्थाध्यायतृतीयपादाष्टमाधिकरणे व्युत्पादितः। अस्मात् पूर्वाधिकरणे विश्वजिदधिकरणे यत्र फलं न श्रुतं तत्र 'सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् स्वर्गरूपं फलं कल्प्यत इत्युक्तम्। तदनन्तराधिकरणं रात्रिसत्राधिकरणम्। अत्र विचार्यते—द्वादशाहादूर्ध्वं त्रयोदशरात्रचतुर्दशरात्रादयः सत्रविशेषा उक्ताः। एते रात्रिसत्रनाम्ना प्रसिद्धाः। अत्रापि विश्वजिद्यागवत् फलं न कीर्तितम्। तस्मात् पूर्वाधिकरणन्यायेन स्वर्गः फलं कल्प्यं इति पूर्वपक्षः। अस्मिन् सत्रप्रकरण एव 'प्रतितिष्ठन्ति ह वा य एता रात्रीरुपयन्ति' इति वाक्यं श्रूयते। यद्यप्यर्थवादवाक्यमिदं रात्रिसत्रविधेः स्तावकं तथाऽपि अश्रुतस्वर्गफलापेक्षया एतद्वाक्यश्रुतप्रतिष्ठायाः आसन्नतरत्वात् प्रतिष्ठा एव फलत्वेन कल्प्यते। स्तुतिः पश्चादपेक्ष्यते फलंच प्रथमम्।

अयं न्यायः श्रीभाष्ये जिज्ञासाधिकरणे उपयुक्तः। जिज्ञासाऽधिकरणरचना एवंरूपा। कार्यबुद्धिरेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः। प्रवर्तकस्यैव शब्दवाच्यत्वम्। अतः कार्यस्यैव वेदवेद्यत्वात् परिनिष्पन्नरूपब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणानन्तस्थिरफलप्रतिपत्तिः वेदवाक्यान्न संभवेत्। अतः ब्रह्मज्ञानफलानन्तस्थिरज्ञानहेतुः ब्रह्मविचारारम्भः न युक्तः इति पूर्वपक्षः।

कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तिरिति निर्बन्धः निर्निबन्धनः । 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते' इत्यादिवाक्यानि कार्यं किञ्चिन्न बोधयन्ति । तथाऽपि श्रोता एतद्वाक्यार्थं बुद्ध्यत्येव । अतः वेदान्ताः परिनिष्पन्नं परं ब्रह्म, तदुपासनं चापरिमितफलं बोधयन्तीति तन्निर्णयफलः ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य एव । अथ वेदस्य कार्यार्थकत्वे निर्बन्धः तथाऽपि ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य एव । 'आत्मा वा अरे श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः ब्रह्मोपासनं प्रतिपन्नम् । तद्विषयकं कार्यं अपूर्वं-नियोगः विध्यर्थः । तत्र अधिकृतः नियोज्यः पुरुषः । अधिकृताय तस्मै पुरुषाय नियोगेन अनुगृहीतं फलं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः । ब्रह्मस्वरूपतद्विशेषणानि फलकोटिनिविष्टानि । अतः 'यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् । अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत्पदं स्वःपदाश्रयम् ॥' इत्युक्तलक्षणस्वर्गादिवत् ब्रह्मविशेषणान्यपि प्राप्यन्ते । ब्रह्मस्वरूपलाभोऽपि रात्रिसत्रन्यायेन अर्थवादात् भवति । 'प्रतितिष्ठन्ति ह वा य एता रात्रीरुपयन्ति' इति रात्रिसत्रार्थवादवाक्यात् यथा वा प्रतिष्ठारूपफललाभः तद्वत् अत्रापि वाक्यात् ब्रह्मस्वरूपरूपफललाभो भवत्येव ।

वाक्यशेषन्यायः

पूर्वमीमांसाप्रथमाध्यायचतुर्थपादे एकोनविंशाधिकरणे विचारितम् । 'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति, तेजो वै घृतम्' इति श्रूयते । मृत्तिकामिश्राः क्षुद्रपाषाणखण्डाः शर्कराः । ताः अञ्जनीयाः । केन द्रव्येण ताः अञ्जनीयाः इति संशयः । 'अक्ता' इति शब्दसामर्थ्यात् येनकेनापि अञ्जनसमर्थेन घृततैलादिना अञ्जनीयाः इति पूर्वपक्षः । अत्र 'तेजो वै घृतम्' इति वाक्यशेषेण घृतं तेजस्त्वेन अभिष्टूयते । एतस्माद्वाक्यशेषात् घृतस्य विधिरुन्नीयते । अतः घृतेनैव शर्करा अञ्जनीया इति सिद्धान्तः ।

अयं न्यायः भगवता बादरायणेन सङ्ख्योपसङ्ग्रहाधिकरणे उपयुक्तः । अस्मिन्नधिकरणे बृहदारण्यकस्थ 'यस्मिन् पञ्चपञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः' इति वाक्ये श्रूयमाणपञ्चशब्दविशेषितपञ्चजनशब्दः पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वप्रतिपादक इति पूर्वपक्षः । 'प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुः' इति वाक्यशेषात् ब्रह्माश्रयाः प्राणादय एव पञ्चजनशब्दवाच्याः इति सिद्धान्तः कृतः । एवमस्मिन्नधिकरणे वाक्यशेषन्यायः उपयुक्तः ।

'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि' न्यायः

अयं न्यायः जैमिनिना तृतीयाध्यायसप्तमपादाष्टमाधिकरणे व्युत्पादितः । स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति श्रूयते । अत्र क्रियाङ्गसम्बन्धि सर्वं कार्यं किं यजमानेनैव कर्तव्यम् ? अथवा द्रव्यत्यागमात्रमिति संशयः । अनेन वाक्येन स्वर्गभोक्तुः यागकर्तुश्च सामानाधिकरण्यादेकत्वं गम्यते । अतः साङ्गकर्मानुष्ठानमन्तरेण फलासम्भवान्निखिलमेव यजमानेन कर्तव्यमिति पूर्वपक्षः । निखिलानुष्ठानाभावेऽपि प्रयोजकतया यजमानस्य सर्वकर्तृत्वमुपपद्यते । यजमानेन त्यागमात्रं कार्यम् ।

अन्यत्र साङ्गप्रधाने क्रीतानां ऋत्विजामनुष्ठानम् । तथाच साक्षात् परम्परया च सर्वकर्तृत्वस्य यजमाने सम्भवात् तस्य फलभोक्तृत्वं न विरुद्ध्यते इति सिद्धान्तः।

अयं न्यायः भगवता बादरायणेन द्वितीयाध्यायतृतीयपादगत कर्त्रधिकरणे उपयुक्तः । आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं नास्ति । अचेतनाः गुणा एव कर्तारः । गुणगतं कर्तृत्वं आत्मा आत्मनि अध्यस्यति इति पूर्वपक्षः । आत्मैव कर्ता, न गुणाः । एवमेव नियोगप्रतिपादकानां शास्त्राणां अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । 'यजेत स्वर्गकामः' 'मुमुक्षुः ब्रह्म उपासीत' इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि स्वर्गमोक्षादिफलानां भोक्तारमेव कर्तृत्वे नियुङ्क्ते नहि अचेतना गुणाः भोक्तारः येन तेषा कर्तृत्वं स्यात् । शासनाच्छास्त्रम् । शासनं च प्रवर्तनम् । शास्त्रस्य च प्रवर्तकत्वं बोधजननद्वारा । अचेतनं च प्रधानं न बोधयितुं शक्यम् । अतः शास्त्राणामर्थवत्त्वं भोक्तुः चेतनस्यैव कर्तृत्वे भवेत् इति सिद्धान्तः कृतः । एवमत्र 'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि' इति न्यायः उपयुक्तः ।

व्याकरणम्

अपच्छेदन्यायः

व्याकरणशास्त्रेऽपि बहवः मीमांसान्यायाः उपयुज्यन्ते । परिभाषाः प्रायः मीमांसान्यायमूलकाः । द्वयोः सूत्रयोः विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यं इति पाणिनिरनुशासनं करोति । अस्य मूलं अपच्छेदन्यायः । परशास्त्रप्रवृत्तिकाले पूर्वशास्त्रं बाधितं भवति । उत्तरज्ञानं पूर्वज्ञानं बाधित्वैव आत्मानं लभते । अयमेव विषयः अपच्छेदाधिकरणे निरूपितः ।

प्रतिनिधिन्यायः

एवं 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति सूत्रेण बहुष्वादेशेषु प्राप्तेषु सदृशतमः आदेशः स्यात् इति सदृशादेशनियमं करोति पाणिनिः । अस्य नियमस्य मूलं जैमिनेः प्रतिनिधि न्यायः । षष्ठाध्यायतृतीयपाद चतुर्थाधिकरणे विहितद्रव्यापचारे कर्मचोदनया आक्षिप्तत्वात् द्रव्यान्तरेण कर्म निर्वर्तनीयमित्युक्तम् । अनन्तरं एकादशाधिकरणे विचारितम्-विहितव्रीह्यादिद्रव्यापचारे नीवारप्रियङ्ग्वादि यत्किमपि द्रव्यं प्रतिनिधीकृत्य तेन कर्म समापनीयमिति पूर्वपक्षः । 'व्रीहिभिः यजेत' इत्यत्र जातिः पुरोडाशं न निष्पादयति । किं तु व्रीहित्वजात्युपलक्षिताः अंशा एव तन्निष्पादका इति अंशानामेव मुख्यद्रव्यत्वम् । ते चावयवाः सदृशे नीवारादौ बहवः अनुगच्छन्ति । भूयोऽवयव सामान्यं हि सादृश्यम् । तस्मादत्यन्तसदृशमेव प्रतिनिधातव्यम् इति सिद्धान्तः ।

'इको यण् अचीति' सूत्रेण अचि परे इ, उ, ऋ, लृ एतेषां वर्णानां स्थाने य, व, र, ल एते वर्णाः आदेशरूपेण विधीयन्ते । अत्र अनियमे प्राप्ते 'स्थानेऽन्तरतम' इति सूत्रेण स्थानादिना सदृशतम एव वर्णः ग्राह्य इति नियमयति पाणिनिः । अयं नियमः प्रतिनिध्यधिकरण निष्पादित एव ।

एवं 'स्थानिवदादेशः' इति सूत्रेण स्थानिनः यत् कार्यं तत्सर्वं आदेशस्यापि भवतीत्युक्तम्। इदं च पूर्वमीमांसातृतीयाध्यायषष्ठपादगतेन 'प्रतिनिधिश्च तद्वत्' इति सूत्रप्रतिपादितार्थानुसारेण पाणिनिना उच्यते 'व्रीहिभिर्यजेत' इति विहितानां व्रीहीणां असम्भवे नीवाराः प्रतिनिधित्वेन स्वीक्रियन्ते। एतेषु नीवारेषु जातितः व्रीहिशब्दार्थाभावेऽपि आकारतः व्रीहिशब्दार्थसत्वेन 'व्रीहीनवहन्ति' इत्यादिविषयः प्रवर्तन्ते। प्रतिनिधयः नीवाराः मुख्यद्रव्यस्य कार्यं सर्वं कुर्वन्ति।

'रामाय' इत्यादिरूपसंपादनावसरे पाणिनिः एतन्न्यायमुपयुङ्क्ते। 'ङेर्यः' इति सूत्रेण अतः अङ्गात् परस्य 'ङे' इत्यस्य यादेशः विधीयते। अस्य यादेशस्य सुप्त्वप्राप्तावेव 'सुपि च' इति सूत्रेण अङ्गस्य रामशब्दस्य दीर्घो भवेत्। स्थानिवदादेश इति सूत्रेण यादेशस्य सुप्त्वं प्राप्नोति। ततः दीर्घश्च भवति। प्रतिनिधिः यादेशः मुख्यङेवत् सर्वाणि कार्याणि भजते।

विकल्पः

एवं 'एकार्थास्तु विकल्पेरन्' आदि सूत्रेण द्वादशतृतीयगतेन पुरोडाशनिष्पादनरूपैककार्यकारिणां व्रीहियवादीनां विकल्पः जैमिनिना उक्तः। इमं न्यायमाश्रित्य पाणिनिना एकस्यैव मत्यादिप्रातिपदिकस्य नदीसंज्ञा विकल्पेन विधीयते। नदीसंज्ञायां 'मत्यै, 'मत्याः' आदिरूपाणि, अन्यथा 'मतये, मतेः' आदिरूपाणि सिद्ध्यन्ति। नदीसंज्ञायाः सत्त्वे असत्त्वे च षष्ठ्येकवचनरूपसिद्धिरूपैकक्रियाकारित्वाद्विकल्पः।

स्थालीपुलाकन्यायेनात्र मीमांसान्यायानां वेदान्तव्याकरणशास्त्रेषु सञ्चारः दिङ्मात्रेण प्रादर्शि। यदि गाढमध्ययनं क्रियते, शास्त्रान्तरेषूपयुक्तानां लौकिकानां च न्यायानां जैमिनिसूत्राण्येव मूलमित्यत्र न सन्देहगन्धोऽपि भवितुमर्हति॥

एतन्निबन्धलेखनाय परामृष्टाः ग्रन्थाः :—

(1) जैमिनेः पूर्वमीमांसासूत्राणि।

(2) खण्डदेवस्य भाट्टदीपिका।

(3) माधवीया जैमिनीयन्यायमाला।

(4) मण्डनमिश्रकृता मीमांसाऽनुक्रमणी।

(5) श्री व्यासकृतब्रह्मसूत्राणि।

(6) श्रीरामानुजकृतश्रीभाष्यम्।

(7) पाणिनिसूत्राणि।

(8) श्री भट्टोजिदीक्षितकृतसिद्धान्तकौमुदी।

SILVER IN THE VEDIC PERIOD

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Ṛgveda

It is generally believed that silver was unknown in the *Ṛgveda*.[1] This view has gained ground because of its present day paucity in India.[2] As silver is to be won either from argentiferous galena or from native gold which call for some metallurgical skill, acquaintance with silver at a later date in history is only natural. However, a solitary reference to *rajata*, evidences the knowledge of silver in the *Ṛgveda*.[3] The view that *rajata* being used as an adjective implies the sense of white

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1. Dr. A. S. Altekar, *JNSI*, XV, Pt. I, 1953, *The Antiquity of Coinage in India, p. 10 ;* Dr. R. K. Mookherjee, *Ancient India*, p. 69 ; Dr. Lallanji Gopal, The Seminar Papers on the *Chronology af the Punchmarked Coins,* 1966, p. 72.

2. With the exception of the quantity of silver won from the Kolar gold mines aggregating some 15,000 to 25,000 ozs) and lately obtained as a by-product from the smelting of the Zawar lead ores (about 14,000 ozs per annum), no silver is produced in the country.

Wadia, D. N., *Geology of India*, p. 479.

It must be recalled that the yield is largely due to modern techniques.

3. ऋज्रमुक्षण्यायने रजतं हरयाणे ।
रथं युक्तनसनाम सुषामणि ॥ *Ṛgveda*, VIII 25, 22.

rather than that of silver[4] does not carry conviction. The references to *rajata* prove the knowledge of silver in the Later Vedic age ; it might likewise be indicative of the same metal in the *Ṛgveda* despite its use as a metaphor.[5]

Again, *rajata* was not the only term for silver in the Vedic period. The *Atharvaveda*[6] explicitly mentions *arjuna* which otherwise means 'bright', 'white' as a term

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4. Dr. Gopal opines *(op. cit.* p. 70) on the basis of the assumption that there was no common term to signify silver in the early Indo-European languages. It was therefore unknown before the dispersion of the Aryan. Further, according to him, the descriptive names like *rajatam-hiraṇyam* in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā, Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* suggest a recent acquaintance with silver which is also omitted in the list of metals enumerated in the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* (XVIII. 13). The arguments are however inconclusive for there is no absence—as we shall see later—of a common term for this metal in the early Indo-European languages. Moreover, in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā, Atharvaveda* and *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, rajata* is referred to. Its enigmatic exclusion in the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* does not prove a recent acquaintance.

5. The commentators too have taken the word for silver and there appears no ground to reject the rendering. (Yāska, *Niruktam*, 5, 15) explains it as :

Rajata-vikṛtam : रजतं हरयाणे इत्यपि निगमो भवति । हरयाणः—अविस्पष्टम् । हरमाण यानः इति सुस्पष्टम् । अत्र निगमः 'रजतं हरयाणे' रजतं रजतमयं रजतविकृतं वा । हरयाणे हरमाण याने नित्यमेवाभिप्रस्थित याने ।

Wilson translates it as follows :

"We have received from the son of Sushan, the descendent of Ukshan, the overcomer (of foes), a well going chariot of silver yoked (with a pair of horses).

6. *Atharvaveda*, V. 28, 5, 9.

for silver.[7] Significantly the cognates of *arjuna*[8] in the other Indo-European languages such as Greek, '*apyos*', Latin '*argentum*', and Avestan '*ərəzata*' are the derivatives of λEvkós (ápyós) '*albus*', '*aurusa*' respectively—the words for bright or white. Thus the terms for silver in the early Indo-European languages are the derivatives of the common root '*arg*', which in turn should indicate the knowledge of silver to the Aryans from great antiquity.

The word *rajata* too might have been a derivative of *arjuna*, the intermediary stage being Avestan ərəzata to which it phonetically appears nearer.[9] It may also be recalled that by the middle of the third millenium B. C. knowledge of silver had radiated all over the near East and the Hittites—a branch of the Indo-Aryans—were noted for silver industry.[10] As the communication between India and the land of the Hittites is attested as early as the second millenium B. C. from Bokas,

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7. There is at least one reference in the *Ṛgveda* (II. 44-5) alluding to the *vajra* of *arjuna* which in the light of the statement in the *Atharvaveda* may imply silver.

8.

	Silver	*White*
Latin	*argentum*	*Albus, candidus*
Italian	*argento*	*bianco*
Iranian	*argat*	*find, gel, ban*
Sanskrit	*rajata*	*arjuna*

C. D. Buck, *Synonymns...languages* 9, 65, p. 610 and 15-64, p. 1054.

9. In that case, the *Ṛgvedic* Aryans presumably owed its knowledge to Persia. Persia is said to be very rich in silver bearing lead ores. In S. E. Persia, silver is known to occur in the Kubti-Nugre ("silver mountain") near Herat and at Guleki not far from Asterabad. Sir Edwin Pascoe (Marshall, *Indus Valley*, p. 675).

10. *Hist. of Tech.* I, p. 583.

it was most likely that the *Ṛgvedic* Aryans were acquainted with silver. The knowledge of this metal in the *Ṛgveda* thus appears almost certain.

But the extraction of silver in the *Ṛgvedic* period was certainly unknown. Lead whose ores are the source of silver in India is not referred to in the *Ṛgveda*. Likewise, it is doubtful whether India's only native silver deposit was utilised by them for it occurs on a dangerous and hardly accessible precipice at an altitude of 11,000 ft., two miles near Chargaon in the Sutlez Valley, Himachal Pradesh.[11]

Later Vedic Age.

Specific objects like *rukma*[12], *nishka*[13] and *dish*[14] of silver (*rajata*) are to be found mentioned in the later Vedic literature. *Rajata* alone is also used as a substantive denoting silver.[15] Another expression was *rajataṁ hiraṇyam* in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*.[16] *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*[17] and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.[18] It may indicate that

11. Mrs. Mehra, D. N. Wadia, *Minerals of India*, p. 89.

12. शतमानो रुमो रजतो धस्तात् स्याच्च । *Mait. Saṁ.*, II. 3. 3.

A. M. Shastry holds that in this passage *śatamāna* of silver is referred to. (Seminar papers on the *Chronology of the Punchmarked Coins*, p. 116). *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XII. 8. 3. 11.

13. *Panchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*, XVII. 1.4.

14. *Tait. Br.*, II. 2. 9. 7 ; III. 9. 6. 5.

15. *Atharvaveda*, V. 20, 1 ; XIII. 4. 51 ; *Ait. Brāhmana*, VII. 12. 2. *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, IV. 17. 7 ; *Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, III. 17. 3 ; *Ṣaḍaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*, VI. 6.

16. *Tait. Saṁhitā*, I. 5. 1. 2.

17. *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, X. 4.

18. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XII. 4. 4. 7 ; XIII. 4. 2. 10 ; XIV. 1. 3. 4.

silver was rare enough to be mentioned as white gold.[19] Lallanji Gopal[20] offers an appropriate suggestion that *rajataṁ hiraṇyam* implies electrum,[21] a natural gold-silver alloy with pale appearance. Presumably it refers to gold of Kolar and Anantapur (Madras) which contain silver as a natural impurity.

There is no evidence to show as how to this metal was procured. Apparently it was extracted from argentiferous-lead ores as lead was now recognised in the period as a separate metal.[22] The *Atharvaveda*[23] refers to working of silver with gold (*harita*) and iron or copper (*ayas*). In another passage alloying of silver

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19. Recently Mr. Deenbandhu Pandey has suggested that *rajataṁ-hiraṇyam* refers to a silver piece of *hiraṇya* weight standard. But it is doubtful that silver pieces of various standards were made in the period of the later Saṁhitās. Moreover, Pandey himself admits that any specific weights of *hiraṇyam* is not known (*On the Monetary use of Silver in the Vedic Age*—a paper read at the Annual Conference of Numismatic Society of India, 1968, Gorakhpur).

20. *Op. cit.*, 72. 174.

21. Electrum is a native alloy of gold and silver, containing 15% to 45% of silver. (Partington, p. 745.)

22. See, Lead.

23. *Atharvaveda*, V. 28. 9.

दिवस्त्वा पातु हरितं मध्यात् त्वा पात्वर्जुनम् ।

भूम्या अयस्मयं पातु प्रागाद् देवपुरा अयम् ॥

By the way a cowrie cast in metal was discovered from the surface of a proto-historic site near Rupar which on microscopic examination showed iron or copper superimposed by gold and silver. (Dr. V. S. Pathak, *A Note on Nishka*, a paper read at the Conference of Numismatic Society of India, 1968, Gorakhpur).

with these metals is apparently alluded to.[24] Its supply was obviously limited for there are but few references to ornaments[25] and dishes of silver in the *Brāhmaṇas.* Its value was recognised in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* where it is said that gold is to silver what lightening is to hail storms.[26] Another statement in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* to the effect that silver being product of Rudra's tears[27] is unfit for *dakshiṇā* is an interesting enigma. Most probably with its greater availability people were growing reluctant enough to part with gold in the name of sacrificial fee and preferred substituting it with silver, much to the chagrin of the priests. To curb the miserly attitude of their patrons the priests prescribed its use in *dakshiṇā* with a threat that whoever gave it as a sacrificial fee would have to see a mourning in his family within a year.

The other possible explanation is that silver being a part of the Vrātya Culture came to be treated as a metal unworthy for auspicious use. In *Vrātyastoma* sacrifice—the sacrifice by which the Vrātyas were converted into the Vedic mode of living—they had to give up among other things wearing of a silver *nishka*. It appears that the Vedic Aryans, who looked them down upon the *Vrātyas* had never a cordial relation with

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24. नव प्राणान्नवभिः संमिमीते दीर्घायुत्वाय शतशारदाय ।
हरिते त्रीणि रजते त्रीण्ययसि त्रीणि तपसाविष्ठितानि ॥
Atharvaveda, V. 28. 1.

25. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* XII.8.3. 11 ; *Tai. Brāhmaṇa,* II. 2.9.7 ; III. 9.6.5.

26. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* XII. 8.3.11. Whether it alludes in any way to the fact that silver is available in raw gold is a matter of anybody's guess.

27. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* II. 2.3.28.

nishkas and *śatamānas* were, however, monetary tokens with more or less recognised bullion value. The description of *śatamāna* pieces of various shapes (*nānā rūpatāyā*) in the *Śatapatha*[40] of course points out that coinage as such was in the process of incubation.

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40. रजतं हिरण्यन्दक्षिणा नानारूपताया अथो उत्क्रमायानपक्रमाय शतमानं भवति । *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XIII. 4.2.10.

them. Anything typical of the *Vrātya* culture was taken with certain amount of abhorence. That is why silver was perhaps not only banned as *dakshiṇā* but its name was also perhaps omitted in the list of metals enumerated in the Vedic literature.

We may also conjecture that extraction of silver was probably the monopoly of the *Vrātyas.* It is possible that both the factors worked in discarding it. However, in contradiction to its own statement the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* in other passages prescribes a *śatamāna* of silver as an offering.[28]

Amalgamation of silver with gold and copper with silver is spoken of in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa.*[29] Towards the end of the period, some progress in silver working is visible. The *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*[30] mentions the treatment of silver with gold and that of tin with silver. This metal is also referred to in the *Upaniṣads.*[31] At one place in the *Ṛgvedc Khila,*[32] Śrī is described as wearing a silver chalplet or necklace along with other ornaments—a form in which Śrī Lakṣmī is presented in the *Upaniṣads.*[33]

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28. XIII 4.2.10.

29. सन्दध्यात्सुवर्णेन रजतं, रजतेन लोहं । I. 1.14.

30. IV. 17.7. An identical statement occurs in the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa,* III. 17.3.

31. *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad,* III. 19.1.2 ; *Bṛhajjāvālopaniṣad,* III. 6 ; *Yogaśikhopaniṣad,* IV. 13.14 ; IV. 22 ; *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad,* III. 4.3.3.

32. हिरण्यवर्णां हरिणीं । सुवर्णां रजत स्रजां ।
चन्द्रा हिरण्यमयी लक्ष्मी जातवेदो मया वहा ।। II. 6.1.

33. *Saubhāgyalakshmyupaniṣad,* 1.10 ; *Mantrabrāhmaṇopaniṣad* etc.

Monetary use of Silver in the Later Vedic Period.

The antiquity of coinage vis-a-vis the monetary use of silver have been traced to the Later Vedic period on the basis of some references to silver *śatamānas* and *nishkas* in the literature. Dr. Agrawala[34] opined that *śatamāna* of silver in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[35] was the term for a silver coinage of a hundred *mānas*. A. M. Shastri further pushed its antiquity to B. C. 1000 on the basis of a reference to *rajata* in the *Maitrāyāṇī Saṁhitā* where according to him it stands for a silver *śatamāna*. But the passage in question[36] refers to for a *rukma* weighing a hundred *mānas*[37] and not a silver piece. Likewise, silver *śatamāna* mentioned in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* simply means a metallic piece of certain weight and it should not be taken to denote a coin.[38] Moreover, archaeology does not favour a date as early as that of the *Brāhmaṇa* for the introduction of coinage in India. Not a single coin was yielded to spade in course of the regular excavations from layers definitely assignable to 400 B. C.[39] or earlier. The use of silver for coinage in the Later Vedic Age is therefore yet to be proved. The

34. *India as Known to Pāṇini*, p. 262.

35. XIII. 4.2.10.

36. II. 2.2.

37. Maheshwari Prasad, Seminar Papers on *P. M. Coins*, p. 164. A. M. Shastri, *Ibid.*, p. 116.

38. A coin is a piece of a metal of definite weight and value, as a rule bearing the stamp of some issuing agency, whose authority is recognised in economical transaction ; *śatamāna* being an ingot of hundred *mānas* was money but not a coin. At the best *śatamāna* was immediate progenitor of the earliest coins of India.

39. See, Archaeological Evidence.

out fear or molestation and being turned out at the arrival of the Ācharyas for staying there.[7]

According to Dr. Bhandarkar.[8] *Gurvāyatana* was a shrine for installing the memorials of the departed *gurus* like the *Deva-kulas* of the Kuṣāṇas found at Māṭ near Mathurā or the *pratima-grhas* in which the statues of the dead kings were kept. Hence, Dr. Sircar's interpretation is not plausible, because, according to it, the Ācharyas were alive and expected to come and occupy the *āyatana* at some later date. Since the two Ācharyas are called *Bhagavat* in lines 5 and 6, they must have been dead by that time. For, the title *Bhagavat* was conferred on those Pāśupata *Yogins* who pass away by releasing their breath through the *Brahma-randhra* i. e., (by bursting of the skull) and being absorbed in Śiva. The teacher Uditāchārya had not yet reached that stage and was alive, he has been addressed as mere *Ārya* in the record. The locative in *gurvvāyatane* (line 10) shows that the shrine was already there. The record does not say that it was built by Uditāchārya. The expression cannot be interpreted as *gurvāyatanaṁ nirmāya tasmin.*

In view of the above, the interpretation of Dr. Sircar cannot stand. The lines 11 to 14 should, therefore, be translated as : "It is not written for publicity ; (but) it is a request and an exhortation to the devotees of Maheśvara. Considering that this is the property (for installing the memorials) of the Ācharyas, they should, on proper occasion, perform worship and make offerings without hesitation, and protect the property."

7. *Ibid*, 274-75.
8. *Ep. Ind.*, XXI, pp. 1-9.

out fear of [illegible] and being stoned out as the survival of the [illegible] arvas for staying there.[1]

According to Dr. Bhandarkar,[2] [illegible] was [illegible] for [illegible] the memorials of the departed something like the [illegible] of the Kushanas found at Mat near Mathura [illegible] the [illegible] in which the statues of the dead kings were kept. Hence, Dr. Sircar's interpretation is not plausible, because according to it, the Acharyas were alive and expected to come and occupy the [illegible] at some later date. Since the two Acharyas are called Bhagavat in lines 5 and 6, they must have been dead by that time. For, the title Bhagavat was conferred on those Pashupata Yogis who pass away by releasing their breath through the [illegible] i.e., the [illegible] of the skull, and being absorbed in Siva. The tender [illegible] had not yet reached that stage and was alive. He has been mentioned as mere [illegible] in the record. The [illegible] in [illegible] line 10 shows that the shrine was already there. The record does not say that it was built by [illegible]. The expression cannot be interpreted as [illegible].

In view of the above, the interpretation of Dr. Sircar cannot stand. The lines 11 to 14 should, therefore, be translated as: "It is not written for publicity; (but) it is a request and an exhortation to the devotees of Mahesvara. Considering that this is the property (or installing the memorials) of the Acharyas, they should, on proper occasions, perform worship and make offerings with [illegible] and protect the property."

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1 [illegible]

2 Ep. Ind., XXI, [illegible]

EPIGRAPHICAL NOTES

SADHU RAM

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1. The Nigālī Sāgara Pillar inscription records the Great Emperor Aśoka's pilgrimage to the *stūpa* of Konākamana Buddha.[1] Evidently, Konākamana is the same as Konāgamana of the Buddhist scriptures.

Dr. D. C. Sircar calls Konākamana '*Pratyeka* Budda' (Silent Buddha) "who attained knowledge necessary for *nirvāṇa*, but did not preach it to men. His *stūpa* was a Buddhist Tīrtha and was visited by Yuan Chwang who also noted the Aśokan pillar with an inscription.[2]"

But the *Mahāpadāna-sutta* of *Dīgha-nikāya* enumerates a total of seven *Sammā-sambuddhas* (Well-awakened Buddhs), of which the fifth is Konāgamana. He was born of Yaññadatta and Uttarā.[3] Gautama Buddha, too, belonged to this category of the well-awakened Buddhas. Konāgamana is, therefore, different from the *Pratyeka* Buddhas who are enumerated in the *Majjhima-nikāya*.[4]

2. The Mathurā Inscription of the reign of Chandragupta II, dated the Gupta year 61, records the installation of the two *liṅgas*, viz., Upamiteśvara and Kapileśvara, in a *Gurv-āyatana* by a Pāśupata teacher

1. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, I, p. 165.
2. *Select Inscriptions*, 2nd ed., p. 68, fn. 5.
3. *Dīgha-nikāya*, ii. 2-7.
4. *Majjhima-nikāya*, . iii. 69.

Uditācārya in commemoration of his teacher *Bhagavat* Upamitavimala and teacher's teacher *Bhagavat* Kapilavimala. The relevant part of the text is as follows.[5]

६. ··· ··· (भगवत्क) पिल विमल-शि-
७. ष्य-शिष्येण भगव (दुपमित) विमल-शिष्येण
८. आर्य्योदि (ता) चार्य्ये (ण स्व)-पु (ण्या) प्यायन-निमित्तं
९. गुरूणां च कीर्त्य(र्थंमुपमितेश्व) र-कपिलेश्वरौ
१०. गुर्व्वायतने गुरु- (प्रतिमा-युतौ) प्रतिष्ठापितो (१) नै-
११. तत्ख्यात्यर्थमभिलि(ख्यते) माहेश्वराणां वि-
१२. ज्ञप्ति × क्रियते सबोधनंच यथा का (ले)नाचार्या-
१३. णां परिग्रहमिति (परिग्रह इति) मत्वाविशङ्क (—̇) (पू) जा-पुर-
१४. स्कार (—̇) परिग्रह-परिपाल्यं (कुर्य्या) दिति (कुर्य्युरिति) (१)

By putting a stop after *saṁbodhanaṁ ca* (line 12) and adding the future verb *bhaviṣyati* after *parigraha* (line 13), Dr. D. C. Sircar interprets lines 11-14 as: "......but it is a request and an address to the worshippers of Maheśvara. Knowing that this *Gurvāyatana* would become) the property of the Āchāryas in course of time, (the worshippers of Maheśvara belonging to Mathura) should without fear protect the property (of the Āchāryas) and offer worship. This is the request."[6]

Dr. Sircar further remarks that Uditachārya built a temple-residence (*Gurvāyatana*) in which he installed two *liṅgas* having the figures of his teacher Upamitavimala and teacher's teacher Kapilavimala carved below, representing each of them as bearing a *liṅga* on his head. According to him, the *Gurvāyatana* and the *liṅgas* were finished, but the teachers Upamita and Kapila were not coming to stay there just then. Uditacharya, therefore, requested the local Śaivas to take charge of them with-

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5. *Epigraphia Indica*, XIII, pp. 8 ff.
6. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XVIII, 1942, 274.

INCORRECT USE DUE TO IGNORANCE

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While speaking our own language we generally commit mistakes in words and formations which are borrowed in our speech or which we do not really understand at the moment. These I would call 'Incorrect use due to Ignorance'. I shall here give a few instances which came in mynotice.

During the course of the study of my own dialect of Awadhi I noticed *maṅgalācāra* being pronounced as *maṅgalācāri* in a song sung by the women folk of my village. Surely *cāri* for *cāra* was due to the ignorance of the correct Sanskrit word and the familiarity with the word *cāri* (four). A fellow inmate of my Hostel was Krishna Mansingh. I used to call him Krishnaman taking Singh to be the surname. People more intimate with him used to call him Krishna. One day Krishna protested to me saying that either I should call him by his full name or the short name as the second part of his name was Mansingh, his uncle's name. Then I realised my mistake. In those very days, I heard my monitor scolding the block servant for uttering my name as Babu Ram without any word of respect such as Mister or Babu. The servant apologised and explained that he thought that my name was Ram Saksena and that Babu was for respect. In the Hindi area we have such names as Sita Ram, Shiva Ram, Ram being the second part of them. A prevalent name is Salig Ram. Evidently

Salig has no sense. The name goes back to Skt. *śāligrāma*, but in our ignorance we have taken Ram as the current second part and separated it from the supposed first part. A very interesting instance recently came to my notice. One Dr. Banerji was attending upon a maid servant. She thought that *Jī* was the usual respectful addition and she referred to the Doctor as Dr. Banar. Similarly they sometimes add *Jī* for respect in ignorance. Once I heard the expression *Shivji Jī*. The devotee did not know that one *Ji* was already there which he wrongly assumed to be a part of the name of the god.

Similar ignorance has been the cause of false etymologies. In my paper entitled 'False Etymologies in the Dhammapada' published many years ago I had pointed out such instances as :

bāheti pāpāni iti bahmaṇo

where the author of the verse was wilfully or otherwise ignorant of the true sense of the word *brāhmaṇa* which was obviously pronounced *bahmaṇo|bāhmaṇo* during MIA period. Similar is perhaps the cause of the derivation of *duhitā* as *dūrhita|dūre hitā*.

NOTES ON THE SĀṄKHYA—KĀRIKĀ

N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI

Santiniketan

The Standard treatise on Sāṅkhya System, *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* with a commentary retranslated from its Chinese version of Paramārtha has been edited by me under the title: *Suvarṇa-Saptati*, published by the Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati in 1944. A few notes that are collected here are intended to supplement the Sāṅkhya ideas enunciated the treatise.

The author of the *kārikā*, Iśvarakṛṣṇa himself admitted his indebtedness to Pañcaśikha's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* for the entire system of thought expounded in his 70 couplets (v. ver. 72). The sage Kapila is credited to have been the first propounder of the thought (v. Introductory remarks in the comm.). Kapila was one of the most ancient sages of India. He has been mentioned in the *Upaniṣad* (*Śvetāśvatara* V, 2) as the first born from the Almighty. The *Bhagavadgītā* declares Kapila as the best of all saints (siddhas), v. X, 26. Sāṅkhya system is generally counted as one of the philosophical schools which plead for heterodoxical opinions about the universe, etc. This may be true so far as the later phase of the system is concerned. It is, however, doubtful whether Kapila who has been respected and quoted as an ideal sage could have propounded himself a heterodoxical system which runs counter against the Upaniṣadic teachings. It is noteworthy that no mention has made been of the *Prakṛti* doctrine amongst the false doctrines of *kāla*,

Svabhāva, etc. (*Śveta*. I, 2; VI, I). The Upaniṣad, on the other hand, declares that one ultimate cause is to be realized through Sāṅkhya-yoga, science of number and meditation (*Śveta*. VI, 13). This position is also probably confirmed in the *Gītā* (III, 3; V. 4-5) which remarks that the Sāṅkhya puts more stress on knowledge and yoga on the disinterested action (*Jñāna-yogena Sāṅkhyānāṁ Karma-yogena yogināṁ*), but their ultimate objective in life is one and the same (V, 5).

I. *Prakṛti*

The fundamental difference between the orthodox and heterodox Sāṅkhya lies in the fact that the former considers *Prakṛti* as subordinate to the ultimate source of universe whereas the latter pleads for an independent position of *Prakṛti*. In other words, the School in its early phase pleads that *Prakṛti* springs up first from the one ultimate principle like *Brahman* and other elements spiritual as well as material come up later from *Prakṛti*, thus upholding the doctrine of Monism (*advaita-vāda*); the same school in the later period, favours an independent position of both *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, thus leading to Dualism. The school discorded completely the idea of God and reduced men to different separate spiritual units. This turn of the Sāṅkhya doctrine into an anti-God movement might have taken place under the influence of anti-Vedic schools of ancient time like Jainism and Buddhism, etc. The change might have been accomplished perhaps prior to the poet Aśvaghoṣa. According to the poet, Buddha parted company with the Sāṅkhya teachers only on the ground that the latter adhered firmly to the soul-theory (*Kṣetrajña*=*ātma-vāda*, v. *Buddhacarita*, XII, ver. 80-81).

The first evolute from the Supreme Spirit is variously designated in the Upaniṣads as follows :

Avyakta : *Śveta-up.* I. 8 : व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीश : ।
cp. Kaṭh. I, 1,11.

Hiraṇya-garbha : Ibid, III, 4 : हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वम् ।
cp. IV 12; VI, 18 : यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वम् ।

Muṇḍaka I, : 4 ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सम्बभूव ।

Kaṭha. II, 1, 6: यः पूर्वं तपसो जातम् । ... and 7

Prāṇa : *Muṇḍaka*, II, 13: एतस्मात् जायते प्राणः...

Praśna VI, 4: स प्राणमसृजत. ... cp. IV, 8.

Akṣara : Muṇḍaka II, 1, 1-2 अक्षरात् विविधाः सौम्य भावाः (=जीवाः). अप्राणो ह्यमना शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात् परतः परः ।
Śveta. I, 10, क्षरं प्रधानं...

Pradhāna: *Śveta*. VI, 16. प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः ...1 cp. ver. 10.

Māyā: *Prakṛti : Śveta*. IV, 10 मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्
cp. IV, 9.

Avidyā : *Muṇḍaka* I, 8-9, *Īśa*, 10-11.

The *Gītā* which describes an early phase of the Saṅkhya doctrine mentions *Prakṛti* as a subordinate principle to God under almost all designations with the exception of Hiraṇyagarbha and *Prāṇa*. The following are some of the references :

Avyakta : VII, 24, : अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नं मन्यन्ते मामबुद्धयः ।
VIII, 18 : अव्यक्तात् व्यक्तयः सर्वाः प्रभवन्त्यहरागमे ।
रात्र्यागमे प्रलीयन्ते तत्रैवाव्यक्तसंज्ञके ॥
परस्तस्मात्तु भावोऽन्योऽव्यक्तोऽव्यक्तात् सनातनः ।
यः ससर्वेषु भूतेषु नश्यत्सु न विनश्यति ॥ 20.

Avyakta refers to Supreme Being :
VIII. 21, अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तः तमाहुः परमां गतिम् ।
II, 25, अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते ।

XII, 3, अक्षरमनिर्देश्यममव्यक्तम्… …
II, 28, अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि ………
Akṣara : XIV, 26-7, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ।
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ॥

Akṣara also refers to Supreme Being in VIII, 11 XII, 3, etc.

Prakṛti, Māyā : VII, 4-5, अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।
IV, 6, प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय सम्भवाम्यात्ममायया ।
IX, 7-8, सर्वभूतानि कौन्तेय प्रकृतिं यान्ति मामकीम् । …
प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय विसृजामि पुनःपुनः ॥
IX, 10, मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।
VII, 14, दैवीह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।

In contrast to the above the *Gītā* in XIII, 19 speaks Prakṛti and Puruṣa both as beginningless. *Prakṛti* may be beginningless (*anādi*) like *Avidyā* of Vedāntin and *anādi-vāsanā* of Buddhist. In fact the chap. XIII comes nearer to the classical Sāṅkhya doctrine in the following statements bearing on *Prakṛti's* agency in action and *Puruṣa's* mastership in its enjoyment :—

कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते ।
पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते ॥
पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणान् । XIII, 20-21.

cp. also प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।
अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ III, 27.

Nevertheless nowhere does the *Gītā* plead for an independent position of *Prakṛti* as it is stressed in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, 10. The idea of *Prakṛti* being a sole agent in action (*kartṛ*) is quite contrary to the *Upaniṣads*, e.g.v. "*Sa īkṣāmcakre*", *Praśna*, VI, 3 with *Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya* and "*So,' kāmayata*", *Taittirīya, No. 2*, sect. 6. etc.

The subordinate nature of *Prakṛti* is made plain in he order of evolutes arranged in the *Upaniṣads* and *Gītā*, tc:—

Indriya, artha, manas, buddhi, mahān, ātman, avyakta, puruṣa and there is nothing above that *puruṣa*; *Kaṭha* I,3,10-11.

Indriya, manas, sattva (=*buddhi*) *mahān, ātman, avyakta* and *puruṣa* who is *vyāpaka* and *aliṅga*; Ibid, II, 3, 7-8.

Indriya, manas, buddhi and *Puruṣa*;*Gītā*, III, 42.

Ākāśa, ahaṁkāra, buddhi, (mahān) *ātman, avyākṛta* and *Puruṣa–Anugītā*, ch. 35, 55-56.

Evolution of *Prakṛti* from Godhead is further confirmed in the *Anugītā* thus.

ततः प्रधानमसृत् प्रकृतिं स (=पितामहः) सर्वशरीरिणाम् ।

मया ततमिदं व्याप्तं यां लोके परमां विदुः ।

इदं तत् क्षरमित्युक्तं परन्त्वमृतमक्षरम् । Anugīta III, 26

It may now be evident that *Avyakta* known as *prakṛti* is not an independent material substance but a first transformed image of Supreme Being (*kārya-brahman*) which creates the entire universe and holds it up steadily. This may prove the soundness of Caraka's idea that *Avyakta* is no other than *Kṣetrajña*, i.e. *Ātman* (Refer to my paper "comparative study of Saṅkhya Tenets", *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, 1952, pp. 194.5).

In the Upaniṣadic scheme of creation *Prāṇa* and *Brahmā* (in masculine), etc. being the first created principle these names may be suggested for *Prakṛti* (v. Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* ad *śveta*. I, 4 and p. below).

II. *Pratyaya-sarga*.

The *Sāṅkhya–Kārikā* 46 mentions *Pratyaya-Sarga* under four heads: *Viparyaya, aśakti, Tuṣṭi* and *Siddhi*

with their varieties 50 in all. The 50 varieties are counted in 47 thus: *viparyaya* 5, *aśakti* 28, *tuṣṭi* 9 and *Siddhi* 8. Five *viparyayas* and their Subdivisions, 62, are made clear in 48. *kārikā* 49 explains *aśakti* and its 28 divisions. The next verse counts 9 varieties of *tuṣṭi*. The *kārikā* 57 enumerates *siddhi's* subdivisions. All these topics are well explained in the commentary on the verses above noted.

Now I would like to draw attention of readers to an apparent allusion to this topic in the *Śveta. upaniṣad* I, 4 as interpreted by Sri Śaṅkara. The *upaniṣad* describes Brahman as a wheel (*cakra*) by way of *rūpaka*, metaphor. It has one tyre (*nemi*), three encirding sections, sixteen ends and fifty spokes etc. one nemi, five reperesnts its potontial productive mood, *Kāraṇāvasthā* known as *Prakṛti māyā*, *Śakti*, *Avidyā* and so on. The sixteen ends form the group of 16 evolutes (*vikāra gaṇa* : five great dements etc.) Fifty spokes (*Śatārdhāram*) depict the fifty varieties of *Pratyaya–Sarga* above enumerated. Śri Śaṅkara comments on them almost in the same fashion as other commentators do. But he mentions none of the Sāṅkhya treatises, nor even the *Sāṅkhya kārikā*. His source of information on this topic, he says, is the *Brahmāṇḍap'rāṇa* chap. 60, sixty reluted the elucidation of *Kalpopaniṣad* (*kalpopaniṣad-vyākhyāna-pradeśe ṣaṣti-tame adhyāye Brahmāṇḍapurāṇe pañcāśadpratyayabhedāḥ pratipāditāḥ*).

It may appear to us that Śrī Śaṅkara does not like to mention any Sāṅkhya treatise like the *Kārikā* which turned into an anti-God system in later period and he mentions *Purāṇa* instead because the *Purāṇa* kept up the earlier tradition according both God *Pradhāna* their

respective places in the system.

I may cite one more similar instance here. According to the Sāṅkhya tradition *Prakṛti-laya*, merging into *Prakṛti* is resulted due to detachment from the group of 16 evolutes (*vairāgyāt-prakṛti-laya* v. s. *kārikā*, 45). Śrī Śaṅkara attributes this tradition of *prakṛti-laya* not to any Sāṅkhya authors, but to some Purāṇic teachers (*Prakṛti-laya iti Paurāṇikair ucyate, v. Īśopaniṣad-bhāṣya* ad mantra 13).

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भट्टप्रभाकरमतयोर्भाष्यानुगुण्यम् ।

एस्० सुब्रह्मण्य शास्त्री, संस्कृत विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी

पूर्वमीमांसायां भट्टमतं प्रभाकरमतं इति मतद्वयं लोके विलसति । मुरारिमिश्रमतं तु लुप्तप्रायम् । तत्र भट्टमतं श्रीकुमारिलभट्टविरचितवार्तिकप्रभवम् । इदानीमुपलभ्यमानं श्लोकवार्तिकं तन्त्रवार्तिकं टुप्टीका इति ग्रन्थत्रयं वार्तिकपदेनाभिप्रेयते । बृहद्वार्तिकमिति बृहट्टीकेति च ग्रन्थेषु श्रूयमाणो ग्रन्थः लुप्त एव । तत्र तत्रोद्धृताः केचन श्लोकाः परं शिष्यन्ते । प्रभाकरमतं तु प्रभाकरविरचितबृहती लघ्वीति टीकाद्वयप्रभवं ऋजुविमला दीपशिखेति तट्टीकाभ्यामाविष्कृततत्वं प्रसिद्धमेव । परं तु तट्टीकाकारशालिकनाथविरचितप्रकरणपञ्चिकया निर्णीतः सर्वोऽपि प्रभाकराभिप्रायः । भट्टप्रभाकरयोः पौर्वापर्यं केचन विवदन्ते । परं तु प्रभाकरेण कण्ठत एव भट्टोक्तविषयाणां खण्डनात्, (१) नयविवेककृता भवनाथेन भट्टाभिप्रायं खण्डयितुमेव प्रभाकरेण प्रयत्यत इति स्फुटमभिधानाच्च (२) भट्टः प्राचीनः, प्रभाकरोऽर्वाचीन इति वक्तव्यं भवति । अत एव भट्टमतं प्राचीनदर्शनानुसारि ऋजु भाष्यस्थपदानुरोधि च दृश्यते । यथा चैतत् तथा अस्मिन् लेखे स्फुटीक्रियते ।

(१) अध्ययनविधिः

तत्रादौ अध्ययनविधिं तावत्परामृशामः । तत्र भट्टः 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य' इति विधिः फलस्याश्रवणात् वेदमात्राध्ययनं स्वर्गार्थत्वेन विधेयं विश्वजिन्न्यायात्, न तु अर्थज्ञानार्थत्वेन वेदाध्ययनविधिः सिद्धान्त्यभिमतो युक्तः, विनैव विधिं अनुष्ठानस्य अर्थज्ञानं विनाऽसंभवादेवार्थज्ञानं सिद्ध्यत्येवेति पूर्वपक्षयित्वा अर्थज्ञानार्थत्वेनाध्ययननियम-

(१) संख्याधिकरणे (पृ. 866) "तस्माद्यागैकत्वे सप्तदशसङ्ख्यान्वयो न घटते" इति वार्तिकपक्षमुपादाय खण्डयति प्रभाकरः—किमिदमन्याय्यमुक्तं यागनिरूपणोत्तरकालं हि संस्कारप्राप्तिः न संस्कारापेक्षं यागनिरूपणम् । अस्य ग्रन्थस्य भट्टखण्डनपरत्वेन शालिकनाथो व्याचख्यौ ।

(२) अत्र यद्यपि परमते (भट्टमते) लोकइत्यादिभाष्यस्य षडर्थानुक्त्वा दशपक्षी चापरा उक्ता । तदपि मन्दं मत्वा गुरुः सप्तदशमर्थमाह (न. वि P. I.)

विधिरयं यथा व्रीहीनवहन्तीति । ततश्च विध्यानर्थक्यम् । विधिफलं तु वेदाध्ययनानन्तरमपि वेदार्थस्य यथावत् ज्ञानाय धर्मविचारः कर्तव्यः । ततश्च कर्मजिज्ञासासूत्रं अध्ययनविधिमूलकमित्याह । प्रभाकरस्तु स्वाध्यायविधौ अधिकारी न श्रुतः अतः न स्वविधिप्रयुक्तमध्ययनं अपितु अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत इति विधौ आचार्यकरणार्थे नीधातोः आत्मनेपदत्वश्रवणात् आचार्यकरणविधिप्रयुक्तमध्ययनम् उपनयनेन कथमाचार्यत्वसिद्धिः ? अध्ययनद्वारा । तया च आचार्यत्वसिध्यर्थं विहितमध्ययनं विवक्षितार्थं भवितुमर्हतीति वेदार्थस्याविवक्षितत्वात् ब्रह्मविद्या नारब्धव्येति पूर्वपक्षे यद्यप्याचार्यत्वसिद्धिः अध्ययनेन सिध्यति तथापि न तस्य मुख्यं फलं बहिरङ्गत्वात् । अर्थज्ञानं तु अन्तरङ्गत्वात् अध्ययनस्य मुख्यं फलं तच्च विचारमन्तरेण न सिध्यतीति धर्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या मीमांसाशास्त्रं च विधिमूलकमिति व्याचख्यौ ।

अत्र प्रभाकर व्याख्याया सम्माननोत्सञ्जनाचार्यकरणादिषु नियः इति पाणिनिसूत्रमेकमेवानुकुलम् । भाष्यं तु मतत्रयस्यापि साधारणं दृश्यते । "दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं नाम । न च तस्याध्ययनमात्रात्तत्रभवन्तो याज्ञिकाः फलमामनन्ति" इतीदमेव भाष्यं अध्ययनस्य दृष्टार्थत्वेनादृष्टस्वर्गाद्यर्थत्वप्रतिषेधकमुपलभ्यते ।

(२) विधिविचारः

धर्मं जिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय सूत्रकारः को धर्म इति प्रश्ने "चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्म" इत्याह । अत्र भट्टः "यो हि यागादिकमनुतिष्ठति तं धार्मिक इति समाचक्षते" इति भाष्यानुसारेण यागादिरेव धर्मः तस्य विधिज्ञाप्यत्वं च चोदना लक्षणोर्थो धर्म इति सूत्रादवगम्यत इत्याह । विधिः लिङ्प्रतिपाद्या प्रेरणा । लिङोऽपि गौणं विधित्वं तत्प्रतिपादकत्वात् अस्मिन्नर्थे भाष्यं चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनं, आचार्यचोदितः करोमि इति हि दृश्यते-इति । अत्र स्पष्टं प्रेरणाया विध्यर्थत्वं प्रतीयते । क्रियायाः यागादेः प्रवृत्तौ कारणं वचनं विधिः इत्यर्थो भाष्यस्य ।

प्रभाकरस्तु कार्यं लिङर्थः, कार्यं नाम अपूर्वंयागादिजन्यं तस्य लिङर्थत्वे च भाष्यसम्मतिरुच्यते उत्तरत्र "यः पुरुषं निश्रेयसेन संयुनक्ति स धर्म इत्युच्यते, इति भाष्यम् । अनेन निश्रेयसकरत्वं धर्मस्योपदिष्टं, अपूर्वाधिकरणे च चोदनेत्यपूर्वं ब्रूमः (२–१–२) इति वदन् स्पष्टं भाष्यकारः अपूर्वस्य निःश्रेयसकरत्वं लिङर्थत्वं चाभिप्रैति । केचित्तु यः यागादिकमनुतिष्ठति तं धार्मिक इति समाचक्षते—इति भाष्यम् । तस्यायमर्थः यागानुष्ठानकर्तरि धार्मिकपदप्रयोगः नियोगानुष्ठाननिमित्तकः । तथा हि अनधिकृतयागाद्यनुष्ठातरि न धार्मिकशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । अतो ज्ञायते नियोगानुष्ठानपरमिदं भाष्यमिति ।

भट्टस्तु अपूर्वाधिकरणभाष्यं न प्रभाकरानुकूलं, यतः तत्र भाष्यं अपूर्वं पुनरस्ति इतरथा विधानमनर्थकं स्यात् । भङ्क्त्वाद्यागस्येति वदन् अपूर्वस्य भट्टाभिमतां अनुमेयतां स्पष्टमाह । नतु लिङ्वाच्यताम् ।

(३) भ्रमविषये विप्रतिपत्तिः

श्री कुमारिलः भ्रमे विपरीतख्यातिं मन्यते । विपरीतख्यातिर्नाम नैयायिकाभिमता अन्यथाख्यातिरेव । ननु अन्यथाख्यातौ नैयायिकाः ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्षेण दूरस्थरजतभानमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । नच भट्टमते ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्षात् रजतभानमुक्तं कुत्रापि इति चेन्न । शास्त्रदीपिकाकारेण "अपि च स्मृतेन रजताकारेण यत्सन्निहितस्य शुक्तिरूपस्य तादात्म्यग्रहणं तदनुपरतेन्द्रियव्यापारस्य भवत् साक्षात्संप्रयोगजमेव अपरोक्षत्वम्" इत्युक्तं वर्तते । यद्यपि ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्षः कण्ठतो नोक्तः तथापि साक्षात्संप्रयोगजत्वोक्त्या कल्पनीय एव । उक्तं तत्रैव आभासनिवृत्त्यर्थं तत्सतोर्व्यत्यय इति ।

प्रभाकरस्तु भ्रान्तिमेव नाभ्युपगच्छति । इदं रजतमिति ज्ञाने इदमिति ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं रजतमिति स्मृतिः । तत्र इदं रजतयोः प्रत्यक्षस्मरणयो विवेकाग्रहात् इदं रजतमिति व्यवहारमात्रम् नतूभयविषयमेकं ज्ञानं इति मन्यते ।

भाष्ये तु "व्यभिचारात् परीक्षितव्यं शुक्तिका हि रजतवत् प्रकाशते" यदा हि चक्षुरादिभिरुपहतं मनो भवति इन्द्रियं वा तिमिरादिभिः सौक्ष्म्यादिभिर्वाह्यो वा विषयः ततो मिथ्याज्ञानम् । अनुपहतेषु च सम्यग्ज्ञानम्" इति कण्ठतो मिथ्याज्ञान सद्भावोक्तिर्दृश्यते इदं भट्टमतानुकूलम् ।

परन्तु प्रभाकरः इदं भाष्यं स्वमतानुसारेण इत्थं व्याचष्टे । तथाहि 'चक्षुरादिभिरुपहतं मनः' इत्यनेन भ्रमस्य अग्रहणनिमित्तताऽवगम्यते । कथं वा इदं हि कथं पुनरन्यसंयोगे अन्यविषयज्ञानं भवति इत्यत्र हेतुः नहि दृष्टा यवादयः शाल्यङ्कुरप्रसवसमर्था भवन्ति । तस्मात् तेन यथावत् पुरोवर्ति विषयस्याग्रहणमेवाभिप्रेयते ततश्च अग्रहणनिमित्तता भ्रान्तेः सिद्धा—इत्याह ।

(४) ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षत्व विवादः

प्रभाकरः ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमिति मन्यते । स्वप्रकाशत्वं च न स्वविषयकत्वं एकत्र कर्मकर्तृभावविरोधात् । अपितु स्वांशे संशयराहित्यम् । यत्तु तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रभाकरमते ज्ञानं मितिमातृमेयविषयमिति तत् न प्रभाकरेणोक्तम् अपितु जरत्प्रभाकरमतमिति ब्रह्मानन्दानामाशयः । भट्टास्तु ज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षं अपितु

ज्ञानजन्यज्ञातता विषयगता प्रत्यक्षा तया ज्ञानमनुमीयते । यथा-इयं ज्ञातता घटत्व-प्रकारकघटविशेष्यकज्ञानजन्या घटवृत्तिघटत्वप्रकारकज्ञाततात्वात् इति प्रयोगं वदन्ति ।

भाष्ये तु "नह्यज्ञातेऽर्थे कश्चिद्‌बुद्धिमुपलभते । ज्ञाते तु अनुमानादवगच्छति इति तस्मादप्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिः" इति च उपलभ्यते । इदं तु यथाश्रुते भट्टस्यैवानुकूलम् इदं भाष्यं प्रभाकरस्त्वेवं व्याचष्टे ज्ञानं विषयतयाऽप्रत्यक्षमेव स्वप्रकाशत्वात् अनुमानात् ज्ञानावगमे प्रभाकरस्य न कोऽपि विरोधगन्धः । तस्य ज्ञाने स्वप्रकाशत्वा ववोधकत्वात् । स्वस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयकत्वं यद्‌बौद्धैरुच्यते तन्निराकरणपरमिदं भाष्यम् । तथाचेदं भाष्यं मतद्वयसाधारणमेव ज्ञेयम् ।

(५) लौकिकवाक्यानाम् प्रामाण्यम् ।

वैदिकशब्दाः प्रमाणमेव । लौकिकशब्दास्तु लिङ्गविधया प्रमाणम् वैशेषिक मतवत् इति प्रभाकरः । भट्टस्तु लौकिकं वैदिकं च वाक्यं उभयमपि प्रमाणं मन्यते ।

अत्र प्रभाकरस्तु—अपि च पौरुषेयाद्वाक्यात् "एवमयं पुरुषो वेद" इति भवति प्रत्ययः नत्वेवमयमर्थ इति" इति भाष्यं प्रमाणम् । एवं "यत्तु लौकिकं वचनं तच्चेत् प्रत्ययितात्पुरुषात् इन्द्रियविषयं वा अवितथमेव तत् । अथाप्रत्ययितात् अतीन्द्रियविषयं वा तत् पुरुषबुद्धिप्रभवमप्रमाणम् अशक्यं हि तत् ज्ञातुं वचनात्" इति भाष्यमप्यत्र मानम् । अपि च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणनिरूपणप्रस्तावे" शास्त्रं शब्द-विज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञायते" इति शास्त्रलक्षणं वदन् भाष्यकारः वेदस्यैव शब्दविधया प्रमाणत्वमभिप्रैति लौकिकवाक्यानि न लक्षयतीत्याह ।

भट्टस्तु "यत्तु लौकिकं वचनं तच्चेत् प्रत्ययितात्पुरुषात् इन्द्रियविषयं वा अवितथमेव तत्" इति भाष्यं प्रमाणप्रस्तावे श्रुतं लौकिकवाक्यमपि आप्तोक्तं प्रमाणमेवेत्यभिप्रैति । अपि च पौरुषेयाद्वचनादित्यस्यायमर्थः पुंवाक्यस्य पुरुषे दोषसंभवेन न प्रतिष्ठितं प्रामाण्यम् । यदि तदर्थः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स्यात् तदा तदपि भवति प्रमाणमिति । शब्दमात्रलक्षणप्रस्ताव शास्त्रलक्षणकथनं तु-वेदानुपयोगि प्रमाणं नात्र भाष्यकारेण निरूप्यते । प्रत्यक्षादिकमपि स्वरूपग्राहकत्वेन वेदोपयोग्येव । अतः शास्त्रं इति पदस्य प्रमाणशब्दमात्रपरत्वमित्यर्थ इति ।

(६)श्येनादेरधर्मत्वं धर्मत्वं वा ?

भट्टः वेदविहितत्वेन अभिचारकर्मणः श्येनादेः धर्मत्वमेव । परन्तु तत्फलस्य शत्रुमरणादेरधर्मत्वेन शिष्टा नानुतिष्ठन्ति इति जगाद । अत्र भाष्यं—श्येनादयः

कर्तव्या इति विज्ञायन्ते । यो हि हिंसितुमिच्छेत् तस्यायमभ्युपाय इति हि तेषामुपदेशः" इति । अतः वेदविहितत्वेन चोदनालक्षणत्वाद्धर्मत्वमेवेति फलति । प्रभाकरस्तु श्येनादेरधर्मत्वमेवाभिप्रैति ।

अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणम्

भाट्टाः अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । तत्र च भाष्यं – अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावः नास्तीत्यर्थस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य इति । प्रभाकरस्तु अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणं नाभ्युपैति । आह च "नास्तीति यदुच्येत तदस्य प्रमेयमित्येतदापद्येत । तथाच यन्न प्रमीयते तत्प्रमेयं इत्यप्रमीयमाणस्य प्रमेयत्वप्रसंगः स्यात्" अतः अभावप्रमाणस्य प्रमेयमेव नास्ति इत्यर्थः । प्रसिद्धिस्तु वटयक्षप्रसिद्धिवन्निर्मूलेत्याह ।

(७) शाब्दबोधप्रकारः

प्रभाकरः अन्विताभिधानमभ्युपगच्छति । भट्टस्तु अभिहितान्वयम् । प्रभाकरस्य मूलं—तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः इतिसूत्रम् । अस्यार्थः—तेष्वेव पदार्थेषु कार्यान्वितेषु भूतानां वर्तमानांनां क्रियार्थेन कार्यवाचिपदेन सहोच्चारणं कर्तव्यमिति । ततश्च साक्षात् परम्परया वा कार्यान्विते पदानां शक्तिः कार्यबोधक पदघटितादेव वाक्याच्छाब्दबोधः । वेदान्ते तत्वमस्यादिवाक्यानामपि 'उपासीत' इत्यादिपदयोजनयैव शाब्दबोधः इत्याह

भट्टस्तु अभिहितान्वयबोधमिच्छति । पदेन अभिहितैः पदार्थैः वाक्यार्थबोधः भवतीत्याह । अस्मिन्नर्थे भाष्यम् –पदानिच स्वं स्वमर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि । अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगताः सन्तः वाक्यार्थमवगमयन्ति–इति । इदं तु भाष्यं भट्टस्यैव संगच्छते । प्रभाकरस्य तु दुर्योज्यमिति मन्तव्यम् । अपूर्वस्य लिङ्वाच्यत्वं यत्प्रभाकरेणोच्यते तत्रापि "कथं पुनरवगम्यते अस्ति तदपूर्वमिति" इत्यपूर्वाधिकरणविरोधः स्यात् लिङ् पदवाच्यत्वे प्रश्नासंगतेः इति ।

इत्थं एकमूलप्रभवस्य मतद्वयस्य कथं प्रकारभेदः समजनीति यथामति यत्किञ्चिन्यरूपयम् ।

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TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION —INDIA AND JAPAN

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In the 4th century B. C., when Buddhism was expounded, it had to absorb Brahmanism on the one side, and also to revolt against it on the other. Buddhists had to establish their own community to impose their beliefs on all people. Hence, the principle on which Buddhism was founded is faith in the Three Treasures (*Buddha*, *Dharma*, *Saṅgha*). The community (*saṅgha*) is one of them. Buddhism used the aid of state power or the patronage of King Aśoka to propagate its belief all over the country.

Under the name of freedom of faith there grew up the two main different sects in India. Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism. Since this partition a number of sects and schools had been developed in accordance with divergent views on the Buddha's teachings in the long span of time from the 3rd century B. C. up to the 8th century A. D. The latent function of such a view was to eliminate heretic views and to make all people enjoy the true religion of the Buddha.

The manifest motive of the institutional organization is universal, and common to all religions. What is different is the fact that Buddhism was cast out of India after the 10th century A. D., while it is still living and playing a vital role for cultivation of spirituality of the people in Japan.

Why, then, did Buddhism disappear in India ?

Why has it been developed in Japan, though in a modified form ? The socio-political background will be able to account for the historical differences between Japanese and Indian Buddhism. Let us take a glimpse of the historical development of Buddhism in Japan.

The different sects of Buddhism grew up in the 13th century A. D., as a revolution against the autocratic, polemic Buddhism of the Heian Period from the 8th to the 9th century. Buddhism in the Kamakura Period (the 13th century) can be called the Renaissance in the point that the masses could, separated from the autocratic polemic, gain a freedom of faith. New sects spread their influences over all parts of Japan, insisting on the latent possibility of the salvation of human beings, high and low. All these beliefs penetrated into the fishermen and peasants. Buddhists of new sects tried to have close contact with the peasant class for spiritual cultivation, not for intellectual and scholarly education. Thus, the heterogenious Buddhism had assimilated the national cult, pervading the masses. It was in the Muromachi and Azuchi-Momoyama Periods (1392-1615) when the intensive dogmatic scholarship reached its peak in the realm of Buddhist theology.

In contrast Buddhism in India was centered around the Buddhist community, having been negligent of propagating itself among the masses. The high standard of scholarship did not affect the popularization of Buddhism among the peasant society.

Moreover, there were little or minor diversities between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Buddhism had the majority of doctrines to be assimilated by Brahmanism. In other words, Buddhism was homogeneous to

Brahmanism in its nature. Therefore, it was ready to be assimilated by Brahmanism.

India had to suffer from the invasions of the foreign troops, in particular, of militant Muslims. It would be obvious that Buddhism, not yet rooted deeply among the masses, was exposed to complete decay by the militant attack of Muslims.

In Japan Christianity was placed under official ban by the Tokugawa Government for fear that it would prove inimical to public order. Foreign intercourse was so active that the Tokugawa Government enforced an even stricter ban on Christianity, resulting in a state of complete seclusion from foreign influence. About that time, however, the nation made remarkable progress in all fields of economic activity. Side by side with seclusion, there went on domestic politics in steadfastness through all parts of Japan.

Although the seclusion pursued for more than two centuries, religions succeeded in establishing temples and dominating the relatively under-developed regions of Japan with no disturbances by foreign religions.

The popularization of Buddhism was so intensively and widely perpetuated that the rise and decay of Buddhist scholarship did not affect so much the sentiments of the people. Moreover, the political seclusion (1639-1854) helped even to create a scholarly stability.

This example demonstrates the significant positive relationship between religious beliefs and socio-political conservatism. To some the political seclusion in the Tokugawa Period is a matter for condemnation, but a power principle makes it sociologically understandable.

In India, however, Buddhism could not as yet dominate and perpetuate the sentiments of the masses,

and also brought the Buddhist scholarship to its extreme seclusion from the demand of the people. Besides, after the Aśoka Period Indian Buddhism did not obtain strong Royal patronage. It would be natural that Muslims, a religious group radical in its political orientation, gave a final blow to Buddhism.

Hinduism and its Institution.

Hinduism did not begin at any definite time in history ; it came out of the amalgamation with foreign cultures which resulted from the invasion of India around 1500 B. C. by Indo-Europeans Hence, it is quite natural that Hinduism did not have any specific religious community to propagate its belief among the people. All of Hindu doctrines had been spread over by the individual activities and the social castes, but not by a definite organization of Hindu monks.

With this background Hinduism in modern India has no churches and temples eccleciastically organized. There are a number of temples and Mandirs for use to worship and pray. But, they have no temple-officer or minister who is to engage in religious ceremonies and sermons. They have also no system of membership which could provide economic support. Nevertheless, a group of people, as we can see everywhere, gather at the Hindu Mandirs to take refuge or to pray and worship. The temples themselves offer no food, no accomodation, no conveniences—even no regular meeting or discussion. Notwithstanding of all these deficiencies, the Hindu people are confident in themselves being Hindus. There might be various reasons why Hindus have had no ecclesiastical organization or no system of membership similar to the Christian church. We can consider at least three reasons.

First, philosophically Hinduism is individualistic in its approach to the truth. Although Hinduism has a trinity (*trimūrti*) of gods—Brahmā (creation), Shiva (destruction), and Vishṇu (preservation)—a Hindu devotee can be an agnostic, monist, pantheist and atheist at the same time. It is difficult to describe Hinduism from the viewpoint of Western concept of religion. Hinduism, in essence, is an all-absorptive, all embracing religion. For this reason it could survive through countless invasion and strifes. They believe that the truth (*Dharma*) is present in all existing things, animate and inanimate, and that the truth is made manifest in the form Krishṇa. The requirement for a Hindu is that he should follow the *Dharma* of his caste, hoping he will be reborn in a happy life after death. The Hindus find nothing peculiar in spending long hours in meditation even in the waiting room of a terminal. They are inward-looking. There are many ways of self-training, of which Yoga is the best known. Each person participates in the *Dharma* in his own way. Hence, there is in Hinduism no dogma and no catechism to dominate human intellect and practice. And the institutional organization is of little or no significance.

Secondly, Hinduism has been moulded on the Indian soil among the masses. It forms a religio-social community, having a close contact with the social structure at any period. Sociologically, it has been interrelated with the caste system which is not merely religious, but also political, economic and social.

By 500 B. C., four castes had developed in India. They have persisted into our times. They are Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Although recent developments have moderated many of the ancient rigid

laws of castes, the masses of India, the peasants in particular, still adapt themselves to the essentials of the customs of their Hindu ancestors. Brahmins are unwilling or even refuse to work and eat together with the low castes like Shudra or Harijan. Under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to organize a united Church or Temple which consists of devotees and members at an equal level of participation. There are different status and various distinctions among the castes. Therefore, the religio-social values upheld by particular groups cannot exert influence upon the other classes, being unable to reflect behaviour of lower groups.

Religious institutions have always an impact on social structure. As far as the caste structure is retained in Indian society, there might not be united activities of Hindu temples and the organization of united churches supported by memberships in an equal degree of participation.

Thirdly, politically speaking, Hinduism has a racial and nationalistic feature. In ancient India there were two kinds of literary sources which provide us with ideas about political problems and the unity of the nation. The *Vedas*, the *Upaniṣads* and other philosophical systems provided fundamental concepts of politics, but essentially they referred to theology, religion and philosophy. The *Arthaśāstra* and the *Dharmaśāstra* literature refers intensively to theories of administration.

What was preached in the days of underdeveloped ancient communication was a philosophy of balance and harmonious human integration. Practical emphasis

was implied by a humanistic concept of *ahiṁsā* (non-violence), which is retained in all phases of politics and human affairs in modern India. The philosophy of balance is found in a political remark by Gandhi, when he referred to socialism and communism.

"Socialism and communism of the West are based on certain conceptions which are fundamentally different from ours. Our socialism or communism should, therefore, be based on *ahiṁsā* and on harmonious co-operation of labour and capital, landlord and tenant."[1] This philosophy of balance has been supported and realized by the racial and nationalistic character of Hindus.

Following independence after World War II, and withdrawal of the colonial powers, the primary concern of India has been with the unity of the nation which is essential for the modernization of India.

India, thus, saw cultural revivalism and the industrial expansion as the only true measures of realizing the philosophy of balance. The former principle is expressed by Indian reformers at any social meeting all over India, while the latter is carried out by the Rural Development Plan or the *Pañchayats* movement throughout India.

For example, in conjunction with cultural revivalism, a land reformer Vinoba states at a Shanti Senā rally on the occasion of the 15th Sarvodaya Sammelan at Rajpur : "One gets the power of compassion and it rises from within one's inner being. We desire and firmly believe that if this power is indispensable for the present age, we will get it from within us. Let us see in every soul our own image."

1. *Bhoodan*, Vol. Viii, 38-39 (January 25, 1964).

This emphasis on "the truth within us" is a deeply ingrained principle of the Hindu philosophy of balance. This is the same idea as embodied in ancient scriptures and Rock Edicts of Aśoka.

In connection with the industrial expansion Indian socialists see rural development as the only democratic means of realizing the philosophy of balance. In line with this idea, India attempts to slow the movement of younger people from rural areas, to the cities. This movement drains, in Gandhi's terms, "the life-blood of the villages." Indian economists increasingly recognize the need to increase the supply and variety of food available for domestic consumption, which entirely depends upon the growth of rural industry.

There is no doubt that glamorous industry, economic and social changes are the proper goal of national development. The primary focus of any rural development program, however, must be to encourage the revival of the traditional spirit of the people in their villages and towns.

Beside these spiritual revival movements, there arose recently some political motives to instigate Indian nationalism, which take the forms of self-defence against the Chinese invasion and of linguistic patriotism through the unity of national languages.

It is one of the important problems to unite the traditional culture and self-assertion in an international policy. In this context it is not an accident that, after India pledged her support to the U. N. and voted to brand the North Koreans as aggressors, Nehru affirmed to the world a policy of non-attachment, an Indian traditional concept, regarding any other decision determined by the U. N. Hindu spiritual tradition still

functions on the Indian polity.

Generally speaking, the Indian traditional, spiritual culture as referred to internal purifications, has been unmindful of political and sociological implication, being thereby not relevant to social improvements.

We come across, from time to time, to such a question as the harmonius unity of the traditional culture and the Indian polity. Such a question as this is given mainly by the young generation, which is critical, even sceptical of the spiritual culture, and yet sympathetic in an implicit way.

India is one of those countries which are proud of their traditional culture and its development through the ages. This strongly sympathetic and emotional attitude towards their own culture is common to all people in India.

Thus, Indian national unity or strength depends upon emotional integration, national impulse and national ethos. In modern India Hinduism is not only a religion, but also national patriotism, upon which the people pursue their own lives. Hinduism means to be an Indian or to be a Hindu in the original sense of the word. It represents the way of Indian life of the Hindu people. The ancient culture provides the people with a national and racial consciousness.

Regional Distribution.

The religious tie in villages still provides a cement for a modern Indian community, which might otherwise be divided into different, independent societies, as the partition between India and Pakistan shows us by its bitter example.

Even after the partition India has 40 million Muslims out of a total of 380 million people. India

has also numerous adherents of various religions and sects such as Sikh, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Parsis, Jews and tribal religions. Among them Hinduism is the predominant religion. It counts 300 million people among its adherents.

The villagers feel responsible for the handicapped or poor men among their caste members. They protect themselves against higher castes and help each other. In their private lives they receive more advantages offered by the caste than offered by the Government Community Plans. The caste system will not be discarded unless and untill social security substitutes for the advantages given by the caste system.

Therefore, the rise and decacy of interest in religion exercise a profound influence upon Indian social revolution. The table[2] shows us the distribution of population by religion in 1963.

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2. *Table*

(Population of Major Religious Communities

(Re-compiled from *1963 Census India)*

State/Union Territory	Hindu	Muslim	Christian	Jain	Sikh	Buddhist
Andhra Predesh	3,18,14,025	27,15,021	14,28,729	9,012	8,563	6,753
Assam	78,84,921	27,65,507	7,64,553	9,468	9,686	36,313
Bihar	3,93,47 050	57,85,631	5,02,195	17.598	44,413	2,885
Gujarat	1,83,56,061	17,45,103	91,028	4,09,754	9,646	3,185
Jammu, Kashmir	10,13,193	24,32,067	2,848	1,427	63,069	48,360
Kerala	1,02,82,568	30,27,639	35,87,365	2,967	822	228
Madhya Pradesh	3,04,25,798	13,17,617	1,88,314	2,47,927	65,715	1,13.365
Madras	3,02,97,115	15,60,414	17,62,954	28,350	2,567	777
Maharashtra	3,25,30,901	30,34,332	5,60,594	4,85,672	57,617	27,89,504
Mysore	2,05,82,853	23,28,376	4,87.587	1,74,366	3,287	9,770
Orissa	1,71,23,194	2,15,319	2,01,017	2,295	5,030	454
Punjab	1,29,30,045	3 93,314	1,49,854	48,754	67,69,129	14,857
Rajasthan	1,81,32,690	13,14,613	22,864	4,09,417	2,74,198	759
Uttar Pradesh	6,24,37 313	1,07,88,089	1,01,641	1.22,108	2,83,737	12,893
West Bengal	2,75,42,734	69,71,287	2.01.854	26,973	34,342	1, 09,205
Delhi	22,34,597	1,55,453	29,269	29,595	2,03,916	5,466
Nagaland	34,677	891	1,95,583	263	255	42
TOTAL	36,29,69,634	4,65,50,773	102,78,234	1,46,25,946	78,36,002	31,54,826

Hinduism.

The Hindu population was 86 percent in 1881, but it gradually declined and stood at 83, 67 in 1941. The decline is mainly due to the conversion of Hindus to Sikhism or Christianity and to higher rate of increase of population among the Muslims. The increase in the present census is due mainly to the exodus of Muslims to Pakistan. It is also due to the re-conversion to Hinduism of the imperfectly converted Christians and Sikhs.

Before World War II the Christian community was growing rapidly in numbers ; the Christian population in 1921 was only 69, 882, and it is more than doubled itself within a period of 30 years. There might have been many factors to cause this process of change.

British emphasis on the equality of all individuals in their right and responsibilities gradually cast away Hindu social restrictions. On the other side, industrialization inspired by British policy whittled down caste restrictions on working and living together in urban districts.

Hindu society did not admit the untouchables to enter into temples. Psychologically, temples play an important role in the spiritual lives of the Hindus. Temple-worship or sitting in temples is the only means by which they can release themselves from mental stresses.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that some untouchables abandoned Hinduism, converting to other religious beliefs such as Chrisitanity, Sikhism, or more recently to Buddhism.

After the War, however, the Indian Government's

Development Plan insisted on equal educational opportunities for all, offering scholarships to the untouchables, while Hindu religious leaders urged modification of Hindu caste rules in conjunction with modern religious and social movements.

The setting up of the Welfare State as the nation's goal in 1950 gradually made them realize that the aspirations of the people after the achievement of independence would rise in a tremendous progression. Village *Pañchayats* were organized and powers were given to them to enable them to work as units of villages or inter-villages.

Besides, the racial nationalism, inspired by independence, encouraged the revival of Indian tradition. The political leaders also encouraged the revival of Hinduism against Christianity. Christian missionary works in India had to undergo difficulties because of the shortage of missionaries. Nehru referred to religion once in Kathamandu in 1954 ; "In Asia there are too many of different religions. Christian missionaries must have many things to do in their own countries before they come to India for mission works."

Muslims.

The second important community is Muslim. The Muslim proportion to the total population stood at 13, 74 in 1881, gradually rose to 15, 43 in 1941. In 1951 it declined to 14, 28. The decline is due to the departure of some Muslims to Pakistan.

The growth of a religious community depends on three factors, natural increase, migration and conversion. The large cities like Bombay, Calcutta and New Delhi show a slight fall in the growth rate of Muslims during the

past decade. It was not only due to the partition, but also due to a slowing down of immigration of Muslims from other parts of India. The decline of Muslims is also found in the Hills Division in Assam. It is mainly due to the moving of Muslim Government servants from Shilong, the capital of the Province, to Pakistan.

Through all parts of India the decline of Muslims in number is absolutely comparable with the increase of Hinduism. The increase of Hinduism does not mean conversion of Muslims to Hinduism. It means that Muslims have migrated to their own States in India after the partition. For example, in West Bengal Muslims numbered 4, 28 and 4, 74 millions in 1921 and 1931 respectively. But, in 1941 their number suddenly swelled into 5, 54 millions. It is 4, 92 millions in 1951 and 6, 97 millions in 1961.

Christianity and others.

Christians are large in number in such states as Travancore-Cochin, Andhra Pradesh and Madras. It was introduced into Travancore-Cochin during the early centuries of the Christian era. Since then it has been steadily increasing, thanks to the tolerant policy issued by the princes and people of Kerala. Since the advent of the Portuguese a number of Hindus, particularly the backward people, have been converted to Christianity. Cochin is one of the centers of ancient Jewish colonies. It has held its own Jewish faith, although it is a small community.

Christians are found in all districts, but in Madras they are found only in such places as East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Nellore and in the

Circars, Cuddapah and Kurnool districts in the Deccan division, the South Madras division, and also in the West Madras division. What is peculiar to Christianity is the missionary activities among the tribes. Assam is one of the states where the various tribes are living away from the urban districts. According to the 1953 *Census of India*, the situation activities is remarked by Mr. Marar in 1941 as follows ; "Christians are most numerous among the tribal people of the Hills........It is, however, reported from Lushai Hills that there has been a tendency in the opposite direction also, Christians reverting to their old beliefs and sacrifices, this has been indicated in the house list, but has not been examined to ascertain its extent."

Jainism comes next to Christianity in number. It spread over such states as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh in large number ; and in Nagaland, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir in small number.

Jainism prevails mainly among urban-dwelling trading communities, except in Belgaum in Southern Deccan where a considerable proportion are agriculturists. The intermarriage is not difficult among Hindus and Jains. The heavy increase in the Jain population during the past decade was probably due to the increased immigration of Jains to Gujarat and Bombay from Kutch and Saurashtra and other districts. The decline in 1951 is due to their returning to the Hindu faith.

It is interesting to note that Jainism and Hinduism are minor in their differences in practice ; this is one of the reasons for the Jains' flexibility in converting to Hinduism.

Sikhism pervades every state, particularly Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The districts minor in number are Nagaland, Kerala, Madras and Mysore. In 1931 the number of Sikhs in Orissa was almost nil, while in 1941 their number was 476 only. Nevertheless, they grew in 1951 to 4, 163 out of every 10,000 of the population. In 1961 it was 5,030. It is due to the attractions of growing industries and the result of partition. Sikhs are engaging mostly in industry, transport services and contract business. The number of Sikhs in West Bengal has also increased, for military personnal and persons displaced by West Pakistan have contributed a large share to the increased number. Sikhs numbered 37,017 in Bombay State, now included in Maharashtra, in census of 1951, or 0,10 percent of the population. Their number was 839 in 1921, 2,951 in 1931, 8,824 in 1941 and 37,017 in 1951. It shows the heavy increase around Bombay, one of the most industrialized cities in India.

Zoroastrians, influential far beyond their numerical importance, are centering around Bombay, Poona and Surat in Western India. They are living almost in a western way. They are the wealthiest of all the religious communities, being most literate. The followers are Parsis, who number 97,573 or 0,27 percent of the population. Parsis marry later and less than other religious groups. Therefore, the fertility is low, but it counterbalances with an extremely low death rate. It is well known that Parsis contributed much to the Independent Movement of Indian's economic and social fields of activity.

Buddhists have kept up the natural rate of increase. They are most numerous in such districts as Maha-

rashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab and Mysore.

In past decades Buddhists are found not among the native Indians, but among the Chinese and Burmese immigrants. Past census figures testified to the existence of Buddhists mostly in Bombay city and 594 in Dharwar district in 1951. It is estimated that the Chinese probably contributed mostly to the Buddhist figures. They are mainly shoe-makers, furniture-makers, restaurant managers, dentists etc.

Since 1956, however, the proportion of Buddhists is found to have increased very greatly. One of the reasons for this abnormal rise is the settlement of Chinese and Burmese families in several towns in the State. Another reason is that a number of untouchables were converted to Buddhism. The lower classes and the untouchables looked forward to building a new life when freedom came to India. Moreover, their aspirations and hopes were raised up to the unification of Buddhists in different districts, thanks to the religious, political movement of a political leader, Dr. Ambedkar.

There might be many factors which caused this conversion into Buddhism. Among them are the self-awareness of freedom, the introduction of industrialization, and above all, Buddhist insistence on the equality of all individuals before the duty and responsibility.

Such a trend of thought has spread over all parts of India among low classes. Buddhist religious leaders organized 'Nawa Buddhan', a new Buddhist movement, among the Harijan. Some of the low classes were so much influenced by the Nawa Buddhan movement that they replaced even Indian native God and Goddess

by Buddhist statuary. It is worth nothing that the Harijan class around Sevagram, Maharashtra, gather every evening at a small Buddhist temple, led by Buddhist laymen and monks, chanting Buddhist *sūtra* and discussing even political and social problems. All of these *Sammitī*, or meetings are very helpful not only to encourage Indian revivalism, but also to cultivate the spirituality of the low people.

Any religious movement has to be related to the material and intellectual life of the bulk of India's rural population. From this point of view, the *Pañchayat* movement contributes much to rehabilitate the people, offering them economic settlement enough to bring them into unity. Among the various programs of the *Pañchayat* the agricultural revolution is most important to meet the demands of the rural people, for an enormous volume of unemployment existed in the agricultural field. Agricultural work entirely depends upon the seasonal conditions. It is possible only for a portion of the year, i. e. 3 to 4 months in over four-fifths of the country, where there is no irrigation except for monsoon rain, and 6 to 8 months in other areas, where irrigational facilities are built up.

For this reason Buddhist leaders are spreading the Nawa Buddhan movement in relation to the Community Projects and the Land Reform Movement, working with people and answering to their needs. We cannot overlook the contributions of the Indian Government to Buddhist revival. The Government made efforts to draw up a well-adapted, comprehensive program to support the Buddhist revival movement, which came to its height when 2,500th the anniversary of the *mahāparinirvāṇa* of Gautama, the Buddha was held in Nepal in 1956,

A number of publications were released for the Publications Division, Government of India. Among them there are two books valuable and useful: "*2500 Years of Buddhism*" and "*The Way of the Buddha.*"

Two reasons can be considered for the Government's support of Buddhism: First, the Indian Government tries to encourage modern revivalism of Indian culture, inspiring the people to achieve their desires in harmony with the culture of the ancient people.

Gandhi's confidence is vividly living among all Indian people. Gandhi remarked ; "In Hindu culture, I venture to submit, Buddhistic culture is necessarily included, for the simple reason that the Buddha himself was an Indian, not only an Indian, but a Hindu amongst Hindus. I have never seen anything in the life of Gautama to warrant the belief that he renounced Hinduism and adopted a new faith."[3]

Secondly, India came to play her vital role in the world soon after Independence. India was thus to guide her own native culture into wider activities in the international perspective, for Hinduism has here-to-fore remained self-sustained mainly on Indian soil.

There is the imprint of Hindu influence on parts of Asia, which includes Indonesia, Sumatra, Java. Since the Second World War, Asian nationalism has spread all over Asian countries such as Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, China and the Malay States. For India to be not simply India but the whole of Asia, she has to re-learn Hindu universalism and deliver it to the other Asian countries on which Buddhistic influence is imprinted. The message of the Buddha, thus, must be a

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3. Mahadev Desai, *With Gandhiji in Ceylon*, p. 129.

message not only for India, but also for the whole world. Whenever Indian statesmen talk on the cultural issues in foregin countries they emphasize and refer to Buddhism as a universal religion, providing a common platform to people of all Buddhist countries. It is, in effect, an extension of Hindu culture, which is capable of embracing all a pects of religion. Efforts are also made to draw up a comprehensive issue to understand the people of different countries, keeping in a view the universal perspective based on Buddhistic or quasi-Hinduistic ideas.

In terms of sex ratio all of these religions in India have a more masculine sex ratio in general. In particular the Sikh sex ratio is heavily masculine, while Hindus, Muslims and Christians are proportioned in sex ratio. Jains and Buddhists have a more masculine sex ratio, while Zoroastrians are balanced in the number of men and women. In the world perspective the Jews sex ratio appears masculine, but well-balanced in India.

The reasons for this proportion of sex ratio in such religions as Sikhism and Jainism are not clearly known. In the case of Buddism it might be added that Buddhism is not as yet a religion deeply rooted in the family and that it is a new special movement in an attempt to pursue the betterment of life, which requires the socio-political approach towards the social organizations in modern India. All these social contacts and activities are to be carried out through men's authorities. Therefore, Buddhist's efforts in modern India are to promote human unity among the low people and to bring them into self-reliance. The Buddhist movement today plays an important role in

the field of social evolution rather than in the gospel of faith.

Hindu Philosophy and Ecclesia.

Hinduism in the course of its history has had innumerable schools. Nevertheless, there are few ecclesiastical institutions in modern Hinduism in India. There is no other system of religion which prevailed deeply among the masses without the ecclesiastical churches and the religious association membership.

In ancient India there was a religious community or *Gaṇa* of *Parivrājakas* in the six century B. C., which had a religious leader (*satthā*). Sociologically speaking, Buddhism formed a sect in the *Parivrājaka* community. Jainism also gives us a view of the early organization of the Order, although materials are not satisfactory, According to Jacobi, *Gaṇa* means a school which is derived from one teacher.[4]

This universalistic character of the religious community is exemplified in the last word of the Buddha. The Buddha repudiates the heritage of his teaching in the Buddhist Saṅgha. His words run counter to the universalistic feature of Saṅgha. The Buddha says: "Be ye islands unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as an island. Hold fast as a refuge to the truth. Look not for refuge to anyone besides yourselves, (*atta-dīpā viharatha anaññasarṇā atta-saraṇā, dhamā-dīpā dhamma-saraṇā-ānañña-saraṇā.*)

Thus, the notion of the paramount authority of a leader or *gaṇadhara* was unfamiliar to the constitution of a Buddhist Saṅgha.

4.. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, S. B. E., pt. 1, p. 288, footnote 2.

In early times there revived powerful monarchies and small tribal republics with rulers. However, these republics were ruled by an assembly, collective legislation and democratic voting. Under Buddhist influence, Buddhist bhikkhus escaped from these republics to participate in Buddhist Saṅgha. Even after the death of the Buddha all of these bhikkhus recruited from these tribal republics exercised this republican idea of self-government. K. P. Jayaswal holds a view that the Buddhist Saṅgha was copied out from the political Saṅgha, the republic, in its constitution.[5]

Sukumar Dutta points out to this effect the *Mahaparinibbāna Suttanta*,[6] where the Buddha holds up to his bhikkhus as example to be followed the "full and frequent assemblies" (*abhiṇham sannipātā sannipātā-bahulā*) by which the Vajji tribe governs itself.[7] Thus, a primitive Saṅgha in the Buddha's period represents a republican colony of Buddhist bhikkhus who formed a system of self-government. Each qualified member had an equal right of membership in it.

Behind Saṅgha lies a universalistic tenet or a conception of Enlightenment of the individual. Buddhist Saṅgha or ecclesiology is strongly influenced by inner spirituality. It is more than a sociological community.

In the course of time, however, the Saṅgha took an aristocratic form in the Theravāda school, and a hierarchical polity in the Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Each Saṅgha presented a picture of a completely universalistic society of monks and it allowed to every-

5. K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*, p. 103, 1934.
6. *Dīgha Nikāya*, Vol. I, London : PTS. 1903, p. 76.
7. S. Dutta, *Early Buddhist Monarchism*, Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. 120.

one the freedom to know, to argue and to speak according to one's own conscience (*atta-dīpā*). This supreme freedom of thought opens the door for all kinds of heretical views. It is a characteristic not only of Buddhism, but also of the whole trend of Hinduistic culture.

As far as one holds fast to this freedom of thought as a tenet of Buddha's preaching, there should be no need to organize a social and institutional body in a direct contact with the wordly human society.

It is said that in Kashmir the Buddhist temple was still powerful in the 7th century during the reign of Durlabhavardhana, though Shaivism was increasing.[8] The decline of the Buddhist ecclesiastical community in India had its beginning in the eighth century. Buddhism is in its essence homogenous with Hinduism. The homogeneity of both religions hastened the assimilation and adoptation of Buddhism into Hinduism. The decline of the Buddhist community in West India was hastened by the Arab conquest of India in 712 A. D. At the time of decline Tantrism had been developed in India. Buddhism and Tantrism had many features common to both. For instance, the object of Hindu Tantrism is mundane enjoyments, rewards for moral actions and deliverance, by prayer and worshipping Durgā (the Shakti of Shiva) through *mantra* and meditation. The worship of Shakti stands for the meditation for *prajñā* (the highest knowledge) in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. The development of Tantrism in India shows the assimilation of Buddhism. Later on, the Buddhist tantrism was transferred into

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8. Kalhaṇa's *Rājaratarangiṇī*, IV, 3, ff. 80. A History of Kāshmir written in A. D. 1100, the date presumed by G. Sastri, A. D. 1148 by Macdonell.

Tibet, becoming Lamaism, while the Buddhist tantrism in India was completely adopted by Hinduism.

The development of Tantrism in India is analogous to the rise of the *Honji Sui-Jaku* (the Buddhist assimilation of Shintoism) theory in the Heian Period in Japan, which gave rise to the *Ryōbu Shinto* in the latter part of the 13th century A. D. According to *Rhbu Shinto* (the Double Aspect Shinto) Buddhist pantheons represent the indestructible parts of the Shinto gods, while the latter are incarnations or manifestations of the former. The noumenon is termed *Honji*, while the incarnation is termed *Shuijaku* (the descendent). Moreover, *Ryōbushinto* is the acquisition of wealth, health and deliverance through magical prayer. It has multitude of Buddhist Trantric elements.

These assimilations have taken the shape of Tantrism in common. In India the homogenity of Hindusism and Buddhism certainly was one of the reasons for the decline of Buddhist ecclesiology, forming Hindu-Buddhistic Tantrism. In Japan the assimilation has resulted in Buddhist-Shintoistic Tantrism. The Hindu attitude towards life is based on the Indian concepttion (*avatāra*), or the identification of this world with the divine. It is represented in Buddhism by the the identification of *saṁsāra* (the worldly life) with *nirvāṇa* (the super-worldly life).

Hindus as a whole are Vishṇu worshippers and its believers. The Vishṇu cult emphasizes philosophically the principle of preservation as the only reality. It maintains that nothing is destroyed. Destruction symbolized by Shiva and creation symbolized by Brahmā are simply changes of forms. According to Braḥmaṇism

the reality of the world is industructible. The deity in the character of preservation is the most lovable of all Hindu deities. Hindus consider Vishṇu as a deity full of forgiveness and tender thoughts towards his followers.

Vishṇu assumed various forms (*avatāra*) to destroy evil and left his celestial abode for other worlds to establish righteousness. This idea accounts for the contemporary situation of Hindu temples in which the God and its incarnation alone are enshrined but not family members. Hindu temples are merely agencies of worship in India today.

The *avatāras* of Vishṇu are considered to be ten : Matsya or a fish, Kūrma or a tortoise, Varāha or a boar, Narasiṁha or a man-lion, Vāmana or a dwarf, Paraśurāma, Rāmchandra, Krishṇa, Buddha and Kalki. Of these the first five are said to have been born in a world other than ours ; in the next four Vishṇu lived on earth as man ; and the last is yet to come at the end of the world.

The *avatāra* comes as the manifesetation of the divine nature in the human world, irrespective of period and race. The human world may, in its turn, mould its principle in a way that the divine nature transfigures itself into the human world.

In other words, Hinduism assumes a view that we are all living in this world manifested by Vishṇu. Sin can never touch it ; we are divine essentially. Everything in this world has its own significance of existence, and different views are nothing but different roads suitable to different peoples.

In India there was from time immemorial this idea of unity that the divine is One but the forms are

various. Hence, the reality exists behind all the diversities of forms. The different religions are nothing but different stages of the Absolute. There is no need to distinguish Hinduism from other religions, establishing distinctive religious bodies or ecclesiastical organization. The Absolute is immanent and resident in nature, intra-cosmic. The purpose of Hinduism, in a sociological view, is not to create its own "holy community" separated from this real world, but to intensify or transform this human society into the divine. There is no need of intermediator like Saṅgha or Ecclesia between the divine and the human society.

Hinduism is in its essence non-dualism. Nevertheless, non-dualism admits an empirical reality of the human world, considering it as a world under the spell of ignorance (*avidyā*) to be transformed into the divine. It would be obvious when we realize that all Hindu philosophers prescribe moral disciplines including social obligations.

In modern India the Brahma Samāj, the Ārya Samāj and the Rāmakrishna—Vivekananda movement have been emphasizing social service in various forms, having thereby left Hindu temples simply agencies of worship. Hinduism is based upon the archetypes. We must lay stress on the importance of a social element in behaviours of the Indian masses.

An irrational expression such as the identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman* or the identification of *Saṁsāra* with *Nirvāṇa* is subject to a premordial psychological expereince. Hindus believe that Hinduism is not only a religion of a certain race, but also a universal philosophy common to all Indian people. This belief is the hidden

deep-seated sanctuary of Hindus in India today. This conviction does not belong to a personal religious awareness, but to collective unconsious or what is termed the archetypes. From a psychological point of view, Hinduism is analogous to the Shinto cult submerged deeply in the mind of the Japanese people today.

It is true that Shinto is different from Hiduism in the conception of god. The Hindu concept of god is as a symbol of philosophical principle as Brahman is a symbol of creation, Shiva as destruction and Vishṇu as preservation etc. In contrast, Shinto God (*Kami*) is a man-god. Man is deified. The Emperor in Shrine Shinto and the founders of new Shinto sects (*Shūha-Shinto*) are respected as man-god.

As far as the national racial consciousness is concerned, however, we can find some similarities between Hinduism and Shintoism. Shrine Shinto is in Japan supported by a strong communal concious-ness. The communal consciouness does not represent itself as sectarianism, but as a spirit inherent to the Japanese native. This inherent spirit is of tolerance, and takes effect in synchronisation with Buddhism and other foreign religions. This inherent spirit or the collective unconscious consists of two psychological elements : a dark facet, and a light facet. This polarity in spirit gives rise to a danger, for when this spirit is set into motion one can restrain the process of action from going into extremes. The history of Japan shows us ample examples : World War II, pro-Americanism, anti-Americnism, ultra-revivalism, Communism and so forth. We can say that the mass movement in Japan today initiates more or less the archetypes or the collective unconcious unaffected by the passage of time.

Nevertheless, the value of the archetypes or collective unconscious must not be overlooked. Getting out of control and going to the extremes will result in danger. But it functions as a protector of the country. History shows a number of examples : the 200 years' isolation in the Tokugawa period, which affected the revival and popularization of native cultures among the peasants through all parts of Japan ; the contemporary cultural revivalism which stimulates reflection upon ancient Japanese culture.

The polarity of Japanese archetypes, as stated above, constitutes a danger, when it is set into motion without control. Nevertheless, Shinto does not describe any means by which polarity can be overcome and brought into unity. Shinto emphasizes purity, casting off impurity. As far as Shintoism is concerned with one side of reality, namely, affirmation, it falls into one extreme, for it cannot include the other side of reality, namely negation. Both concepts, affirmation and negation, constitue totality, as it is.

In order to avoid the inevitable process of the Shintoist spirit, the Japanese people must retain a consciousness of reality, and recognize things as totality from two aspects : affirmative and negative. This philosophical attitude towards reality alone may overcome the polarity of the Shintoist spirit. With the inception of Buddhism in the 6th century A. D., they began to think of reality from these two aspects. Since then, a concept of 'mutuality' (Jap. *Wa*) has come to be the moral code for them. The attitude of *Wa* is by no means an exclusion of negation ; instead, the synthesis of affirmation and negation. Psychologically speaking, it is tranquility in the unsteadiness of the world. Hinduism

is also of the archetypes similar to Shintoism in a way that it is an unshakable element deeply rooted in the Indian mind, conveying to the people the numinous energy.

The polarity of Indian archetypes possesses, like that of the Japanese, a possibility of danger. But unlike the Japanese the Indian people are essentially philosophically minded. Therefore they can overcome radical actions with an idea of *ahiṁsā*. They express their philosophy by the two concepts, *ahiṁsā* (non-violence) in a negative form, and the middleway (*madhyā-pratipad*) in a positive form. The former is the cardinal virtue of Indian humanity, and it has been called the keystone of Indian morals. The latter means a conviction that things are compromised through mediation between the disputants. The middle way is realized in an attitude of indifference or non-attachment. In other words, man accepts facts of life for whatever they may be, with indifference or non-attachment. Man is in the impurity of the world, but not of it. India unashamedly affirms to the world a policy of the middle way with respect to this or any other decision made by the international disputants.

The polarity of the archetypes in Japan leads one often to extremes of action. On the other side the polarity in India leads to extremes of logic. In terms of logic the modern Western logic has been neglected in India. The Indian can work merely with generalization and abstraction, removing ones thereby from the actual understanding of reality, which seems to be only valid. Namely, they go to extremes from generalization to abstraction. There cannot be found a consequent, logical process in between.

The Indian polarity of logic can find its application in religon. Hindus believe that truth is manifested in various forms and that everyone has an equal right in participation in it. This denotes one extreme of truth, that is, generalization or popularization.

Hindus also hold a view that Gods and Goddesses are merely symbols of philosophical, abstract principles. Symbols, myths and rites convey to the whole group of Indians the numinous energy. These elements form direct and fundamental data of the individual religious life. This shows us another extreme of truth, that is, abstraction.

Thus, there is no need of ecclesiastical organizations which provide a medium between generalization and abstraction by and through a logical explanation.

The archetypes in India and Japan formulate symbols, myths and rituals. The sphere of the collective unconscious calls forth, by its archetypes, the mythical, symbolical and ritual aspect of religion. In Japan the Shinto Shrine is a symbol of the abode of an ancestor, and a place where the symbolic ritual is observed. Moreover, Shintoism neglects an essential aspect of the religious life, what is expressed in the word *nirvāṇa*) Enlightenment. Hence, Shintoism does not have the activities of Saṅgha.

It is the same with Hinduism. Hindus in India are divided among themselves between those who prefer the emphasis on Hindu Universalism and those who are interested merely in religious rites. The former is found among the intellectuals, while the latter among people in the rural areas. In either case Hinduism does not need any form of ecclesiastical organization or Saṅgha.

Hinduism, as contrasted to Shintoism, is not content with symbols or rites. Hinduism, in its essence is concerned with Enlightenment. However, Hindu mentality acknowledges only one thing in man and Brahman to which devotion should be absolute. To the Hindu, Brahman is as immediate and therefore as directly experienced as a part of the world and of one's self as is anything which is born and dies. For this reason there is no need of any intermediator or medium like churches or Saṅgha between Brahman and man.

Hinduism is a particular religion which is founded neither by founders nor by prophets. This is one of the characteristics of Hinduism, and also an importaut element to distinguish Hindu groups from ecclesiastically established organizations.

Regarding religious organization, scholars presented various views. For example, Joachim Wach examined, from the typological point of view, the general nature of religious authority. According to his view, religious leaders have an extraordinary power called Charisma, and Wach tried to categorize religious authority upon an examination of the existence and quantity of the Charisma. He noted further that only the founder became the object of the cult when he divided the religious leaders into founders, reformers, prophets and heads of schools.

None of these categories, however, can be applied to the structure of Hindu group. Hinduism has in its essence the two important elements. First, it has a religious element. Secondly, it has a racial nationalistic element. This trend of Hindu thought goes back to the ancient thought of India.

In ancient India, Hindu thought meant *Ārya Dharma*, It implies the law of an inner being such as righteousness, duty, responsibility, truth, moral code and so forth. *Ārya Dharma* includes all the philosophies and faiths orginated in India. Nehru quotes in his book Gandhi's statement.[9] Gandhi defined Hinduism, saying : "If I were asked to define the Hindu creed, I should simply say : Search after truth through non-violent means. A man may not believe in God and still call himself a Hindu. Hinduism is a relentless pursuit after truth...Hinduism is the religion of truth. Truth is God. Denial of God we have known. Denial of truth we have not known."

Thus, Hinduism is a religion by faith as well as a racial nationalism by culture. In much the same way the word 'Hindu' itself exemplifies the characteristics of Hinduism. The meaning of 'Hindu' is described as follows.

The word 'Hindu' came clearly from 'Sindhu'. 'Sindhu' in its turn was tranformed into Hindustani, Hindu, In dus and India. Nehru presumes that 'Hindu' is not referred to in ancient Indian literature ; it is said that 'Hindu' is found in a Tantric work of the eight century A. D., where it implies a people and not the devotees of a particular religion.[10] It is interesting to mention here that the noted Chinese piligrim I-tshing, who travelled to India in the seventh century A. D., refers to 'Hsin-tu' in Chinese, which preferably stands for 'Sindhu' rather than 'Hindu'. Meanwhile, 'Hindu' comes into general circulation in the later period.

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9. J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, London : Meridian Books Ltd., 1951, p. 59.

10. Ibid.

The modern Indian people use a concept of Hinduism in distinction from other faiths. In much the same way they intend to use it as a term meaning the Indian culture in general. In this context I should like to refer to the Indian attitude towards Buddhism, which is different from Hinduism by faith and similar to Hinduism by culture.

Buddhism has grown up on Indian soil with the background of Indian culture. Indian culture can be traced back to 2,000 B. C. ; or as far as the literary source is concerned. It has through the ages enriched itself by contact with extraneous influences and evolution. In terms of faith Buddhism is certainly distinguished from a particular Hinduism or even from the Vedic *Dharma*. However, in terms of Indian culture Buddhism is considered as an integral part of Hinduism. Even the students of the High School believe that Buddhism is a sect of Hinduism. I payed once a visit to a public High School in the Mehrauli district around New Dehli in 1964. At the centre of the campus there was erected a stone pillar decorated with various ornaments and coloured *langoli*. On the center of pillar the Buddha image was painted, but not any image of Indian deities at all. Usually almost all of the images in India are Indian deities or the ornaments related to the Hindu mythology. Morever, the students of that school told me that Hinduism was a term used for the native Indian, while Buddhism was a term used for the people of other countries. Both are synonymous. This view represents the most popular opinion in modern India. At least they wish to have it so.

To the masses there is no distinction between religion and culture. The intellectuals, however, do

not want to use 'Hinduism' for Indian culture. They realize the historical development of faith and the tenet of Indian philosophies. In the ancient period the old faith and philosophy are concerned with a way of life and the world view. Hence, it was greatly synonymous with Indian culture proper. But when a particular religion developed with ingeneous rites and observances, it became something religious, less cultural.

In terms of cultural assimilation, there has been a great distinction between India and Japan. All of the cultures and beliefs originated in India are, they believe, included in Hinduism. It was Hinduism that assimilated and adopted various cultures homogeneous and heterogeneous. The Indian native culture has succeeded in embracing the foreign cultures and faith, and not vice versa. This conviction prevails among the Indian people from the highest to the lowest.

However, the cultural situation in Japan was opposed to the Indian. In Japan the heterogeneous culture, namely, Buddhism, entirely assimilated the native culture Shinto. Buddhism orginated in India left the native culture (Shinto) modified or remaining as it was. Shinto is what is known as Deism. The ancient Japanese believed in nature deities, deified a personality of the Emperor, in the moral order of the universe, and in homage to be duly paid to the deities. There was no philosophy and no awareness of negation. Optimism coloured the age. Buddhism brought a new culture, which taught a negative, pessimistic side of life to understand life as a whole. The emphasis on the negation of life was quite unfamiliar and heterogeneous to the ancient Japanese cult. They learned from Buddhism the human powers rather than

the divine power with which they lived. Buddhism left them to their own devices, giving them self-reliance.

In order to celebrate the Buddhist ideal, and to translate it into achieved Japanese life, Buddhism had to organize institutions and exert influence on public affairs. Thus, a political reformation as well as a Buddhistic spiritual innovation took place under the patronage of Prince Shōtoku. Buddhism encouraged them to follow the Buddhist faith. Prince Shōtoku established a monastery Hōryūji temple and other social welfare centers throughout the country. Especially pious was the Emperor Shōmu (701-756), who erected a temple in each province, so that Buddhism might be diffused throughout Japan. Since then, Buddhist monarchism and ecclesia blossomed forth.

This Buddistic Ecclesia is amalgamated with a native character of the Japanese masses, namely, 'collective consciousness. They have a tendency to seek for an authority, to find in it the fundamental power to control them. They lay stress on rules and organizations instead of an inspiration, and tend to regard founders as man-god. For this reason they attempt to institutionalize religious movements and even small religious groups with the 'collective consciousness.'

In contrast, the Indian people are through the ages convinced of the universality of truth (*Dharma*). To them the concept of God is equivalent to the truth from which Indian deities have transfigured themselves in this human world. Therefore, they do not regard such heroes and reformers as Shankara, Gandhi and Tilak as men-gods or controller. These heroes are found simply in their memorial tombs, and not

enshrined in any form as founders of particular denominations. As Hinduism teaches reference to the truth, it cannot but support all the religions. Consequently a Hindu does not believe in or persuade conversion. As far as Buddhism retains Hindu homogeneity, it does not have to ditstinguish itself from Hinduism. This may be one of the reasons for the amalgamation of Buddhism with Hinduism in India today.

To sum up, we have so far discussed several reasons why Hinduism has not organized ecclesiastical orders.[11] We have considered four important reasons : (1) Hindu universality, (2) *avatāra* idea, (3) The archetypes of Hindus and (4) No-founder of Hinduism. The multitude of religious *cum* cultural movements in modern India are going on with the basis of Hindu universalism and non-sectarianism in a wide perspective. The success of cultural assimilation has brought about a development which cuts across the distinctions of tradition even among the native cultures—namely, the rise of new approches to Hinduism, unknown to past generations.

11. A group of Hindu priests are substantially mendicant friars, supported by offerings and contributions from the villagers or a group of casual followers. In some remote villages there can be found instances in which agricultural land is allotted to the temples, the produce from which goes to the priests. (A. B. Bose and S. P. Malhotra, "Anthropo-Geographical Study of the Settlement Pattern of a Desert Village", *Man in India*, Vol. 43, 3, 1963, p. 237.). This village Core, located around Village Korna (located about 36 miles south-west of Jodhpur Shergarh road), gives us some references to the caste distinction among the supporters of the temples. According to Bose's report, there are numerous shrines in the village. These temples, responsive to the prayers of villagers for granting relief from specific ailments, are supported by village prayers on such appropriate occasions as rites and ceremonies. But there are some shrines where prayers are offered only by the upper castes (Ibid). In other words, there is caste-discrimination even among the temples. But all of these offerings are served on casual occasions, as they are unable to organize ecclesia system.

THE FEUDAL TEAM "AVALAGĀ" OR "OḶAGĀ"

DASHARATHA SHARMA

Perhaps no Indian feudal term has enjoyed greater currency and shown more vitality than "avalagā" or "olagā". It has been found used in Kannaḍa, Marāṭhī, Sanskrit, Gujarātī and Rājasthānī and is current even now though at times in a modified sense. J. Bucher's *Kannada-English Dictionary*, which is based on F. Kittel's well-known lexicon of the same name, gives the following forms and senses of the word :—

(a) *Ōlagā*—Service, homage, an assembly, an audience, hall, a darbar.

(b) *Ōlaga*—To hold a public levee, to pay homage.

(e) *Ōlaga*—śāle—A hall of audience.

(d) *Ōlagāgu*—To get into the power of, to submit himself, to be subject, to incur.

Thus the feudal affiliation of the word in Kannaḍa is obvious enough, and that this affiliation is neither confined to this language nor is anything new can be shown on the basis of fairly old epigraphic as well as literary evidence.

Of inscriptions the earliest to use the word is Dūdhapānī (Hazārībāgh District, Bihār) Inscription of about the eigth centruy A. D.[1] We are told that the king, Ādisiṁha of Magadha, on reaching the forest skirting the villages of Bhramaraśālmalī, Chhingalā and

1. *EI.*, II, pp. 345 ff.

Nabhūtiṣaṇḍaka, all of which belonged to him, sent for the villagers and ordered them to render immediately the *avalagaka* or *avalagana* due from them[2]. As this *avalagana* was performed on their behalf by a rich merchant named Udayamāna who happened to be staying at the time in the village Bhramaraśālmalī with his brothers, its residents made Udayamāna their chief with the king's consent. Next, at the request of the residents of the other two villages, Udayamāna put Nabhūtiṣaṇḍaka and Chhingalā respectively under his younger brothers, Dhautamāna, Ajitamāna, stipulating, however, that these two villages were to recognise the supremacy of Bhramaraśālmalī.[3]

Obviously, the entire set-up of these localities was of a feudal character. There was a feudal over lord to whom *avalagana* was due; and if instead of the villagers themselves someone else performed this feudal duty, he became entitled to certain privileges, perhaps even to the ownership of the land held on the condition that the *avalagana* would be rendered duly and regularly. It was thus that the rich merchant Udayamāna, though an outsider, came into feudal relationship with Ādisiṁha and gained the lordship of the three villages of Bhramaraśālmalī, Nabhūtiṣaṇḍaka and Chhingalā, of which the latter two he passed on to the sub-feudatories, his own younger brothers, Dhautamāna and Ajitamāna.

The general sense of *avalagana* in the epigraph is clear enough. But as it is no common Sanskrit word, the writers who have so far dealt with the Dūdhapānī Inscription have offered more than one explanation. According to Kielhorn, it probably meant presents or

2. Ibid., verses 13-14.

3. verses 20-23.

supplies.[4] Shri R. K. Chaudhary is disposed to regard it as an instance of "miscellaneous contributions" from the villagers about which we read in the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Smṛtis*.[5] Actually, however, it should (if we keep in view its significance both in the Kannaḍa language and the Dūdhapānī Inscription) mean some sort of personal and perhaps even military service due to the feudal overlord. It has either to be performed by the *avalagaka* himself or by someone else for a consideration. And this consideration, the price paid, could sometimes be heavy, for it could, as in the case of the three villages referred to above, mean the transfer of the ownership of the land held on that basis to the actual *avalagaka*[6] and the reduction of the peasants, unwilling to leave their hearths and homes for *avalagā*, to the position of the new lord's ryots.

In that very century, to which historians assign the Dūdhapānī Inscription, we find the use of the term *ōlagā* in two well-known Prakrit works of Western India, the *Samarāichchakahā* of Haribhadra Sūri and the *Kuvalayamālākathā* of Uddyotana Sūri. Of these the latter, which was composed at Jālor in 778 A. D., describes an "old Thakkura"[7] named Kṣetrabhaṭa, who though a scion of an earlier royal family, had lost all his property and begun the *avalagā* of the ruler of Ujjayinī. In return for it he received the village where he resided and which probably had been his ancestral possession at one time. Later on when the old Thakkura "whose limbs bore the marks of wounds inflicted by the swords

4. *EI.*, II, pp. 343 ff.

5. *JIH.*, XXXVII, p. 302.

6. *i. e.*, one who performs the duty of *avalagana*.

7. *Junna-Thakkura*.

of opposing warriors in hundreds of battles" lost the needed strength to put in active service, he put his son, Vīrabhaṭa, in his master's service and began leading a retired life in the village granted to him.[8]

In this case *avalagā* or *ōlagā* appears to have taken the form of personal and military feudal service. In lieu of his service the Ṭhakkura received from his over-lord a village which, as suggested above, might once have been his ancestral property and with which he had to part earlier in his life on account of his poverty. His assignment, if we might so call it, was hereditary, because in his old age he passed it on to his son. In the *Samrāichchakahā* we have the forms *olugga* (pp. 499 and 504) and *olagga* (p. 639)[9].

Olage finds a place in the early Mahārāṣṭrī work, the *Jñāneśvarī*, though perhaps only in the general sense of personal service. But we have the sense of feudal service in the *Bharateśvara-Bāhubali-rāsa* of Śālibhadra Sūri (composed in the last quarter of the twelfth century). Asked why he had not gone to attend the coronation ceremony of his elder brother, Bharata, the younger brother, Bāhubali replied, "Let him not wait for my *avalagā*. Let the noble Bharateśvara not feel uneasy on that account, for there are no differences between me and my brother, whatever the mischief-makers might

8. *Kuvalayamālākahā*, Singhi Jain Granthamālā, p. 50,11.21-7.

9. See the *ASB* edition. For the details of feudal service in the *Samarāichchakahā* read the present writer's paper on "Some Fedual Elements in Ancient Indian Polity" published in the *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1961.

say."[10] But that *oḷaga* (probably personal attendance and homage) was expected even from a younger brother and great could be the reward for it can be seen from the Imperial messenger's exhortation, "Do not delay. Go and see your brother at once.........Believe me when I say that Bharateśvara is a giver of elephants and horses of very good breed. He gives villages, cities, towns and ports ; he makes one the permanent ruler of extensive tracts of land. While giving he does not make distinctions by saying that a certain gift can be given and the other one not. Nor does he ignore the claims of relationship. (On the other hand), if he finds that achief is not doing *oḷaga* through pride he gets angry and destryos him. He protects one who seeks refuge with him. Not for a *ghaṭikā* (24 minutes) does he make a suppliant wait."[11]

The *Kānhaḍadeprabandha* (composed 1385 A. D.) uses the word "*uḷagai*" when speaking of the service put in by Kānhaḍadeva's nobles. "Brave and warlike Solankīs, Baghelās, Rāṭhors, Chāvaḍās, Hūṇas, Paramāras, Guhilas, Yādavas and members of the other thirty-six Rājpūt clans served and attended on Kānhaḍade and received in return subsistence-money and villages which they enjoyed. They had from him costly garments, the best of weapons and armour and delicious food."[12]

10-11. D. Ojha and D. Sharma, (Ed.),*Rāsa aur Rāsānyavī kāvya*, Nagari Pracharini Sabha, Banaras, vv. 89-94. Attention may be drawn also to Jineśvara Sūri's *Kathakośa*, where Bharata is represented as asking his brothers either to *serve* him or to give up their kingdoms (p. 53, Singhī Jain Granthamālā edition).

12. Canto IV. 43-51. See also our paper, "Life in Rājasthān in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries", *JIH*, XXXIII, pp. 105-107.

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It would be wrong to see everything of even the military aspect of feudalism in these descriptions ; but a general resemblance to it would be hard to deny. The *olangiās*, as such performers of *avalagā* have been called in the *Payāḍā Nihāl-de-Sultān*, were very much like the feudal followers of a European lord, who not only attended on him but also rendered military service, as and when necessary, and received in return board, lodging, equipment and land to maintain the dignity of their status.[13] In another popular poem, *Dholā Mārūrā Dūhā* the hero speaks of rendering *uḷaga* in the land of Īḍar and sending from there ornaments to his wife, the princess from Mālwā.[14] In *Vīramade rī Bhāvan* we read of chiefs performing *uḷaga* at the court of Alāuddīn and of the Sultān's promise that he would bestow Malwa 52 lacs, Gujarat 13 lacs, and Marwar 9 *kotis* on Vīramade Sonigarā if he attended his court.[15] Obviously, *oḷaga* at the court of powerful and munificent ruler could be a highly paying proposition.

In the old Gujarati poem, the *Virāṭaparva* of Śālisūri (composed before 1421 A. D.) *oḷaga* takes the form of military service and makes a coward wail, "O Fate, what foolish ideas did you give me ? Why did I take up this *oḷaga* ? In my house I have a milch buffalo and a wife with tremulous eyes. Today my wife is going to be a widow. Today the Kaurava family is going to ruin me."[16]

13. See our note on the word *olangiā* in the *Marubhāratī*, VIII, Part 1, p. 132 and the article referred to in the last note.

14. vv. 224-225.

15. *Rājasthān-Bhāratī*, VI, Parts 3-4, p. 102, vv. 3-4.

16. *Gurjararasāvalī*, G. O. S., p. 61, vv. 66-67.

In the decadent days of Indian Feudalism, *avalagā* appears to have assumed a form not very flattering to Rājpūt character, forms more characteristic of a luxury-loving and effect than a vigorous and martial people, eager to inspire the community with their character and high ideals. The *Vividha-varṇaka-samuchchaya*, a Gujarātī work of the sixteenth century, for instance, tells us[17] that subordinate princes, overawed by their lord's prowess, waited on him (*uḷagai*) with mirrors in their hands, shaved off their moustaches to serve him in the guise of women, looked after his kitchen-garden, hewed wood for him and tried to please him by playing buffoonish parts.[18] There must be a good deal of exaggeration in this account. But that it could be served out to poets and writers as a model description of a great ruler, waited on by his feudatories and vanquished princes, is in itself proof enough of some truth in it.

Equally interesting is the description of *avalagā* of later days in the *Sabhāśṛṅgāra* (c. sixteenth century).[19] It speaks of the overlord's orders carried out by the Lord of Pāñchāla, of presents given by the Lord of the Himālayas, of *uḷaga* rendered every night by the lord of Kachchha-*deśa*, and of *ulaga* by others too, the objective of all these being to please the overlord, not as of yore by putting in doughty military service but by what can, in many cases, be styled sycophancy and flunkeyism.

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17. p. 67. A similar description elsewhere in the same book speaks of the god's *uḷaga* at Rāvaṇa's court. The same description is given also in its Sanskrit form on p. 164 under the caption, *varṇyavastuvarṇanavidhi*.

18. *Kei gaḍhurā chālai loṭai lilaiṁ oḷagai.*

19. The *MS.* a copy of some older *MS.* is dated in V. 1675.

The last few instances of *oḷaga* that we propose to quote come not from conventional descriptions of court life but from folk songs. The first one of these is sung by Rājasthānī women when they worship Gaurī in the month of Chaitra.[20] And here we breathe again the fresh air of Rājpūt chivalry and early *oḷaga*. The worshippers, the song tells us, reach the door of Śiva and Gaurī and tell them that their *oḷagiās* stand outside eager to wait on them. Śiva responds by saying, "Give *olaga* to my *olagias*."[21] Give them lion-seats to sit on. We shall give the *oḷagiās* dominion over the fort of Tilaḍī and half of Mālwā." After that Gaurī opens the door and while the famaic devotees ask for *anna* and *dhānya*, the men ask, as naturally they should, for horses.

Having their husbands sent for *avalagā* to the courts of the overlord must have been distasteful to youthful ladies. A lady, for instance, is represented as requesting her husband to send the father-in-law for *avalagā* at least that time.[22] Or if this could not be done why should not he persuade the elder brother to go ? Another youthful wife, finding no other way, writes to the queen of Īḍar, requesting her to send back soon her *oḷagu* Ṭhākur.[23] A *pada* of Mīrā expresses happiness at the return of the *oḷangiā*.[24] Alāuddīn

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20. For its text see *Marubhāratī*, VIII, Pt. 1, p. 116.

21. *Olagiā* is one who does *olaga*. Another form of the word is *olangiā*. The early Hindi poem, the *Pradyumacharita* uses the form *ulagāṇā*.

22. *ab ki olgānai Mārūji susarājī-naiṁ bhej.*

23. *Idargaḍh-ryāṁ rāṇiyāṁ, āpā kali lahiyāha.*
āṁk ā Ṭhākur oḷagu, begau moliyāha. | |

24. *Mhārā olagiā ghara āyājī, tanakī tāpa miṭī sukha pāyā.*

Khaljī, we are told in the *Padmāvat*, had 36 lacs of *aurangāṇā sawārs* and 20,000 elephants.[25] All these examples amply attest the feudal duty of an *avalagaka* to be in attendance on his feudal lord.

Bloch regarded *olagā* as a word of Dravidian origin; and his view seems well-founded, if we remember that not only has the term been in continuous use in Kannaḍa[26] for centuries but that it appears in North India perhaps for the first time in the eighth century, with a sense recalling to our minds the Kannaḍa meanings, "homage", audience-hall", and "to submit oneself to". Hemachandra notices it as a *desi* word.[27] Did it then reach Northern India in the wake of some Deccanese raids, of which there were quite a few even before the Rāṣṭrakūṭa invasions of the eighth and ninth centuries? If it did, we may have to conclude that some of our feudal or quasi-feudal practices originated in India South of the Vindhyas and reaching North India in due course flourished in a soil not uncongenial to their growth.

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25. *Chhatīs lākh auragān asavārā bīs sahas hastī darabārā.*

26. See the *Gurjararāsāvalī*, G. O. S. p. 149.

J. N. Joshi thinks of *olagā* as a word of Kanarese origin (*Proceedings and Transactions of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference, p. 947*). The word can be derived also from the Sanskrit root *lag* with the prefix *ava*. But if it is an emigrant from the Deccan (which is likely enough) it is sure not to be of Sanskrit origin, even though the Sanskrit word may yield a sense not very different from that in Kannaḍa. In North India its sense appears to have deteriorated steadily, the word in Gujarāt coming ultimately to mean *scavenging*.

27. *Desīnāmamālā*, I. 164.

A FRESH INTERPRETATION OF THE ṚGVEDA II, 12, 3.*

S. N. SHUKLA

Simla-5

O. Object of the paper :

As we know, there are several conflicting and contradictory views regarding the interpretation of the Ṛgveda (ṚV) as a whole, as well as individual words and the verses of the ṚV ; so it becomes obligatory for the students of the ṚV, particularly for those who are actively concerned with the interpretation, to investigate into the argumentations and variations of the views of the exegetists to find out the correct and plausible meaning(s) of those verses and words whose meaning is either uncertain or conjectural or optional, and to see whether those meanings are from an objective point of view sound and valid or open to objection. The verse under consideration also comes under those verses which have been variously interpreted by the exegetists of the ṚV. An attempt has been made in this paper to investigate the various meanings, and to suggest the plausible interpretation of the words and the verse as a whole.

I. O. Various interpretations-compared :

Before we proceed to give any critical observation, it is desirable to consider all the interpretations rendered on this *ṛk* by oriental (or traditional) as well as occidental

* यो हत्वाहिमरिणात् सप्तसिन्धून् यो गा उदाजदपधा वलस्य ।
यो अश्मनोरन्तरग्निं जजान संवृक् समत्सु स जनास इन्द्रः ॥

scholars through the ages. The oldest interpretation found yet comes from Durgācārya's *vṛtti* on the *Nirukta* (*Nir*) 8, 2, 2. It runs as follows :—

"तृतियेऽहनि दशरात्रस्य निष्केवल्ये विनियोगः । गृत्समदो ब्रवीति। ऐन्द्रम् रूपमास्थितोऽसुरैर्हन्यमानः किं मा हथ, नाहमिन्द्र इति । कस्तर्हि इन्द्रः ? 'य "हत्वा" 'अहिम्' 'मेघम् 'अरिणात्' 'सप्तसिन्धून्' 'स्यन्दता आकाशनदीः "एला च इला च"— इत्येवमाद्याः 'य' च 'गाः' अप 'उदाजत्' उदगमयत् 'अपधा' अपधानेन उद्घाटनेन 'वलस्य' मेघस्य शिराणाम् छिद्राणाम् 'यः' च 'अश्मनोः' अशनवत्योः द्यावापृथिव्योः 'अन्तः' मध्ये 'अग्नि' 'जजान' जनयति 'य' च समत्सु संग्रामेषु शत्रूणां संवृक् सत्र्छेना । 'जनासः' हे असुरजनाः । 'स' इन्द्रः नाहमिन्द्र इति ।"

Veṅkaṭa Mādhava comments as follows :—

"यश्च अहिम् हत्वा निरगमयत् सप्तनदीः यो वा पशून् उदाजत् । अपधा विलान्तरपिहिता वलस्यासुरस्य यश्च मेघयोः मध्ये अभिघातजं वैद्युतमग्निं जनयति सः छेत्ता संग्रामेषु ।"

Skanda Svāmin explains it in the following way in his commentary on *Nir*. III, 15 :—

गृत्समदाहैन्द्रं रूपमास्थितः। इन्द्रोऽयमिति । मन्यानैरसुरैर्हन्यमानस्तानाह स्मेत्याख्यातम् । मेघम् हत्वा सप्तसिन्धून् व्यत्ययेन पुल्लिङ्गम् । सिन्धुर्नदीः। नदीनां मध्ये या प्रधानभूताः गङ्गाद्याः सप्तनद्यस्ताः प्राधान्यान्निर्दिशिता मन्त्रदृशा । अन्तरिक्षनदीर्वा सप्त अम्बा च अम्बाला चेत्येवमाद्या अरिणात् रिणातिर्गतिकर्मणोऽन्त र्णीतिण्यर्थस्येदं रूपम् । अगमयत् यो वा पशून् उदाजत् उदगमयति इत्यर्थः । अपधा अपेत्येतेपामपेत्येतस्य (अपेत्यदान्मन इत्येतस्य) स्थाने आत्मबोधा निधानेन स्थापनेन मेवमात्मनोऽधो निधाय तावत् पादाभ्यां मृदनाति यावदुदकमस्मि- ज्ञातर्मित्यर्थः। अवधातेनैव! (अपधानेनैव), बिलोद्घाटनेनैव मेघस्य यश्च अश्मनोरन्तर अश्मेति मेघनाम पर्वतनाम वा, द्यावापृथिव्यौ वा तद् व्यापनयोगात्, अन्तरित्यव्य- यमधिकरणभूतं मध्यमाचष्टे, द्यावापृथिव्यौ वा अत्राधेयवंशयोस्तरुशाखयोर्वा वायुना संघर्षाज्जायते तं दावरूपम् अग्निम् वैद्युतं वा जनयति । सः जनासः, हे असुरजनाः इन्द्रो नाहमिति, सम्यक् छेत्ता हन्ता शत्रूणाँ संग्रामेषु ।"

Sāyaṇa's commentary on this verse runs as follows :—

"यः अहिं मेघं हत्वा मेघहननं कृत्वा सप्तसर्पणशीलाः सिन्धून् स्यन्दनशीला अपः अरिणात् प्रैरयत् । यद्वा सप्त गंगायमुनाद्या मुख्या नदीररिणात् । 'रीङ्'

1. *Ṛgarthadīpikā* (ed. by L. Sarup, Lahore 1939, vol. III, (Rv. 2,12.3).

प्रस्रवणे। क्र्यादिः। यश्च वलस्य वलनामकस्य असुरस्य अपधा तत्कर्तृकान्निरोधान्निरुद्धाः गाः उदाजत् निरगमयत्। अपधा अपपूर्वाद्दधातेः आतश्चोपसर्गे (पा० ३,३,१०६) इति भावे अङ् प्रत्ययः। 'सुपाँ सुलुक् 'इति पञ्चम्या आकारः। यः च अश्मनोः अश्नुते व्याप्नोत्यन्तरिक्षम् इत्यश्मा मेघः। अत्यन्तमृदुरूपयोर्मेघयोः अन्तः मध्ये वैद्युतमग्निं जजान उत्पादयामास। यश्च समत्सु संभक्षयन्ति योद्धृणामायूंषि इति समदः संग्रामाः तेषु संवृक् भवति। वृणक्तेर्हिंसार्थस्य क्विपि रूपम्। सः इन्द्रः नाहमिति।"

If we observe minutely all these traditional interpretations it will be quite clear that there is very little difference in the totality of their views regarding the meaning of the individual words except those very few which are interpreted optionally in more than one way. On the contrary it may be stated that the subsequent interpreters have followed their predecessors. The alternative interpretations of the words *ahim*, *saptasindhūn*, *gāḥ*, *apadhā*, *valasya* and *aśmanoḥ* make it evident that they (the interpreters) are not sure of their own views regarding the correctness of the interpretations given by them. Here it would not be undesirable to compare the interpretations offered by the occidental scholars.

Among the occidental scholars H. H. Wilson[2] has followed Sayaṇa ; and T. H. Griffith[3] differs only on the meaning of *aśmanoḥ* which has been rendered by him as 'the earth and the 'sky', and this can be compared with that of SKN's interpretation as '*dyāvāpṛthivyau vā/ tad vyāpan yogāt*. Geldner[4] follows Sāy. but unlike Sāy. he renders *ahim* as 'drachen' (dragon), and he suggests

2. *Rigveda* Translation, Vol. II (Poona, 1925), P. 137f.

3. *Hymns of the Rigveda*, vol. I (Chaukhambha Sans. Ser. Varanasi, 1963), p. 273.

4. K. F. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda ubersetzt*, vol. I (Cambridge Mass, 1951), p. 990.

the possibility of *apadhā* as *apadhāḥ* against the *padapāṭha*. He cites Oldenberg also who notes that 'durch Aufdeckung des Vala ; Vala bezeichnet sowohl die Berghohle der Paṇis wie den drain hausenden Damon' (by the unclosing of Vala ; vala signifies just the same as the mountaincaves of Paṇi, as being the dwellings of the demons).

Thus the alternative and conjectural meanings given by the traditional as well as historical interpreters open the doors for new enquiries about the meanings of these words as well as the verse itself. Therefore, an extensive investigation into the meaning(s) of these words is desirable.

I. I. ahim variously interpreted :

The word *ahi* occurs frequently in the ṚV. (in all 86 times)[5], and has been variously interpreted by the scholars. Three meanings have been assigned to this word by *Nighaṇṭu*,[6] namely, (i) cloud, (ii) water and (iii) a proper name, but *Nir.*[7] adds one more to it, i. e. 'serpent'. The etymology of this word, given by Yāska is this : '*ahiḥ ayanāt eti antarikṣe, ayam api itaro ahiḥ etasmād eva ; nihrasi topasargaḥ āhantīti*[8]'.

Thus, according to Yāska it may be derived from root *i* or *ay* 'to go' or *i+ā+han* (Indo-Europ. angu(h) i — 'serpent'—, Lithu. *angis* 'a snake')[9] ; and thus the root-meaning of *ahi* would be 'one who goes' or 'one who kills' (āhantīti) according to Yāska ; but this ety-

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5. See *ṚV. Samhita* vol. V (V. S. M. Poona 4, 1951), p. 92f.
6. *Nighaṇṭu* 1,10,21 ; 1,31 ; 5,4,29.
7. *Nir.* 2,17.
8. Loc. cit.
9. Siddheshwar Varma, *The Etymologies of Yāska* (V. V. R. I, Hoshiarpur, 1953), P. 118.

mology appears to be based on unscientific method of derivation.

Veṅkaṭa Mādhava[10] renders it as *asura* (demon) and *ahantā* (killer) implicitly following Yāska, Sāyaṇa proposes seven meanings of this word, i. e. (1) mid-region, (2) water, (3) cloud, (4) name of Vṛtra. (5) name of Agni, (6) one who kills, and finally (7) a serpent. But all these meanings can be traced back to *Nighaṇṭu* and *Nir.* The modern scholars like Roth, Grassmann, Geldner etc. have followed invariably the meanings proposed by traditional interpreters, which is evident through their respective works.

1.2. *Ahi, Dānu* and *Vṛtra : their relation with Vala :*

Here I would like to propose on equation :

ahi = dānu = vṛtra = vala.

This parallelism is based on the similar statements in the Vedic texts regarding these names. Indra is mentioned as killing *ahi* who was sleeping on the mountain (cf. ṚV. 3,32, II ; 5,306). ṚV. 2,12,11 mentions Indra as killing *dānu* in the same manner (*yo ahim jaghāna/dānum śayānam*—'who has slain *ahi*, the son of Dānu, or Dānu as he lay' (cf. 3,32,11). We find the same statement in ṚV. 6, 72,3, where Indra and Soma smite Vṛtra who is obstructing the waters. Indra-Vṛtra myth is so popular that it does not require any illustration here. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[11] says about Vṛtra etc. that Vṛtra, Ahi, Dānu are the names of only one being variously taken in different contexts :

"स यद् वर्तमानं अभवत् तस्माद् वृत्रो नाम, अथ यद् अपात् समभवत्

10. Op. cit., verse 2,12,3.
11. *ŚB* I. 1,3,4.

तस्मादहिस्तं दनुश्च दनायुश्च मातेव च पितेव च परिजगृहतुः तस्माद् दानव इत्याहुः ।"

In this statement the word *apāt* probably refers to *ahi* as 'serpent'. But nothing can be said with certainity whether *ahi* meant a 'serpent' in the very beginning of the Vedic period ; because in the so called older portion of the ṚV. Saṁhitā there is no clear trace of this meaning. It is only in the later portion where we find this word, though only once, clearly used for 'serpent' ; where '*ahir na jūrṇam ati sarpati tvacaḥ*'[12] (as a serpent he removes his skins) refers to a serpent. This meaning of *ahi* as a 'serpent' must have crept into language on the analogy of creeping streams which was closely related with *ahi*. Now the question arises whether *ahi*, *dānu*, *vṛtra* etc. refer to some living beings or they are just the symbolic expressions of some natural phenomena. It would not be possible here to give a detailed account of the argumentations of the mythologists regarding the identity of these names, but it would not be unwarranted too, to refer to internal evidences of the Veda to have a vivid picture of these names and their connotations in the field of the Vedic interpretation. Indra's battle with Vṛtra, in which the former smites the latter and drives out the streams to flow freely and frequently, is a well known myth in the ṚV.[13] *Ahi* is also related with such contexts. Thus, there appears a complete identity between these two names, and sometimes *ahi* appears only as an epithet of Vṛtra, and except few exceptions (i. e. ṚV. 5,30,6 *ahim ohānam apa āśayānam* ; 7,34,16 *abjām* "born in water" ; 8,3,20 *mahān* "great"—yet Indra blow him away ; 2,12,11 ;

12. ṚV. 9,86,44.
13. ṚV. I. 32,7 ; 80,12 ; 2,26,2 ; 6,13,1 ; 18,6 ; 34,5 etc.

ojāyāmānam "showing his strength") is as a rule left without attribute.[14] Thus it appears that Vṛtra and Ahi denote the same phenomenon. Again, Vṛtra can be identified with *ābhu* which is mentioned in the Nāsadīya Sūkta[15] as covering everything. Nothing was seen except water. This statement probably refers to darkness and clouds which cover everything ; and therefore, Vṛtra and Ahi can be identified with darkness and clouds both.[16] Vṛtra is mentioned as trying to defeat Indra with his thundering uproars and lightening[17], but ultimately Indra defeats him in the battle with his mighty thunderbolt[18]. Here a remarkable statement from *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*[19] can be cited where it has been stated that when Indra killed Vṛtra there arose a thundering uproar. Thus this statement of lightening and thundering in relation to Vṛtra explicitly indicates that Vṛtra is the symbolic expression of the clouds and Ahi related to it also stands for the same. The whole symbolism has been woven into a mythological garb.

Another question is related with Dānu. It has been mentioned above that Indra is referred to as the killer of Dānu who was sleeping on the mountain.[20] ŚB. mentions Dānu as the bestower of rains through which grains are made prosperous[21]. This statement clearly,

14. cf. Jan Gonda, ***Epithets in the Ṛgveda*** ('s-Gravenhage 1959), p. 134.

15. ṚV. 10,129.
16. ṚV. 10,129,3.
17. ṚV. 1,80,12 ; 32,13.
18. ṚV. 1,52, 6.
19. *Tāṇḍ. Br.* 13,4,1.
20. ṚV. 2,12,11.
21. ŚB. 1,1,3.4.

sheds a light on the identity of Dānu with the clouds which cause rain as well as the growth of the grains. In other Indo-Eur. languages also Dānu refers to water and streams.[22]

Thus it can be surmised that the triad of Ahi, Vṛtṛa and Dānu is connected with the active clouds whom Indra smites with his thunderbolt and drives the water or streams to the fields.

Here a question arises in connection with this triad. Who was the first among all of them to catch the imagination of the Vedic seers, and to take the form of an antogonist of the Gods? In accordance with the contextual referances Ahi seems to be the first among this triad. Ahi is mentioned as the first—born among the Ahi-race ;[23] and before the commencement of Indra-religion in the Vedic society he was regarded as a deity, which is implicit through the verses of the Ṛv. where *ahirbudhnya* is invoked with *aja-ekapāda*.[24] He was a deity of either the oceanic water or the mid-region, and his name is mentioned solely in the hymns of the *Viśvedevās*. In ṚV. 5,41.16 he is besought not to give his worshippers over to injury, which suggests that there was something hurtful in his nature. This phenomenon was developed in Ahi-Indra-relation later on. Thus it may be surmised that *ahirbudhnya* was not different from *ahivṛtra*, though he is invoked as a divine being

22. Avestan *dānu* 'river', Pahlavi *don* 'river', Ossetic 'don' 'river, etc. See Bartholome, *Altiranisches Woerterbuch* (Berlin, 1261), p. 733f.

23. ṚV. 1,32,3.

24. ṚV. 10,66,11.

who resembles with *Apām Napāt*, his baleful aspect only hinted at.[25]

Ahi may be identified with Azi-Dahak, an antogonist to the old Iranian culture in Khotanese region. He has been referred to in the Avesta also, where Yima, the son of Kərəsāspa, smites him who is 'three jawed, three headed, six eyes etc.[26] certainly he was the antagonist of Ahura-Mazda-religion in the early period of Iranian culture[27], but later on it was developed into a mythic personality. The same Iranian *azi* or Vedic *ahi* continued to be the antogonist of Indra-religion also in Vedic India, and was easily connected with Vṛtra, and lat r on the myth developed with Vala also.

After considering the mutual relation of the above triad, namely Ahi, Vṛtra and Dānu, now attention may be drawn towards Vala's relation to them. Vala represents the old Iranian *vaṛa*, the dialect form of Indo-Iranian *vara* 'enclosure'.[28] The base being *Var*, can be traced back to Indo-Eur. ger 'to shut', 'to shield', 'to protect', to resist etc., and thus *vala* can be identified with Latin *valeo* 'to be strong' and English *valour* and

25. A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (Varanasi, 1963), p. 73.

26. Yō janat azīm dahākem
thrizafanəm thrikamərəδəm
xvas—asīm hazanra-yaoxatīm-*yasna* 9, 8.
"Who killed the serpent Dahāk
who was three jawed, three skulled,
six eyed and one thousand baleful intentions . . .".

27. See M. N. Dhalla, *Zoarastrian Theology* (New York, 1914), p. 164,257.

28. H. W. Bailey, *Analecta Indo-scythica*, II, JRAS, 1954, p. 26 ff.

valiant.[29] The same base can be applied with *Vṛtra* also. Thus there is a close resemblance between Vala and Vṛtra so far as their etymology is concerned. As Vṛtra has mainly three functions, viz. (i) obstructing the waters, (ii) covering the uṣas or light and (iii) enclosing or encompassing the cows, all these three functions can be easily assigned to his counterparts, namely, Ahi and Vala also. But Ahi's main function is connected with the obstruction of waters, and Vala is closely related with the cows—either enclosing them or guarding them and therefore, he is called *gomat*—"possessing cows"—(*tvaṁ valasya gomataḥ apāvar adrivo bilam*—ṚV. 1,11,5, "thou o lord of the stone missile[30] (Indra) hast opened the cave of Vala, the possessor of cows"). But Vṛtra plays main role in the demoniac and antogonistic activities, and that is why he is associated with all the activities mentioned above ; and this phenomenon can be observed on a comparative basis in the whole span of Indo-Eur. mythology.[31] As Vala's name seems dis-

29. Llya Gershevitch, *The Avestan Hymn to Mitra* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 162 f. Siddheshwar Varma, *The Etymologies of Yaska* (Hoshiarpur, 1953), p. 71.

30. For the sense of *adrives* see J. Gonda, *Epithets in the Ṛgveda* ('S-Gravenhage, 1959), p. 60 f,

31. Here Sir George W. Cox can be quoted in *extentio* ; "Vrtra the thief is also called *ahi*, the throtting snake, or dragon with three heads, like *geryon*, the stealer of the cows of *Herakles* or *Kerberos*, whose name reappears in carvara, another epithet of the antogonist of Indra. He is also vala, the enemy, a name which we trace through the Teutonic lands until we reach the cave of Wayland Smith in Berksira Grimm, *Deutsch Mythologie*, 943). Other names are Susna, Sambara, Nanuei etc. but the most notable of all is Paṇi, which marks him as a seducer. Such he is enticing the cows of Indra their picture, and more especially as seeking to corrupt Sarama, when at Indra's bidding she comes to reclaim plundered cattle.

The name Paṇi reappears in Paris, the Seducer of Helen". *Mythology of Aryan Nations* (Varanasi 1963), p. 537.

appearing in the later part of the Vedic literature, it seems that the main demoniac force was only Vṛtra whose evolutionary mythology is much more vigorous than Ahi, Dānu, Vala and other inimical powers. Being the strongest one only Vṛtra remains on the scene. However, Vala plays an important role in the stealing or enclosing the cows, and it appears plausible to suggest that originally it was just like Iranian *Vara* 'enclosure', in which cows were enclosed either for shelter from snow, or for stealing purposes. Such types of shelters are described in the Avesta as 'paxrumaeṣu nmānaeṣu (firm houses or strong stables-*Vendidād* II, 23), where cattle were captivated.[32] The image of the rock-caves or stables out of which the Dawns or the cattle were freed, attracted the imagination 'of the Vedic people and came into the mythological form of Vala. Thus originally it was *vara* or *vala*, and later on it developed into a myth and its place was taken by other words as *bilam, apadhā, apihita*, etc. His frequent mention with the cows indicates towards his evolutionary mythology and gives indications to the new meanings of '*gāḥ*' 'cows'.

2.0. Vala and cows :

After a minute observation of all the contexts in the ṚV. where cows come in contact with Vala, it becomes clear that the 'cows' refer to three distinct traits of meanings, namely, (i) water, (ii) uṣas or light, and (iii) 'cows' in general. With reference to this statement Vala also signifies three phenomena, namely, (i) as a cloud which blocks the waters, (ii) as darkness which obstructs the light or Uṣas, and (iii) as a demoniac power who en-

32. Cf. A. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I (Breslau, 1927), p. 41.

compasses the cows (later on developed into Paṇis mythology). Now, these statements can be supported by the internal evidences of the ṚV. In the ṚV. 3,45,2, Indra is invoked as "the destroyer of enemies, breaker of Vala and the impeller of waters ; and in the ṚV. 2,15,8 "He (Indra) broke open Vala, being praised by the Aṅgirases, and scattered away the strong parts of the mountain (cave), flung open (or battered down) the embankments erected by them (i. e. Vala and his followers)[33]", Here 'the artifical obstructions,[34] raised by Vala and his followers, are merely a poetical fancy indicating towards cloud-symbology ; otherwise Vala is not even partly anthropomorphised in the ṚV.[35] In other context (ṚV. 10, 138,1) waters and Uṣas come together with Vala, where Indra is mentioned as smiting Vala with the help of Aṅgirases, and driving out Uṣas and waters (*yatrā daśasyann uṣaso riṇann apaḥ* etc.). This statement reveals another fact that there is a close connection between Indra and Aṅgirases in the destruction of Vala, therefore, it will be desirable here to see this relation with the perspective of releasing the cows.

2.1. *Indra and Aṅgirases vs. Vala* :

Indra is invoked as the leader of the Aṅgirases.[36] He discovers cows for them, and is mentioned as driving out cows from the encampment of Vala with the help of Aṅgirases.[37] Sometimes Indra smites Vala when he

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33. Cf. Velankar, *Ṛgveda Maṇḍala* II (Uni. of Bombay, 1966), p. 45.
34. Cf. *kṛtrimā sadanāni* at ṚV. 1,55,6.
35. H. D. Velankar, Loc. cit.
36. *So aṅgirobhir aṅgirastamo bhūd vṛṣā vṛṣabhiḥ* etc. ṚV. 1, 100,4.
37. ṚV. 1, 51, 3; 8, 14, 8 ; 63, 3 etc.

is praised by Aṅgirases.[38] According to other several contexts Bṛhaspati appears with Indra on the place of Aṅgirases ;[39] and this indicates a close resemblance between Aṅgirases and Bṛhaspati. Like Indra, Bṛhaspati himself is mentioned as breaking the mountain and obtaining the cows :

bṛhaspátir bhinád ádrim vidád gāḥ

sámusriyābhir vāvaśanta nárah/ṚV. I. 62,3.

"Bṛhaspati left the mountains and found the cattle ; the heroes (gods) shouted with the kine in triumph". Similarly Indra discovers cows for Aṅgirases :

udgā ājad āṅgirobhya āviṣkṛṇván gúhā satīḥ

arvāñcaṁ nunude valám//—ṚV. 8, 14, 8.

"Discovering them in the cave he (Indra) drove forth the cows for Aṅgirases, and cast down Vala".

Several examples of such statements can be traced in the ṚV.[40] Thus *Vala* appears as the common enemy of Indra, Bṛhaspati and Aṅgirases. As Indra and Aṅgirases are always against Vala, similarly Bṛhaspati's antogonist is Vala. He (Bṛhaspati) strikes Vala with his hosts and drives away the cows :

sá suṣṭúbhā sá ṛkvatā gaṇéna

valám ruroja paligám rávena /

bṛhaspátir usríyā havyasūdaḥ

Kánikradad vāvaśatīr ud ājat / /—RV. 4, 50, 5.

"(Aided) by the praised and brilliant hosts he destroyed with sound the mischievous Vala ; Bṛhaspati

38. ṚV. 2, 11, 20 ; 15, 8 ; 4, 3, 11, 16, 8 ; 1, 62, 5 ; 6, 18, 5.

39. ṚV. 2, 24, 3 ; 14 ; 4, 50, 5 ; 10, 68, 4-10.

40. ṚV. 2, 14, 3 ; 1. 62, 4 ; 3, 34, 10 ; 8, 14, 7 ; 10, 62, 2 ; 67, 6.

shouting aloud, set free the boon-bestowing, oblation-supplying cows."[41]

Bṛhaspati obtains not only the cows but the Sun and the Uṣas also :—

vibhídyā púram śayáthem ápācīm
nístrīṇi sākám udadhér akṛntat /
bṛhaspátir uṣásam sūryam gām árkam viveda
stanáyanniva dyaúḥ / /—ṚV. 10, 67, 5.

"After he has cleft the lairs and western castle, he cut of three together from him who held the waters. Bṛhaspati discovered, while he thundered like Dyaus, the Dawn, the Sun and the Cow.

In this verse the word *udadhi* refers to the enclosures of Vala, as *arṇava* in the ṚV. 10, 67, 10, 111, 4 ; 8, 40, 5, and *arṇasam* in the ṚV. 5,54,6. The last two *pādas* of the verse quoted above, can be compared with ṚV. 10,68, 9, where Bṛhaspati finds out Uṣas, Agni, Sun etc. and disperses the darkness.[42].

Thus, in accordance with the above evidences Indra, Bṛhaspati and Aṅgirases form a triad which is opposed to the another triad formed by Ahi, Vṛtra and Vala, who blocks the other triad of Uṣas, Waters and cows. Or in other words, it may be surmised that one heavenly triad is engaged in either in release or gain of another triad by destroying another demoniac triad. Thus, there is an inter-relationship among all these triads. This whole mythological setting can be said as the struggle between the good and the evil to regain something benevolent,

41. Cf. ṚV. 2, 24, 3 ; 14 ; 64, 4.

42. See K. F. Celdner, *Der Rig-Veda Ubersetzt*, IV (Cambridge Mass. 1951) p. 242n.

which is much more clear in old Iranian culture through the Avesta-text.[43]

3.0. Various connotations of the word gāḥ :—

The word *gāḥ* (accusative plural of *go*), as stated above, has several connotations in the ṚV. At the very outset it denotes 'cow', but when observed deeply it signifies more than its surface meaning Roth[44] and Grassmann[45] have attested several meanings to this word, but here only those are cited which are generally applicable to the ṚV. :—

(i) Rays of the Sun,
(ii) Water or streams,
(iii) Uṣas or light,
(iv) Vāk 'Speech',
(v) Praise (according to Sāyaṇa), and
(vi) Cows in general.

A few examples seem necessary here to exemplify the above meanings :—

Rays of the Sun :

In several contexts we find *gāḥ* standing for the rays of the Sun, as :—

údapaptann aruṇā bhānávo vṛthā
svāyújo árusīr gā ayukṣata /—ṚV. 1,92,2.

"Their purple rays have readily shot upwards, they have yoked the self yoked and ruddy kine (rays) (to their chariot)".

Here in the context of Uṣas, the word *gāḥ* explicitly signifies the rays of the sun. It may be compared with

43. See M. N. Dhalla, *Zorastrian Theology* (New York, 1914), PP. 26-53. A. A. Macdonell, *Lectures on Comparative Religion* (University of Culcutta, 1925), P. 50.

44. *Sanskrit Woerterbuch* (*Garaz*, 1959), P. 178.

45. *Woerterbuch Zum Rigveda* (Wiesbaden, 1964), P. 407 ff.

other contexts also.[46]

Water or Streams : This meaning can be observed in the following verse of the Ṛ V :—

agnáyo ná śuśucānā ṛjīṣiṇo
bhṛmim dhámanto ápa gā avṛṇvata |—Ṛ V. 2,34,1.

"(The Maruts) brilliant like fires, and impetuous have uncovered the (rain giving) cows by blowing away the cloud."[47]

Uṣas or light : Uṣas is mentioned frequently as the mother of the cow, but sometimes the word *gāḥ* denotes the Uṣas itself directly or by the way of comparison. Thus this word has become a mythological synonym of the Dawn herself.[48] The light is often mentioned as coming after the darkness is dispersed.[49] For example :

yújam vájram vṛṣabháścakra índro
nìrjyótiṣā támaso gā adukṣat |—Ṛ V. 1,33,10.

"Indra, the showerer, grasped his bolt, and with its brightness milked out the cows (light) from the darkness." (cf. Ṛ V. 7,36,1)"

When the first streaks of the Dawn reddens the sky, the light appears to be similar to the red cows which approach towards the east.[50] *Vāk* or Speech The word *gāḥ* has been taken in the sense of 'speech' also, as :—

abhisvárā niṣádā gā avasyáva
índre hinvānā dráviṇāny āśata |—Ṛ V. 2,21, 5.

"Seeking his favour and sending their speech (prayers) to Indra, they enjoyed riches (from Indra)".

46. cf. Ṛ V. 1, 10, 8 ; 83, 5.
47. cf. Max Mueller, *SBE*, Vol. 32, P. 298f.
48. cf- Hillebrandt, op. cit, P. 39.
49. cf. A. Bergagine, *Religion Vedique* I, 242 ff.
50. Hillebrandt, op. cit., P. 41.

Here also we find a reference to the Aṅgirases and the Vala episode in the preceding part of the verse.

Praise (according to Sāyaṇa). Sāyaṇa has taken this word in the sense of 'praise' also.

'Cows' in general. The word *gāḥ* denotes cows in general in several contexts of the ṚV.

4. *Various meanings of udājat :*

Udājat is 3rd pers., sing., 'continuative imperfect,[51] form of the root *'aja-gatikṣepaṇayoḥ* (put forth, set in motion, drive out, impel, propel etc.) with the prefix *ud* which gives the compounded meaning as 'drive out from some place' (heraustreiben),[52] or 'to find out.' This form occurs only thrice in the ṚV.,[53] and everywhere it is connected with the same contexts, viz. 'driving out the cows from Vala's enclosure'. In the first two places Indra is the subject, but in the ṚV. 2,24,14 Bṛhaspati "drove out the cows, broke Vala with his hymns, hid away the darkness and caused the Sun to shine." The 3rd pers. plur. imperfect form with the prefix *ud,* occurs only once,[54] and without prefix also only once.[55] In both these contexts, which present "continuative and 'non-successive description",[56] Pitṛs are the main force to bring out the cows from the

51. See J. Gonda, *The Aspectual Function of the Ṛgvedic Present and Aorist* ('s-Gravenhage, 1962), P. 102.

52. Roth & Boehtlingk, *Sanskrit Woerterbuch* (Graz, 1959), P. 15.

53. ṚV. 2, 12, 3 ; 14, 3 ; 24, 14.

54. ṚV. 10, 62, 2.

55. ṚV. 4,1,13.

56. J. Gonda, op. cit., P. 115.

enclosure of Vala. The forms *ajati* (ṚV. 1,33,3), *ājat* (ṚV. 1, 83, 5 ; 2,24,3,4,50,5 ; 8,14, 8,10, 68, 5 ; 7), *ājata* (ṚV. 1, 161, 6 ; 3, 44, 5), *ājatam* (ṚV. 1, 112, 16) etc. give the indication of other meanings as 'to make available', 'to find or receive', 'to impel', 'to set in motion' etc.

Thus, the root meaning of *ājat* can be extended in several ways, but when it is prefixed with *ud* it conveys the meaning of only 'driving something out', or 'to find out something from some place', which is clear through the above contexts, and it sheds some light on the form and meaning of the word *apadhā* also.

apadhā : A controversial form :

apadhā is a *hapax legomenon* in the Vedic literature. So far as its meaning is concerned there is not much controversy among the commentators of the ṚV, but its form has always been controversial. SKN and Durgācārya[57] explain it as '*upadhānena bilodghāṭanena*' (by uncovering of the enclosure) which explicitly indicates that they have taken it as the instrumental sing. of *apadhā*, and perhaps on the anology of *pratidhā* (*ekayā* —ṚV. 8, 77, 4). Veṅkaṭa Mādhava[58] explains it as '*bilāntar apihitā*' (enclosed in the cave) which indicates that he thinks it as a form of locative singular, and perhaps taken on the analogy of *guhā* (*dāsam varṇam adharam guhākaḥ*—ṚV. 2, 12, 4). Sāyaṇa explains it as the form of oblative singular, and derives it as "*apa pūrvād dādhātoḥ 'ātaścopasarge'* (*Pāṇini* 3.3.106) *iti bhāve aṅ pratyayaḥ ; 'supāṁ suluk' iti pañcamyā ākaraḥ*."

Among the modern commentators Roth[59]

57. *Nir.* comm. 3,115 ; 8,2.
58. *Ṛgartha Dīpikā* III, (2,12,3).
59. *Sanskrit Woerterbuch* s. v.

Grassmann,[60] Ludwing,[61] Lanman[62] and Macdonell[63] follow SKN's line explain it as an instrumental singular, while Wilson,[64] Geldner[65] and Griffith[66] take it as an oblative sing. explicitly following Sayaṇa. Peterson[67] thinks it as a locative singular form, but translates it as 'from the enclosure', which is clearly ablative singular. Velankar[68] explains it as an instrumental singular form.

Thus, according to these commentators *apadhā* can be taken either as an instrumental sing. or ablative singular or locative singular. But which one is the most probable, this is the question here. Other analogous forms like *bilam*, *paridhin*, *apihitam* etc. which give the same meaning, are mostly in the accusative, and are either opened or destroyed by Indra, Bṛhaspati, Aṅgirases etc., from where these deities find or drive out the cows: A few examples seem desirable here :—

(i) *indro valasya bilam apaurṇot—Tait. S.* 2.1.5.1.
"Indra destroyed the enclosure of Vala".

(*ii*) *indrō......bhinad valasya paridhīn*...ṚV. 1, 52, 5.
"Indra...broke through the defences of Vala".

(iii) *tvam valasya gomato 'pāvar' adrivo bilam*—ṚV. 1, 11, 5.

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60. *Woerterbuch Zum Rig-Veda* (Wiesbaden, 1964). P. 72.
61. *Kommentar zur Rigveda*, Pt: 2, P. 53.
62. *Noun Inflection in the Veda*, P. 447.
63. *Vedic Reader* (Oxford Un: Press), 1960 P. 46 f.
64. *Rigveda Trans. Vol. II*, P. 138.
65. *Der Rigveda ubersetzt*, Pt. I, P. 290.
66. *Hymns of the Rigveda*, Pt. I, P. 173.
67. *Hymns from the Rigveda* (6th ed ; Bombay, 1938), P. 116 ; 310.
68. *Rigveda Maṇḍala* II, (Un. of Bombay, 1966), P. 33.

"Thou didst open the cave of Vala, who had there concealed the cattle".

(iv) *apām bilam apihitam yadāsit*
Vṛtram jaghanvān apa tad vavār /—ṚV. 1,32,11.
"By laying Vṛtra, Indra set open the cave that had confined the waters".

All the above examples clarify that *apadhā* is not an 'action' as explained by Skanda Svāmin and Durgācārya in the way of '*udhāṭanena*' 'by uncovering'; but it indicates the *locale* like *bilam* 'enclosure' from where the cows are either 'driven out' or 'regained'. Thus, *apadhā* can be taken as an ablative singular form of the same stem, i. e. *apadhā*, meaning 'enclosure'.

6. *Connotations of Saptasindhūn* :

The oft repeated phrase '*saptasindhūn*' raises some controversy of interpretation. The traditional interpreters have explained it as 'seven rivers' which is evident through '*gaṅgādyāḥ nadyaḥ*' or '*elā ca ilā ca*', but at the same time their alternative interpretation as '*syandanāḥ nadīḥ*' 'flowing rivers' raises question whether the word *sapta* stands here for some specific 'number' or for some attributive epithets. As numbers play an important role in the cultural life of peoples,[69] the word *sapta* may be taken here to denote number 'seven', which may be exempliified by the usages as *sapta-aśvaḥ*[70] having 'seven horses', *sapta-āsyaḥ*[71] 'seven months', *sapta-ṛṣayaḥ*[72] 'seven seers', *sapta-cakram*[73] 'seven wheeled, *sapta-jāmayaḥ*[74]

69. See the observation made by F. Heiler, *Erscheinungsformen und Wesender Religion* (Stuttgart, 1961), P. 161 ff.

70. ṚV. 5,45, 9.

71. ṚV. 4,50,4.

72. ṚV. 10,109, 4.

73. ṚV. 1,164, 3 ; 2,40, 3.

74. ṚV. 9,10, 7.

'seven sisters', *sapta jihvaḥ*[75] 'seven tongues' *sapta-putram*[76] 'having 'seven sons' *sapta-mātaram*[77] 'seven mothers', etc. in the Ṛ‌V. Thus, it appears that the number 'seven' was very common in the usage to denote either the plurality of the things or some ominous phenomenon. The predilection for the number 'seven' in ancient Indian-as well as modern-culture is also apparent from a special rite called *sapta-padī*.

So, the phrase *sapta-sindhūn* does not refer here to any particular name (or names) of the river (s),[78] but it indicates all the rivers which are made free to flow by Indra.

Meaning of aśmanoḥ :

aśmanoḥ, the locative dual form of *aśman* 'rock' or 'cloud' occurs only here in the ṚV. Here, the allussion is to the lightning form of Agni who in several passages is said to be 'in the rock'[79] or 'to be produced from the rock'[80] and is called 'son of the rock, (*adreḥ sūnuḥ*).[81] Thus, it is clear that it does not refer to the 'earth and the sky' as explained by Skandin and Durga, and followed by Griffith.

The verse as a whole represents six distinct functions of Indra-mythology, namely, (i) smashing the clouds

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75. ṚV. 3,6, 2.
76. ṚV. 1,164, 1.
77. ṚV. 10,107, 4.
78. For details see A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Kieth, *Vedic Index*, Vol. II, P. 424.
79. ṚV. 2,1,1.
80. ṚV. 10,20,7.
81. Cf. A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Reader* (Ox. Un. Press, 1960), P. 47.

in the form of *ahi*, (ii) setting free the rivers to flow freely, (iii) driving out the cows (in the form of Uṣas or light), (iv) destroying Vala (in the form of enclosure' or obstruction or darkness), (v) producing fire (lightening) between two rocks (clouds), and (vi) being victorious in battle. Thus, all the main functions of Indra-mythology are contained in this single verse of the ṚV.

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CONTRIBUTION OF PRAKRIT LITERATURE TO THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES OF ANCIENT INDIA

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Literature is to be judged by its value to humanity. An estimation of it is determined by the principles to what extent does it contribute to the progress of mankind by enabling it to live with more happiness, more intensity, more profoundness, more wisdom and more freedom in the mundane world. From this angle of vision on literature Prakrit literature testifies sufficiently to the linguistic and literary development of its age and its value to mankind by conveying various aspects of Indian Culture.

Here an attempt has been made to bring to light the contribution of Prakrit literature to the physical sciences of Ancient India in course of her cultural evolution.

The Jaina Āgamic Prākrit literature (Śvetāmbara and Digambara) has made a great contribution to the development of the physical sciences of Ancient India by making analysis of Matter (*Pudgala*) in its different aspects, while dealing with the metaphysical problems from the point of view of *dravya* (substance), *Kṣetra* (field or locus), *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (condition)[1]. The authors of this vast literature kept in view the concepts of Matter as embodied in different Indian

1. *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, 2.10.118.

Systems of thought. Matter has been studied by every philosophy in its own manner. *Bhūta*[2] of the Cārvākas, the *Prakriti*[3] of the Sāṁkhya -Yoga, the *Jaḍadravya*[4] of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[5] and the Mīmāṁsaka,[6] *Rūpa*[7] of the Buddhists, *Māyā*[8] of the Śaṅkara-Vedānta, *Acit*[9] of the Rāmānuja-Vedānta and *Pudgala*[10] of Jaina Metaphysics are only the diverse views on this problem. The Jaina conception of Matter preserved in the Jaina Āgamic Prākrit literature forms the basis of the physical sciences in Jaina metaphysics in a nascent form ; on it a superstructure of analysis of Matter has been raised by Umāsvāti and others in the post-Āgamic period and Darśanakāla, having taken a synthetic view of all other concepts of Matter embodied in other Indian systems of thought on the basis of its conception as a permanent substance endowed with infinite qualities and modes in the light of many unique notions of Matter as found in the modern physical sciences.

Matter (*Pudgala*) is conceived as *dravya* (substance) endowed with *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode)[11] and it is studied from the aspects of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (locus,) *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva*

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2. *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, p, 1.
3. *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 8.10.11.
4. *Vaiśeṣika*, 1.1.5.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 16, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 16, etc.
6. *Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā*, pp. 35 ff.
7. *Abhidharmakośa*, 1.24.
8. *S. Bhā.* on *Brahmasūtra.*
9. *Śrībhāṣya*, 1.1.1.
10. *Bhs.*, 2,10.118.
11. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118 ; *Anuyogadvāra*, 5.121 ; *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.6 ; 28.3.

(condition)[12] on the basis of the metaphysical speculation which runs parallel to the conception of Matter as revealed in Western Philosophy and modern physics to some extent. It is to be noted that the subject 'Substance' of Western Philosophy corresponds to *Dravya* (substance) of Jaina Metaphysics, the predicate and the relation of the former to *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode) of the latter respectively. A substance is defined as "that which can only enter into a proposition as subject, never as predicate or relation. Metaphysically substances have generally been held to be indestructible."[13] "The physical world consists of substances with qualities and relations."[14].

The most visible form of Non-living substance (*ajīvadravya*) is Matter. It exists in different forms, such as, earth, water, shadow, objects of the four senses, mind, speech, bodies, etc. upto Karmic matter (*karma-pudgala*) and ultimate atom (*paramāṇu*)[15]. Matter is a tangible reality existing within the sensuous and super-sensuous experiences in perceptible and imperceptible conditions. It is also accepted as a reality in other Indian systems of thought as pointed out in the beginning. Jaina *pudgala* is equivalent to Matter of the physical sciences. The derivative meaning of the word '*Pudgala*', skt. *Pudgala* (Pud+gal=to integrate and to disintegrate) is that the substance which undergoes modification by the process of combination and dissociation is called *Pudgala*[16]. In the physical sciences also Matter

12. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118.
13. *Analysis of Matter*, Bertrand Russel, p. 238.
14. Ibid., pp. 243-4.
15. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. III, p. 3.
16. *Bhs.* (comm.), 20.2.664 ; *Dravyasaṁgraha*.

is conceived as the substance in the sense of 'stuff, of which the material universe is constituted, undergoing changes by the process of intergration and disintegration.[17]

Matter is a permanent, non-living, extensive, physical, corporeal and concrete, active, disintegrating and integrating, and changeable substance[18]. It is infinite in number, co-extensive with the universe, possessed of the capacity to be received by soul[19] and to be of assistance[20] to it. It possesses infinite eternal modes of capacities like colour, taste, smell and touch, etc. It is characterized by origination, decay and permanence without giving up its essential nature of existence.[21] Both the Jainapudgala and the Sāṁkhya *Prakriti*[22] (Primordial Matter) are non-living, eternal, infinite and all-pervading, undecaying and indestructible in nature. The Buddhist conception of the two general characteristics of *Rūpa* (Matter), viz. *vikāritva* (modifiability) and *sapratighātva* (impenetrability)[23] is identical with the Jaina view of the general characteristics of *Pudgala*, viz. *pariṇāmitva* (changeability) and ghataśarīratva (impenetrability) of the effects of Matter.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy Matter is conceived as intrinsically non-living and essentially substantive eternal reality, having the characteristics of existen-

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17. Inter Physics p. 2.
18. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118 : *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5.1,2;3,4,6 ; *DS.*, 15 ; *Bṛhaddravyasaṅgraha*, p. 67.
19. *Bhs.* 2-10. 118 ; Ts. 8.2.
20. *Bhs.*, 2-1-90.
21. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, III. 3.
22. *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 8.10.11.
23. *Abhidarmakośa*, *kā*, 1.13, *Sphuṭārthā*.

tiality (*astitva*), knowability (*Jñeyatva*), self-identity (*abhidheyatva*) and inherent causality (Svātmasyāram-bhakatva).[24] Impenetrability, perceptibility and mass are the essentical aspects of its nature. In Western Metaphysics also Matter is accepted as one of the ultimate principles or substances of which phenomena are manifestations. The physical world consists of the material substances with qualities and relations, i. e. modes. In the physical sciences it is the substance in the sense of stuff which constitutes the whole material universe.[25] Earth, water, shadow, objects of the senses, Karmic matter and ultimate atom[26] are in general the elements of Matter according to Jaina Metaphysics. It appears from this order of the elements of Matter that this philosophy commenced with the conception of its grossest form and entered into the conception of its subtile force by stages in its dealing with this problem like Metaphysics and physics. The most valuable point in the conception of elements of Matter is this that each of its effects, when studied, is ultimately found to have been formed of one or more of the elementary particles. The Jaina conception of elements of Matter, when compared to that of other Indian systems of thought, appears to be unique in its origin, for it has accepted not only earth, water, fire and air, etc. as the basic elements of Matter but it has given place to

24. *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 16 ; *VS.* II. II, 26 ; *PP. Bha.*, p. 16 ; *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 58 ; PP. Bhā., p. 20 ; PP. Bhā., p. 20. Nyāyakandalī p. 21, vide *Conception of Matter According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 59 ; VS., 1.1.9.14.

25. *Atoms, and the Universe,* ch. VI, Matter and its properties," pp. 126-149.

26. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. III, p. 3.

indriya (senses), *Karma* (action) and *leśyā*[27] (condition of soul) as the material elements in its fold by making a synthesis of all of other Indian philosophical views on the subject on the basis of psychophysical aspects of the material substance.

Action (*Karma*) is energy and energy is the attenuated form of Matter. According to the physical sciences, energy like Matter is something which exists in Nature, though in different kinds. It pervades throughout the universe but has no bulk to be apprehended by the senses. It has also no weight and extension or compression. Whatever be its nature, work can never be produced without application of energy. So energy and work (*Karma*) are accepted as synonyms. What is energy is work and what is work is energy.

The speculation on the concept of *paramāṁu* (ultimate atom) marks a stage of emergence and development of a subtle thought in the field of Indian philosophy of the Āgamic Age, post-Āgamic Age and Age of Indian Metaphysics (Darśanakāla). In this speculation the Jaina, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsaka, Bauddha and Vedānta systems of thought have attacked the problem in their respective manners. Jaina philosophy conceived this atomic theory on the basis of destruction and origination of the material world from the stand-point of transformation taking place in it due to external and internal causes and made a synthetic view of the concept of atom from the aspects of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (locus), *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva*

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27. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 89 ; *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* (leśyā) (comm.), 34 p. 650 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, 13 (comm.), p. 336 ; *Karmagrantha*, (4th.), gā. 3 ; *GS.*, *Jīva.*, 531, etc,

(condition)[28].

The Jaina conception of elementary particles of Matter has a parallel theory of elementary particles of Matter in Western philosophy and physics. The concept of hyle or ylem (Primordial Matter and its elements), when compared to Jaina *Pudgala* shows that originally the name 'elementary particle was applied to the four elements—fire, earth, air and water.[29] It is to be noted that like Jaina philosophy, Western philosophy and physics also began the study of the conception of gross elements of Matter and gradually entered into the subtle atomic theory, according to which all material substances are constituted of small units called atom. Atom means indivisible, but the physical sciences have demonstrated that atom is divisible.

According to the physical sciences, there are stated to be one hundred and three elements of Matter. In the Āgamic Prākrit literature also there is found a list of a number of basic elements of Matter which are common to the physical sciences and Jaina physics, e. g. silicon, sulphur, iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold, carbon, etc.[30] The value of the Jaina conception of basic elements of Matter lies in the fact that, like the alchemists of the Middle Ages the Jaina Ācarya conceived the idea of pure element of Matter as distinguished from the base forms of it with their keen insight into the womb of Nature even in the absence of developed experimental physical sciences of modern age.

28. *Bhs.*, 25.4.740 ; 20.5.670 ; *Acārāṅga Cūrṇi*, p. 195 ; *Uttarā. Tīkā* (Kamala Saṁyama), p. 99.

29. *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. II, W. K. C. Guthrie, p. 141.

30. *Paṇṇāvanā*, 2. *Jīvapaṇṇāvanā*.

Paramāṇus (ultimate atoms) are infinite in number with regard to *dravya* (substance) ; it is the finest particle of matter with regard to *kṣetra* (locus) ; it is momentary from the aspect of *kāla* (time) and its quality is changing from the stand-point of bhāva (condition).[31] *Paramāṇu* is both cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*)[32] of the material world from the point of view of transformation, but not only the ultimate material cause of it like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *Paramāṇu*.[33] This conception of *Paramāṇu* as cause and effect is parallel to the conception of energy and consequence of energy of the physical sciences[34]. In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy *paramāṇu*[35] is conceived as a produced entity (*Janyapadārtha*) but not as an eternal entity. It is evolved out of the first *tanmātra* (infra atomic potential) ; it is divisible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceives the indivisibility of *paramāṇu*[36] while the Buddhists maintain the divisibility of paramāṇu (*saṁghāta paramāṇu*)[37] which consists at least of eight parts of elements of *Rūpa* (Matter) (*aṭṣadravyaka*). According to the physical sciences, atom is divisible without limit. In the Jaina view *sūkṣmaparamāṇu* is indivisible, but *vyavahāraparamāṇu*[38] and four qualities of paramāṇu,

31. *Bhs.*, 25.4.740 ; 20.5.670.

32. *Uttarā.*, 1.33 ; See *Tīkā* (Śānti Ācārya) p. 24 ; *Rājavārtika*, p. 491.

33. *Nyāyavārtika*, IV, 1.33.

34. *Atomic physics*, p. 4.

35. *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 62, ch. 1, 35 ; Yogabhāṣya, IV, 24.

36. *VS.*, 4.1.1.

37. *Abh. K.*, II, 22.

38. *Anuyogadvāra*, Sū. 133 ; Jambūdvīpa, 19.100, p. 169 ; *Loka Prakāśa*, 1.21.

viz. colour, taste, smell and touch, have infinite divisions.[39] This conception suggests that *paramāṇu* conceived in Jaina Metaphsics is divisible without limit like the atom of the physical sciences. Saṁghāta paramāṅu of the Buddhists is *avinirbhāgin* or *bhoga* (indistinguishable), while the Jaina *paramāṇu* is *anantabhāga* (infiniteth part) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *paramāṇu* when compared. It is eternal from the substantial point of view and non-eternal from the modal stand-point.[40] A *paramāṇu* is *abhedya* (homogenous or impassable), *acchedya* (uncuttable), *avibhājya* (indivisible), *adāhya* (incombustible) and *agrāhya* (non-receivable by soul)[41].

It is *anardha* (without half part), *amadhya* (without inner part) and *apradeśa* (without having part) from the point of view of *kṣetra* (field)[42]. It is itself beginning, it is itself middle, it is itself end.[43]

Paramāṇus are of one class only. A *paramāṇu* can assume any form in accordance with the causal condition. The paramāṇu which underwent change into the form of earth can undergo transformation into the forms of water, fire, etc. on the alteration of the materials. The capacities-colour, taste, smell and touch, exist as equal in each and every *paramāṇu* and can change into any form according to the cause.[44] Even though they are equal in all paramāṇus, the variousness of their transformation occurs because of the difference of materials.

39. *Bhs.*, 254.740.
40. *Bhs.*, 14.4.512.
41. Ibid., 20.5.670.
42. Ibid., 5.7.215.
43. *RV.*, 5.25. 1. p. 491.
44. *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṁśikā*, pp. 1-4.

The *skandha* (molecule) formed by the combination of *paramāṇus* is not any new material substance. It is only one particular form out of the combination of *paramāṇus*. All *paramāṇus* are permanent in their respective individual nature[45] and their *pariṇāminityatā* (permanence-in-change) is explained by accepting *skandha* (molecule), *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode or action) as being produced as a result of transformation of *paramāṇus*.[46] Thus the *skandha* is accepted as some how non-different as well as different from them.

All gross and fine material creations are explained on the basis of the capacity of transformation of paramāṇus and their combination and dissociation. It appears from the study of the nature of paramāṇu that the Vaiśeṣika philosophy stops by conceiving paramāṇu as the sixth part (or division) of *rajakaṇa* (mote) perceived in the sunrays,[47] whereas Jaina philosophy accepts one *paramāṇu* also as skandha (molecule) of infinite *sūkṣmaparamāṇus*.[48]

According to its view, infinite paramanus and infinite *skandhas* (molecules) also can exist in a subtle form in one space-point, in which one paramāṇu exists, by virtue of its capacity of contraction (*saṁkoca*)[49]. On this ground paramāṇus are conceived as fine and unmanifest like the *Prakriti* of the Sāṁkhya. The difference between them is that the *Prikriti* is one, whereas the Jaina paramāṇu is infinite in number.[50].

45. *Bhs.*, 20,5.688.
46. *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṁśikā*, pp. 1-4.
47. *NV.*, p. 647.
48. *Anuyoga*, 133 ; *Jambudvīpa*, 19.100.
49. *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṁśikā*, p. 2.
50. *Bhs.*, 25.4.740.

The Jaina view of atomicity of matter bears a striking similarity to the concept of atomicity of matter of the physical sciences in some respects although it differs from the latter in other respects. The hypothesis of W. Prout that "the atoms of all elements are built up of one atom, the atom of hydrogen corresponding to the Prime Matter, the Ylem of the Greeks[51] comes nearer to the Jaina conception of paramāṇu which is of one class only. "Individual atomic events are not observed directly, though their consequences may be and hence greater reliance must be placed on logical inference and methodology than in most other branches of sicences"[52]. The Jaina conception of oscillation and motion of paramāṇu[53] is nearer to the conception of oscillation or vibration and motion of atom of the physical sciences, for the oscillatory behaviour or wave motion is applicable in atomic physics[54] the wave aspect of elementary particles is possibly their most fundamental characteristic. The Jaina principles of *Vega-pratighāta* (resistance to atom in its motion), *bandha-pratighāta* (resistance to atom by its binding-transformation) and *upakārābhava-pratighāta* of *paramāṇu* (resistance to atom at the last border of the Universe in the absence of the assistance of *Dharmāstikāya*-Principle of Motion) in the Non-Universe compare well with the process of collision of neutron with proton like two billiards balls, the physical law, "every atom exerts a force upon every

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51. *Atoms and the Universe*, p. 28.

52. *Atomic Physics*, p. 4.

53. *Bhs.*, 1.5.7.217 ; 25.4.744 ; 16.8.584 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, 16.471-4; *Sthānāṅga*, 10.9.35.211 (274).

54. Physics, 261 ; Atomic Physics, p. 12, 1.4 ; p. 65. Atoms and the Universe. pp. 84, 87.126 ; Mysteries of Space, p. 5.

other atom and there is a tendency for atoms because of their force of attraction to draw together and stick" and the law "nothing can go beyond the border of the universe because of the absence of the support of motion" respectively, according to the physical sciences.

The Jaina conception of the four general properties of Pudgala, viz. colour, taste, smell and touch[55] is well supported by the physical sciences. The notion of five colours-black, red, yellow, blue and white[56] is identical with the conception of the five natural colours of Matter of the physical sciences.[57] Infinite modes of these five colours can be compared with the difference of wave lengths ; "as the apparent colour of a material substance depends upon its state of the sub-divisions, it becomes lighter as large particles are ground up into small ones"[58] In regard to the five kinds of taste of Pudgala it is to be noted that sweet, bitter and sour, are common to both Jaina metaphysics and the physical sciences, while saltish and insipid[59] tastes of the latter are different from the acidic and astringent tastes of the former. Two kinds of smell—pleasant and unpleasant are the common properties of Matter mentioned in all metaphysics and the physical sciences. Eight kinds of properties of Matter conceived in Jaina philosophy can be reduced to the following four physical properties of Matter of modern

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55. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118. PS. 52.

56. *Bhs.*, 12.5. 450.

57. Report of the Colorimetry Committee, 1922, Optical Society of America, vide Cosmology, Old and New. p. 168.

58. General Chemistry, Pauling, p. 12.

59. "Taste and chemical constitution" by A. J. Mee, M. A. in the *Science Progress,* October, 34, vide Consmology, Old and New, p. 164.

physics, viz. scale-hardness (*mṛdu-kaṭhina*), density (*guru-laghu*), temperature (*śita* and *uṣṇa*) and structure (*snigdha* and *rukṣa*). Besides, the property of impenetrability of the effects of Matter is its common property according to all metaphysics and physics. Motion[60] is the intrinsic property of Matter. *Parispandana* (oscillation)[61] of *Pudgala* is the common property of Matter according to the Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta philosophies.[62] It represents the oscillation of elastic bodies of the physical sciences,[63] while Jaina pudgala-gati corresponds to the motion of Matter of physics according to which motion is the change of position of a body with time. Every thing is in motion, though on object may be at rest in relation to another, Motion and rest are relative, for the motion of a body involves a change of its position with respect to some known object as there are no such fixed points in Nature.

The viśreṇi gati of Jaina *Pudgala* may be compared to the curvilinear motion of Matter of physics, while *vigrahagati* and *kuṭilagati* may correspond to the rotatory and complex motions of Matter of the physical sciences respectively. In Jaina metaphpsics and modern physics the motion of a body is specified by its successive positions in time. Both of them study motions which take place along a straight line as well as a curved line, uniform horizontal motion and a verti-

60. *Paṇṇāvanā*, 1.474 ; TS. *Bhāṣya*, 5.6. 386.

61. *Pravacanasāra*, II. 37 (See Pradīpikāvṛtti).

62. *Tattvakaumudī* 10 (Vācaspati), Raghunath Siromaṇi, *Nyāyakusumāñjatī*, Stavaka, V ; Saṅkara, vide *Positive Sciences* of the *Ancient Hindus*, p. 121.

63. Inter Physics, S. C. Roy Chowdhury and D. B. Sinha, p. 488.

cal motion of free fall[64]. The value of the Jaina conception of the general properties of Matter and its motion lies in the fact of its scientific approach to this problem. Matter exists in Nature, occupying some volume in perceptible and imperceptible conditions in various forms. Its effects appear as earth, water, fire, air, and vegetation[65], body, speech, mind and respiration[66], while its manifestations are found as sound, combination, fineness, grossness, shape, division, darkness, shadow, heat, light[67] etc. Earth, water, fire, air and vegetation are also accepted as the effects of matter in the physical sciences.[68] Besides, the bodies of mobile being, organs of speech, mind and respiration[69] are regarded as material in metaphysics and physics.

The Jaina view of sound (*Śabda*) is similar to the conception of sound of modern physics. According to the former, sound is generated by molecules when they strike one another, which may be natural or artificial, hence sound is associated with atom also. In physics it is explained that "usually sound originates in vibrating bodies.[70]" In regard to the wave of sound and its propagation both the Jaina and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[71]

64. *Bhs.*, 3.3.153 (comm.), p. 121 ; TS. *Bha*, 2.29, p. 182.

65. *Bhs.*, 24.12-21. 702-707 off. ; 25.4.739 ; *GS.*, *Jīva*. 182.

66. *Bhs.*, 13.7.473-4-5, *TS.*, V. 19, p. 341.

67. *Uttara.*, 28-12 ; DS., 16 ; TS., v. 24.

68. Inter Physics, S. C. Roy Chowdhury and B. D. Sinha, p. 2.

69. *Human Anatomy*, Henry, Grey, p. 1016 ; *The principles of Psychology*, William James, pp. 145 ff.

70. P. S., 79 *Physics-Principles aud Application* by Margenau, Watson and Montgomery, 38.1, p. 560.

71. *Bhāṣārahasya*, 5 ; *Paṇṇāvanā, Bhāṣāpada*, 11.398. PP, Bhā, p. 156 ; NK., P, 157 ; NV., p. 286 ; *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Gaṅgeśa.

systems of thought agree on the point that sound becomes refracted as well as diffracted according to the causes of its fineness and manifoldness, and association with other substances like air, etc. and expands in all directions upto the last border of the universe. The unbroken sound attains division and dies out at last after crossing countable distance with the growing of the momentum of the impact of series feebler and feebler.[72]

Tha Jaina theory of wave of sound and its propagation with pitch, intensity and quality is well supported by modern physics. It explains that "sound waves exhibit the properties of reflection, refraction and diffraction-characteristics of all forms of motion"[73]. "Every point of a wave front may be considered to be a new sourse of disturbance from which spherical wave-lets issue"[74]. "The vibrations are transmitted through elastic medium usually air, as wave motion of the longitudinal type[75]. Jaina *parāghātabhāṣādravya* (sound generated by vibrating particles of speech)[76] increase infinitefold and expands and goes in a straight line, a curved line and a parallel line or in a mixed to all directions.

Combination (bandha), fineness (*saukṣmya*), grossness (*sthaulya*), shape or figure (*saṁsthāna*), heat (*ātapa*), light (*udyota*) except shadow (*chāyā*) find place as the manifestations of Matter in the physical sciences.

72. *Bhāṣārahasya*, 6 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, , 11.398 *Bhāṣāpada*.

73. *Physics-Principles and Applications*, Margenau Watson and Montgomery, 28.1, p. 560.

74. Ibid., p. 552.

75. Ibid., p. 560.

76. *Bhāṣārahasya*, 10 See also *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* for sound, 336, 337, 351-54 ; 375, 377.

The Jaina conception of *ātapa* (heat) and *udyota* (light)[77] is important in this respect that it touches upon the theory of heat and light-energies[78] of modern physics in a nascent form. The infinite modifications of Matter as dealt with in the Jaina Āgamic Prākrit literature from the stand-point of substantiality, modality, immersion, duration and qualities[79] are thought-provoking, when they are studied in the light of the physical sciences from the aspects of substance, quality and relations with regard to their existence in space and continuity in time. *Pariṇāma* (change and transformation) takes place in *Dravya* (Substance) due to external and internal causes. *Dravynparamāṇu* (material atom) undergoes transformation as a result of internal causes and external influences, e. g. the restlessness of mind owing to the impact of external conditions *Jaḍavastu* (non-living thing) like mind, hence there takes place also internal change in the atomic structure of the body. The properties in *paramāṇu* are changing from moment to moment, e. g. transformation of its *rūpaśakti*, (colour), etc. *Viśiṣṭapariṇāma* (particular transformation) is taking place in it, e. g. *ekaguṇakālaka*, *dviguṇakālaka*, etc. (onefold black, twofold black, etc.). This transformation of colour can be compared with the latest view of the late National Professor Dr. C. V. Raman, Nobel Laureate, on the transmission (or emission) of ray of colour from flower. The view of the Jainas on the division of smell-particles is most scientific and thought-

77. Bhs., 8.8.344 ; *Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 296 ; *Sūriyapaṇṇatti*, 3.24-8 ; *Candapaṇṇatti*, 28.

78. Physics, pp. 248, 588.

79. Paṇṇāvanā, 266-279.

provoking in the physical sciences. *Agurulaghupariṇāma*[80] (transformation of the quality of neither heaviness nor lightness) is the general transformation taking place in all substances, i. e. there occur the decrease and increase of this quality in them. *Pudgala* becomes of one form (*egarūva*)[81] by the process of transformation like the energy of Matter of the physical sciences. Besides the Jaina theory of transformation of Matter brought about by the process of integration, dis-integration and integration-cum-disintegration[82] compares well with the principle of chemical behaviour of atoms and molecules as laid down in the physical sciences. "Molecules can sometimes interchange atoms and form new substances and molecules already formed can sometimes dissociate again into separate atoms."[83] "In more complex reactions in which atoms are interchanged between molecules there are more qualities of energy to be considered. There are the energies which have to be supplied before the separate molecules can be dissociated and also the energies gained by formation of the new types of molecule.[84]" The combination of particles of Matter takes place as a result of the inter-actions between ultimate atom having the force of attraction (*snehakāyatva*) and the force of repulsion (*rūkṣatva*) of unequal degree (quantum).[85] This Jaina view of the interactions between ultimate atoms which give rise to the

80. There are ten kinds of *Pudgalapariṇāma* including *agurulaghupariṇāma*, *Bhs.*, 8,10.355 ; *Paṇṇavanā*, 13, 417.

81. Bhs., 14.4.510.

82. *Ts. Bha.*, 5.28, p. 372.

83. *Atoms and the Universe*, p. 132.

84. Ibid., 132-33.

85. *Bhs.*, 1.10.80 ; 8.9.345 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, 13.418 ; *Bandhaṣaṭtrimśikā* 10.

existence and behaviour of Matter in bulk bears some points of similarity with that of the physical sciences regarding inter-atomic forces and the combination of atoms. It is explained in this way that "every atom exerts a force upon every other atom. The details and the magnitude of the force vary as between one type of atom and other, but in general the force is always the force of attraction when the atoms are at a distance apart greater than their normal diameters. changing to a force of repulsion if the atoms are forced very close together. Thus there will be a tendency for atoms because of their force of attraction to draw together and stick."[86]

This brief analysis of Matter shows the great contributions of Prākrit literature with scientific approach to the problem even in the absence of the critical verifying data of modern experimental science, The reality of Matter has amply and brilliantly been expressed by it, together with the three potent factors origination, decay and permanence, in the daring flight of human imagination, not sacrificing the logical aspect of knowledge in the thoughts of its metaphysical and physical existence and in the synthetic views of its qualities, modes, basic elements, properties, effects and modifications, evolution and combinations, as it exists in space and continues in time with its static and dynamic forces in the cosmic universe.

86. *Atoms and the Universe*, O. Jones, J. Rotblat and Withrow, p. 126.

ABBREVIATION

Abh. K	=	Abhidharmakośa.
Anuyoga	=	Anuyogadvārasūtra.
Bhs.	=	Bhagavatī Sūtra.
Ch.	=	Chapter.
Comm.	=	Commentary.
DS.	=	Dravyasaṁgraha.
Ga.	=	Gāthā.
GS.	=	Gommaṭasāra.
Jambūdvīpa	=	Jaṁbūdvīpaprajñapti.
Jiva.	=	Jīvakāṇḍa.
Kā.	=	Kārikā.
NK.	=	Nyāyakandalī.
NV.	=	Nyāyavārtika.
Paṇṇāvanā	=	Paṇṇāvanāsūtra.
PP. Bhā.	=	Praśastapādabhāṣya.
Ps.	=	Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra.
RV.	=	Rājavārtika.
Ś. Bhā.	=	Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.
Sthānāṅga	=	Sthānāṅgasūtra.
Sū.	=	Sūtra.
TS.	=	Tattvārthasūtra.
TS. Bhā.	=	Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya.
Uttara.	=	Uttarādhyayanasūtra.
VS.	=	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

ON THE ṚGVEDA I. 115.14.

(*SŪRYA ĀTMĀ JAGATAS TASTHUṢAŚ CA*)

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It is too often asserted that the concept of Sūrya centres round the material form of the Sun in the Vedic literature.[1] It is said that the spiritual element in him is a later and superimposed feature.[2] Such views have been mechanically repeated so many times that they look like plain and simple truths while the matter is otherwise. It appears that the Vedic Āryans from the very beginning had conceived of Sūrya as a great spiritual force in the universe. To them he was the ultimate source and the highest reality. He was the spirit of all animate and inanimate things of the universe. The Ṛgvedic *pāda* (I. 115. 1d) *Sūrya ātmā jagatastasthuṣaśca* presents before us a similar idea. It may be taken as a characteristic phrase for Sūrya because it has not been repeated for any other god except once for Parjanya in the *Ṛgveda*[3] and that too in a different sense. In the case of Parjanya the phrase looses all weight because he is said to possess in himself the vitality of all the moveable and immoveable. He is not identical with the soul of all the moveable and immoveable things as is the case with

1. Macdonell, A. A., *The Vedic Mythology*, p. 30 ; Griswold, H. D., *The Religion of the Rigveda*, p. 266, Wilson. H. H. (Tr.) *Rigveda*, Intro. p. XXX.

2. Hopkins, E. W., *The Religion of India*, pp 44-45.

3. VII. 101.6-*tasminnātmā jagatastastasthuṣaśca*; cf. Bloomfield, M., *Rigveda Repetitions*, p. 121.

Sūrya. The word *ātmā* has been interpreted in these two contexts by the commentators differently. Sāyaṇa[4] interprets the word to mean the soul of the world, the cause of all effects whether moveable or immoveable in the case of Sūrya while in the context of Parjanya it means, according to him,[5] only the body. Mādhava, a pre-Sāyaṇa Commentator of the *Ṛgveda*, also takes the word to mean *jīvabhūtaḥ* in the case of the former, while in the case of the latter no such meaning has been given.[7] Yāska does not explain its sense though he says in the context of its preceding *pāda* that Sūrya by its greatness has filled the earth, heaven and the intermediate region.[8] From the context the all-pervasive character of Sūrya is clearly expressed. Therefore the interpretation of the commentators appears to be correct. Similar phraseology with slight difference has been used in case of Sūrya at least twice. Once[9] in place of *ātmā patim* has been used while in the second phrase[10] *gopā* replaces *ātmā*. The phrase in question is continued in its use

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4. Max Müller, F. (ed) *Rigveda*, Vol. I, p. 509- *īdrigbhūta-maṇḍalāntarbarto Sūryo antaryāmitayā sarvasya prerakaḥ paramātmā jagato jaṅgamasya tasthuṣaḥ sthāvarsya cātmā svarūpabhūtaḥ| sa hi saravsya sthāvara-jaṅgamātmakasya kāryavargasya kāraṇam ...| sthāvarajangamātmakasya sarvasya Prāṇijātasya jīvātmā|.*

5. ibid, vol. III, p. 210- *atasminna Parjanya jagato jaṅgamsya tasthuṣaḥ sthāvarsya cātmā deho vartate|.*

6. Sarup, L. (ed) R*igveda Samhitā*, vol. I, p. 600.

7. ibid, vol. IV, p. 1159.

8. *Nirukta*. XII. 16-*āpūpurad dyāvā-prithivyau cāntirikṣaṁ ca mahattvena sūrya ātmā jaṅgamasya ca sthāvarsya ca|.*

9. *RV*., VII. 66.15- *Śīrṣṇaḥ śīrṣṇo jagatastasthuṣaśpatim|.*

10. ibid, VII. 60.2- *Viśvasya sthātur jagataśca gopā.*

throughout the Vedic literature[11] in connection with Sūrya while in the case of Parjanya there is no continuity of the tradition.[12] In view of all these facts we are inclined to brand it as a distinctive phrase applied to Sūrya.

This phrase contains the highest metaphysical thought of the identity of the self and the god. It shows one of the earliest forms of Brāhmanical monism. It is significant to point out that in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[12-a] it is explained as the soul of all fixed and moving things. The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*[13] cites this verse as the evidence in favour of its doctrine of the identity of the self and the Sun. Sāyaṇa as shown earlier takes it in a metaphysical sense and illustrates the doctrine by a quotation from the *Brahmasūtra* (III. 3). Thus it is evident that in the period of the later Vedic literature it was definitely of great spiritual significance.

Hopkins[14] contends that this identification of the Sun with the all-spirit is distinctly a late feature does

11. *AV.*, XIII. 2.35d ; XX. 107. 14d ; *VS.*, VII. 42d ; XIII. *TS.*, 46d ; 1. 4. 43 II.4.14.4d *MS.*, 1.3.37d : 43.9 ; *KS.* IV. 9d : XXII. 5d ; *Ārs.*, V. 3d ŚB. IV. 3.4.10d ; VII.5 .2.27 ; *TB.*, II. 8.7 4d ; *ĀĀ.* II.2. 4. 7; 3.2.3. 10d ; *TĀ.*, I.7.6d ; I.13.1d. In the *Grihya* and/ the *Śrauta Sutras* the use of hymn of which this is a part is mentioned. see 'ŚŚS., IX. 20, *AŚ.*, VI. 5. 8. ; *ŚGS.* IV.6.4. cf. Bloomfield, M., *Vedic Concordance*, 1025.

12. *Vedic Concordance*, p. 413.

12-a. *Sūrya ātmā jāgatastastasthusaścetyeṣa hyasya sarvasyātmā* yacca *jagadyaśca tiṣṭhati* ; Weber (ed) *ŚB.*, p. 617.

13. II. 2. 4. 7-*tad yo'haṁ so'sau yo'sau so'sam, Sūrya ātmā jagatastasthuṣaśceti*/ *Anukramaṇikā* quotes it in support of its stand that there is only one god. *Bṛhaddevatā* (I. 61.) regards sūrya as the source of all that moves and is stationary.

14. op. cit. p 42.

not appear to bear scrutiny. This question of the relative antiquity of this concept may be examined from the following points of view. The time of the passage where it occurs is to be examined. According to Keith[15] the hymn in question will fall in the second stage of the development of the *Ṛgveda*, the first being that of the family-books (II-VII). It will be earlier than the third (VIII-I. 1 to 50), the fourth (IX) and the last (X) (books) stages of the development. In view of the fact that similar phrases[16] with slight differences of words but of similar meanings are applied to Sūrya in the family books we are inclined to place it in the first stage of the development.

The author of this hymn, Kutsa[17] belongs to the Āṅirasas, one of the oldest families of the *Ṛgveda*. Āṅgirasas are referred to in the earliest strata of the *Ṛgveda.*[18] There is a reference to Jiṣṇu, son of the Aṅgiras in one of the family books[19]. It shows that the earliest portions the *Ṛgveda* were familiar with the Āṅgiras family. In the *Atharvaveda*[20] there were definite families of the Āṅgirasas. In view of all these it is difficult to agree with those who view the Āṅgirasas as the semi-mythical beings.[21] More acceptable is the view that they were originally priests of the Indo-Iranian period.[22] However,

15. *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, p. 2
16. *ṚV.*, VII. 60.2 : 66.15.
17. Sāyaṇa on *ṚV*. I.115,1 assigni is to Kutsa.
18. III.31.5-10.
19. IV. 40.1-*Āngirasasya Jiṣṇoḥ*.
20. XXIII. 4.8, cf. *TS.*, VII. i.4.1. ; *PB.* ; XX. 11. 1. see Macdonell, Op. cit. p142-143.
21. Macdonell & Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, Vol., I, p. 11.
22. Weber, *Indische Studien*, I, p. 219.

it is indicated that the author of the hymn belonged to an ancient family and it is no wonder if his expressions are products of an ancient tradition.

Thirdly from the point of view of the similarity in thought the question may be examined. The identity of the god and the universe in connection with the Sūrya is expressed in many hymns occurring in the family books whose early character has been accepted. Thus once it is said that Sūrya is beheld by all the same, the creator and the created.[23] In another verse[23-a] he has been described as the lord of every moving and stationary object. Here the words, *Śīrṣṇaḥ, śīrṣṇo* show complete identity. At other occasion he is called the preserver of all that is moving or stationary.[24] In the last two cases the phraseology is similar to that in discussion. There are many references[25] to the supremacy and identity of the sun with the universe in other parts of the *Ṛgveda* but in view of their late character we are not taking them as evidence here. It is significant to point out that the phrase is part of the description of the material Sun. It shows that the concept of a spirit behind the physical phenomenon was always present before the Vedic seers from the very beginning. In the *Upaniṣads* such concept of a *Puruṣa* in the Sun was directly voiced. Thus it may be suggested that Sūrya

23. *ṚV.*, VII. 62. 1 *Samo divā dadriśe rocamānaḥ kratvākṛtaḥ sukṛtaḥ kartribhir bhūt* /.

23. a ibid, VII.66. 15.

24. ibid, VII.60.2.

25. X.114.5 ; X. 177 cf. *AV.*, VII.1.2, *TS.*, II.12.1 ; *T.B.*, III.5.7.2.

26. *BĀU.*, II.3.1 ; *MU.* ; VI.3 ; *CU.* 3.19.1.
Āditya brahmetyādeśaḥ.

was regarded as the source of all moving and stationary objects in a Ṛgvedic circle represented by Kutsa of the Āṅgirasa family.

It is an expression of the belief of the Indo-Āryans that the Sun is the nucleus of the original power which is immanent in all creations and which transcends all the moveable and the immoveable things of the universe. This concept approaches the Upaniṣadic ideal of monism and pantheism.

ŚĀNTARAKṢITA AND KAMALAŚĪLA

ANANTALAL THAKUR

Patna

I

The spread of Buddhism in Tibet was largely the work of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, two Indian missionaries from Nalanda. The heyday of the Buddhist University was not over. Scholars from far and near still came there and it continued in its premier position among the centres of Buddhist culture with the joint help of the Pala Kings, the benevolent citizens of the Kingdom and above all, the devoted Professors and students.

Śāntarakṣita was born in a princely family of Gauḍa in Zahor, identified with Sābhār in the district of Dacca, now in Bangla Desh. The date of his birth is unknown. But it is said he was born in the reign of Gopāla (died c. 705 A. D.), the first Pala King of Gauḍa and Magadha.

About his early life and education we know but little from the accounts preserved. But a study of his extant works shows that he was well-versed in all the branches of Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit grammar and *belles lettres*, besides Tantras which formed an important item in the curriculum in those days. Tibetan records inform us that he was a Svātantrika-mādhyamika and was raised to the position of a Professor at Nalanda. He is sometimes called the high priest of Nalanda and the spiritual teacher of the King of Magadha.

Śāntarakṣita's stay at Nalanda was fruitful. Scholars like Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra studied under him. He was respected as a scholar as well as a man. Presumably he wrote the *Vipañcitārthā* on the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti and the *Tattvasaṁgraha* while at Nalanda. But it is not clear from the records why and when he left Nalanda. We find him in Nepal when King Khri Sron. de. Tsan (728-864 A. D.) ascended the throne of Tibet (743 A. D.) and wanted that Buddhism should take the place of the Bon feticism as the state religion of his country. He engaged scholars both Tibetan and Indian to translate the Mahayāna texts into Tibetan. But here the King was opposed by some of his ministers. Those in favour of the religion of the Buddha sougth help from the South and sent their men to Mon. yul. One of these men came to India for pilgrimage and on his way back met Ācarya Śāntarakṣita in Nepal. Highly impressed by his character and erudition, the Tibetan dignitary, Gsal.snan became his disciple, took him to Man.yul and erected a monastery there. The Indian preceptor conferred upon him, the title of Yese.dvan. After a brief stay at Man.Yul, Śāntarakṣita returned to Nepal. His disciple went home to inform the King of the Ācarya and the help to be expected from his visit to Tibet.

The King removed the obstacles in his way and sent a mission headed by Yese.dvan to Nepal to invite the Ācarya to Tibet. Eventually the Ācarya reached there and was accorded a reception befitting his position. He expounded the doctrines of Buddhism. But his stay in Tibet was cut short by calamities which befell the land and were thought to be the consequence of the attempt at introduction of the new religion. The Ācārya again returned to Nepal.

Yese. dvan now went to China to study Buddhism and was highly honoured there. The King of Tibet in the meantime tried in vain to take Śāntarakṣita back to his Kingdom. On his return from China, Yese. dvan was deputed for this purpose and he succeeded in his mission. Disturbances broke out again to quench which the assistance of Padmasambhava, a great Tāntrika Ācārya from Uḍḍīyana was thought necessary. Another mission was sent and Ācārya Padmasambhava was found at Man. yul on his way to Tibet.

The joint efforts of the two Indian Ācāryas began to bear fruit. The great monastery of Sam. ye with its twelve temples, two mausolia and the surrounding wall was built. The famous monastery of Odantapuri in Magadha served as the model. The walls of the new monastery displayed portraits of the great sages like Śārīputra, Rāhula, Nāgārjuna, Śubhaṅkara, Śrīgupta and Jñānagarbha. The Buddhist images in the temples were of course made on Tibetan pattern.

It was the beginning of Lamaism in Tibet. Ācārya Śāntarakṣita was appointed head of the Buddhist church in the country. At first twelve Indian monks of the Sarvāstivāda school of Magadha were invited. And then they picked up seven novices from among the Tibetans. Gradually Tibetans began to be ordained as monks. The deep erudition of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and the uncommon occult powers of Ācārya Padmasambhava brought spiritual and material prosperity to the Kingdom. A good number of Indian scholars were invited to translate the Sanskrit Buddhist works into Tibetan with the help of Tibetan scholars. As a result religious literature of Tibet was highly enriched. The scholars,

thus invited took up on themselves the task of looking after the spiritual welfare of the newly ordained monks.

After thirteen years of distinguished service to Tibet, Ācārya Śāntarakṣita met with an accident which resulted in his death. Before this, it is said, he foresaw a split in the Tibetan Buddhist church. To counteract this he advised his followers to invite Ācārya Kamalaśīla from Nalanda, who, as pointed out earlier, happened to be his disciple and wrote the *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā* on the *magnum opus* of the teacher.

A rift actually occurred when Mahayana Hoshang, a Chinese Buddhist scholar came and began to preach unorthodox ideas. He gathered considerable following in the country. The Tibetan Buddhist church was now split into two warring camps. It was a matter of concern to the devout Buddhists including the King. The latter at the advice of the true followers of the path decided to act upto the wishes of the late Ācārya and Kamalaśīla was invited to Tibet. On his arrival, an arrangement was made for a debate between the Chinese and Indian scholars. The King acted as the umpire. Kamalaśīla refuted his opponent and established his thesis. As previously settled, his adversary garlanded him and left the country for good. Amply rewarded by the King, Kamalaśīla was placed at the head of the metaphysical branch of the Buddhist church of Tibet.

It is said that the opponents of Kamalaśīla murdered him. And his embalmed body is still preserved in a Tibetan monastery.

Kamalaśīla has been called a 'great Buddhist Philosopher of Magadha'. But his sur-name śīla (Sans, *Śrī-la*) seems to indicate that he also hailed from

Bengal. This sur-name along with 'Rakṣita' is still current there.

The three Indian Ācaryas along with the King are highly respected in Tibet. Ācārya Śāntarakṣita is also called 'Bodhisattva' which signifies his place in the heart of the Tibetans.

II

Śāntarakṣita wrote on Philosophy and Tantra as well as composed hymns. It may be presumed that all his works were first written in Sanskrit and then gradually translated into Tibetan by members of his school. The Tibetan catalogues give the following list of his works :

(1) Aṣṭatathāgatastotra
(2) Tattvasaṁgraha
(3) Mādhyamakālaṁkārakārikā
(4) Vajradharasaṅgītabhāgavatastotraṭīkā
(5) Vajravidāraṇidharaṇīṭīkā
(6) Vipañcitārthā Commentary on the *Vādanyāya* of Dharamakīrti.
(7) Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā
(8) Saptatathāgatapraṇidhānavistarasūtrāntavacana
(9) Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarakalpavacanavidhi
(10) Sarvatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtrāntopadeśa and
(11) Hevajrodbhavakurukulyāpañcamahopadeśa.

Besides these, Sanskrit manuscripts of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi* have been discovered. The *Tattvasaṁgraha*

is the most important work of the Ācārya. The original Sanskrit version of it along with the *Pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla was published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda. A complete English Translation of both the text as well as the commentary by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha appeared in the same series. Another edition of the text and the commentary with some textual improvements on the basis of fresh manuscripts has been published from Varanasi. Since their first publication in 1926, the *Saṁgraha* and the *Pañjikā* have opened up new vistas of research to the students of Indian Philosophy.

The Tibetan sources inform us that the *Saṁgraha* and the *Pañjikā* were translated into Tibetan by the Indian Panditas Guṇākaraśrībhadra and Kumāraśrībhadra with the help of the Tibetan scholars Lha. bla. ma. shi. wa. hod. and Shes. rab. hbro. sen. kar respectively. The *Tattvasaṁgraha* is written in verses, their total number being 3645. It is a compendium divided into twenty-six sections called *Parīkṣās* 'examinations'. Each of these sections examines a doctrine prevalent in the then Indian schools. Śāntarakṣita first collects the views of the opponents on each topic and then crtically examines them one after another. Below is given a list of the topics dealt with in the *Saṁgraha*.

(1) Primordial matter (*prakṛtiparīkṣā*) of the Sāṁkhyas.

(2) The Creator of the universe (*Īśvara*) of the logicians.

(3) Matter *cum* God (*Prakṛtīśobhaya*) of the Pātañjalas.

(4) Self-existence (*Svabhāva*).

(5) *Śabdabrahma* of the Grammarians.

(6) Anthropomorphic God (*Puruṣa*) of the Vedas and Purāṇas.

(7) Soul (*Ātmā*) of the logicians, Mīmāṁsakas, Sāṁkhyas, Digambaras, non-dualists and Buddhists of the Vātsīputrīya school.

(8) Permanence of things (*Sthirabhāva*) of the Mīmāṁsakas, Logicians and others.

(9) Actions and their results (*Karmaphala*).

(10-15) Categories of the Vaiśeṣika School.

(16) Relation between words and objects (*Śabdārtha*).

(17) Perception (*Pratyakṣa*) of the Logicians, Mīmāṁsakas and others.

(18) Inference (*Anumāna*) in non-Buddhist schools.

(19) Other means of cognition (*Pramāṇāntara*) accepted by the opponents.

(20) Non-absolutism (*Syādvāda*) of the Jainas.

(21) Three points of the time (*Traikālya*).

(22) Cārvaka doctrines (*Lokāyata*).

(23) Existence of the external world (*Bahirartha*) of the Logicians, Mīmāṁsakas and some Buddhist schools.

(24) Revealed Literature (*Śruti*)

(25) Self-validity of knowledge (*Svataḥprāmāṇya*),

and (26) Omniscience (*Sarvajña*)

This shows that the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas are the main targets of Śāntarakṣita's attack. The other schools received less attention. But he was well-read in all the branches of learning—orthodox and non-orthodox. Many texts he has quoted or used

have been lost. The *Saṁgraha* along with the *Pañjikā* has thus proved to be a source of information about the missing links in the history of different philosophical schools. Among his predecessors in the Buddhist school, the *Saṁgraha* quotes or mentions Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the non-Buddhist authors Kumārila, the Mimāṁsaka and Uddyotakara, the Naiyāyika occupy the most important position. He has quoted a number of verses from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā* which is no longer extant.

The *Vipañcitārthā* explains in detail the position of Dharmakīrti in relation to the points of defeat (*nigrahasthānas*). Dharmakīrti accepts only two such points (*asādhanāṅgavacana*—presenting in a debate a proposition non-conductive to the establishment of the thesis of the speaker and *adoṣodbhāvana*—non-pointing to a fallacy in the opponent's argument) and refutes the Nyāya position which accepts twenty-two types besides the five *hetvābhāṣas* (fallacies of the probans). While explaining the text Śāntarakṣita refers to the views of Aviddhakaraṇa, Prīticandra and Bhāvivikta among the important Nyāya commentators (whose works are no longer extant) along with that of Mādhava, the Sāṁkhya scholar, who earned the sobriquet *Sāṁkhyanāśaka* —destroyer of Sāṁkhya (the reading in the printed text : *Sāṁkhyānām śakamādhava* is evidently faulty). Dr. V. Raghavan in one of his articles has given useful information about Mādhava whom Umbeka places before Kumārila. The Sanskrit version of the *Vipañcitārthā* has been published in the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society (Vol XXI, pt. IV & XXII. pt. I) along with the text of the *Vādanyāya* by Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Sankrityayana from manuscripts preserved in Tibet.

About the other works of Śāntarakṣita preserved in Tibetan versions our knowledge is scanty. The titles show that they were Tāntric texts connected with esoteric practices of Buddhists.

Besides the voluminous *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā*, Kamalaśīla wrote :

(1) Āryavajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā
(2) Āryasaptaśatikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā
(3) Ḍākinīvajraguhyagītīmarmopadeśa.
(4) Tattvāloka
(5) Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṁkṣepa
(6) Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā
(7) Bodhicaryāpradīpa
(8) Bodhicittabhāvanā
(9) Bhāvanāyogāvatāra
(10) Mādhyamākālaṁkārapañjikā
(11) Mādhyamakāloka and
(12) Sarvadharmasvabhāvasiddhi.

He is further said to have translated the *Mahāmudropadeśavajraguhyagītā* into Tibetan. Of his works the *Pañjikā* alone is extant in Sanskrit. Kamalaśīla like his preceptor has followed the practice of giving historical and philosophical information about the text he comments upon. While commenting upon the *Tattvasaṁgraha* he quotes the views of authors of the different schools many of whom are otherwise little known.

Among the Naiyāyikas Kamalaśīla quotes from the subcommentaries of Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta and Śankarasvāmin on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. We have, elsewhere, tried to assess the importance of these quotations. Among the Vaiśeṣika works, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* have been quoted several times. These quotations

suggest the necessity of re-editing the current text of Kaṇāda's treatise. The next Vaiśeṣika author quoted by Kamalaśīla is Praśastamati. He has been identified by us with Praśastapāda, author of the *Padārthadharma-saṁgraha*, wrongly called the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. This Praśastamati or Praśastapāda wrote an elaborate commentary on the ancient *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* from which passages have been quoted in the *Dvādaśāranayacakraṭīkā* of Siṁhasūri also. The present *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, called *Padārthapraveśaka* by Kamalaśīla is but a short digest of his views given in the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*.

Apart from Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Buddhist authors like Śubhagupta, Ghoṣaka, Dharmatrāta, Yogasena, Buddhadeva and Vasumitra have been mentioned by him,

Ubeyaka of Kamalaśīla seems to be identical with Umbeka, the earliest commentator on Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika*. Samaṭa and Yajñaṭa are two little-known Mīmāṁsa authors mentioned in the *Pañjikā*.

Ahrīka is not a person as has been supposed. The word points to a Digambara Jaina in general. Sumati, Pātrasvāmin and Ācāryasūri are other Jaina scholars referred to by Kamalaśīla. Rudrila identified with Vindhyavāsin, the Sāṁkhya author has also been mentioned by him. So are Kambalāśvatara and Purandara, two authors of the Cārvaka school. Besides these, Kamalaśīla mentions a literary work called *Sītāharaṇakāvya* which might be identical with the *Jānakīharaṇa* of Kumāradāsa.

The works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla received less publicity in India than they deserve. It may be due to the author's missionary engagements in Tibet and the rise of the Vikramaśīla University which, later

on eclipsed the glory of Nalanda scholars. Vācaspatimiśra and Vidyānanda, however, quote and criticise verses from the *Tattvasaṁgraha* in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* and the *Āptamīmāṁsā* respectively. Cakrapāṇidatta in his commentary on the *Carakasaṁhitā* (I. xi. 25) quotes two Kārikās from the *Tattvasaṁgraha* with the *Pañjikā* thereon.

With all the recent critical studies, the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla have not received the attention they deserve. A comparison of the Sanskrit texts with the Tibetan versions may clarify many a naughty issue, while a thorough study of the Tibetan versions where Sanskrit original is lost may throw new light on the authors and their environment.

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FOLK DANCE-TRADITION IN MITHILĀ

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Folk-dance is of great national importance and aesthetic value as it often portrays the character of a people through their amusements for in the hour of mirth, the mind is unrestrained and takes its natural bent. Distinct from the so-called sophisticated art, known as the classic art, this rural art, though placed in a lower scale of value, faithfully displays a profundity of philosophical conception, an integrity of feeling and a standard of virile and artistic expression, in no way inferior to the sophisticated forms of art and dance. On the other hand, they are, in some respect, of greater significance as they are a very faithful, subtle, direct and natural expression of the innermost spirit of a community. Like the folk-songs, folk-dances also speak of pleasures and sorrows, tears and smiles, ups and downs, success and frustration and the various currents and cross-currents in the day-to-day life of the common man. Indeed, it is the only medium through which his suppressed soul and intense feelings and sentiments find a free play, unrestrained and unobstructed. It is really the mirror of the common man, who has remained all the same throughout the centuries inspite of the numerous outward changes and convulsions in the society, because it manifests his temperament, art, culture, social status, customs, religion and creed.

I

Mīthilā or North Bihar may well be termed as the land of folk-songs and classical music. The extensive folk-literature of Mithilā amply speaks of the mode how the people at large tried to express themselves in folk-forms. Its variety and richness is unique. It reveals the worlds of idealism and romance, the supreme moments of happiness and glory. The Maithila folk-dance tradition is unique in that it contains certain peculiarities that are hardly to be found elsewhere. Its historicity is to be traced back to the hoary past and goes side by side with folk-songs which are varied in nature and rich in contents. Right from birth to death it covers all the aspects of the living and the dead. It is however, to be noted that while we have very interesting description of the various forms of the dancing in Jyotirīśvara Thākura's *Varṇana Ratnākara*, (14th century), we have no such description or enumeration of the different forms of folk-dance in any other ancient or later work.

In Mithilā, the land of excessive orthodoxy and conservativeness,[1] dancing, as an art, was an object of hatred and abhorrence among the intellectuals and as such deserved outright condemnation rather than appreciation and encouragement at their hands. And, folk-dance, to say the least, attracted little or no notice of the sophisticated and cultured in the world of intellect, as it was all a rustic affair with little or no aesthetic value whatever. Moreover, the language of the village-folk or mass was never deemed a proper vehicle for intellectual expressions or learned dissertations among

1. For details, see Upendra Thakur, *History of Mithilā*, and *Studies in Jainism and Buddhism in Mithilā*.

the Paṇḍitas. All honour, therefore, to Jyotirīśvara, who, first of all, described and enumerated the various kinds of dancing in his immortal work, *Varṇana Ratnākara* (in Maithilī).[2] He has devoted three sections of his work to the art of dancing.

We have mention of the ten qualifications of the drum-player (*muraji*), twelve kinds of drum music (*murajavādya*), the time beats (*tāla*), the ten *rasas*, the thirty *vyabhichāribhāvas* and so forth. Accordingly, the *Pātra* was a dancing girl who was well-versed in the thirty-two kinds of movements and the equal number of grace. The *Preraṇa* was a male-dancer. We have discription of the various kinds of dances they executed, and finally we have a list of 27 kinds of *vīṇās* (or lutes).[3] We have yet another work, *Śrī Hastamuktāvali*[4] (in Sanskrit), composed by Mahārāja Shubhaṅkara Thākura (16th century) of the Khaṇḍavāla dynasty[5] which deals with various kinds of the art of dancing on traditional line. But both these works are mainly concerned with the various forms of classical dancing.

Though literary sources fail to give us complete picture of the folk-dance tradition in Mithilā, the folk-songs (songs of the rustic) preserves some of the dance-traditions, yet performed at the time of certain religious

2. Edited by S. K. Chatterjee and Śrī Srikrishna Mishra and published by Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.

3. Ibid.

4. MS. is preserved in the Library of Shri Hemraj Sharma, Nepal.

5. For a detailed history of this dynasty, see Upendra Thakur, "Socio-economic Life in Mithilā" and "Sanskrit Learning in Mithilā under the Khaṇḍavāla dynasty" in *JBRS* (Mahārāja Kāmeshwar Singh Memorial Vol., Pt. I), 1961, Section II, pp. 64-104.

and social ceremonies. Beside these, archaeological sources also enlighten us on this important aspect of social life. The terracotta art—the art of the rustic mass, throws a vivid light on the different aspects of folk-dance. The clay-figurines, as they are known to us, speak of the centuries-old glorious tradition which even now survives in some form or other. They offer valuable material for the study of contemporary religious conceptions, amusements, pastimes, dress and ornaments. Terracotta figurines found in Vaiśālī and other parts of Mithilā constitute glowing testimony to this wonderful art of the people which was otherwise neglected and very often condemned to languish for want of adequate patronage and encouragement by the sophisticated section of the society.

These little clay-toys, burnt or otherwise, give us a clue to the whole outlook of the people of those times. They are in many ways better records of the thoughts and aspirations of the people of the times than the overwhelming flood of philosophical treatises and literary compositions synchronistic with these terracottas. It is true that we do not get an exact idea of folk-dance from these clay figures; nevertheless they present some of the forms that still survive in this centuries-old tradition. An examination of the Vaiśālī terracottas discovered in different excavations at Kauśāmbī, Buxar, Pāṭalīputra, Belwa (Saran), Kāsiā (Kuśīnarā) and the Didarganj image of the Mauryan age as well as the reliefs at Bharhut of the following century reveals some of familiar aspects of folk-dance tradition in Mithilā in the matter of dress—the same pattern followed throughout Northern India all through the eight centuries beginning with the Mauryas (300 B. C. - 500 A. D.). The head-dress and necklace,

the waist-chain and the *dhotī* going round the waist with one end pressed by the chain behind and the other end hanging down in front between the things and the legs up to the ankles and rings round the ankles ; no cover for the portion of the body below the neck and about the waist and, in case of males, no cover for the thighs and the legs, and nothing for the arms except a broad chain round each of them against the armpit, as gleaned from these terracottas, unfold a unique story for us about the life and work of this common man. Poor and helpless as always, he directed his energies towards creating the stage on which to appear himself with the wife, the children, kinsmen and the comrades, singing and dancing all, playing on the *mṛdaṅga* and the *Vīṇā*, in perfect glee as it were, partly because of his love and enjoyment of life and partly because of his desire to forget his troubled existence for a while, and also for the recreation of his master, the king or the noble. Bereft of all aspirations after perfections as set for the ideal of life in the philosophical treatises and literary compositions, these myriads of unthinking human beings found solace in their traditional songs and dance—their only medium of recreation and merry-making.

II

Against this background, it is interesting to make a study of the folk-dance tradition in Mithilā which still survives partly, if not wholly. Notwithstanding the transformations in the process of evolution as regards the costumes and other aspects, the principle remains the same, though performance varies according to variances in individual taste and communal trends of thought and culture.

As we know, art in India receives its greatest inspiration from religion whether that art be painting, architecture, literature, music or dancing. Unlike other countries, in India, in all cases, religion is the background. Naturally, therefore, dance-themes mostly depict scenes or episodes from the stories of mythology or scripture.

The folk-dance of Mithilā may roughly be divided into two broad classes: (i) the women's dance and (ii) the men's dance. Unlike the Santhals and other aboriginal tribes, the sexes do not generally take part in dancing together in Mithila. According to the subject-matter, the dances may then be divided into two main classes—(i) Social—those being semi-religious and connected with seasonal festivals and (ii) purely religious. It is, however, never possible to place a particular dance exclusively in any one of these main categories as most dances though predominantly religious or social, also bear traces of other themes. It is, therefore, dangerous to draw a line between social and ceremonial dances for, that which is serious ritual in one generation, becomes merely the amusement of the next, and perhaps even the child-dren's game of the phase following. But, inspite of these rapid changes, most of these dances retain sufficient of their ancient character from which inferences about their origin may be drawn. The festivals and ceremonies with which they are now linked, also furnish, to some extent, a valuable clue to their pristine significance, however much the performers may have forgotten about their meanings.

Some of the popular folk-dances that are even now performed in Mithilā on different occasions, are as

follows :—

(1) *Dasaut* or *Ghasakaṭṭī*

A grass-cutting dance performed by women on the occasion of the marriage ceremony among the Mithila Brahmins.

(2) *Kīrtana* or *Kīrtaniyā*

A dance performed by all people without distinction of caste or rank and associated with the worship of Viṣṇu, based on Purāṇaic episodes, founded by Umāpati Upādhyāya (17th C. A. D.).

(3) *Rāmalīlā*

A part of the famous Yātrā (journey) which is rather an operative than a dance performance, generally staged in the open greens of villages in honour of Rādhā-Kriṣṇa, Hara-Pārvatī, Gaṅgā, based on *Mahābhārata* episodes.

(4) *Holī*.

A dance performed by the villagers on the eve of the Holī festival.

(5) *Jaṭā-Jaṭina*.

A versified performance by the young women (resembling one-act play) depicting the matrimonial life of the *Jaṭā* (lover) and the *Jaṭina* (lady-love), for bringing rain.

(6) *Sāma-chakevā*.

A simple village-dance in which actors are represented through clay-images, performed for inspiring pure love in the hearts of brother and sister.

(7) *Nayanā-Jogina*.

A ritual connected with the marriage-ceremony among Maithila Brahmans, bearing Tantric sinificance.

(8) *Salhesa-pūjā.*

The song of King Salhesa, popular among low-caste people, written in prose and chanted.

(9) *Kamalā-pūjā.*

The song of Kamalā, the water-goddess who is worshipped by Mallāhas (fishermen).

(10) *Kosī-pūjā.*

Celebrated against the background of the song of the Kosī river, prevalent in some parts of Tirhut *

III

Besides the above dances, there are other minor dances among the different classes of low-caste people. The *Goraiyān* dance among the Dānukas and the Musaharas; the serpent dance among the *Saperas* or *naṭas*; the *Rāhu dance* among the *Dusādha*; *Dīnābhadrī* among the Musaharas and others among the Chamaras (Domes); the *Mana-chubbhi* and Bhikhārī Ṭhākur's *Bidesiā* deserve special mention. Of these the *Rāhu-pūjā* among the Dusādhas is of no less importance than the *Salhesa Pūjā*. The Dusadhas trace their descent from Rahu who is as such a great object of worship among this caste. On this occasion a huge sacrificial pit is made and out of it spring forth the raging flames towards the sky. The *bhagata* or the priest with a stick in his hand chants a song and crosses the flames along with two others. And, then the *Bhagata* starts showering blessings on the devotees who include all classes of people. The style of performance is almost the same as in the *Salhesa-pūjā*. The *Manachubhi* (one which pierces the mind) and the *Bidesiyā* (though not originally

* This section of the paper is abridged by the Editorial Board.

Maithila and imported from South Bihar) are also very popular dances with the low caste people.

And lastly, a few words about *Marciā*. The Muslims of almost every district of Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur have incorporated dancing into their great mourning period of Muharram as part of the ceremonies which express their grief. The principal dances of this occasion are called *Marciā* and *Jāri* (meaning mourning). The dancers form themselves into a ring, and holding up the flowing skirts of their dhoties in one hand, and waving scarlet pieces of cloth in the other, move round stamping out a rhythm with the aid of the ball-anklets worn on the ankles and small bamboo sticks to the tune of songs led by the presentor of the group, who stands outside the ring of the performers and intones the dirges relating to the tragic events on the battlefield of Karbalā when the two brothers, Hassan and Hussain, met their untimely ends.

It can be safely remarked that the life and energy of the dance seem to be derived almost entirely from incidents in the colourful lives of the Hindu heroes and gods whose festivals are celebrated in great number throughout the year or, it may be suggested, it seems to be derived from the incidents of the peasant's own lives, lived so close to nature, and so dependent on her moods.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TENSE-FORMATION IN SOME OF THE MAIN DIALECTS OF HINDI.

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0.1 The ten classes (gaṇas) into which the Sanskrit grammarians arranged *OIA* verb roots became levelled down to one in Apabhraṁśa. Original thematic affixes were either dropped or incorporated with the root in *MIA*. The elaborate system of tenses and moods underwent the greatest simplification possible in *NIA* languages and dialects.

0. 1.1 Below are given the suffixes which form various tenses in the three main dialects of Hindi. These three include standard Hindi, Braj Bhākhā and Awadhī. The materials on which the analysis is based is the standard Hindi of the upper class people, Braj Bhākhā of khurjā Tahsil of Bulandshahr and Awadhī of Meja Tehsil of Allahabad district.*

0. 2. For the purpose of analysis, the tenses of verb of these three dialects can be classified as follows :—

0. 2. 1. Radical Tenses.

0. 2. 1.1 Compound Tenses.

0. 3. First of all, the participial and auxiliary-verb forms have been analysed separately. After this the formation of various tenses have been explained.

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*The materials for Braj Bhākhā and Awadhī have been supplied by my two students Dr. Mahavir Saran Jain and Śri Dinesh Prasad Shukla, M. A.

1. 1. Participial Forms.

In standard Hindi, Braj-Bhākhā and Awadhī, the compound tenses are formed by suffixing the auxiliary verbs to the participial forms. The progressive tenses are formed by adding the auxiliary to the present participial forms, the perfect tenses are made by adding the same auxiliary to the past participial forms and the simple tenses are made by adding the very auxiliary verbs to the future participial forms. These three participial forms, in the three dialects, are given below :—

1.1.1. *Present Participial Forms* :—

(A) *Standard Hindi*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–t–a	–t–e
F.	–t–ī	–t–ī̃

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–b–əe~t–ɔ	=
F.	–b–əe~t–ī	–bəe–t ī̃

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	it~t~ət	=
F.	=	=

1.1.2 *Past Participial Forms*

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	– a~ya	– e
F.	– ī	– ī̃

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	ɔ~yə	– e
F.	– ī	– ī̃

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	$-a \sim e \sim \phi$	=
F.	$-\bar{\imath}$	=

1.1.3. *Future Participial Forms* :—

(A) *and* (*B*) *Standard Hindi and Braj-Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	– na	=
F.	=	=

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	$-\partial b \sim b$	=
F.	=	=

1.2. Auxiliary Verbs.

These are found in the following five forms :—

1.2.1. Present Definite auxiliary verb.

1.2.2. Past Definite auxiliary verb.

1.2.3. Future Definite auxiliary verb.

1.2.4. Present Imperative auxiliary verb.

1.2.5. Past conjunctive auxiliary verb.

1.2.1. *Present Definite Auxiliary Verb.*

In all the three dialects, the differences due to person, and number exist. In Awadhī, of course, the gender also affects some forms.

(A) *Standard Hindi*

	Sg.	Pl.
I	–h– ū̃	–h– ə̃e
II	–h– əe	–h– o
III	–h– əe	–h– ə̃e

(B) *Braj-Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
I	– ū̃	– ə̃e
II	– əe	– ɔ
III	– əe	– ə̃e

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.	
		M.	F.
I	−h−əī∼ə−h−əī	=	=
II	ə−h−e∼h−əe	ə−h−yʌ	h−əū ∼ə−h−ū
III	ə−h−əi	h−ẽ ∼ə−h−e	h−əī̃ ∼ə−h−ī̃

1.2.2. *Past Definite Auxiliary Verb.*

In Standard Hindi and Braj, differences occur due to number and gender but in Awadhī, Person also causes differences.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	−th−a	−th−e
F.	−th−ī	−th−ī̃

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–ə	–e
F.	–ī	–ī̃

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.		Pe.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.
I	γəh–e	=	=	=
II	γəh–e	=	γəh–yʌ	γəh–ū
III	γəh–a	γəh–ī	γəh–ẽ	γəh–ī̃

1.2.3. *Future Definite Auxiliary Verb.*

In all the three dialects—Standard Hindi, Braj-Bhākhā and Awadhī, differences occur due to number gender and person.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	M.		F.	
	Sg.	Pl.	Sg.	Pl.
I	—ũ̄—g—a	—ẽ—g—e	—ū—g—ī	—ẽ—g—ī
II	—e—g—a	—o—g—e	—e—g—ī	—o—g—ī
III	—e—g—a	—ẽ—g—e	—e—g—ī	—ẽ—g—ī

(B) *Brdj—Bhākhā*

	M.		F.	
	Sg.	Pl.	Sg.	Pl.
I	—uṅ*—g—ɔ	—h—g—e ~ əṅ—g—e	—uṅ—g—i	—ṅ—g—ī ~ əṅ—g—ī
II	—e—g—ə	—ə—g—e	—e—g—i	—ə—g—ī
III	—e—g—ə	ṅ—g—e ~ əṅ—g—e	—e—g—ī	ṅ—g—ī ~ əṅ—g—ī

(C) *Awadhi*

	M.		F.	
	Sg.	Pl.	Sg.	Pl.
I	—b—ϕ —b—əī	=	=	=
II	—b—e	—b—yʌ	—b—e	—b—ū ~ b—iu
III	—e	—h—ĩ	—e	—h—ĩ

* ṅ = ङ्।

1.2.4. *Present Imperative Auxiliary Verb.*

The forms of present Imperative are found in the second person only. The forms of first and third persons are the same as those of Present Definite auxiliary. In all the three dialects, differences occur due to number only.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
Imperative	$-\phi$	– O
Honorofic	$-\phi$	– iye

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
Imperative	ϕ	– ɔ
Honorofic	ϕ	– ie

(C) *Awadhī*

Sg.	Pl.
$-u\sim\phi$	ϕ

1.2.5. *Past Conjunctive Auxiliary Verb.*

The form of Past conjuntive is formed by adding two suffixes after the root √hō. The first Suffix i—ti is

past conjunctive and the second suffiix indicates gender and number in the Standard Hindi and Braj-Bhākhā and person, gender and number in Awadhī.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	ho – t – a	– ho – t – e
F.	ho – t – ī	– ho – t – ī̃

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	ho – t – ɔ	ho – t – e
F.	ho – t – ī	ho – t – ī̃

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.		Pl.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.
I	– ho – tϕ	– ho – t – i	– ho – t – ϕ	– ho – t – i
II	– ho – t – e	– ho – t – e	– ho – t-yʌ	– ho – t – ū
III	– ho – t – əi	– ho – t – i	– ho – t – ẽ – eh	– ho – t – in ~ ini

1.3. *Tense formation*

1.3.1. *Radical Tenses*

1.3.1.1 *Present Definite Tense*

Root+Present Definite auxiliary (modified by person, gender and number).

1.3. 1.2. *Past Definite Tense*

Root+Past Definite auxiliary (modified by person, gender and number).

1.3 1.3. *Future Definite Tense*

Root+Future Definite auxiliary (modified by person, gender and number).

1.3 1.4. *Present Imperative Tense*

Root+Present Imperative auxiliary (modified by person, number and gender).

1.3. 1.5. *Past Conjunctive Tense*

Root+Past Conjunctive auxiliary (modified by person, number and gender).

1.3.2. *Compound Tenses*

1.3. 2.1. *Present Progressive Definite Tense*

Present Participial forms + forms of Present Definite Tense.

1.3. 2.2. *Past Progressive Definite Tense*

Present participial forms + forms of Past Definite Tense.

1.3. 2.3. *Future Progressive Definite Tense*

Present participial forms + forms of future Definite Tense.

1.3.2.4. *Past Progressive Conjunctive*

Present participial form + forms of Past Conjunctive Tense,

1.3.2.5. *Present Perfect Definite Tense*

Past Participial forms + forms of Present definite Tense.

1.3.2.6. *Past Perfect Definite Tense*

Past participial forms + forms of past definite tense.

1.3.2.7 *Future Perfect Definite Tense*

Past participial forms + forms of future definite Tense.

1.3.2.8. *Past Perfect Conjunctive Tense*

Past participial forms + form sof past Conjunctive Tense.

1.3.2.9. *Present Simple Definite Tense*

Future participial forms + form of present definite tense.

1.3.2.10. *Past Simple Definite Tense.*

Future participial forms + forms of past definite tense.

1.3.2.11. *Future Simple Definite Tense*

Future participial forms + forms of future definite tense.

1.3.2.12. *Past Simple Conjunctive Tense.*

Future participial forms + forms of past conjunctive tense.

पाणिनीयाः 'अभ्यासः' 'आम्रेडितम्' 'अभ्यस्तम्' चेति शब्दाः

भागीरथप्रसाद त्रिपाठी 'वागीशः शास्त्री',
संस्कृतविश्वविद्यालयः, वाराणसी

महामुनिना पाणिनिना 'एकाचो द्वे प्रथमस्य' (६, १, १) इति 'अजादेर्द्वितीयस्य' (६, १, २) इति च सूत्रद्वयाधिकारे द्वित्वमापन्नस्य शब्दस्य द्वयो रूपयोः प्रथमस्याभ्याससंज्ञा विहिता 'पूर्वोऽभ्यासः' (६, १, ४) इति सूत्रेण । कृते सति द्वित्वे मूलरूपस्याभ्याससंज्ञा विधीयते तत्परिचयायेति भवन्ति तत्रैव कार्याणि, नान्यत्र । नास्ति पाणिनीये शास्त्रे काचन व्याख्या खल्वेतस्या अभ्याससंज्ञायाः । 'लिटि धातोरनभ्यासस्य' (६, १८, ८) इति सूत्रेणाभ्याससंज्ञामप्राप्तस्य धातोर्द्वित्वं भवति । लोके द्वित्वस्याऽऽवृत्तेर्वाऽभ्यासरूपेण प्रसिद्धिः (द्र० मेदिनीकोशः) ।

द्वित्वमुपेतं रूपद्वयमेव 'अभ्यस्तम्' इत्युक्तं पाणिनिना–'उभे अभ्यस्तम्' (६, १, ५) । षाष्ठप्रकरणोक्तं द्वित्वमिदम् । जुहोत्यादिप्रकरणपठितानां समेषां धातूनां भवति द्वित्वं सार्वधातुके–√हु–जुहोति, √दा–ददाति, √धा–दधातीत्यादि । चतुर्षु स्थलेषु दृश्यते तद् धातूनाम् ।

१. लिटि,
२. सन्यङ्यङ्लुक्षु,
३. जुहोत्यादौ सार्वधातुके,
४. चङि चेति ।

अभ्यस्तस्य (द्वित्वस्य) द्वितीयं खण्डम् आम्रेडितम् इति प्रतिज्ञातं पाणिनिना (८, १, २) । 'आम्रेडितं भर्त्सने' (८,२, ९२) इति सूत्रे भट्टोजिदीक्षितस्तु–आम्रेडितग्रहणं द्विरुक्तोपलक्षणम्' इति व्याचष्टवान् । अस्मिन्नेव सूत्रे खण्डद्वयमाम्रेडितत्वेनाभ्युपगतम् । 'स्वरितमाम्रेडितेऽसूयासंमतिकोपकुत्सनेषु' (८,२,१०३) इति द्वितीयमेव खण्डम् आम्रेडितत्वेन स्वीकृतम् । अष्टमेऽध्याये 'सर्वस्य द्वे' (८, १, १) इति सूत्रेण विहितं द्वित्वमाम्रेडितमेव–'संभ्रमेण प्रवृत्तौ यथेष्टमनेकधा प्रयोगो न्यायसिद्धः' इति वार्त्तिकम् ।

'जक्षित्यादयः षट्' (६, १, ६) इत्यनेन सूत्रेण तथाविधानामदादिपठितानां

सप्तधातूनां क्रियतेऽभ्यस्तसंज्ञा, येषां क्वाप्यष्टाध्याय्यां द्वित्वं विहितं नास्तीति महच्चित्रम् । ते चेमे—

१. √जक्ष् (जक्ष)=भक्षहसनयोः (प)
२. √जागृ = निद्राक्षये (प)
३. √दरिद्रा = दुर्गतौ (प)
४. √चकास् (चकासृ)=दीप्तौ (प)
५. √शास् (शासृ) = अनुशिष्टौ (प)
६. √दीधी (दीधीङ्)=दीप्तिदेवनयोः (आ)
७. √वेवी (वेवीङ्) =वेतिना तुल्ये (आ) इति ।

एतेषामभ्यस्तसंज्ञकत्वे फलम्—शतुर्नुमभावः ('नाभ्यस्ताच्छतुः' ७, १,७८) । एवं तावद् गच्छन्,गच्छन्ती, गच्छन्त इत्यादिवन्नेह नुम्—जक्षत्, जक्षती, जक्षत इत्यादौ । अभ्यस्तानां (जुहोत्यादि—जक्षित्यादीनाम्) धातूनां तिङ्रूपेष्वपि झस्यान्तादेशो न भवति, 'अदभ्यस्तात्' (७, १, ४) इति निर्देशात् । इत्थं लड्लङ्लोडादिषु लकारेषु वर्जितो नुमागमः ।।

जक्ष्धातोरर्थद्वयी लभ्यते—भक्षणं हसनं चेति । धातुरेष धातुद्वयसंमिश्रणरूपः । √घस् इति, √हस् इति च तौ । घस्धातोर्लिटि प्रथमपुरुषस्य द्विवचने बहुवचने च 'जक्षतुः' इति 'जक्षुः' इति च प्रयोगौ परामर्शनीयतामर्हतः । हस्धातोर्द्वित्वे जहास' 'जहसतुः' इत्यादयो दृश्यन्ते प्रयोगाः । हस्य घः, घस्य च ह इति सामान्यम् । अतो हेतोर्घस्हसोः सभूय द्वित्वप्रयोगः—√जक्ष् इति विज्ञेयः । ऋग्वेदे भक्षणे (जक्षीयात्—१०, २८, १) हसने (जक्षतः—१, ३३, ७) चेत्यर्थद्वये प्रयुक्त एषः ।

जागृधातुः √गृ (गॄ) धातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । गृधातुः क्र्यादिगणे शब्दार्थकश्चुरादौ च विज्ञानार्थको लभ्यते । शब्देन जागरणरूपो निद्राभङ्गो जायते, ज्ञानयोनिर्वा शब्दः । जागरणस्यार्थो ज्ञानम् (अज्ञानक्षयः) अपि संभवति । शब्दार्थकस्य विज्ञानार्थकस्य वा गृधातोर्यङ्लुगन्तं रूपं भवति लटि प्रथमपुरुषस्यैकवचने—'जागर्ति' इति । एवमेव विक्षेपणार्थकस्य √कृ इत्यस्य, प्लवनार्थकस्य √तृ इत्यस्य च यङ्लुगन्तस्य भवति क्रमशो रूपम्—'चाकर्ति' इति, 'तार्तर्ति' इति च ।

दरिद्राधातुः स्वप्नार्थकस्य द्रा (द्रै) धातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । √एष दृ + √द्रा इत्यनयोर्धात्वोर्मिलितं रूपमपि संभाव्यते । वस्तुतस्त्वभ्यासं प्राप्तस्य √द्रा इत्यस्य स्वरभक्तिर्वैदिकस्य चन्द्रस्य (चन्दिर) इन्द्रस्य च (इन्दिर) इव न, किन्तु 'दरि' इति जातेत्यद्वितीयं निदर्शनम् । द्राधातोरर्थः—पलायनं निद्रा चेति । दरिद्राधातावनुगतं द्वयमेव । अलसाः पलायनशीलाश्च पुरुषा भवन्ति दुर्गताः ।

दीप्त्यर्थके चकास्धातौ सुस्पष्टं भासते द्वित्वीकृतं रूपं दीप्त्यर्थकस्य सायणनिर्दिष्टस्य कास्धातोः ।

अनुशिष्ट्यर्थकस्य शास्धातोर्द्वित्वस्य न भवति स्पष्टतेति तदीयमभ्यस्तं विचिकित्सितम् । इच्छार्थकेन (आ) शंस् इत्यनेन धातुना तदीया योजना न संभाव्यते सध्रीचीना ।

√दीधी (दीधीङ्) धातुर्ध्याधातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । एतद् दीप्धातोः 'दी' इत्यस्य, 'ध्या' इत्यस्य च योजनयापि शक्यते भवितुम् ।

√वेवी (वेवीङ्) धातुः स्पष्टत आदादिकस्य गतिव्याप्त्याद्यर्थकस्य वीधातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । उभयत्रार्थाः समानाः ।

'जक्षित्यादयः षट्' इति सूत्रस्य प्रणेतुरिमानि द्वित्वानि विदितान्यभूवन् नवेत्यनुयोगः । नूनं विदितानि किन्तु तेषां नैयत्याभावादेव प्रणीतवान् भगवान् पाणिनिः पार्थक्येन सूत्रमेतत् ।

THE ROLE OF "YOGIC PERCEPTION" IN THE BUDDHIST THOUGHT

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The joys and pleasures of the Tuṣitaloka where the Amitābha rules, the luxuries and enjoyments of the *Sukhāvatī Vyūha*, the delightful city of Akṇiṣṭha free from the habitation of unclean beings, the grand and glorious personality of the invisible Tathāgata, the vision of the four Noble truths, the *deśanā* of the Lokanātha, the invisible grand vision of the *mahābhiniṣkramaṇa* of the Śākyamuni at midnight, the sentiments of love and piety or *Karuṇā* and benevolence which impel the Blessed Lord to descend on earth, in order to remove the sufferings of the ignorant people and to lead them to the gate of Nirvāṇa revealed to the Buddhists the hollowness of other types of cognition which deal with discrete bare instants and with objects mingled with imagination. They thought 'Is there not a method by which all the grandeur of the objects of sense perception and noble conception be apprehended within a moment ? Is there not some instrument which may reveal the secrets of the heart, the treasures of the hidden earth and the mighty waves of the future ? Is there not some source of the knowledge which may transcend the barriers imposed by sensibility and understanding ? And the result was the discovery of yogic perception.

The yogic perception[1] is the source of revealing

1. *Yogi pratyakṣa.*

all the objects, physical and mental, past, present and future, remote and near, hidden and visible, which are beyond the limits of the intellect or ordinary human beings. It may be defined as the cognition which arises out of contemplation of things, and which is free from conceptual content and error. According to Dharmakīrti it is the perception which is produced from the subculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality.[2] In order to understand it, it is important to explain what is 'transcendental reality' and what is 'subculminating point.'[3]

The 'Reality' is transcendental. It is 'existence as such'. It is the basis of all our knowledge. It is self-luminous, and falls short of all descriptions.[4] It is beyond the triad of knower, known and knowledge. The ideas of the 'apprehender' and the apprehended[5] cannot touch it. The means of cognition are simply a device to indicate it as a child is given a mirror to apprehend the moon, but he is not the actual apprehender of the real moon. This reality which is the substance of all things,[6] and which is devoid of all the attributes,[7] becomes an object of contemplation for the saint who takes vow to see a vision of it. The Yogin focusses his attention on this reality again and again,[8] in his consciousness. By his repeated practice of meditation he comes to a stage when the Reality begins to emit its

2. *Nyāya Bindu* 1. 11.
3. *prakṛti prabhāsvara.*
4. *anirvacanīya.*
5. *grāhya grāhaka Vinirmukta*
6. *bhūtārtha.*
7. *sarvopādhi vinirmukta.*
8. *Nyāya Bindu Ṭīkā, p.* 15.

lustre, though it has not yet been realised. It is the stage when the image of the contemplated object begins to reach a condition of clarity as though it were present before the meditator.[9] It is called the culminating point of contemplation. The sub-culminating stage is that stage which precedes culminating stage.[10] It is the degree of clarity which precedes complete vividness.[11] Now the yogic perception may be defined as 'a perception of Reality which occurs at the subculminating stage of contemplation. It is a knowledge which apprehends with absolute vividness the contemplated image as though it were actually present before the meditator.[12] This knowledge of the Mystic is nonconceptual, uncontradicted by experience, vivid and non-illusory. It is a new piece of knowledge unapprehended prior to this stage and has its origin in contemplation.[13] It is a faculty by which the saints are capable of completely changing all ordinary habits of thought and contemplating directly the universe *sub specie aeternitatis* in a vivid image.

Is yogic perception a different source of knowledge ?

In a yogic perception there is no sense contact with the object. Hence it cannot be regarded as perception. If it is perception, how is it possible for it to apprehend those objects which are beyond its reach ? If on the other hand, the yogic perception is not perception but conception, the entire knowledge of the saint which

9. Ibid, p. 15.
10. Ibid, 1.15.
11. Ibid, 1.15.
12. Ibid, 1.15.
13. *Pramāṇa Vārttika* 3,282.

results from it will become unreal because conceptual knowledge which proceeds through dialectical process has no reference to external reality and is a mere thought-construction.[14] Consequently, there would be no difference between the knowledge arising from 'yogic perception' and the knowledge which arises from infatuation, sorrow, fear, lunacy, illusion and dream.[15] These questions led Kumārila to deny perceptual character of yogic perception. According to him yogic perception is in fact a fanciful imagination like wiseful thinking and memory. It cannot be regarded as a kind of perception, because it lacks the contact of objects with the sense-organs which is an ingredient of perception[16] It may be argued that it results from contemplation, but the contemplation is nothing except '*concentration of the mind on an object*.' Actually what happens in a 'mystic intuition' is that there appears a series of memory-images of an object uninterrupted by the thought of another object[17] with such vividness and clearness that it comes to be regarded as perception.

Śāṁtarakṣita and Kamalaśīla find Kumārila's objections to the theory of yogic perception as baseless. According to them 'all things can be manifested'[18] by the clear and unflinching light of knowledge called yogic preception.' Even those objects which are not in direct sense-contact and are depicted as 'illusory' are cognised through the 'mystic intuition' of the saint

14. *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya* quoted in the Fragments from Dignāga Fragment G.

15. *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, 3.283.

16. *Śloka-Vārttika*, 4.26-31.

17. Ibid, IV. 29.

18. *Tattva-Saṁgraha*, 3269,

through the 'mind' whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of the past experiences.[19] The mental power of the saint is capable of apprehending even the most subtle and remote things. All superiorities and peculiarities lie within the field of mental cognition. Nothing lies beyond its field. Therefore, the questions regarding the restrictedness of sense-organs in their scope or the apprehension of one thing by one sense-organ alone does not arise.[20] Through the contemplation of 'Reality' in the meditation the mind of the yogin and his mental cognitions become superior. He acquires a superior grade of wisdom, mercy and other qualities. By constant practice of the yoga his mental faculty of apprehension of objects reaches the highest stage. He acquires power by which all the objects past, present and future, become apprehensible for him like an āmalaka fruit. He has no need to resort to inference for their apprehension.[21]

The position of a yogin may be compared with a young goose.[22] Just as a young goose in the beginning is incapable of going even out of his nest but through constant practice becomes capable of crossing even the vast oceans, similarly the meditator on 'Reality' has at first a limited power but through constant practice of yoga he acquires tremendous powers.[23] The moment a yogin reaches the highest stage of his meditation, he suddenly acquires the transcendental intuition.[24] He changes

19. Ibid, verse 3319.
20. Ibid, verses 3381-3389.
21. Ibid, verse 3474.
22. *rāja haṁsaḥ.*
23. *Tattva-Saṁgraha*, verses 3428-3430.
24. *yogi pratyakṣa.*

completely. He becomes another *pudgala,* a saint, an *Ārya*, a Bodhisattva. All his habits of thought are changed. He acquires the habit of realising the relativity,[25] and unreality of the phenomenal veil[26] concealing absolute reality.[27] He enters the Mahāyānistic *dṛṣṭimārga* and first of the ten Mahayānistic stages which is known as '*pramuditā*'. At the same time he is filled with overwhelming devotion to the salvation of all living beings.[28] He then understands the Four Noble Truths of the Saint in their Mahayānistic interpretation as a formula intended to support the equipolency of *Saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* in a monistic universe."[29] On the basis of this transcendental capacity he can know whatever he wishes to know. He can apprehend things either simultaneously or successively or both as he likes. There shall be involved no logical inconsistency, because he has shaken off all evil and has reached a stage which is beyond the sphere of logical thought.[30]

In fact perception is a process which envisages the objects clearly and distinctly without the help of the categories of understanding or imagination. On the other hand the conception cannot envisage an object without the help of the categories of imagination. The object of perception is the extreme particular, the point-instant, devoid of all attributes, while the conception deals with those objects which are expressed through the medium of words. In a yogic perception the objects

25. *Śūnyatā.*
26. *saṁvṛti.*
27. *paramārtha, bhūtārtha.*
28. *mahā karuṇā.*
29. *Buddhist logic*, II, p. 32.
30. *Tattva-Saṁgraha*, verses 3628-3629.

appear simultaneously and vividly in their original form where the language has not begun to play its role. Hence the whole knowledge arising from it is preception.[31] Dharmakīrti argues that 'the objects of knowledge whether they are external or internal remain within the range of perception as long as the words do not start their business of dichotomy and dialectic.[32]

The knowledge arising from the yogic perception is vivid and results from the contemplation on the absolute reality in a mediated and undisturbed condition, while the knowledge arising from dreams, illusions and hallucinations is vague and conceptual. This is a characteristic difference of yogic preception from dream, illusion and hallucination.[33] Another difference between these types of knowledge is that yogic perception is uncontradicted[34] by normal experiences of mankind, whereas the knowledge of dream, illusion and hallucination is contradicted. The latter knowledge is conceptual while the former is perceptual. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is right in maintaining that the yogic perception is the highest degree of perception. He contends that although it is rare, it is not impossible. The yogic perception is thus probable for normal human beings. This probability is converted into a reality by Saints through the development of their meditation.[35] For the Mīmāṁsakas, yogic perception is not a source of right knowledge at all. It is simply a fancy which owes its origin in human imagination. It is like the fancy of ordinary man. But

31. *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, 3.286-287. *Tattva Saṁgraha*, verse 3475.
32. *Pramāṇa Vārtikālaṁkāra*, 3.287.
33. *Pramāṇa Vārttika Bhāṣya*, p. 327, lines 32.35.
34. *Tattva saṁgraha Pañjikā*, p. 902, lines 11-12.
35. *Indian Psychology*-Perception, pp. 339-340.

their view is mistaken. It is a means of valid knowledge because it is a kind of perception.

According to *Dharmottara* the knowledge arising from yogic perception cannot be inferential or rational because there is no middle term. When a yogin reaches the highest stage of his contemplation he has the vision of the Reality as vivid and unconstructed as sense-perception. It is not contradicted by experience. The object which is apprehended in 'meditation' is 'pure'.[36] Thus the knowledge arising from yogic perception is different from inferential and illusory knowledge.

36. *Nyāya Bindu Ṭīkā*, p. 15, lines 8 ff.

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CONCEPT OF PRATIBIMBA*

K. C. VARADACHARI

In the philosophy of Madhva the individual soul is held to be *pratibimba* of the *Īśvara*. What does this exactly mean ?

If God is the *bimba* the individual is its *prati-bimba*. Image of reflection.

Prati as prefix indicates (a) towards, in the direction of (b) back, in return, again ; (c) in opposition to, against counter, (d) upon, own upon.

B. As a prefix to nouns not directly derived from verbs it means (a) likeness, resemblance, equality (b) opposite of the opposite side. eg : *Prati-bala*, *Prati. Chandra*, *Prati-Puruṣaḥ*.

C. *Prati* also means every, each in a distributive-sense. The enormous diversity of the meanings given to this prefix is undoubtedly a great handicap for any serious philosopher. When similarity and opposition are both intimated by the same prefix whether prefixed to a verb or to a noun, the philosophical ambiguity could become a source of paradox and worse.

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* In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* Passage

"Yathādarśe Tathātmani
Yathā Svapne Tathā pitṛloke
Yathāpsu parivṛtaiva tathā gandharva loke
Chāyatapayoriva tathā Brahma loke.

It is shown how the *Brahman* appears in the different worlds, The first line suggests that Brahman's *Pratibimba* is all that we see. *Brahman* himself is far Beyond.

There are some concepts such as *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* which in debate refer to the two opposing or differing s·and points both of which cannot be true or be the locus of the hetu or rea on or the middle term, that connects the miner and the major.

But the concept of *Bimba* and *pratibimba* would refer to the one being reflection or image of the former. Normally it is said to be a reflection as in a mirror or the lake in which case the *prati-bi nba* would be an illusory appearance of the original. This is surely not the view of Madhva about the individual soul but that of the Māyāvādins of this *bimba-pratibimba* school. These latter would emphasize the view that the one supreme form appears in each and every (*prati*) thing or is reflected in it or present in everything which therefore would be called *prati-bimba*. This of course is really an ingenious explanation which combines the two meanings-as something reflected and in each and every - of the prefix *prati*.

If the meaning of *prati* can be shown to primarily refer to the presence of the one in the many distributively and not collectively, the individual souls could be shown to be *bimba* in the many. But the reality of the things as many would be needed and matter is the infinitely many-atomistic, diversity, and Madhva insists upon this aspect of Matter or *Prakṛti*.

The inner dialectic however between the One and the many remains as the oneness of the *bimbas* in the *Bimba* and the manyness of the *prati-bimbas* in the matter.

Once the *prati-bimbas* are not considered to be reflections of the One but the images of the one of presences in each and every thing it would perhaps help us to understand the reality view.

But even this is rather difficult to accept for the individual soul is not infinite or a reflection of the infinite or an image of the infinite. If it is finite that does not expand into an infinity even for a season. The idea of image is sometimes said to be a view which has the Christian conception of man as an image of God. This leads to so many further conclusions such as the infinity of man, his omnipotence and so on or it may mean the diminution and distortion of the divine which yet produces the image even as in Plato's concept of the mirroring of the Eternal form in the shadows or as shadows. If it is said to intimate the theory of correspondential identity as in the macrososm so in the microcosm, then too the *bimba-pratibimba* would only intimate the identity of constitution between the original and its reflection or reproduction. The *prati* would mean reproduced similarity. But if in the Divine *Sat Cit* and *Ānanda* are infinite (*ananta*) in the individual these three would appear much reduced and limited by the inescapable finiteness of the individual soul.

Thus it is clear that the *prati-bimba-vāda* would not help except in a general way the notion of similarity between the divine and the souls in respect of constitution but limited severely by the finiteness that is the basic differentia between God and the individual soul.

In the context of knowledge, the *pratibimba* should seek to know the *Bimba :* in respect of conduct the *pratibimba* should do activities which are almost particularised activities of the bimba, and in respect of love or Bhakti or devotion it is clear that it should align itself with the Divine, or act as God acts or loves in respect of these several individuals. However it becomes necessary to think about the manner of the relationship between

the *bimba* and *pratibimba* not as contradictory to one another or each other but as resembling or reciprocating their structures or form and functions. Analogous behaviour might well be considered to be the *prati-kārya* or *kriyā* following up the activities of the Divine reciprocally.

Thus the contradictoriness between the individual and the Divine yields place to reciprocity and resemblance and togetherness as such.

It is clear then that the prefix *prati* has quite a lot of inflation of meanings which had led to the several philosophical realisations which had more than confused the philosophers. Simply stated the individual's relation to the Divine is in the nature of confrontation and then complementariness and reciprocity and resemlance which annuls the contradictions but retains the difference. It enhances the perception of similarity and identity of spiritual union. If the devotion or love of one's opposite is a true one, then the love of the soul to God is the love of its unlike or opposite. Perhaps if the resemblance of husband and wife is said to be one of *prati-bimba* then such love could be classed as dualistic devotion, not the love of one's self or one's like but love of one's opposite or different.

Thus *Advaita* love insists that one likes one who is like oneself. But one knows that like poles repel and only unlike poles attract. Madhva sees the truth of the second axiom of attraction as well as the falsity of the first axiom. Śrī Rāmānuja sees that one likes one who is one's self who is in every one and as self of all.

The significance of the prefix *prati* thus goes beyond the usual counter-correlativeness or opposition or negation which supplies the challenge of attraction between unlikes.

THE CONCEPT OF "AGENT"--PHILOSOPHICAL AND GRAMMATICAL—IN SANSKRIT TRADITION,

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I. Introductory :

The term "agent" here is used in the widest possible sense, including the independent doer of an action or a mere instrument, for in nearly all schools of thought in Indology, the term "doer" or "agent" has been used in diversely flexible and remote senses.

II. "Agent" as a Philosophical Concept :

The agent or doer (Sanskrit *kartā*), according to Gotama, ((*Nyāya Sūtra*, 2.1.58) is one who is at least partly responsible for an action : for in the Sūtra concerned (2.1.58), it is stated that "the so-called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice".[1]

Moreover, according to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,[2] the actor is inherently connected with action, and consequently according to the author of this work, the actor of such an action is primarily an actor ; but in an utterance like "wood burns", the agenthood or "doerness" of wood is only secondary.

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1. S. C. Vidhyabhushan, *The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama*, 2.1.58. *na karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt.*
2. Quoted by *Nyāyakośa*, p. 203 :— *Kriyāyāḥ kṛtervā samavāyitvaṁ idaṁ naiyāyika-matānusāri mukhyaṁ kartṛtvaṁ, tanmate acetane kāṣṭhādau kartṛpada-prayogastu gauṇah.*

This view would therefore associate some voluntary or deliberate activity with the concept of agenthood necessarily and primarily. The agenthood of inanimate objects would be then taken only in a secondary sense.

III. "Agenthood" Involving Consciousness of Action :

According to Annambhaṭṭa.[3] the concept of Agent involves a consciousness of the action to be performed, of something to be produced, implying a direct perception of that object. The example given is of the potter, who produces a pot, with a direct knowledge of what is to be produced.

Such a view would consequently exclude from the concept of the agent all unconscious action.

IV. The Sāṅkhya View as Reproduced by The Bhagawad Gītā :

The Sāṅkhya view has been eloquently reproduced by the *Bhagawad Gītā*[4] 5.14, where it is stated that there exists neither an actor, nor action, nor even the fruit of action, God having absolutely no hand in these phenomena. What actually exists is only the nature of things.

This Sāṅkhya-based view tends to be mechanistic as well as metaphysical and can throw no light on the actual range of individual action, the responsibility involved, and the role of the agent in that action (Cf. Para X below).

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3. Quoted by *Nyāyakośa*, sub-voce *kartṛtvam*. (p. 904). *Upādāna-gocarāparokṣajñāna-cikīrṣākṛtimatvam. Yathā kulālasya ghaṭa-kartṛtvam.*

4. 5.14.

na kartṛtvam na karmāṇi kasyacit sṛjati prabhuḥ, na karmaphala-saṁyogam svabhāvastu pravartate.

V. The Concept of "Agent" as a Totality :

According to *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha,*[5] an "agent" represents the totality of all those who have had a hand in the production of any action whatsoever, so that it includes, metaphorically, or by implication, like the Instrumental, the Dative in a syntactical content, which are often stated to be the mediums of a particular action, e. g. in the utterance "Caitra goes to the village".

VI. The Agent's "Doing"—Gadādhara's View :

According to some authorities, two relationships are involved in an utterance like "Caitra is cooking" viz. that of the producer and that of the intender. According to Gadādhara[6], even the intender's relationship involves an element of the producer, in view of the objective necessarily to be taken into account, e. g. in cooking, the producer's objective has to be borne in mind.

VII. "Agent" Presupposed by The Concept of Instrument :

In an utterance like "*kāṣṭhena pacati*", although *kāṣṭha* - is a necessary instrument, it necessarily involves, according to Gadādhara,[7] the sense of the agent as well, for an instrument is dependent upon the agent.

5. Quoted by Nyāyakośa, Ib., p. 204.
itara-kārakāprayojyatve sati sakala-kāraka-prayoktṛtvam. Yathā caitro grāmaṁ gacchatītyādau Caitrasya kartṛtvam.

6. Gadādhara : *Vyutpattivāda*, Bombay, 1970, p. 416 *'caitraḥ-pacati' ityādau viṣayatā-ghaṭita-kartṛtva-bodha-nirvāhāya yathā kṛtau pākāderupa-dhāyakatva-viṣayitvobhaya-sambandhenānvayaḥ, viṣayitāyāḥ sambandhatvepyupadhāyakatvaniveśa āvaśyakaḥ.*

7. Ib., p. 417.
"kāṣṭhena pacati" ityādau karaṇatvaṁ tṛtīyārthaḥ. tacca vyāpāravatkaraṇatvam ; vyāpāre kartṛvyāpārā-dhīnatvaṁ niveśanīyam.

VIII. Instrument as a Factor of Logical Conclusion :

When something is inferred from a sign, as fire from smoke, the phenomenon, according to Gadādhara,[8] should be called *karaṇa-*, mere instrument, for which Pāṇini 2.3.18 *kartṛkaraṇayoḥ tṛtīyā* offers a scope. For any conclusion depends upon an instrument of cognition, which further depends upon a contact of the soul with the mind, according to the school of Nyāya.

IX. Causality in a Logical Context :

A "Cause" would be an "instrument" in a Syntactical context, but according to Gadādhara,[9] in a logical context, e. g. when fire is inferred from smoke, the smoke which a Grammarian may call a *hetu* "cause" from Pāṇini 2.3.23 *hetau*, the logician would call the smoke as an indicator, not a producer.

Here we see how logical and grammatical terms overlap.

X. Usage Extending The Concept of "Agent" to other Spheres :

According to the *Gautamasūtra vṛtti*[10], usage extends the use of a word from a secondary sense to the primary

8. Ib, p. 420.
Liṅga-jñānasyānumiti-kāraṇatāmate 'dhūmena vahnim anuminomi' ityādau dhūmādipadaṁ tadbhānaparam. sa cātmamanoyogādirūpānumātṛpuruṣādhina iti tasya niruktakaraṇam abādhitam eva.

9. Ib, p. 421.
Liṅga-jnānasya kāraṇatve api 'dhūmena vahnim anuminomi' ityādau dhūmādipadaṁ mukhyārtham eva ; "hetau" iti sūtreṇa tatra tṛtīyā-hetutvasya kāraṇatāvacchedaka-sādhāraṇa prayojakatva-rūpasya tatra vivakṣitatvāt.

10. Quoted by *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 204.
kvacit vyāpārāśrayatvam, yathā ratho gacchatītyādau rathādeḥ kartṛtvam ; kvacit pratiyogitvam, yathā ghaṭo naśyatītyādau ghaṭasya kartṛtvam.

sense : e. g. "the chariot goes" ; here the support of the action functions as the goer proper ; in "the pot vanishes", the thing negated functions as if doing some action.

XI. Universal Mind's Spontaneous Activity : Sāṇkhya View :

The Sāṇkhya[11] view conceives of the "agent" as the tendency of the universal mind to natural activity. This characteristic, however, is a generalization, excluding the individual from any specific role, which is denying the empirical approach altogether (Cf. para IV above, in which the reproduction of this view by the *Bhagawadgītā* has been recorded).

XII. "Instrument" as a Philosophical Concept—A Necessary Condition for any Action :

Instrument—*karaṇa*—a term being common both to philosophical and Grammatical schools—is, according, to *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*,[12] that by the existence of which alone all actions can be effectual ; instrument is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of any action.

But according to the *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī*, any extraordinarily effective cause is an instrumet, just as an axe[13] for cutting purposes, the knowledge of invariable concomitance for inference, or an organ of sense for perception.*

*NOTE :—A loose term *sādhana* is also used in philosophical contexts in the sense of "instrument", but its nuance does not go so far as to denote effectiveness.

11. Quoted by *Nyāya-kośa* p., 205 :—
anukūla-kṛtimadantaḥkaraṇa-prakṛtitvaṁ kartṛtvam.

12. Quoted by *Nyāyakośa*, p. 199 :—
Yasmin sati kriyā bhavatyeva tat.

13. Quoted by Nyāyakośa, p. 200 :—
vyāparavadasādhāraṇaṁ kāraṇam, yathā chidikriyāṁ prati kuṭhāraḥ, anumitiṁ prati vyāptijnānaṁ karaṇam, pratyakṣaṁ prati indriyaṁ karaṇam.

XIII. "Agent" in Sanskrit Grammatical Tradition :

Like philosophical tradition, Grammatical Tradition about "agent" is pivoted on two terms *kartā* and *karaṇa* the former referring to agent proper, the latter to secondary agent. The Grammatical Tradition concentrates most of its attention on two Sūtras of Pāṇini, 1.4.54 *svatantraḥ kartā* and 1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam.*

XIV. "Independence" - A Distinctive Feature of the Grammatical Agent :

In 1.4.54 Pāṇini had characterized the grammatical agent (or subject) as "independent". This "independent" has been explained in various ways :—

(1) Patañjali explains the "independence" of the subject as ,'preference". Patañjali here refers to Sanskrit usage and states that when Sanskrit usage spoke of the independence of a Brahmin, it implied his preferential position[15]. Thus in certain contexts the nominative excludes the use of other cases.[16]

(2) Other grammatical authorities declared that the "independence" suggested by the Sūtra should be taken in the sense of dependence on the action implied by the verb.[17]

(3) The "independence" of the agent has been further explained by the grammatical commentary

14. Cf. *Nyāyakośa*, page 993 :—
"Yathā parvato vahnimān dhūmāt" ityādau dhūmaḥ sādhanam.

15. On 1.4.54,
ayaṁ tantra-sabdaḥ prādhānye vartate ; tad yathā svatantro asau brāhmaṇa ityucyate.

16. Cf. the commentary *Prabhā* on *Vaiyākaraṇa bhūṣaṇa* - (Benares, 1947), p. 191 :
prādhānyaṁ ca kārakāntarāprayojyatvenāvivakṣitam.

17. p. 191.
svātantryaṁ ca dhātvartha-vyāparāśrayatvam.

darpaṇa - as "setting the ball of other cases rolling"[18] in all grammatical contexts'.

(4) The grammatical authority *Bhūṣaṇa* points out, on the other hand (Cf. No. 2 in this section) the limitations of the action itself; for action, by itself, is inadequate for manifesting the sense, unless the cases play some part.[19] the commentary of the *Siddhānta kaumudī*,[20] states that all cases by their own particular functions contribute to the consummation of the action, so that with "who cooks"? - in such a context, several cases like "with whom"?, "with what?", "in which?" etc. are also n the picture.[21]

The above data should compel us to appreciate Patañjali's explanation of "independence" as "preference", in view of the interdependence of cases in so many contexts. The concept of "independence" of the agent is therefore a selective preference.

XV. Agent, Functioning as a "Grammatical Instrument" :

Nāgeśa, while quoting Bhartṛhari defines instrument as the "capacity for bringing about", being that "by which a task is accomplished immediately",[22] when we

18· Ib. p., 195.
svātantryam ityarthakena kārakacakraprayoktṛtvam.

19. p. 194.
phalānukūla-vyāpārānukūla-kṛter dhātuavācyatvena tatra vibhakti vācyatvasambhavāt.

20. On Pāṇ. 1.4.23., *kārake.*

21. *tataḥ kaḥ kena kiṃ pacatīti vivakṣāyāṃ sva-sva-vyāpara-vaśena-karaṇāditvam.*

22. *Laghu-Mañjūṣā*,, page 1251.
karaṇatvaṁ ca karaṇatā-śaktimatvam ; sā ca śaktir yadvyāpārā-vyavadhānena kriyā niṣpattirvivakṣyate tanniṣṭhā.

say : "cooking is effected by the cooking pot", it is usage[23] which gives the intended sense by implication. This usage, continues Nageśa, is an element of linguistic convention[24] (lit. grammar), not anything tangible.

XVI. Grammatical "Instrument" as the most Efficient Medium :

Pāṇini (1.4.52) defines this grammatical instrument as "the most efficient medium".[25] As Patañjali explains it, other cases are efficient but the Instrumental case would be the most efficient one.[26]

XVII. Instrumental in the Associative sense :

In 2.3.19 Pāṇini mentions a secondary sense of the Instrumental case, viz. the associative sense,[27] the accompanying agent having only a secondary function, as in *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā*. Here the direct connection with the verb is only of *pitā*. The secondary connection of *putra* - being only apparent.[28]

XVIII. Various Usages of the Instrnmental :

Grammarians have pointed out various usages of the Instrumental e. g.,

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23. p. 1251.
sthālyā pacyata ityeṣā vivakṣā dṛsyate yataḥ.
24. *Ib.*, *vivakśyata ityanena vivakṣaiva vyākaraṇa aṅgam, na bāhyavastu sattetyuktam.*
25. 1.4.42.
sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam
Patañjali :
sarvāṇi hi kārakāṇi sādhakāni tama-grahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati.
26. On 1.4.42.
tad jñāpayatyācāryaḥ, kārakasaṁjñāyāṁ tara-tama-yogo na bhavatīti.
27. 2.3.19 *sahayukte apradhāne.*
28. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇ. 2.3.19 :—
'putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā', pituratra kriyādisambandaḥ śabdenocyate putrasya tu pratīyamāna iti tasyāpradhānyam.

(1) Indicatory, as in *jaṭābhistāpasaḥ*.[29]

(2) Deformity, as *pādena khañjaḥ*.[30] Such usages of the Instrumental occur in some other parallel Indo-European languages.[31]

XIX. Conclusion :

The above data, it may be presumed, would give us the following points :—

(1) Comprehensiveness : The tendency of ancient Indian thought was to comprehend into an organic whole various concepts like action, agent, instrument.

(2) Flexibility : These concepts sometimes passed into one another, there being no rigidity in their use.

(3) Overlapping : The flexibility of terms was often liable to overlapping, as in the philosophical and grammatical use of the term *hetu* - (Cf. para VIII).

(4) Usage : The importance of usage, both in philosophical and grammatical parlance was noticed, so that we find in ancient Indian thought, the germs of Stylistics.

(5) Pragmatism : The pragmatic view of Pāṇini, who took the "instrument" as the most efficient medium, was interesting and worthy of appreciation.

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29. Nāgeśa, Ib., p. 1259.
Jaṭābhistāpasa ityādau jñāpyatvaṁ tṛtīyārthaḥ.

30. Ib., p. 1259 :—
pādena khañja ityādau vikāraprayuktatvarūpasambandhas tṛtīyārthaḥ.

31. As in Russian, from :
Pulkina and others : *Russian*, p, 109:—

(a) Instrumental with the verb "to be" as in "he will be an Engineer" (b) with the Russsian verb for "to seem" as in "The ship in the distance seemed a mere dot."

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXPRESSION *MUSṬINDHAYA*

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The word *muṣṭi* is noted in lexicons as having more than one meaning. But its usage is commonly found in the sense of a fist, a clenched hand. For instance, the usage by Kālidāsa and others may be noted in the following lines :—

1. *prajighāya kṛtāntasya muṣṭiṃ pṛthag iva sthitam* (Raghu., 15-21)
2. *udaraṃ parimāti muṣṭinā* (Naiṣadha., 2-35)
3. *dṛḍhataranibaddhamuṣṭeḥ kośaniṣaṇṇasya sahajamalinasya. kṛpaṇasya Kṛpāṇasya ca kevalam ākārato bhedaḥ.* (Gobhaṭṭa)

In the context of some kind of boxing the expressions *muṣṭiyuddham* and *muṣṭīmuṣṭi* seem to have been used. The word is derived from the root *muṣa steye*, and as Prof. Monier Williams notes the usage of the word in the sense of a fist perhaps had originally something to do with stealing. Subsequently the word came to be used for a fist in general even when it was not involved in any type of stealing.

The expression *muṣṭindhaya* is recorded in the sense of an infant by some lexicographers such as Puruṣottama, the author of the *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, and Vāmana Bhaṭṭabāṇa of the *Śabdaratnākara*, and perhaps following them by Prof. Monier Williams. Monier Williams and V. S.

Apte explain the literal meaning of *muṣṭindhaya* as "one who sucks the thumb", and so they say that the meaning intended is an infant. They do not, however, cite any usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in this sense from any work. I have not come across any such usage[1] either.

Now, I see a problem which I am unable to solve, if the word *muṣṭindhaya* is to mean an infant, as recorded by Puruṣottama, Vāmana Bhaṭṭabāṇa, Monier Williams, and Apte. Here is the problem. Mallinātha in his commentary on the *Ekāvalī*, and his son Kumārasvāmin in his *Ratnāpaṇa* say as follows :

jagati vividhavidyāsindhumuṣṭindhayānāṃ
parabhaṇitiparīkṣā yujyate sajjanānām,
tad iha mama nibandhe dūṣaṇaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ vā
bhavati yadi vidagdhais taddhy avaśyaṃ vimṛśyam.

Also in *Mallikāmāruta* of Uddaṇḍa we find the usage thus *tapaścaraṇacuñcavaḥ sakalaśāstramuṣṭindhayāḥ* (I-16)

The meaning intended in brief by the expression *muṣṭindhaya* in this context seems to be "A master of all the śāstras,'. It seems strange if the word were to convey the meaning of a highly learned person, as is the case in this example, while it is noted in the Dictionaries in the sense of an infant, an ignorant one Even if we take

1. I learn from Dr. K. K. Raja that Nārāyaṇa, a poet from Kerala, uses *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of a child in his *Subhadrāharaṇa-kāvya.*

This is one of the meanings of the expression mentioned by Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa too in his grammatical work the *Prakriyāsarvasva.* This single usage, coming from Kerala, alone cannot be taken to prove the expression to convey the meaning of an infant according to the rule of Pāṇini or Pāṇini's commentators. Excepting this one instance, it does not seem to have been used by any writer outside Kerala.

the general meaning of the word *muṣṭi*, i. e. a fist, I am at a loss to know as to how the fluids like water (of the ocean in this context) can be referred to as being held in a fist for the purpose of drinking.

We may find a solution to the problem here, if a meaning similar to that of *culukīkartṛ* be possible of the expression *muṣṭindhaya*. But *muṣṭi* is not noted, as far as I know, in the Dictionaries as a synonym of *culuka*. *Culuka*[2] means "a hand hollowed to hold water or the like", whereas *muṣṭi*, according to the Dictionaries, stands for a clenched hand. I do not think that the word *muṣṭi* could have ever been used as a synonym[3] of *culuka*, because of the fact that the meaning of the root *muṣa steye* must have some bearing prior to the figurative application of the word. In the practical life a *culuka*, which is an open hand so to say, could not be seen so involved in stealing as a *muṣṭi*, a closed hand, could. In this context I should like to point out a few facts which I think may help us in finding a solution to the

2. The word *culuka* seems to have been in existence even in the days of Pāṇini, as it occurs in one of the lists of the *gaṇapāṭha* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (4.1.105).

3. Murāri uses in his *Anargharāghava* the expression *catussamudramuṣṭindhayena* (p. 231, N. S. P.),—I am obliged to Dr. K. K. Raja for bringing this usage to my notice—, and this is explained by the commentator as *tat* (*catussamudram*) *muṣṭīkṛtya dhayati pibati iti muṣṭindhayaḥ* (*tena*). The commentator does not quote any lexicon to show that *muṣṭi* is a synonym of *culuka*, and he does not even use the word *culukīkṛtya*, but uses only *muṣṭīkṛtya*. The expression *muṣṭīkṛtya* of the commentator may be explained also as *catussamudram* prabhūtam *api muṣṭīkritya*=(as I show at the end of this paper) *stokadravadravyavat kṛtvā, anāyāsena pibati* iti, etc. Otherwise my doubt, as to how liquids like waters could be mentioned as being held in a *muṣṭi*, clenched hand, as in a *culuka*, remains unanswered.

problem. Though the word *muṣṭi* meant primarily a clenched hand, it was later on used in many other meanings. For instance, *muṣṭi* was used as a unit of measurement, which was also known as *paṇaḥ* in the examples such as *mūlakapaṇaḥ* and *śākapaṇaḥ*. The remarks of the author of the *Kāśikā* on these examples are worth noticing. He says :

saṃvyavahārāya mūlakādīnāṃ yaḥ parimito muṣṭir badhyate, tasyedam abhidhānam mūlakapaṇa ityādi (3-3-66).

Sāyaṇācārya also notes this in his *Dhātuvṛtti*. *mūlakapaṇaḥ* or *mūlakamuṣṭiḥ* means a handful or a bunch of radishes intended as a unit for transacting business by a seller of the vegetables. (This custom prevails even today in india.) By the by, *muṣṭi* in its figurative application in Sanskrit seems to be similar to the expression "handful" in English. In this sense of a handful again, the word is used by Kalidāsa and others also.

1. *bhavati viphalapreraṇā cūrṇamuṣṭiḥ* (*Meghasandeśa*)
2. *keyūracūrṇīkṛtalājamuṣṭim* (Kumārasam., 7-69)
3. *nabhobījamṣṭim dadhānā* (Raghu., last verse), etc.

Just as *muṣṭi* was thus used as *alākṣaṇikaśabda* for solid things measured by a fist, so also it was used in the sense of a particular measure of fluids. In the *Śārṅga-*

(1) In any lexicon *muṣṭi* is not noted as a synonym of *culuka*.

(2) Nārāyaṇa the author of the *Subhadrāharaṇa* too does not seem to use the expression *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of *culukīkartṛ* ... I presume this as I am not given to understand any instance of the type, and Dr K. K. R. cited only in the sense of a child from that *kāvya*.

(3) The author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva* does not explain either *muṣṭi* as a synonym of *culuka* or *muṣṭindhaya* as a synonym of *culukīkartṛ*.

dharasaṃhitā ((1-24) *muṣṭi* is actually recorded as a synonym of a *pala* (2 *śuktis* or 4 *karṣas*, or half a *prasṛti*). As a container like a bamboo-pipe or a reed-pipe made suitably could hold a necessary measure like *pala* of fluids of medicine etc., and as it (the pipe), on its turn, could be held in a *muṣṭi*, the word *muṣṭi* must have come to mean the measurement of a *pala* by some indirect *lakṣaṇā* (instead of *tātsthyāt*, *tatstha-sthatvāt*). Thus *muṣṭi* can be used in the sense of *a small quantity of fluids* like water etc., just as it was used in the sense of *a small quantity of solid things* in the examples such as *cūrṇamuṣṭiḥ*, *lājamuṣṭiḥ* *bījamuṣṭiḥ*> *mūlakamuṣṭiḥ* etc. In essence, therefore, in the context of fluids *muṣṭindhaya* should convey a meaning like *stokadravyapāyin*, similar to that of *culukikartṛ* or *culukapāyin*. This seems to be the meaning intended in the verse of Mallinātha and Kumārasvāmin quoted above, though this meaning for the *muṣṭindhya* was not noted in the Dictionaries of Puruṣottama and others. The meaning of an infant sucking the fist or the thumb, on the other hand, though noted in those Dictionaries is definitely not applicable in this context. Consequently the first half of Mallinātha's verse, under reference, should be understood in the following manner :

"An examination of the writings of others is proper on the part of those learned persons, by whom the entire ocean of all knowledge in all branches, was treated as a small quantity like one *pala* and was thus drunk off easily".[4]

(4) Either in *Bhaṭṭikāvya* or in other works of grammarians *muṣṭi* is not found in the sense of *culuka*, and so also *muṣṭindhaya* is not seen in the sense of *culukīkartṛ*. Because of these considerations I am not inclined to take *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of *culukīkartṛ*, until some conclusive and positive evidence is available.

An established usage of a word and an idiom in a language are unquestionable facts. Grammarians and Lexicographers have simply to record the facts as found in a language. This was definitely true with Sanskrit. Patañjali says.

avaśyam lokaḥ pṛṣṭhato' nugantavyaḥ keṣv artheṣu laukikāḥ kān śabdān prayuñjata iti ((1-2-164).

Muṣṭindhaya was noted by Patañjali too, but only as an illustration for the grammatical points related to the rule *nāḍīmuṣṭyoś ca*. The meaning in which the expression might have been used in those days is not clear.

Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva*, notes *mutṣindhaya* in the sense of an infant, and in the sense of one who drinks liquid measured or measurable by *muṣṭi*. He also does not note the meaning of a learned person for the expression *muṣṭindhaya*. The word *muṣṭindhama* is noted by him in the sense of a *malla*, in addition to the meaning of a *svarṇakāra*.

In the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* we generally find idiomatic uses of important words and phrases illustrating some

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The usage of *muṣṭindhaya* by Murāri is similar to that of Mallinātha. Probably Mallinātha's usage is based on that of Murāri. So the problem being same in both the cases, any solution to the usage of Mallinātha will be the answer to that of Murāri too. The ideas of mythology are expressed by poets sometimes in their own figurative way. Therefore the expression *muṣṭindhaya* of Murāri need not be in the exact sense of *culukīkartṛ*. But, in the light of the explanation as *muṣṭīkṛtya* by the commentator, instead of *culukīkṛtya*, and also in the absence of any lexicon to show *muṣṭī* to be a synonym of *culuka*, and for other reasons mentioned above, I feel that the expression may be in the sense of (*muṣṭīkṛtya*) = *stokadravadravyavat kṛtvā, anāyāsena pibati iti*, etc.

4. In a reply to my query Prof. V. Raghavan also says that only this type of meaning is possible in this verse. The details of this paper are, however, worked out by me.

noteworthy grammatical aspects as mentioned by Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhāyayī*. Of the rules of Pāṇini *ejeḥ khaś* (3-2-28), *nāsikāstanayor dhmādheṭoḥ* (3-2-29), *nāḍīmuṣṭyoś ca* (3-2-29), Bhaṭṭi has given one illustration each in the following verse

sattvamejayasiṃhāḍhyān stanandhayasamatviṣau,
kathaṃ nāḍindhamān mārgān āgatau viṣamopalān. (6-95)

Here we find the uses of *sattvamejaya, stanandhaya,* and *nāḍindhama* at illustrations respectively of the rules of Pāṇini quoted above. It is my bad luck (or our bad luck) that Bhaṭṭi did not find a suitable situation to employ *muṣṭindhaya* instead of *nāḍindhama* for illustrating the rule *nāḍīmuṣṭyoś ca* >. He goes on to illustrate the next rule of Pāṇini *udi kūle rujivahoḥ* (3-2-31) in the following verse.

uttirṇau vā kathaṃ bhimāḥ saritaḥ kūlamudvahāḥ
āsāditau kathaṃ brūtaṃ na gajaiḥ kūlamudrujaiḥ. (6-96)

It is clear from this that he has not included the use of *muṣṭindhaya* for illustration, and as a result we are unable to know what the significance of the idiom *muṣṭindhaya* would have been in the opinion of the learned Bhaṭṭi. Puruṣottama and Vāmana Bhaṭṭabāna thought that the significance of *muṣṭindhaya* was "an infant", perhaps because of the expression *stanandhaya* mentioned by Pāṇini in the previous rule (*nāsikāstanayor dhmādeṭoḥ*). If this is to be the significance the first para *muśṭi* of *muṣṭindhaya* may be understood to retain its primary meaning *muṣṭi* standing either for a fist or *muṣṭyavayavāṅguli*, and the second element *dhaya* may convey, not the primary meaning of pāna (of *dheṭ pāne*) but, a figurative sense like chewing, or licking etc. I wonder why Pāṇini did not mention a word like *aṅgulindhaya* or *aṅguṣṭhandhaya*,

if an infant was meant by *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of sucking the thumb. In the interpretation applicable to Mallinātha's usage, the second element *dhaya* may retain the primary meaning of *dheṭ pāne* (drinking), and the first part *muṣṭi* may be understood to be in a figurative sense of a *small quantity of fluid*... i. e. like *palam*.... In view of the recording in the *Śārṅgadharasamhitā* of the word *muṣṭi* as a synonym of a *pala*, the particular measurement of fluids, (perhaps this was so recorded in some other texts also on *āyurveda*) Mallinātha's figurative usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of a learned man seems possible, because of the idea of treating the entire *sindhu* as a *pala*, a small quantity, and thus drinking it off easily. If we can find any usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of an infant sucking the thumb, of which I am doubtful, then both the meanings of the expression *muṣṭindhaya* (i. e. an infant, and a learned person) may be taken to be possible. In that case *muṣṭindhaya* would appear to be similar to words having quite opposite meanings, such as *ārāt* (*dūra* or *samīpa*), or the element *artha* at the end of a compound like *bhūtyartham* (in *prajānām eva bhūtyarthaṃ sa tābiyo balim agrahīt*) and *maśakārtho dhūmaḥ*, where *artha* in the first means *prayojana*, and in the second *nivṛtti*, or the root *yu miśraṇe amiśraṇe ca* (to unite or to separate, like the English verb cleave which means either to unit or to cut asunder). *Muṣṭindhaya* thus may be taken to have opposite meanings, i.e. a *stokapāyin*, an infant, an ignorant one, and an *astokapāyin* a highly learned person. Of these two opposite meanings one or the other may be applicable to specific cases depending upon the context. This is what I feel, in conclusion, while trying to understand the significeance of the usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in Mallinātha's and Kumārasvāmin's verse referred to above.

THE SYSTEM OF LAND RIGHTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF LANDED PROPERTY DURING THE LATE ANCIENT AND EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD OF INDIAN HISTORY

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Property rights, including those in land, can hardly be understood apart from the particular social situation in which they function. Among other factors, changes in economy and social hierarchy have been found to bring about changes in the nature of right over land and other resources.[1] During the late ancient and early medieval period of Indian history we come across the increased agrarian character[2] of society, and the emergence of the *sāmanta* system along with a sizable class of landed aristocracy. Among the notable features of this period are the growth of a hierarchy of ruling aristocracy involved to a considerable extent in a sort of land-vassal nexus, the emergence of the phenomenon of political authority becoming closely connected[3] with landed property which became in some measure the actual basis of social and political status, and the rise of a fairly large class of rural

1. Cf. Sprott, *Sociology*, p. 153 ; section on land tenure in the *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*.

2. See, e. g., Vṛddha-Hārīta, 7.189.

3. *Upamiti-bhava-prapañca-kathā* (10th century A. D.), p. 59 : *kvacidvitrāṇāmapi kṣudragrāmāṇāṁ lābhaṁ cakravartitvaṁ manyate, kvacit kṣetrakhaṇḍamātra-prabhutvamapi mahāmaṇḍalikatvamākalayati.* see also *Aparājitapṛcchā* (12the century A. D.), pp 201 ff.

aristocracy connected with land[4]. Land was commonly assigned by the rulers, with rights of varying degree, to Brāhmaṇas and religious institutions, to vassals for military service, to members of the clan or family, and even to officers.[5] Some inscriptions reveal that the regular rights of the local officers like the *talāras*[6] and the *pratīhāras*[7], and of the local diginitaris like the *paṭṭakilas*[8], and the occasional rights of petty officers like *cāṭas*[9] to a portion of the produce of the soil, were also recognized by the rulers. The evidence of the *Lekhapadhati*[10] suggests the existence of revenue farmers too in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A. D.. Thus there developed a great variety of interests in and rights over land, claimed by the various grades of intermediaries.

In the feudal pattern from the supreme overlord, his *sāmanta*, the latter's *sāmanta* and so on down to the peasant who worked on the soil, there emerged many parties claiming rights over land and its produce. But the number of intermediaries was not the same everywhere and the peasants were also of many categories[11]. Then again, the hierarchy of ruling landed intermediaries was not so elaborate and well-defined, and so deeply

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4. *Land System and Feudalism in Ancient India*, ed. D. C. Sircar, pp. 83 f.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 72 ff.

6. Cf. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhān Dynasties*, pp. 207 ff., *Lekhapaddhati*, pp. 7, 8.

7. U. N. Ghoshal, *Hindu Revenue system*, p. 262.

8. *E. I.*, XXI, No. 15, p. 92.

9. See, e. g., the grant (V. S. 1230) of Paramardi, *E. I.*, XVI, No. 2.

10. *Lekhapaddhati*, pp. 8-10.

11. *Land System and Feudalism in Ancient Imdia*, pp. 90 f.

involved in the lord-vassal nexus as in medieval Europe.[12] Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the *sāmanta* hierarchy and the consequent fragmentation of political authority together with its having become connected with property in land, could not but have contributed to the complexity and multiplicity in the system of land rights.

Under the particular conditions of the age, what eventually prevailed in regard to ownership of land does not appear to have depended so much on theory as on the actuality and the circumstances of situation in various regions and kingdoms. This fact also, and not only legal subtlety and the demands of logical soundness, may be regarded as responsible for the formulation of the doctrine of *laukikasvatvavāda* by Vijñāneśvara and his followers, which maintains that 'property has its basis on popular recognition without any dependence on the *Śās tras*'.[13] The issue of the ultimate ownership[14] of land appears to have become complicated as a result of the immense complexity of the situation, and, as such, we find the medieval authorities conceiving of a multiplicity

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12. In Medieval Europe there had emerged such a multiplicity of land rights from the supreme overlord through the hierarchy of vassals down to the tenant that 'the word ownership as applied to landed property would have been almost meaningless...' (Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, pp. 115-116).

13. P. N. sen, *The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence*, p. 42.

14. For recent discussions on this point see R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, Chap. IV ; L. Gopal, *The Economic Life of Northern India*, Chap. I. ; R. C. P. Singh, *Kingship in Northern India*, Chap. VI ; D. C. Sircar, *Landlordism and Tenancy in Ancient and Medieval India* etc., pp. 1 ff ; R. Chaudhary, *Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Indian History Congress*, pp. 118. f. ; *Journal of the Allahabad Historical Society*, July, 1962, pp. 14 ff.

of rights[15] over land, which can rightly be understood not only in terms of the linear development and elaboration of the earlier ideas, but also in the background of the actual conditions prevailing during that period. The medieval Indian jurists conceived of property (*Svatva*) as qualitatively sub-divisible--'the *svatva* of the king, the *svatva* of the land-owner, the *svatva* of the tenant farmer, and even the *svatva* of the mortgagee in possession (as against the trespasser)'[16]--thus giving rise to various incidents of the manifestations of ownership. All might have been regarded as *svāmis* within their respective boundaries But the jurists and logicians did not bring out the differences between various kinds of tenures or interests,[17] It appears that so far as land is concerned, the view of concurrent, though distinct, rights of ownership between the king[18] and the *sāmantas*, on the one hand, and the rulers and the ruled, on the other, may not be unsatisfactory.

Amidst the circumstances characterised by the emergence of so many parties claiming and enjoying land-rights of various grades, we notice certain marked tendencies during the early medieval period. One of them was represented by the growing royal claim of the right of ownership over land--a tendency which may be noticed to some extent even during the Gupta period. Two verses of Kātyāyana, a lawgiver of that period, as quoted

15. Cf. Derrett, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London*, XVIII (1956), pp. 481 ff.

16. Derrett, op. cit., p. 484 ; p. Banerjea, *A History of Indian Taxation*, p. 361, fn. 1.

17. Derrett, loc. cit.

18. The theoreticians mainly took into account only the immediate ruler, and as such they did not define the relative land rights of the *sāmanta* rulers and the supreme overlord.

in the *Rājadharma-Kāṇḍa*[19] of Lakṣmīdhara (12th century) and explained by Mitramiśra[20] later on, have led K. P. Jayaswal[21] to plead for private ownership of land, Ghoshal[22] to infer king's ownership of land, and Kane[23] to think that 'the state was deemed to be the owner of all lands as a general proposition' but 'individuals or groups that had cultivated lands in their possession were regarded practically as owner's thereof subject to the liability to pay land tax and the right of the state to sell land for non-payment of tax.'

It is clear that what we find here is neither the absolute ownership of the king nor the fullest individual ownership of the ordinary inhabitants of the kingdom. The verses in question suggest the idea of concurrent, though distinct, rights of ownership between the king and the subjects in respect of land. It may be noted that the king's claim to a part of the produce is sought to be justified here not on the ground of the protection which he afforded to the subjects--a view which was dominant in earlier times--but on the ground of his *svāmitva* of land.

A clearer statement of king's ownership of land to such an extent as to render the land right of the cultivators somewhat tenuous is found in the commentary of Asahāya (8th century) on the *Nārada Smṛti* (4.93). Explaining the term *narendra-dhana* he states[24] :

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19. Kātyāyana quoted in the *Rājadharma-kāṇḍa*, p. 90.

20. *Vīramitrodaya* (Rājanīti), Benares Ed., p. 271.

21. K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*—Pt II, pp. 173 ff.

22. U. N. Ghoshal, *Indian Historiography and other Essays*, p. 164.

23. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 495 ; also *Kātyāyana-smṛti-sāroddhāra*, vs. 16, 17.

24. Quoted in *Vyavahāra-kāṇḍa* of Lakṣmīdhara, p. 186; fn. 3.

narendra-dhana-śabdena bhūmiruktā kila narendrāṇāṁ bhūmireva dhanamityataḥ. Strīnarendradhane viṁśati-varṣairapi na naśyata iti.

The further development of this idea may be noticed in the commentary of Bhaṭṭasvāmin (C. 12th century) on Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* which states that the king is admitted as the owner of both land and water and that the people can exercise their right of ownership over all things except these two.[25]

Significant in this context are a number of inscriptions which reveal that during the early medieval period kings began to grant the nearest title to an absolute estate[26] with rights to lands, waters, timber, mineral, treasures etc., and also with the authority[27] over the people in the main capacity. It may be noted in this context that the *Mitākṣarā* postulates the transfer of proprietary right in connection with land-grants.[28]

In a verse[29] of the *Nārada Smṛti* which has been quoted with approval in the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa* of Lakṣmīdhara the right of the king to deprive a peasant of his field and house enjoyed even for three generations has

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25. *Arthaśāstra,* tr. Shamasastry, 4th Edn., p. 144.

26. Derrett, loc. cit.

27. Some land-grants in which peasants, artisans etc., or the inhabitants as a whole are specifically mentioned along with the lands or villages donated to Brāhmaṇas or religious institutions, suggest in a way the transfer of the people concerned to the donees ; see below.

28. *Mitākṣarā* on *Yāj.* I. 318. However, there is also the provision for granting only usufructory rights (*nibandha*).

29. Nārada quoted in the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa,* p. 459 ; for a more or less similar view see *ibid.*, p. 450.

in a way been recognized, though in another verse[30] he has been given the moral advice that he should not adopt such a drastic and risky measure for they constitute the householder's means of subsistence and it is on account of them that the latter resides there. In the same text it has been enjoined on the subjects to be subservient to the commands of the ruler, and to remain bound to him for they depended upon him for their means of subsistence.[31]

It appears that at least in some regions the rulers began to realize a land tax[32] which appears to have been claimed by virtue of their increased rights of ownership over the soil, and was in addition to the protection tax amounting to one-sixth of the produce. This is clear from the account of Alberuni :

"With regard to that which he earns by the crops or from the cattle he is bound first to pay to the ruler of the country the tax which attaches to the soil or to the pasture-ground. Further, he pays him one-sixth of the income in recognition of the protection which he affords to the subjects, their property and their families. The same obligation rests on the common people...".[33]

30. *Ibid.*, p. 460.

31. *Nāradīya-Manu-saṁhitā*, ed. K. Sambasiva Sastri, 18.23. This verse has been quoted with approval in the *Rājadharma-kāṇḍa*.

32. It is well-known that according to the ancient theory, the king was entitled only to one-sixth of the produce of land, though the rate could differ according to the nature of the soil and other factors—in lieu of the protection which he afforded, and not to any separate land tax in addition to it. It is not clear how far land tax had partaken of the character of rent in this period. However, the commentary of Abhayatilakagaṇi on a verse of the *Dvaẏāśraya* (III, v. 18) of Hemacandra (12th century A. D.) reveals that the ruler realized *kara* from the peasants for using the royal land (*rājakīya-bhūmi*) for the purpose of agriculture, pasture etc.

33. *Alberuni's India*, tr. Sachau, Chap. LXVII, p. 149. The revenue terms like *talārābhāvya, baladhipābhāvya* etc. occurring in the inscriptions also suggest the same.

The school of the royal ownership of land which represented a dominate trend during this period mainly supported the interests of the ruling aristocracy and the class which derived benefit from their land grants, as against those of the peasantry. But in an age in which the rulers were viewed, and also functioned to a considerable extent as private persons[34], royal ownership of land could not have been coterminous with State ownership; it appears to have acquired the complexion of private individual ownership[35]. This becomes further clear from the private religious purpose of numerous landgrants made by the rulers.

Side by side with the increasing extent and the changing complexion of the king's right of ownership over land, the issue of the royal ownership of land became very much complicated in actual practice due to the increasing claims of the ruling *sāmanta* hierarchy and rural landed aristocracy in this respect. Some inscriptions[36] of the early medieval period reveal that the monarchs and overlords gave land-grants in the territories and estates of the *sāmantas*. Some verses in the *Upamiti - bhava-prapañca-kathā*[37] may suggest that the superiormost right over land was deemed to have been vested in the supreme overlord. The *Mitākṣarā* (on *Yaj.* I. 318) has also laid down that the *bhūpati* (king or ruler) and not *bhogapati* had the right to make the grant of lands or revenues. But the term *bhogapati* appears to

34. B. N. S. Yadava, *Some Aspects of Society in Northern India in the Twelfth Century A. D.* (D. Phil. thesis, Allahabad University), Chap. III.

35. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, pp. 152 153.

36. See, e. g., *E. I.*, IX, pp. 120 ff.; *E. I.*, XX, No. 11.

37. *Upamiti-bhava-prapañca-kathā*, p. 840.

mean here governor or the enjoyer of only the usufructory rights of an estate, and not *sāmanta* for it was the rulers themselves who constitued the *sāmanta*, hierarchy. A land-grant[38] (11th century A. D.) of a *sāmanta Rāṇaka* Amma of the Gaṅga family, reveals that he was a petty chief holding 84 villages and his overlord Yaśovarman was in turn the vassal of Bhoja Paramāra from whom he had received one-half of the town of Selluka and was enjoying 1500 villages. The *Rāṇaka* made the grant to a Jain monk without referring the matter to his suzerain. Another inscription[39] (c. 1157 A. D.) found in the Monghyr district of Bihar states that in the victorious reign of Madanapala and in the *rājya* of *Pṛthīpati Ācārya* Devasena the queen of a *mahāmaṇḍalika* (a petty vassal chief) granted a village along with its lands and waters to a Buddhist monastery. The village appears to have formed an integral part of the fief of the queen. No permission appears to have been taken from the superior authorities in the feudal hierarchy, i. e. Devasena and Madanapala in the ascending order. Instances like this may be found in inscriptions belonging to other regions also. In some other inscriptions, however, there is no mention of the superior authorities at all. Thus it appears that in actual practice the rights enjoyed over land by the overlords and the *sāmantas* of different grades depended upon their actual power and prestige. Under the rule of weak kings, the *sāmantas* increased their power and tried to become independent. The increased power of the *sāmantas* with their claims to greater rights over land must have meant a corresponding curtailment of the actual land rights of the overlords.

38. *E. I.*, XIX, No. 10.
39. *E. I.*, XXXVI—Pt. I—No. 5.

Thus two sets of Caulukya copper plates[40] (A. D. 1074) reveal that a powerful *sāmanta* made it impossible for his overlord's grant of a village lying in his territory to be issued, the reason being that the landgrant charter did not contain the sign of the former. When the service and military tenures of even smaller chiefs and warriors became hereditary,[41] they used to claim real proprietary right over the lands under their possession. A famous poem of Hemacandra indicates that a piece of land apparently granted on condition of military service was regarded as the ancestral property (*bappī kī bhum-haḍī*)[42], when it became hereditary. Such secular assignees, the petty *sāmanta* chiefs, some Brāhmaṇas enjoying land-grants and other landlords, who were immediately connected with land, constituted the land-holding rural aristocracy.

We also find at the same time the evidence of the private individual ownership of land in the law-books and in some inscriptions. The former[43] contain clear provision for the lease, gift, partition, sale and mortgage of villages, fields etc. These provisions mainly referred to the landed aristocracy. But the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*[44] records that a petty tanner was paid a compensation for a plot of land by a generous king. While this may be regarded as a rare case, it is obvious that the conditions may

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40. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXVI, p. 258.

41. However, the *Lekhapaddhati* (p. 24) reveals that the estates granted to chiefs for military service could be seized, if they failed to fulfil their obligations.

42. *Prākṛta-vyākaraṇa* (IV. 395) of Hemacandra.

43. *Vyavahārakāṇḍa*, pp. 152, 153, 430 ff. ; K. V. R. Aiyangar, *Int. to Vyavahārakāṇḍa* (Baroda, 1958), p. 68.

44. *Rāj.*, IV. 55. ff.

have differed from kingdom to kingdom. It is also to be borne in mind that royal ownership of land and private individual ownership thereof were not mutually exclusive in the context of land system of this age, and then again the former did not remain very much different from the latter.

The theory of private individual ownership of land also appears to have been utilized by one school for upholding the claim to the right of ownership over land by the landholding aristocracy as against that of the monarchs and rulers. The continuation of this trend may be noticed in the commentary[45] of Abhayatilakagaṇi on The *Dvayāśraya*, and further in the *Vyavahāramayūkha* of Nīlakaṇṭha (1615-1645 A. D.) and the commentary on the *Dāyabhāga* by Śrīkṛṣṇa Tarkālaṅkāra, who 'regard the *bhaumikas* (landlords) as the real owners of the soil held by them'[46] and the king as having the mere right to collect revenues from them in lieu of the protection he afforded to them in the peaceful enjoyment of their property[47].

The law-digests and commentaries reveal that there were peasant proprietors in villages[48]. The *Samarāṅgaṇa-sūtradhāra* (p. 29) of Bhoja (11th century) suggests the existence of well-to-do peasant proprietors in some regions of the kingdom. However, the *Mahāpurāṇa* (XVII. 164) of Jinasenācarya defines a village in a way which reveals that usually the majority of village population was composed of Śūdra *karṣakas* who were share-

45. On *Dvayāśraya*, III, v. 2 ; see also *Bṛhat-Parāśara*, V. 149-50.

46. & 47. P. N. Sen, op. cit., p. 51. However, the view that the king was not entitled to the ownership of soil was already upheld by the Mimāṁsā school.

48. See, e. g., Aparārka on *Yāj*, p. 579.

croppers, temporary tenants, field labourers etc. It appears that during the early medieval period the bigger peasant proprietors were making their way into the ranks of the ruling aristocracy and the smaller ones were being reduced to poverty by oppression and overtaxation, and also due to the curtailment or extinguishment of their land rights. The former trend is more clearly reflected in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*[49] of Kalhaṇa which informs us that, after having derived much income from their landed property, the prosperous and ambitious cultivators used to become Ḍāmaras or feudal barons in Kashmir, who lived in forts, gathered retainers and often violated the authority of the king. This phenomenon may have occurred in varying degrees in other regions of Northern India also. But it is quite clear from the policy of a king[50] of Kashmir in the eighth century that the rulers tried their best to check this tendency and the phenomenal expansion of the ruling aristocracy may have meant its corresponding enfeeblement during the later phase of the early medieval period.

As regards the latter trend, there are many pieces of evidence suggesting that it had become more common. A verse in the *Subhāṣita-ratna koṣa* (35.28) indicates how on account of the *bhogapati's* oppression the peasant proprietors in villages used to be reduced to such straitened circumstances as to find themselves on the verge of being uprooted. The chances for such a state of affairs were obviously greater in the small estates of *sāmanta* chiefs and landlords who held the land more directly and with greater personal connection than the kings in their wider territories.

49. Rāj., IV. 346 ff. VII. 494 ff.

50. *Ibid.*, IV. 347 f.

Then again, the *Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa* (38.86), the *Ukti-vyakti-prakaraṇa*[51], the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* etc., reveal a state of insecurity and violence which could not but have affected the land rights of the peasants. The commentary of Haradatta (12th century A. D.) on Gautama envisages a situation in which fear might prevent the weak persons from asserting the right of ownership over their property against the powerful individuals[52]. Though it is laid down that under such conditions the owners did not lose their proprietary right, yet it is stated in the commentary of the next *sūtra* that no long enjoyment was necessary to acquire the right of ownership over land[53] (fields and gardens), as also over cattle and female slaves. Whatever the legal position in this respect, the commentary reflects the conditions under which peasant proprietors may have sometimes lost their land holdings or their real right of ownership over arable land to powerful individuals[54]. The continuation of a

51. *Ukti-vyakti-prakaraṇa* of Dāmodara (12th century A. D.)p. 40 l. 21; Ind., 84.

52. *Gautama Dharma Sūtra*, Ed. U. Pandeya (Kashi Sanskrit *Series*, No. 172, com on II. 3.35, p. 126.

53. *Ibid.*, Com. on II. 3.36. It may be noted that there was also the tendency of increasing the period of adverse possession, after which a stranger in possession of the land or other immovable property of any other individual could acquire the right or ownership over it ; cf. K. V. R. Aiyangar, *Int. to Vyavahārakāṇḍa*, pp. 28-29. It appears that, under the conditions noticed above, this could have been advantageous mainly to the land holding aristocracy.

54. One may be reminded, in this context, of the *deśī* terms *grāmaroḍa* and *koṇḍio*, occurring in the *Deśīnāmamālā* (II. 48, 90) of Hemacandra, which were prevalent in this age for such persons who acquired rights over villages and enjoyed them by manipulation.

variant of this tendency may be found in some regions of Rājasthān afterwards, where the weaker peasant proprietors surrendered their lands to chiefs and rulers for protection and then laboured on the same as common tenants[55]. Without taking into consideration these trends and tendencies, we cannot fully understand the growing poverty of the common mass of peasantry, which, however, has also got to be viewed in the background of the overtaxation, and the laws of debt and mortgage[56]. During the early medieval period there was a considerable growth of dependent peasantry, and there is also some evidence of restriction on the mobility of peasants in some regions in the estates of chiefs and landlords[57]. The emergence of the *sāmanta* hierarchy and a sizable class of landed aristocracy was bound to affect adversely the land rights of the common peasantry.

Of the communal rights in land the prevalence of which in early times is attested to by the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* (VI. 7.3) of Jaimini and the commentary of Śabara on it, there can be found some faint traces and vestiges during

55. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities* of *Rājasthān*, Ed. W. Crooke, Vol. I, p. 206.

56. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.VIII, No, I, pp. 70f.

57. The *Lekhapaddhati* (p. 19, ll. 21-22) which reflects the conditions of Gujrat, Rājasthān and the adjoining regions during the early medieval period, reveals that one of the methods adopted by the chiefs to prevent the migration of peasants was to threaten a fugitive with confiscation. A number of inscriptions which mention the grants of lands or villages along with the inhabitants thereof—peasants, artisans etc. —also suggest the same restriction on their mobility ; e. g. *E. I*, XXXV, Pt. III, No. 17 (A. D. 1020-Bihar), No. 178. (V. S. 1083-Bihar) ; some Candella grants (*E. I.*, XX, p. 131 ; *E. I.*, XXXII, pp. 121-23).

this period. Thus there is some evidence of collective rights over pasture grounds, but a number of land-grants reveal that they were undermined[58] by the rulers who began to transfer the right over them along with the grants of villages. The evidence of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (VIII. 2226) also reveals the same trend. It informs us about the resumption of a pasturage of cows, given in charity, which led to the suicide of a cowherd who was highly aggrieved at this state of affairs. The increased claims of kings and the ruling landed aristocracy to rights over land and the widespread practice of enfeoffment and subinfeudation were bound to obliterate to a considerable extent the traces of communal or collective ownership of land.

58. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, p. 140.

this period. Thus there is some evidence of collective rights [illegible] grounds. But a number of [illegible] [illegible] were undermined [illegible] by the [illegible] who began [illegible] the right over [illegible] along with the grant [illegible]. The evidence of the [illegible] VIII. 228 [illegible] reveals the same trend. It informs us about the [illegible] of a pasturage [illegible] given in charity, which led to the suicide of a [illegible] who was highly [illegible] this state of affairs. The increased claims of [illegible] and the ruling landed [illegible] to rights over land and the widespread practice of subinfeudation and [illegible] were bound to [illegible] considerably upon the traces of communal or collective ownership of land.

58. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, p. [illegible]

SOME MUNDA ETYMOLOGICAL NOTES ON NAMES IN THE RĀMĀYAṆA

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Summary. It is suggested—not for the first time—that the name 'Sītā' may have a Munda source, and further evidence for this is given. It is also suggested that certain animal, bird and ethnic names mentioned in the Citrakūṭa scenes of the *Vālmīki Rāmāyana*—including the name 'Citrakūṭa' itself—are perhaps Munda in origin. These two suggestions have separate but relatable implications. The latter suggestion-and its support in the etyma for 'Khara', 'tiṭṭibha' etc., will I think surprise nobody. The former again is not new, and some of those against it will not be persuaded by newer and better data. One further implication of the acceptance of a Munda etymon for 'Sītā'—not provable, but not implausible, and getting some small support here—is that Videha and Janaka—what we can retrieve of them—may have been culturally at least partly Munda themselves. This does have implications for the history of ancient India, and particularly for the shaping and putting together in later times of the *Rāmāyaṇa* as we now know it, since if such was the case these facts were unknown or inadmissible at those times. This implication is independently verifiable to a degree, and obviously needs suppporting evidence. There is nothing in our knowledge of the North Munda groups and their institutions (including language), that makes such as-

sumption implausible a priori, and a little that seems to favor it.

The history (and prehistory) of the speakers of the various Munda languages and of those groups for which we have evidence of previous Munda affiliation - what there is of it - is not well known. For a few of the North Munda groups—the Santals and the Mundari (or Munda) —traditional histories are known and recorded, but even in these cases not much effort at corroboration or connection has been made. S. C. Roy in his 'The Munda and Their Country' brought together and organised into a continuous narrative a mass of interesting information, from tribal traditions, Sanskrit literature, archeology, linguistics, etc., but this information is of all sorts and of varying degrees of reliability. Roy's work showed a great deal of interest, ability and energy, but since he wrote the book - more than fifty years ago - not much more has been done either following up work or suggestions of his, or taking up independently questions concerning the histories of these peoples.

In this contribution to a volume honoring Pandit Kshetreshachandra Chattopadhyaya I offer some linguistic evidence on some names of persons (including Sītā) and animals mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and suggest that Munda etymologies—and no better ones—for these are available. I draw a few implications from the hypothesis that 'Sītā' and perhaps 'Videha' are Munda names.

The paper is organised as follows : first, the linguistic data and justification for an etymology of 'Sītā, is given (note that Roy—and presumably others—assume that the borrowing was the other way around, from Sanskrit to Munda; most Sankritists now seem quite certain that

si in Sanskrit is a loan, and that it is not from Dravidian). Then, some other etymologies of *Rāmāyaṇa* names, personal and animal, those of *Khara, ṭiṭṭibha, sṛmara and gokarṇa* are offered. Finally, a comment on place-names of Munda origin, an aside on 'Videha', and some conclusions on the implications of these etyma taken together, in particular some speculations on what follows if Sītā and Videha could be shown to be (at Janaka's time) culturally Munda.

I should at this point toss in a caveat to ward off uncritical acceptance or exaggerated rejection. False hypothesis - particularly those relating to 'peripheral Indological matters', e. g. 'tribals' - die hard in India. For instance, the term 'Austric' - which Grierson and Konow took fresh from Schmidt at the beginning of the publication of the *Linguistic Survey of India* (before 1906) - is still used in India as if there were an 'Austric' family of languages in the same way that there is a Dravidian family of languages. The hypothesis that underwrote the term 'Austric' is : that the Austroasiatic languages (which do form a Linguistic family, which family includes the Munda subfamily) and the Austro-asian language family (also a demonstrable genetic stock) are themselves genetically related, the composite super-stock being called Austric. Since the relationship has never been proved—and there have been more than a few attempts—one must assume that though there are typo-logical similarities, there is no relationship, or an extre-mely distant one. Until such a relationship can be de-monstrated, it is confusing - at the least - to use a term, Austric, which presupposes it.

I suggest that *si* is from North Munda, and not from South Munda (which also has cognate and

phonetically similar forms), not on linguistic but on cultural (geographic, consistency with the rest of the data, etc.) grounds.

First, some relevant linguistic background on Proto-Munda **si-* 'to plough' and **s-Vn-i*, 'plough.[1] There is a fair amount of morphological elaboration, retained more fully in South Munda than in North Munda, which supports - if support is still needed - the claim that **si* goes back to Proto-Munda. I should make explicit some tentative assumptions I am operating with : that the split between North and South Munda is old, say three thousand years old (although the divisions within North Munda are not very old), and that certain characteristics of North and South reconstructed from the modern languages can be reconstructed to and offered as characteristic of North and South Munda two thousand years ago or more. Obviously, this can be done only very tentatively, and I am aware of the amount and kind of evidence I am using, and its validity.[2]

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1. The words now in use for 'plough' in North Munda are not related to *si* : Korku *nāgar* (a loan from Dravidian), and Kherwarian **nahḁl*.

2. One further assumption and its corollary : anything reconstructable for Proto-Munda predates Aryan arrivals and contacts. Also, anything elsewhere in Austroasiatic (e. g. in Khmer) which has a Proto-Munda cognate must go back to old Austroasiatic, and can not be a Sanskrit borrowing. Words in Khmer (Cambodian) that are cognate with PM **bvlɘX* 'ripe. ripen, fruit', **jeX (V) n* 'foot, leg' have been called borrowings from Sanskrit *(phala, jaṃgha)*. They are not, although there may also be borrowings from these Sanskrit words in Khmer. If the similarities between the Munda and the Sanskrit items are not fortuitous, the borrowing must have been to and not from Sanskrit - which is not (for these cases) implausible.

A common process in Munda (and in some of the other Austroasiatic languages) derives the names of 'instruments' from verbs whose actions they serve. The word for 'plough' is derived from the stem *si* - using the nominalising infix - *(V) n* (thus Gata ? *s-n-i*, Gutob *s-un-ei*, *s-un-oi*, etc). The same infix with certain verbs is also used to derive 'endproduct' nominalisations, thus Gutob *b-un-a*j 'drawing, decoration' - from *baj* 'to draw, decorate', Korku *-on-ol* 'edgem border' from Korku *ol* - 'to mark, write', etc. (the productive use of this sort of infixation is dead in Korku, though alive in Mundari, and a number of the South Munda languages) and conceivably the word for 'furrow' could once - or more than once - have been formed by this process, and this would have been homonymous with 'plough' (*s-n-i*, etc). One can, however, reconstruct for Proto - Munda on the available evidence only the verb **si-* 'to plough', and its derivative **s-V-n-i* (or the like) 'plough', but no other drivatives of it, Gata ? derives - quite regularly - *s-n-si* ;place for ploughing' (from an old Munda - and probably old Austroasiatic - infixation of -*((V)n-* into a reduplicated verbstem). The word for 'furrow' in Gata ? is *g-n-ur-si*, a nominalisation of the verb *gur-* 'to dig in, penetrate', used with the qualifying combining form of the verb *si-* (or of a noun derived from it). The derivation of 'Sītā' then from a Munda noun (presumably one derived from a verb) meaning 'furrow' is unlikely. The derivation is from - and to - a verb meaning 'to cultivate with a plough', 'to plough'. As to strictly linguistic evidence of a North Munda source over a South Munda source, or a more specific source within North Munda, at the present stage of reconstruction of vocalism, and of the study of Sanskrit reflexes of Munda-borrowed vowels,

we do dot know enough to make such distinctions, if they are there to be made.

The source form in North Munda would have been either a verbstem (*si-*) or an infinitive. The infinitive if derived from a CV (C)- stem presumably would have been reduplicated, but if of CVV shape (like modern Korku *siu*), the infinitive would not have been reduplicated, and would have been homonymous with the verbstem. Whether the source was a reduplicated verb (where Sanskrit would have had no trouble in de-reduplicating it) or a verbstem in a finite verb form (where it would have been followed by mode, and object suffixes) the obvious stem (to any more or less bilingual user of Sanskrit) to borrow would have been *si*, or the like.

As for - *ta*, we take it as a Sanskrit morpheme—the feminine past participle found in a number or verb-derived women's names in Sanskrit ; otherwise, a possible source of *ta* could be the third person kinterm possessive morpheme indicating 'inalienable possession', (Munda had a set of affixes for kinterms and bodyparts which includes *-te* ?, perhaps an allomorph of *ta*). The *ta* - whether or not it can be identified with *-te* ?—however, presents problems. It occurs with a restricted set of nouns: kinterms and bodyparts. As to other North Munda words, perhaps derived using this or another *ta*, a preliminary survey turns up only Santali *seta*, etc, 'dog' where the *se* (*C*) is known to be separate morpheme from other evidence (SM **soXd* (*?*) 'dog'), and *hel-ta*, *kel-ta* 'bamboo', where the cognate forms elsewhere (e. g. Gorum *ta-bon*) suggest that the *-ta-* is a morpheme meaning 'bamboo' - or perhaps 'plant (of a particular kind)'. In R. D. Munda's reconstruction of proto-Kherwarian there are

the forms *hi* (-) *ta* 'seed' and *ki* (-) *ta* 'tree (sp)', which do not help much though the *-ta* could be connected with the one in *hel-ta*. In Korku it occurs in kinterm duals - as *-ta-kiñ*. It is also found in certain Korku demonstratives, e. g. *cuttha* 'which one' from *mi-n-ta-ej* 'one', like Hindi *-wālā* in present usages, (Korku *pulum-mithaj* 'white-one'). I find no example of verbstem *-ta* (or drived verbal noun-*ta*), and the occurrence of a verb-stem (e. g. *si-*) plus *ta* or a nominalised verbstem *s-Vn-i* fol-lowed by *ta* is unlikely. That the *-ta* in *hel-ta, ki* (-) *ta* and *hi* (-) *ta* has something to do with plants is noteworthy, but the same form class (i. e. non-verbal) derivational restrictions would hold against '*Sītā*' as including this same *-ta*, if, that is, the *si-* is the verb 'to plough'. One might of course guess that '*si-ta*' was an old plant name folk-etymologised in old North Munda but apart from the new borrowing problems this presents, as yet there is no evidence for this.

The liklier alternative would be to assume no connection with any North Munda *ta*, but to assume the verbstem *si* to be borrowed from a North Munda verbstem *si*, its Sanskrit derivative in *-ta* giving 'Sītā'. It might be nice to have a source for all of Sītā, in Mundā, but none is visible to me. (There is no phone-mic length in Munda. The *a* in *ta* (any *ta*) would be borrowed as *tā* in Sanskrit.)

S. C. Roy suggests in his 'The Mundas and Their Country' that the name 'Citrakūṭa' in the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* (Ayodhyā kāṇḍa, passim, etc.) may have as its original first element, not the Sanskrit *citra*, picture, but the Mundari *citri* 'partridge' (the Korku *cithere* would be even closer) or something related to it. The

suggestion seems worth pursuing - but one would like supporting evidence in the form of firmer etymological connections for *cithere* with the Indo-Aryan forms (e. g. Hindi *ṭītar*), - the complexities of who got what from where when could be considerable - and independent evidence from the *Rāmāyaṇa* that in fact there were partridges in the Citrakūṭa region.[3] A reading of the Citrakūṭa sections of the *Rāmāyaṇa*—and of those subsequent sections that don't take us back to Ayodhya—suggests that further Sanskrit vocabulary with Munda etyma can be turned up. I offer one more fairly plausible item, and three possible ones, but the surface of *Rāmāyaṇa* etymology has barely been scratched. The plausible item is *ṭiṭṭibha*, 'a species of bird' (Ayodhya, Kāṇḍa, sarga 54). Korku and North Munda *ti* (*t*) *thid* (the '*d*' being preglottalised). A morpheme cognate with *-tid* 'bird' -probably a general term for small (song?) bird - is found in the five (South Munda) Koraput languages as well, but not in the reduplicative derivative characteristic of North Munda, so that the form would be a borrowing from North Munda. The dissimilating *-bh-* for '*d* needs comment; the aspiration for preglottalisation is not surprising (but obviously additional support for such a development is needed). The *bh* for *d* (the question of whether the preglottalised '*d* in this possition was retroflex or not is open) is somewhat unexpected, although the unreleased preglottalised final '*d*' would be hard for a Sanskrit speaker- and listener - to perceive as such, and *b* (*h*) as a transcription of what heard would not be surprising.

The other items—all of them suggested as possibilities, with no great self-evidence to them, are (1) the

3. Also, all the other names with *citra* ought to be examined.

name Khara (Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa, e. g. sarga 103. Āraṇya Kāṇḍa, e. g. sarga 28) the leader of the local rākṣasa army (from *koXro*) 'man, person, member of the Koro community'; *koro*, can refer to almost any North Munda group (*korku* - in Korku - is the plural of *koro*, the word for 'man, person, Korku'). The 'Kherwarian' - (or 'kharwarian') note the word - groups (Santali, Mundari, Ho, etc.) call themselves *hoṛo* (or similar-cognate-names), a cognate word, but with *h* for earlier *k*, and regular *r* for Korkur we have no way of dating the *k h* change, but it could well have postdated the period referred to in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Khara, not surprisingly, is called Rāvaṇa's younger brother, and Rāvaṇa is still revered by many of the central Indian tribal groups, including the Korkus. (2), (3) there are two species of 'deer *sṛmara* and *gokarṇa* (Ayodhya kāṇḍa, sarga, 103). The former could be cognate with the deer (species) name reconstructable (in South Munda) as *sVram*. The second, less likely, perhaps to the 'antelope' called *ghotari* in Korku and *ghotre't* in Santali. (This could be a loanword in North Munda, but not from Sanskrit.)[4]

As to 'citra-kūṭa' and placename formation in Sanskrit and later Indo-Aryan, we note in modern times such names as *Alang-paḍa* (in Koraput District, Orissa),

4. There was no contrast between *t* and *ṭ*, and *d* and *ḍ* in the older Munda languages. What we reconstruct for South Munda is a (phonetically) retroflex *ḍ* and a dental *t*, but the allophones of these have not been established. The phonetics of North Munda *t* and *d* have not been satisfactorily worked out (but see R. D. Munda on Kherwarian, and Zide and Munda on Proto-North Munda). ṭiṭṭibha is informative in this connection, but one would like a larger corpus of Sanskrit Munda-derived forms before drawing any conclusions.

the first morpheme of which is clearly from a Munda language, Gutob (Gadba). The Gutob name for this village, a Gutob village,is *alun-ūgom* meaning 'interior-village'. The official (Oriya) name replaces *ūgom* 'village, by the non-Munda *paḍa* 'village', and takes over—with some modification—the Gutob word as the first piece. The application of similar processes could have resulted in '*citra-kūṭa*.

Very little has been done on Munda toponyms and much of what has been is fantasy. There is some useful (with several grains of salt) material in Roy's book. The two commonest and most widespread placename suffixes—both of them meaning 'village'—seem to be *-ḍih* (as spelled in Hindi, Kherwarian **ḍi*) and *-sini* - from *-sin-* (from Sora). The (former suffix suggests itself as possibly relavant to an etymology of 'Videha" although of course IA *deśa* > *deha* 'village (?)' has to be contended with. The Kherwarian form is perhaps related to South Munda *ḍin* (*oXn*) 'house' - and related words in Austroasiatic - or is conceivably an old loan from Indo-Aryan.[5]

Another word of more interest to a study of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and its placenames is North Munda (without, apparently, any cognates in the South) *lanka* 'far

5. There is some additional support for *ḍi* as the old North Munda term and also some additional support for it as a source of 'Videha'. First, it turns out to have a cognate in a South Munda language, Gorum, (distantly related, and geographically far away), *-ḍi* ? the echo word for *da* (-) *o* ?, 'village'. Second. the usual Kherwarian (but presumably not North Munda, since no cognate has been found in Korku) word for village, *(*h*) *atɔ* (Mundari (*h*) *atu*, Santalis *atɔ*) seemes to be an old loan from IA *-yastu vat (t) hu* ; the aspiration is neatly reflected in the **ɔ* reconstructed. Lastly, although more evidence is needed, *deha* is not common in placename formations.

away'. As R. D. Munda has pointed out this suggests an etymology for 'Laṇka,' Rāvaṇa's home base which was eventually identified with Ceylon (although 'Laṇka, is not an old name for Ceylon). North Munda *lanka* suggests how 'Laṇka' may have got its name and further connects 'Laṇka' with the North Munda peoples, although it does not necessarily connect them with Rāvaṇa.

What relation - supporting ? contradictory ? might there is between the existence of Munda etymologies for 'Citrakūṭa' and some of its animals and people - and the possibility of a Munda etymon for 'Sita', and conceivably, for 'Videha' ? In the *Rāmāyaṇa* of cource Sita is a gently nurtured Videhan princess who has to be shown how to wear the rude barkcloth, clothes of the primitive forest people. If she was originally from a less 'sophisticated' background, she would not have been a stranger to such clothing. More interestingly, the possibility of a 'tribal' background for Sītā suggests other answers to the old questions of Rāma's reasons for rejecting her on her return (e. g. that, as one of putatively 'tribal' background, suspiciously free behavior could reasonably be imputed to her, particularly in a period of Aryanising pruning and purification ; I am assuming that the marriage customs and attitudes of the Mundas, North and South, go back a long way, and can be plausibly reconstructed for this period - the period of the establishment of the text, and perhaps for the earlier period as well). Also, perhaps more - or at least differently - explainable from such a point of view is the nature of Sītā's 'autochthonous response' to her rejection, Rāvaṇa's interest in—and perhaps connection with—Sītā in the first place, etc.

What is useful about the hypothesis that Sītā came

from a (partly) Munda background is that it is testable : a close reading of the *Rāmāyaṇa* with an intelligent eye to supporting and contradictory evidence for such a hypothesis would be very much worth making. (I am aware that the study of *Rāmāyaṇa* origins and antecedents is not exactly new, and that these implicit suggestions as to urforms, basic motifs and their contexts are not incompatible with some of the approaches and conclusions that have been made. I have read only a little of the available literature and now have no access to the rest. I should acknowledge here the benefit gained from a reading of Bulcke's *Rām Kathā'*, T. B. Naik's paper on tribal Rāmāyaṇas, and, most of all, from conversations with Romila Thapar.) I don't think that e. g.' Bodding's volumes of Santal folktales, and the published Mundari folk literatur - the best collections for Mundari are in press, and have been for some time - have been properly explored in this connection. All of this must of course be connected with whatever else we can retrieve of Munda life and contacts at the period : with North Munda kinship and social organisation (which is reconstructable), the early importance of sacred trees and groves in this part of India which is strikingly like what we know of certain institutions of present day Mundas, North (particularly) and South, etc.

I have not tried to provide any further precision in arriving at the location of Citrakūṭa, in the Vindhyas, or eleswhere. First, this does not much matter since the usual approximate locations suggested are all quite consistent with the general identification of the place and its people as North Munda. Second, to add to previous discussion, I would need access to the earlier materials,

which I do not have. The identification of the place and some of its inhabitants as Munda, does not mean that there we:e only North Munda-speaking people in the area and not, say, Dravidian and other tribes as well. There are many places (in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa) where there are Munda and Dravidian groups now living in proximity to each other, and in some cases in close association as well. This could have been the case at much earlier times. I should note somewhere in this paper that to date there has not been any tiein of present day Munda cultures with archeological remains in the Munda areas, or anywhere else.

As to the existence of early 'chiefdoms', 'dynasties', etc. of Munda stock' there is no reason to find this dubious a priori. The actual identification of specific ethnic names in Sanskrit texts with Munda, speaking groups known more recently is not something that has been done with any justifiable assurance. Burrow - whose guidance have taken in this messy area - in a paper called 'Sanskrit And The Pre-Aryan Tribes And Languages', says only 'No doubt in any of the later dynasties in the later history of Orissa were of the same (tribal)-Dravidian or Munda) nationality, though Brahmanised in religion using Sanskrit as their official language. We may instance the Bhauma Karas, the first part of whose name correspnds in sense and derivation to such modern terms for these aboriginals as Bhumij and Bhuiya, whereas the second term be a Sanskritisation of the Kolarian word for 'man'." Other identifications of Munda groups with tribal names in Sanskrit texts e. g. those of Shafer seem quite unsupported. This acculturation and 'de-Mundaisation' has continued to the present day. Most of the Bhumij, for instance, have

divested themselves of their Kherwarian language - they now speak Bengali - and clan names and other Munda features that were identified by them as such have been junked or reetymologised as Indo-Aryan ; but that there have been in the past and up to the present rajas and jagirdars who belonged to various North Munda groups, and maintained their language and - more or less -traditional culture is known (see e.g. Roy's book).

I agree with Burrow's general approach to finding Munda loans in Sanskrit although I disagree with the provenance of certain Sanskrit words he claims to be from Munda (in his 'The Sanskrit Language' and elsewhere). Certainly, it is to be expected that the names of fauna and flora of eastern and central India would be borrowed from the older inhabitants of the area. To my knowledge, nobody has ever made a checklist of Sanskrit (and Indo-Aryan not derived from Sanskrit) and Dravidian plant and animal names that have no good etymologies and systematically combed the lexicons of the various North and South Munda languages for etyma. Ideally, ethnobotanical studies should be made in these areas, and the plants identified and their uses properly described.

The line of research recently begun by A. R. K. Zide in exploring what lexical items can be reconstructed for proto-Munda (or branches of it) and what conclusions about aboriginal culture can be drawn from proto-Munda vocabulary (e.g. with regard to metalworking, food preparation and spices, etc.) is also important, and has already turned up some interesting results.

In the case of 'administrative' vocabulary, it has been observed - on the basis of partial and casually collected materials - that words for 'headman' (*pāṭel*, *muṇḍa*,

manjhi, *naiko*) as well as those for 'king' (*raja* mostly) - which is less important -in North and South Munda are borrowed ones. This, of course, is no guarantee that the institutions have been borrowed (though they may have been to greater or lesser degree), any more than the fact that proper (personal) names in many of the Munda groups are all borrowed (from Indo-Aryan, largly) indicates that the Munda groups concerned had none unlil the Ino-Aryans came along and lent them some.

So far the number of sound Munda etyma for Sanskrit words is very small, although the etymologies proposed - which it would be convenient if some one put together in one place - are fairly numerous. The general impression of what sorts of things were taken from the Mundas (e. g. the banana-pepper-ginger group) is misleading, since in the light of newer data, 'pepper, 'turnsout to be borrowed into Munda, and the only evidence for 'banana' or 'ginger is in Sora, although for the former there are old non-cognate words in other South Munda languages. Another possibility - perhaps one that Burrow would not reject - is that such items ('banana' and perhaps 'ginger') were borrowed into Sanskrit - and Sora ? - (in Indīa) from other - non-Munda - Austroasiatic languages, languages that, presumably no longer exist. Further work on Austroasiatic ought to provide evidence for such a view, if the view is correct. Any cultural generalisations from Munda loanwords in Sanskrit ought, ideally, to be based on a larger corpus of solid items than as yet exists, so that details of what and - linguistically - how can be speculated about a little less airily. All the proposed etyma - including of course the ones offered in this paper - could use more

support. If certain ones permit cultural inferences to be drawn from them and these are independently verifiable, so much the better, but it is to be hoped that before long there will be a sufficient stock of established Sanskrit-loanwords-and-their-Munda-sources to permit the application of stricter linguistic criteria in evaluating them.[6]

This paper has offred Munda etymologies for a few lexical items from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, two of these being for 'Sītā, (this along with a discussion of the possible bases for such an attribution, which is not new one) and 'Videha'. None of the etymologies offered is irresistible, but all of them (or the discussions incurred in presenting them) purport to add something to the etymological knowledge of these words. If the etymologies for 'Sītā' and 'Videha, were both unimpugnable then the suggestion offered above -that Videha at the time of Janaka must have been culturally at least partly North Munda- would have to be taken very seriously. This hypothesis, as I have suggested, is confirmable - more and less supportable -on the evidence of various sorts of analysis of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, analysis which to some degree exist, and which would be worth extending for other reasons. Mrs. Karve's remarks in *Yugānta*' on Sītā - in comparing Draupadī with her (for instance, commenting on her parents comparative lack of concern for her, noting that her mother is not named and otherwise little noticed) are interesting in this respect as are her notes on "some

6. Bibliographical Note. The linguistic data in this paper on Gorum come from A. R. K. Zide, on Kherwarian and Proto-Kherwarian from R. D. Munda, and on Korku Gutob, Gata ? and Comparative Munda from me. I have profited from conversations on matters taken up in this paper with Arlene Zide and Romila Thapar, and from correspondence with R. D. Munda.

social groups mentioned in the *Mahabharata*". A similar anthropological-literary analysis of the *Rāmṇyaāa* along with a sophisticated folkloric analysis of structure and and content would probably provide the material for a fairly definite answer to the questions of Videha and its cultural background at the time of Janaka.

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